



Norse brothers

Social Democratic anti-Communism in Norden 1945-1962

Bjørnsson, Iben

Publication date:
2012

Document version
Early version, also known as pre-print

Citation for published version (APA):
Bjørnsson, I. (2012). *Norse brothers: Social Democratic anti-Communism in Norden 1945-1962*. Københavns Universitet, Humanistisk Fakultet.

NORSE BROTHERS

Social Democratic anti-Communism in Norden

1945-1962

PHD-THESIS

University of Copenhagen, SAXO Institute, Department of History, August 2012

Author: Iben Bjørnsson

Supervisor: Poul Villaume

1. INTRODUCTION	4
SOURCES.....	5
ABOUT THE TITLE	6
ORGANISATION NAMES.....	7
DEFINITIONS.....	8
<i>Anti-communism</i>	8
<i>Security</i>	9
<i>Securitisation</i>	10
<i>Intelligence and propaganda</i>	11
<i>Norden and Scandinavia</i>	12
A NOTE ON THE USE OF THEORY	14
THE THESIS.....	14
<i>What I will not write about</i>	15
2. COLD WAR HISTORIOGRAPHY	16
‘CULTURE’ AND THE COLD WAR.....	17
THIS THESIS IN EXISTING HISTORIOGRAPHY	18
NORDEN AND THE COLD WAR	20
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES	22
<i>Denmark</i>	23
<i>Sweden</i>	24
<i>Norway</i>	25
<i>Fragments: on the topic of this thesis</i>	26
3. ON ELITES & CORPORATIONS	27
THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL NETWORKS	28
4. ON STATE, PARTY AND POST-WAR (SOCIAL) DEMOCRACY	31
LABOUR NORDISM.....	31
BECOMING ‘THE PEOPLE’: DE-RADICALISATION	33
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC STATE.....	37
5. SEEDS OF HATRED: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNISM	40
PRE WWII: PARTING.....	40
POST WWII: CEMENTING	45
6. EDUCATE! AGITATE! ORGANISE!	48
MIRRORING THE ENEMY	55
7. DENMARK	57
AIC.....	57
INTELLIGENCE AND REGISTRATION	59
CONTACT TO OTHER ANTI-COMMUNIST ORGANISATIONS.....	60
8. SWEDEN	62
PERSONNEL CONTROL.....	63
THE MAKING OF GROUP B/IB	64
GROUP B AT WORK.....	66
9. NORWAY	68
HAAKON LIE AND ROLF GERHARDSSEN	68
HAWKS AND DOVES: THE SPLIT.....	72
10. SCANDINAVIA: COMMON CONCLUSIONS	75
11. FINLAND	81
TANNER, LESKINEN AND THE LEGACY OF WAR.....	81

THE FCMA TREATY	83
FINLAND AND SAMAK.....	84
THE NORWEGIAN CONNECTION	85
WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM THEIR FRIENDS: FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR ANTI- COMMUNISM	87
SAK, WFTU AND ICFTU.....	92
TROUBLES.....	94
12. ICELAND.....	99
A STORY OF TURMOIL.....	99
SETTING THE ICELANDIC HOUSE OF LABOUR IN ORDER: SCANDINAVIAN INVOLVEMENT.....	104
13. ODD ONES OUT: COMMON CONCLUSIONS.....	112
14. COOPERATION: THE ANTI-COMMUNISM OF NORDEN	115
15. 1945-49: STARTING UP AGAIN	118
THE OFFICIAL SETTING: SAMAK	118
LABOUR CONFERENCES.....	125
BACK IN SAMAK.....	127
A SPECIAL MEETING: HELSINGBORG 1949	129
<i>Communist organisation</i>	129
<i>Militancy</i>	130
<i>Finances</i>	130
1945-49: IN CONCLUSION	131
16. 1950-54: SETTLING INTO THE COLD WAR.....	134
A SECOND MEETING: STOCKHOLM 1950.....	135
<i>Communist organisation, finances, campains and contacts</i>	136
<i>Sabotage and security</i>	137
BETWEEN MEETINGS.....	139
NAMES: HELSINKI 1950.....	141
<i>Communist organisation and tactics</i>	142
<i>Finances</i>	144
<i>Eastern connections</i>	146
<i>Names</i>	147
<i>Militancy and sabotage</i>	148
<i>What kind of information was this?</i>	150
THE PEACE CAMPAIGN	151
SPECIAL MEETINGS CONTINUED	154
<i>The German connection</i>	157
<i>Norway and Sweden</i>	160
<i>Finland</i>	162
SAMAK 1951-54: THE FINNISH GAFFE & PHASING OUT COMMUNISM	165
FINNISH REPORTING	168
SPECIAL MEETINGS CONTINUED, II	171
AT ITS HEIGHT: DOMBÅS 1954.....	175
<i>Communist organisation and tactics</i>	176
<i>Propaganda themes</i>	177
<i>Finances</i>	179
<i>Finland</i>	180
<i>A Norwegian guest</i>	181
<i>'A man from the south'</i>	184
EDUCATION.....	187

