The Porretani on truth and propositional meaning
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The Porretani on truth and propositional meaning. / Donato, Enrico.
In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2023.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - The Porretani on truth and propositional meaning
AU - Donato, Enrico
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2023 BSHP.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - This paper discusses a conception of truth and propositional meaning that was developed in the second half of the twelfth century by the followers of Gilbert of Poitiers, the Porretani. I begin by outlining some basic metaphysical principles that underlie the propositional semantics of the Porretani. I then go on to consider the Porretanean account of truth and of the truth-predicate, and argue that the Porretani subscribe to a form of deflationism about truth. Then, I turn to the Porretanean view of propositional meanings or ‘assertables’ (enuntiabilia), as they call them. After elucidating the crucial claim that an assertable is a composition or a division, I go on to address the question of the ontological status of assertables. I argue that the Porretani endorse a form of deflationism about propositional meaning. For they maintain that assertables, although indispensable to logical inquiry, are not real entities. I conclude by presenting a discussion on assertables contained in an unedited tract dating probably from the beginning of the thirteenth century. Like the Porretani, the author of the tract identifies assertables with compositions and divisions. However, he interestingly takes the theory in a new direction by introducing the concept of negative relation.
AB - This paper discusses a conception of truth and propositional meaning that was developed in the second half of the twelfth century by the followers of Gilbert of Poitiers, the Porretani. I begin by outlining some basic metaphysical principles that underlie the propositional semantics of the Porretani. I then go on to consider the Porretanean account of truth and of the truth-predicate, and argue that the Porretani subscribe to a form of deflationism about truth. Then, I turn to the Porretanean view of propositional meanings or ‘assertables’ (enuntiabilia), as they call them. After elucidating the crucial claim that an assertable is a composition or a division, I go on to address the question of the ontological status of assertables. I argue that the Porretani endorse a form of deflationism about propositional meaning. For they maintain that assertables, although indispensable to logical inquiry, are not real entities. I conclude by presenting a discussion on assertables contained in an unedited tract dating probably from the beginning of the thirteenth century. Like the Porretani, the author of the tract identifies assertables with compositions and divisions. However, he interestingly takes the theory in a new direction by introducing the concept of negative relation.
KW - Gilbert of Poitiers
KW - Porretani
KW - Propositional semantics
KW - Truth
KW - twelfth-century logical schools
U2 - 10.1080/09608788.2023.2224834
DO - 10.1080/09608788.2023.2224834
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85164422783
JO - British Journal for the History of Philosophy
JF - British Journal for the History of Philosophy
SN - 0960-8788
ER -
ID: 370206771