The Authoritarian Security Apparatus: Officer Careers and the Trade-offs in Command

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport › Bidrag til bog/antologi › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Standard

The Authoritarian Security Apparatus: Officer Careers and the Trade-offs in Command. / Gläßel, Christian; González, Belén; Scharpf, Adam.

Research Handbook on Authoritarianism. red. / Natasha Lindstaedt ; Jeroen J.J. den Bosch. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024. s. 111–126.

Publikation: Bidrag til bog/antologi/rapport › Bidrag til bog/antologi › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Gläßel, C, González, B & Scharpf, A 2024, The Authoritarian Security Apparatus: Officer Careers and the Trade-offs in Command. i N Lindstaedt & JJJ den Bosch (red), Research Handbook on Authoritarianism. Edward Elgar Publishing, s. 111–126. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781802204827

APA

Gläßel, C., González, B., & Scharpf, A. (2024). The Authoritarian Security Apparatus: Officer Careers and the Trade-offs in Command. I N. Lindstaedt , & J. J. J. den Bosch (red.), Research Handbook on Authoritarianism (s. 111–126). Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781802204827

Vancouver

Gläßel C, González B, Scharpf A. The Authoritarian Security Apparatus: Officer Careers and the Trade-offs in Command. I Lindstaedt N, den Bosch JJJ, red., Research Handbook on Authoritarianism. Edward Elgar Publishing. 2024. s. 111–126 https://doi.org/10.4337/9781802204827

Author

Gläßel, Christian ; González, Belén ; Scharpf, Adam. / The Authoritarian Security Apparatus: Officer Careers and the Trade-offs in Command. Research Handbook on Authoritarianism. red. / Natasha Lindstaedt ; Jeroen J.J. den Bosch. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2024. s. 111–126

Bibtex

@inbook{4bce3697d7cf4d81a0f49d9b52a0bf9d,
title = "The Authoritarian Security Apparatus: Officer Careers and the Trade-offs in Command",
abstract = "This chapter discusses the fundamental trade-off between competence and loyalty in the authoritarian security apparatus. Research suggests that the survival of autocracies and dictatorships hinges on loyal security officers. However, the management of regime security also requires skills and competence, which officers may use to oust the very regime they pledged to protect. The chapter highlights the importance of command experience as a key ingredient to successful officer careers. It then explains how autocrats use command posts to generate loyalty among competent officers. Employing original data on an entire officer corps, it illustrates the dual logic of officer selection and placement at work in Argentina{\textquoteright}s last dictatorship. The regime assigned skilled officers to field positions and co-opted those with uncertain loyalties by placing them close to their home regions. The chapter concludes by highlighting avenues for future research.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Military, Deployment, Repression, Coup, Co-optation, Argentina",
author = "Christian Gl{\"a}{\ss}el and Bel{\'e}n Gonz{\'a}lez and Adam Scharpf",
year = "2024",
month = mar,
day = "14",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.4337/9781802204827",
language = "English",
pages = "111–126",
editor = "{Lindstaedt }, Natasha and {den Bosch}, {Jeroen J.J.}",
booktitle = "Research Handbook on Authoritarianism",
publisher = "Edward Elgar Publishing",
address = "United Kingdom",

}

RIS

TY - CHAP

T1 - The Authoritarian Security Apparatus: Officer Careers and the Trade-offs in Command

AU - Gläßel, Christian

AU - González, Belén

AU - Scharpf, Adam

PY - 2024/3/14

Y1 - 2024/3/14

N2 - This chapter discusses the fundamental trade-off between competence and loyalty in the authoritarian security apparatus. Research suggests that the survival of autocracies and dictatorships hinges on loyal security officers. However, the management of regime security also requires skills and competence, which officers may use to oust the very regime they pledged to protect. The chapter highlights the importance of command experience as a key ingredient to successful officer careers. It then explains how autocrats use command posts to generate loyalty among competent officers. Employing original data on an entire officer corps, it illustrates the dual logic of officer selection and placement at work in Argentina’s last dictatorship. The regime assigned skilled officers to field positions and co-opted those with uncertain loyalties by placing them close to their home regions. The chapter concludes by highlighting avenues for future research.

AB - This chapter discusses the fundamental trade-off between competence and loyalty in the authoritarian security apparatus. Research suggests that the survival of autocracies and dictatorships hinges on loyal security officers. However, the management of regime security also requires skills and competence, which officers may use to oust the very regime they pledged to protect. The chapter highlights the importance of command experience as a key ingredient to successful officer careers. It then explains how autocrats use command posts to generate loyalty among competent officers. Employing original data on an entire officer corps, it illustrates the dual logic of officer selection and placement at work in Argentina’s last dictatorship. The regime assigned skilled officers to field positions and co-opted those with uncertain loyalties by placing them close to their home regions. The chapter concludes by highlighting avenues for future research.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Military

KW - Deployment

KW - Repression

KW - Coup

KW - Co-optation

KW - Argentina

UR - http://t.co/lMVQaCTsmT

U2 - https://doi.org/10.4337/9781802204827

DO - https://doi.org/10.4337/9781802204827

M3 - Book chapter

SP - 111

EP - 126

BT - Research Handbook on Authoritarianism

A2 - Lindstaedt , Natasha

A2 - den Bosch, Jeroen J.J.

PB - Edward Elgar Publishing

ER -

ID: 388371221