<i>Gothenburg 1954</i>	187
<i>Oslo 1955</i>	193
<i>Books</i>	198
TRAVELLING.....	200
1950-54: IN CONCLUSION	203
17. 1955-59: CHANGES	207
1955: BUSINESS AS USUAL	207
<i>Communist organisation and tactics</i>	207
<i>Propaganda themes</i>	209
<i>SDP propaganda</i>	210
<i>Eastern connections & finances</i>	211
<i>Infiltration and espionage</i>	212
<i>Trends and other issues</i>	213
<i>Iceland revisited</i>	215
1956: UPHEAVAL	216
<i>The XX CPSU congress</i>	217
<i>Strikes</i>	217
<i>Finnish reporting</i>	218
SAMAK: A SHORT REVIVAL	220
FIZZLING OUT – OR A LACK OF SOURCES?	223
<i>Other business</i>	225
1955-59: IN CONCLUSION	227
18. 1960- : THE END	229
1960- : IN CONCLUSION	233
19. CONCLUSION	234
THE STATE PARTY.....	234
THE STRUGGLE	235
THE PARTY SECRETARY MEETINGS.....	240
NORSE BROTHERS <i>AND</i> BROTHERS IN ARMS?	242
LITERATURE	244
ARCHIVES	261
ELECTRONIC RESOURCES	262
ABBREVIATIONS	263
APPENDIX I – TABLES	265
ENGLISH SUMMARY	272
DANISH SUMMARY/DANSK RÉSUMÉ	273

1. INTRODUCTION

From the 1970s onwards, questions of Scandinavian Social Democratic Parties (SDP's) intelligence work and ties to state intelligence during the Cold War have surfaced every so often. From the 1990s on, it has been shown that such did, in fact, exist.¹ The SDP's and intelligence services worked together on containing national communism.

When several Nordic SDP's did this, it is only natural to ask whether the neighbours knew of each other's practices, or even cooperated in them. Obviously, I do not ask this question out of the blue: other research (including my own) has touched on the subject of anti-communist meetings between especially the Nordic SDP secretaries.² But there has never been a major investigation into the subject.

I then ask: to what extent was there a social democratic inter-Nordic anti-communist cooperation during the first Cold War, and what was the nature of it? What were the reasons and threat perceptions that lay behind?

In security policy, the Nordic countries have been labelled 'Just good friends'.³ Another question I seek to answer is: in the light of the above, was it really so? This question will be answered by combining my own results with pre-existing research.

I write about 'the first Cold War'. Traditionally, the Cold War is divided into three periods: the first or 'early' Cold War, 1945-1962. 'Detente', 1963-1978-79, and lastly 'the second Cold War', 1979-1991. These periods can be (and have been) discussed at length, but it will not be done here, suffice to say that the first Cold War was largely a period of tension

¹ Norway: Lund, Ketil. *Rapport til Stortinget fra kommisjonen som ble nedsatt av Stortinget for å granske påstander om ulovlig overvåking av norske borgere (Lund-rapporten)*. Oslo: Stortinget, 1996, Bergh, Trond, and Knut Einar Eriksen. *Den hemmelige krigen: overvåking i Norge 1914-1997. Bd 1, Overvåkningssystemet bygges opp 1914-1955*. Oslo: Cappelen, 1997, Bergh, Trond, and Knut Einar Eriksen. *Den hemmelige krigen: overvåking i Norge 1914-1997. Bd 2, Storhetstid og stormkast 1955-1997*. Oslo: Cappelen, 1998. Sweden: Lampers, Lars Olof. *Det grå brödrskapet: en berättelse om IB: forskarrapport till Säkerhetstjänstkommissionen (SOU 2002:92)*. Stockholm: Fritzes Offentliga Publikationer, 2002. Denmark: Bjørnsson, Iben. *Arbejderbevægelsens Informations-Central. Socialdemokratiets kamp mod kommunismen 1944-1973*. København: SFAH, 2012 and Schmidt, Regin. *PET's overvågning af arbejdsmarkedet 1945-1989. Fra samarbejde til overvågning. AIC, fagbevægelsen og faglige konflikter under den kolde krig. (PET-kommissionens beretning, bind 8)*. København: Justitsministeriet, 2009 (2009a).

