Leave inference alone: direct inferential social cognition

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Standard

Leave inference alone: direct inferential social cognition. / Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico.

I: Theory & Psychology, Bind 30, Nr. 2, 2020, s. 186-201.

Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt

Harvard

Lo Presti, PUE 2020, 'Leave inference alone: direct inferential social cognition', Theory & Psychology, bind 30, nr. 2, s. 186-201. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354320908337

APA

Lo Presti, P. U. E. (2020). Leave inference alone: direct inferential social cognition. Theory & Psychology, 30(2), 186-201. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354320908337

Vancouver

Lo Presti PUE. Leave inference alone: direct inferential social cognition. Theory & Psychology. 2020;30(2):186-201. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354320908337

Author

Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico. / Leave inference alone: direct inferential social cognition. I: Theory & Psychology. 2020 ; Bind 30, Nr. 2. s. 186-201.

Bibtex

@article{631930666da54332b0539edbe27a49b0,
title = "Leave inference alone: direct inferential social cognition",
abstract = "Direct perception and theory–theory approaches to social cognition are opposed with respect to whether social cognition is inferential. The latter argues that it is inferential, the former that it is not. This article argues that the opposition in terms of inference is mistaken. A sense of inference is specified on which social cognition can be inferential and directly perceptual. Arguing for inferential social cognition does not commit to a defense of indirect social cognition if inferential access to other minds can be direct. Contrary convictions are symptomatic of working with too simplistic a notion of inference. The dispute between direct and inferentialist social cognition is one in which both sides can be right. The argument, then, is that inferentialism should not be called on to witness in favor or disfavor of advocates of either direct or indirect social cognition.",
keywords = "Faculty of Humanities, Affodances, direct access, inference, Sellars, social cognition",
author = "{Lo Presti}, {Patrizio Ulf Enrico}",
year = "2020",
doi = "10.1177/0959354320908337",
language = "English",
volume = "30",
pages = "186--201",
journal = "Theory & Psychology",
issn = "0959-3543",
publisher = "SAGE Publications",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Leave inference alone: direct inferential social cognition

AU - Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico

PY - 2020

Y1 - 2020

N2 - Direct perception and theory–theory approaches to social cognition are opposed with respect to whether social cognition is inferential. The latter argues that it is inferential, the former that it is not. This article argues that the opposition in terms of inference is mistaken. A sense of inference is specified on which social cognition can be inferential and directly perceptual. Arguing for inferential social cognition does not commit to a defense of indirect social cognition if inferential access to other minds can be direct. Contrary convictions are symptomatic of working with too simplistic a notion of inference. The dispute between direct and inferentialist social cognition is one in which both sides can be right. The argument, then, is that inferentialism should not be called on to witness in favor or disfavor of advocates of either direct or indirect social cognition.

AB - Direct perception and theory–theory approaches to social cognition are opposed with respect to whether social cognition is inferential. The latter argues that it is inferential, the former that it is not. This article argues that the opposition in terms of inference is mistaken. A sense of inference is specified on which social cognition can be inferential and directly perceptual. Arguing for inferential social cognition does not commit to a defense of indirect social cognition if inferential access to other minds can be direct. Contrary convictions are symptomatic of working with too simplistic a notion of inference. The dispute between direct and inferentialist social cognition is one in which both sides can be right. The argument, then, is that inferentialism should not be called on to witness in favor or disfavor of advocates of either direct or indirect social cognition.

KW - Faculty of Humanities

KW - Affodances

KW - direct access

KW - inference

KW - Sellars

KW - social cognition

U2 - 10.1177/0959354320908337

DO - 10.1177/0959354320908337

M3 - Journal article

VL - 30

SP - 186

EP - 201

JO - Theory & Psychology

JF - Theory & Psychology

SN - 0959-3543

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 333305204