² Petersen, Klaus, and Regin Schmidt. "Gemensam nordisk front." *Arbetarhistoria*, no. 4 (2001): 42-46, Bjørnsson 2012, chapter 6, Bergh & Eriksen 1 1997, p. 455, Lampers 2002, p. 284, Majander, Mikko. "Med apelsiner mot kommunismen." In *Arbeiderhistorie. Årbok for Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek*, 123-151. Oslo: Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek, 2009.

and insecurity. It is in this period that the anti-communists efforts of the SDP's were at their highest.

The Nordic labour movement have a long history of cooperation on many levels. Therefore, an investigation into the anti-communist aspects needs to be severely limited. I look mainly at the *party secretaries*. The party secretary was a powerful figure centred in the middle of the party, with contacts to shop floor as well as leadership and their job ranged from practical to ideological issues. If we imagine the SDP's and labour movements as a giant web, the party secretary would be the spider in the middle, holding the threads together. One must assume that the centralised efforts of the party secretaries had more bearing on party and movement as a whole than e.g. cooperating trade unions at shop-floor level.

This limitation also has a practical benefit: investigating all branches of labour movement and party, searching for anti-communist material would be a task of mountainous proportions. Limiting the investigation to the party centre makes the amount of sources manageable. Of course it can lead to omissions; however, as we shall see, it has not been futile.

SOURCES

It is almost impossible to obtain a *complete* picture of who orchestrated, knew, and assumed political responsibility for the cooperation between the secret services and the Labour Party/the Labour Movement. Much time has passed, the written source material is scarce, important actors are gone and not everybody alive are willing to tell what they know.⁴

This quote is telling for the state of research. Intelligence activities are, by nature, covert. Reports might be missing or might have never been made. Actors might be unwilling to speak, and archives might be inaccessible.

In this case we are (somewhat) in luck. SDP archives in all three Scandinavian countries are neatly kept and accessible at the Labour Movements' archives. They are also enormous. I have limited the search to central party offices and persons, for the reasons stated above: to obtain a view of the activities based centrally in the party.

³ Blidberg, Kersti. *Just good friends: Nordic social democracy and security policy 1945-50*. Forsvarshistorisk forskningssenter, 1987.

⁴ 'Det er nesten ikke mulig å få frem et *fullstendig* bilde av hvem som regisserte, visste og tok politisk ansvar for samarbeidet mellom de hemmelige tjenestene og Arbeiderpartiet/fagbevægelsen. Mye tid har gått, det skriftlige kildematerialet er sparsomt, viktige aktører er borte og ikke alle som lever er like villige til å fortelle det de vet.' Lund 1996, p. 1027

Finnish and Icelandic have not been investigated for two reasons: 1) an assumption that the Scandinavians were central in orchestrating the cooperation, 2) language. It must be admitted that I would have very much liked to investigate especially Finnish archives, but I am forced to leave it to Finnish-speaking researchers. Even so, I believe that from the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish material, some conclusions on Finland and Iceland can be drawn.

I have not conducted any interviews: most of the actors are dead. I have tried to reach the son of Rolf Gerhardsen but without any luck.

Chapters on the battle against communism in each Scandinavian country are based on existing literature. The topic has, in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, been thoroughly investigated, and there has been no reason to start over with time-consuming archival research.

The situation on Finland and Iceland is different. Some literature on the subject has been published, but we lack a comprehensive analysis of the social democratic battle, overt and covert, against communism. The chapters on Finland and Iceland reflect this, and are different than those on the Scandinavian countries – they are puzzled together by existing research and Scandinavian sources. They lack the detail of knowledge available on Scandinavia.

A visit to the National Archives in UK proved futile, much to my disappointment. British involvement in Scandinavian (especially Danish and Norwegian) anti-communism, led to an assumption that they were also involved in, or at least knew about the coordination of it.⁵ However, they seem not to have.

ABOUT THE TITLE

The term *Norse Brothers* is perhaps a sorry excuse for the Scandinavian *brødrefolk/brödrafolk*. Looking up *brødrefolk* in a dictionary, you get *sister nations*, which is a satisfactory translation in some cases, in this case not. Directly translated it means 'brethren people' but that sounds too clumsy to put in a title.

Brødrefolk is what Scandinavian/Nordic people call each other in emotional moments of Nordic nostalgia. Where *sister nations* underline the nation, *brødrefolk* underlines the people,

⁵ Based on Bjørnsson, Iben. "The Information Research Department – i grænselandet mellem information og efterretning under den kolde krig." *Arbejderhistorie*, no. 2 (2008): 33-50. Insall, Tony. *Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an Anglo-Norwegian Special Relationship 1945-1951*. Oslo Academic Press, 2010.

which is an important nuance when speaking of labour movements. Moreover, nations are feminine: *sister* nations. The people involved in this thesis were not women, and the Scandinavian term underlines their feelings of brotherhood. When Nordic social democrats wrote each other, they would with *Dear Brother*, *Best Brother* or simply: *Brother!* As expressed by the Swedish party secretary Sven Aspling: '... in the end, we all act within one big common family.'⁶

The 'brother'-terminology and the '*brødrefolk*'-ideology are important factors in the self-image of those involved, and therefore, *sister nations* does not catch the meaning.

The term has often been used in titles about Nordic cooperation, such as *Brethren people, but not brothers in arms* (*Brødrefolk, men ikke våbenbrødre*) and *The good of the brethren people* (*Brødrafolkens väl*).⁷

ORGANISATION NAMES

To ease understanding, I have chosen the same name for all Social Democratic Parties: SPD (preceded or followed by the name of the country). As for the National Trade Union Conferences, they are named LO (Landsorganisationen), in the Scandinavian countries (in Denmark it was DSF until 1959, where it changed to LO. To avoid confusion, I call it LO throughout). The Icelandic TUC is called ASI (Althydusamband Islands) and the Finnish is called SAK. (Suomen Ammattiliittojen Keskusjärjestö. In Swedish: Finlands Fackförbunds Centralorganisation – FFC).

Some levels of organisation need to be cleared up for those not familiar with Nordic labour terminology: the Trade Union Congress (LO, ASI or SAK) is the organisation for all unions in the country. A trade union is specific to a line of work. In between, we have the trade union federations, which are organisations of unions in roughly the same line of work, e.g. unions in the forest- and lumber industry. Moreover, there are transnational Nordic federations of unions in a line of work, e.g. the Nordic federation of shipyard workers.

⁶ '...vi verkar ju ändå till slut alla i en stor gemensam familj.' Sven Aspling to Niels Matthiassen, 18 September 1962. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 13 1961-62

⁷ Olesen, Thorsten Borring. "Brødrefolk men ikke våbenbrødre – diskussionerne om et skandinavisk forsvarsforbund 1948-49." *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 69–70 (1994): 151-178, Petersson, Magnus. *Brødrafolkens väl: svensk-norska säkerhetsrelationer 1949-69*. Stockholm: Santérus, 2003 (2003a).

DEFINITIONS

Anti-communism

Anti-communism is a term with many connotations. To some, it rings of McCarthyism; to others it implies foreign policy.

Here, it is used in a basic and value-free sense: 'a collective term for movements and views that reject and fight communism. Anti-communism appears in different forms, from a rational critical attitude towards totalitarian forms of communism, to a strong emotional hostility towards *all* communism (...).'⁸

In practice, we can distinguish between *negative* and *positive* anti-communism. Negative anti-communism criticises and fights communism by attacking it (physically or verbally) and pointing out its negative sides.

Positive anti-communism promotes other ideologies and tries to remove incentives to be a communist. It was believed that poverty was a major reason for people to vote communist. Hence a positive anti-communist move would be to reduce poverty. For example, the Marshall plan had a positive anti-communist objective, besides the economical; by contributing to rebuild Europe, the American Government hoped to counter communism.⁹ This logic was also often applied to foreign aid policy.¹⁰

In Scandinavia, positive anti-communism had a dimension in the welfare state. Social democrats would argue (and sincerely believe) that a sound welfare state was one of the best ways to prevent communism. The welfare state was not an anti-communist project in itself, but social democrats believed that by fulfilling the needs of the working class, they would not radicalise to the extent of becoming communist.

Social democratic anti-communism built on first-hand experience with communism and communist policies. Whereas American anti-communism was often based on a fleeting idea of communism as 'evil' (most Americans have never met a self-proclaimed communist), a dash of paranoia and tied to the international position of the Soviet Union, Scandinavian social

⁸ 'samlingsterm för rörelser och åskådningar som avvisar och bekämpar kommunismen. Antikommunism uppträder i olika former, från en förnuftsmässig, kritisk inställning till totalitära former av kommunism till en starkt känslomässig fientlighet mot *all* kommunism (...).' Swedish National Encyclopedia, internet version: <http://www.ne.se/antikommunism> 4 June 2012

⁹ Hogan, Michael J. *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*. Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 41-42, 71, 190

¹⁰ Lahlum, Hans Olav. *Haakon Lie: historien, mytene og mennesket*. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2009, p. 325

democratic anti-communism was based on an intimate knowledge of the communist ideology and an actual presence of communist parties.¹¹

Security

National security and security policy are terms, which, although relatively new,¹² have so many different associations and has been evoked in so many connections that they sometimes seem nearly devoid of meaning. This is neither the time nor place to engage in a lengthy discussion on the topic and it's different schools. However, this thesis is about security, so we need a working definition.

Security policy deals with preventing and/or averting threats to the survival and core values of society. It potentially concerns both domestic and foreign policy and is dependent on present factors such as political movements, and international relations.¹³

Traditional(ist) view of security has focused much upon military and state actorship.¹⁴ But neither category is satisfying if we talk about the kind of security, which involves society, ideology and culture. American IR professor Joseph Nye coined the term *soft power*. Whereas hard power is military and economic means of coercion, soft power has to do with attraction: internal practices, handling of relations, culture and the communication of values. One's soft power can be wider than one's military or economic might would suggest.¹⁵ The Cold War was a battle of soft power (hearts and minds) as well as hard (economic strength and the acquisition and show-off of military hardware).

As an analogy to soft power, one might speak of soft security.¹⁶

The tendency in research to look at soft security started cautiously in the 1980's and has boomed with the end of the Cold War, also trying to adapt to the post-Cold War reality.¹⁷ This

¹¹ On American anti-communism compared to Danish, see Villaume, Poul. *Allieret med forbehold: Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig: en studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949-1961*. Eirene, 1995, p. 863

¹² Heurlin, Bertel. *Global, regional and national security*. Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut (DUPI), 2001 (2001a), p. 11

¹³ Heurlin, Bertel, and Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut. *Danish security policy over the last 50 years: long-term essential security priorities*. DUPI, 2001 (2001b), p. 30. For a more in-depth definition see Heurlin 2001a, pp. 7-18

¹⁴ Pedersen, Thomas. "Sikkerhedsbegrebet." In *Fred og konflikt*, edited by Henning Gottlieb, Bertel Heurlin, and Jørgen Teglers, 43-54. København: Det Sikkerheds- og nedrustningspolitiske udvalg (SNU), 1991. p. 50, Beukel, Erik. "Hvad er sikkerhedspolitik." *Politica* 14, no. 3 (1982): 6-28, Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, pp. 1ff.

¹⁵ Nye, Joseph. *Soft power: the means to success in world politics*. Public Affairs, 2004, p. 10

¹⁶ 'Soft security' inspired by *Dansk Og Europæisk Sikkerhed*. Kbh: DUPI/SNU, 1995, p. 10

brings about two problems: first, as mentioned, the definition can be so broad that it loses meaning. Second, the broadened definitions of post-Cold War political research do not always address Cold War issues. Although the security agenda must obviously change with such a radical change in world politics as the end of the Cold War, soft security is not merely a post-Cold War phenomenon. To obtain a broader understanding of the Cold War we can apply some of the newly developed theory retrospectively.

In this, I find help in the 'Copenhagen school' of IR theory developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde. They speak of *sectors* into which they divide different types of security issues. Although intertwined, the sectors give more clarity to the different security issues and make them manageable. There are five sectors:

(...) the military sector is about relationships of forceful coercion; the political is about relationships of authority, governing status, and recognition; the economic sector is about relationships of trade, production, and finance; the societal sector is about relationships of collective identity; and the environmental sector is about relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere.¹⁸

Hopefully, it should be clear, that the security framework of my thesis is the political and societal sectors.

Securitisation

Security is neither static nor objective. Perception is key to defining security threats. If we look at our definition of national security – matters concerning the survival of a nation and its core values – security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them. By saying 'security', one declares a state of emergency.

This process is called 'securitisation'. It is '(...) the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.'¹⁹ This justifies means otherwise not tolerated: secrecy, violation of civil rights, etc. If securitisation is successful, the audience that would otherwise prevent you from using them will tolerate those means. Your audience are the ones who have to agree, to render the steps you want to take possible. If your means are secrecy, withholding information is allowed

¹⁷ *Dansk og Europæisk Sikkerhed* 1995. On the changing nature of security after the Cold War, see Heurlin 2001a, Evans, Graham, and Jeffrey Newnham. *The Penguin dictionary of international relations*. London: Penguin Books, 1998, p. 490, Buzan et.al. 1998, pp. 2ff

¹⁸ Buzan et.al. 1998, p. 7-8

¹⁹ Buzan et.al. 1998, p. 21-23

by securitisation. If you fail to convince your audience, there has only been a securitising *move*. Securitisation is fulfilled by ‘cases of existential threats that legitimise the breaking of rules.’ The case does not have to actually exist, only be convincingly made. Thus securitisation is an act of speech, of rhetoric.²⁰

Still, this does not necessarily mean that securitisation is just a cover for other agendas, or a deliberate design to get one’s way. Those making a securitising move can very well be convinced that the threat is of a nature that demands extraordinary measures to be taken. Whether or not a threat is ‘real’ is hard to judge, even in retrospective. But it should be made clear, that when talking about securitisation, I am not necessarily implying that the threat was purposely exaggerated or distorted by those that made securitising moves.

Intelligence and propaganda

Intelligence is said to be the second oldest trade in the world. However, investigation of intelligence as an integral part of security policy is a relatively recent phenomenon.

When writing my masters thesis on the Danish social democratic organisation AIC (Arbejderbevægelsens Informations-Central/The Labour Movement’s Information Centre) I tried answering the question, asked by a colleague: propaganda- or intelligence organisation?²¹ My answer was: both. However, I still meet people who contest that, so it is worth explaining how I define intelligence and how it is narrowly interwoven with propaganda.

Intelligence is systematic gathering of information, with the intent of threat assessment. The purpose is to know one’s enemy. It can be gathered through open sources (media, government statements, publicly accessible information) or covert, through agents or technical remedies. It can be done in a myriad of imaginative ways; however, most intelligence is gathered through open sources.

In my view, intelligence does not have to be performed by the state (which seems to be the area of disagreement). Private organisations, or groups, can do intelligence too, for various reasons. Obviously, by this standard, anyone can do ‘intelligence’, by cutting out articles in a newspaper. Key in defining when information gathering is intelligence is, as mentioned, that it is done to assess a threat (whatever one’s threat perception) and often counter it.

A group or organisation with a purpose that can be threatened does it. In the subject at hand, political parties wanting to keep a rivalling party in check did it.

²⁰ Buzan et.al. 1998, pp. 25-26

²¹ Grelle, Henning. “AIC – propaganda- eller efterretningsorganisation?” In *Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv. Årsskrift 1998*, 30-37. København: ABA, 1999.

Much intelligence was used for propaganda purposes. Propaganda becomes very poor if you do not know the nature of the 'enemy' you are propagating against. To strike where it hurts, you need to know his arguments, philosophy and tactics. The better your knowledge, the better your propaganda.²²

For the SDP's, intelligence was carried out to know where to hit the communists and how to counter their actions. To do that, one had to start by knowing whom the communists in the workplace or union was. A testimony to the value of this intelligence is the interest it was shown by the state security services.

Norden and Scandinavia

The terms Norden and Scandinavia are often used interchangeably. Here, *Scandinavia* will refer to Denmark, Norway and Sweden only, while *Norden* covers Scandinavia plus Finland and Iceland.²³

Separating Norden from Scandinavia makes sense linguistically, geographically and societally. Swedes, Norsemen and Danes are able to understand each other with some effort. Icelandic, though being the mother of all Scandinavian languages, is hard to understand for a Scandinavian, while Finnish is of another language family altogether.

Geographically, Iceland is located in the corner of the Atlantic, far from the Nordic 'mainland'. This often was an obstacle in cooperation. Icelandic social democrats often had to pass on meetings because traveling was too expensive and time-consuming. Though neighbouring Scandinavia, her neighbour to the east always influenced Finland. Russia/The Soviet Union had a direct and indirect bearing on Finnish politics and statehood.

The geography of Finland and Iceland placed them in the immediate sphere of interest of each superpower. The effects of this became Finland's friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviets and the American military base at Keflavik, Iceland. None of the superpowers really left the two small countries much choice whether or not they wanted to be a part of their Cold War landscape. Both arrangements were widely unpopular among the populations and gave cause for considerable anti-Soviet (Finland) and anti-American (Iceland) sentiment.

²² Ex. Björnsson 2008

²³ For a similar distinction see Haskel, Barbara G. *The Scandinavian option: opportunities and opportunity costs in postwar Scandinavian foreign policies*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1976, p. 12. On Iceland and Finland as Nordic countries, see Wåhlin, Vagn. "Island, Færøerne, Grønland og det nordiske." *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 69-70 (1994): 38-61, and Engmand, Max. "Är Finland ett nordiskt land?" *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 69-70 (1994): 62-78.

It isn't just language and geography (or the absence of monarchy), which separates the two countries from Scandinavia. A modern history of hardships due to independence issues, late industrialisation and post-war poverty differentiates them. Some even find the Finns and Icelanders to possess a different, more rough-and-ready 'soul' than the Scandinavians. That, I will leave to someone else to figure out, but an important fact is: communism was always bigger in Iceland and Finland. Social democrats neither dominated state nor labour movement. This did not mean absence of a power struggle between communists and social democrats. However, it meant that the SDP's could not rely on the state apparatus as a steady support, and they never outnumbered communists. Neither did they have the same amount of welding of SDP's and TUC's as in Scandinavia.²⁴ Finland and Iceland simply were not *Social Democratic states* (see pages 37ff). In developing their labour movements (and welfare states), both Finland and Iceland have been somewhat 'behind' the Scandinavian countries.²⁵ Their SDP's were developed under the influence of their 'big brothers' (Denmark to Iceland, Sweden to Finland), and they relied on support, practical, moral and financial from the Scandinavian movements.

Moreover, their SDP's suffered damaging internal struggles during the first Cold War (see chapters 11 and 12).

The Scandinavian countries have been called the 'core area countries' in Nordic security.²⁶ It goes for social democratic anti-communism as well. The position of Finland and Iceland vis-a-vis the Scandinavian countries in the battle against communism has often been one of 'little brotherhood'. Cooperation in combatting communism often took the form of the Scandinavian countries 'helping' Icelandic and Finnish comrades with either money or training. Thus, the stable 'core' was situated in Scandinavia, who tried to radiate it to the troubled partisans on the periphery.

One should not be mistaken; Finnish social democrats having fought actual wars against the Soviet Union, might have been the most anti-communist of the Nordic bunch. However, they lacked the means and power to act upon it, as they might have wanted to. Instead they looked to their Nordic brothers, not only to help them in this battle, but also to create ties that would distance them from the East.²⁷ The battle against communism was more difficult for the

²⁴ Helenius, Henrik. "Socialdemokratin i Finland – klasskamp och Consensus." In *De nordiska arbetarekongresserna under 100 år: arbetarrörelsens framväxt och utveckling i de nordiska länderna*, 151-175. Stockholm: SAMAK, 1986, p. 160

²⁵ Helenius 1986, and Kjartansson, Helgi Skúli. "Íslands arbeiderbevegelse og sosialdemokraterne." In *De nordiska arbetarekongresserna under 100 år* 1986: 151-175 and 195-212.

²⁶ Holst, Johan Jørgen. *Five roads to Nordic security*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973, p. 5

²⁷ Arter, David. "Social Democracy in a West European Outpost: The Case of the Finnish SDP." *Polity* 12, no. 3 (1980): 363-387.

Finns and Icelanders than for the Scandinavians. Hence the role of the Denmark, Sweden and Norway sometimes became that of older brothers, trying to help tame the often disorderly and rowdy labour movements in the Nordic periphery.

A NOTE ON THE USE OF THEORY

Historians are lucky: we can apply theory without being burdened by its (lack of) ability to foresee events. Much Cold War theory does not apply on today's world, simply because bipolarity has vanished and security issues are different. Some historians choose not to use theory at all, however, I find it a useful tool in understanding the mechanisms behind the actors. It is applied as such, not necessarily as all-encompassing laws that are true for all of society at all times.

Rather than describing a social *law*, Swedish political scientist Astrid Hedin prefers theory to explain social *mechanism*, which allows for 'explanation, but not for prediction. (...) Because of the inherent complexity of human relations'.²⁸ With this, she also suggests that researches 'scale down' the ambition of making theories which try to identify 'laws' and focus on locating 'mechanisms and causal patterns that seem frequent, and indicate some conditions which make these more or less likely'.²⁹

This definition and use of theory is similar to the one I apply here.

THE THESIS

The chapters on Nordic cooperation are centred on the *party secretary meetings* that were the basis of the anti-communist cooperation. As such, I have found each meeting to be so important that they are described and analysed individually and the chapters are built around them. While the information given at these meetings is important to understand the nature of the cooperation, so is the development of the meetings themselves. This might make for some 'heavy' and very source-based chapters, but nevertheless it is a disposition I have made to underline their importance.

²⁸ Hedin, Astrid. *The politics of social networks: interpersonal trust and institutional change in post-communist East Germany*. Lund: University, Dept. of Political Science, 2001, pp. 150-151

²⁹ Hedin 2001, pp. 80-81. Similar points are made by Gaddis, John Lewis. "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War." *International Security* 17, no. 3 (1992-1993): 5-58

It is important to note that information from these meetings might not be altogether correct. Some reports were partly based on rumours, others on sources that it is not possible to identify or verify. Moreover, there might be misunderstandings owing to differences in language. Luckily, the accuracy of the information is not of prime importance in this investigation, but rather the context in which the information was exchanged. While it would obviously be interesting to know how accurately the social democrats were informed, the most important thing is the general content of the meetings, type of information, the setting in which it was put forth, the way it was gathered and for what purpose. These things give us an idea of the nature and purpose of the cooperation, the degree of confidentiality surrounding it, and the degree to which they can be said to deal with intelligence and security matters.

What I will not write about

Limitation is one of the hardest exercises in academia, and one of the most necessary. It is easy to get lost in details and theories, be led off track by the material and pursuing interesting paths at the cost of the whole. Subjects and perspectives bordering one's own can be both relevant and interesting, but in the end, one could go on endlessly if having to include everything of relevance. There are obvious topics, which could be included on this thesis, but have not been:

– Domestic economic and social policy: when writing about a labour movement intent on building up a welfare state, this is an obvious aspect. However, it is also the topic of several lengthy books, which cannot receive a fair treatment in a thesis that is basically concerned with security policy.

– Foreign and military policy: this is an equally obvious aspect of security policy, and in traditional research the very definition of it. I will – briefly! – touch aspects of it, but only to give context to the topic at hand. Obviously the prism through which it is presented is mine, but I will not engage in lengthy discussions or analyses of each Nordic country's foreign political choices.

– Broader Cold War theory: the Cold War is the backdrop of this thesis, and as such ever-present. However, discussions about the Cold War on a systemic level are too broad and far away from the topic at hand. However, one thing must be said in this context, and that is the obvious fact that I work with sub-systems within the Cold War system and view Norden as such.

2. COLD WAR HISTORIOGRAPHY

Western Cold War research has been influenced by research on American diplomacy. Traditionally, Cold War historiography has been divided into three schools: the *orthodox/traditional* of the 1950s and 1960s, which placed USA in a defensive posture, reacting to Soviet moves and aggression. Traditionalist research followed the IR school of *realism*, viewing international society as anarchic, and states as actors in a zero-sum power game. In opposition to this, *revisionism* developed in the 1970s, a structuralist view placing more (often all) responsibility for the Cold War on the US, and her (economic) imperialist designs.

Post-revisionism, as introduced by John Lewis Gaddis in 1983 was a self-proclaimed synthesis. However, many thought it to be 'orthodoxy plus archives': re-running old orthodox views, and supporting them by (hand-picked) documents.³⁰ In the case of Gaddis, this is not entirely off, preoccupied with (Soviet) guilt as he is.³¹

Post-revisionism is now a diluted term, sometimes invoked when researchers want to make clear that they don't want to place guilt for the Cold War; that it takes two to tango. Which is all well and good, but it doesn't really say anything about the framework of research. It just lands in a gap between poles. If post-revisionism has come to mean everything in between traditionalism and revisionism, it is too vague to really function as an analytical or theoretical framework.

My opinion is, indeed, that both the US and the USSR were superpowers seeking a preponderance of power (see below) – and when two of these get in each other's way it is bound to cause friction. However, that hardly explains anything else.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, a new school has seen daylight; the *triumphalist* which is, basically, orthodoxy plus 'we won/we told you so!'³²

³⁰ Gaddis, John Lewis. "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War." + Gardner, Lloyd C. "Responses to John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War'." *Diplomatic History* 7, no. 3 (1983): 171-190 + 191-204. For (severe) criticism, see Cumings, Bruce. "'Revising Postrevisionism,' or, The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History." *Diplomatic History* 17, no. 4 (1993): 539-570.

³¹ In his 1997 *We now know*, Gaddis generally blames the Cold War on Stalin and the Soviet Union, which is repeated in the 2005 *The Cold War: A New History*. See also Lundestad, Geir. "Introduction." In *The cold war - and the Nordic Countries. Historiography at a Crossroads*, edited by Thorsten Borring Olesen, 7-15. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004.

³² Schrecker, Ellen. *Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism*. New York: The New Press, 2006.

'CULTURE' AND THE COLD WAR

Since the 1990s scholars have increasingly paid attention to culture, ideology, psychological warfare, and intelligence, in short: 'the battle for hearts and minds' as a central theme in the Cold War narrative.³³ But, as one of America's leading Cold War historians Melvyn P. Leffler rightly argues, these should not *replace* studies in political economy and geopolitics – rather should they interact and compliment each other.³⁴

Obviously this thesis is born out of that tendency.

Psychological warfare was no neglected area during the Cold War. However, it hasn't had high priority in traditional research; perhaps because designs behind psychological campaigns and connections between intelligence and psychological warfare have not been easy to uncover until now, where archive access has increased.

Writings on ideology and psychological warfare are more a trend in historiography than a theoretical school, even if they do have the notion in common that 'soft' politics are important and necessary in order to understand and get a full picture of the Cold War.

They place themselves within theories of other disciplines within humanities and social sciences, and it is useful to bring in a range of theories from fields that are just as diverse as the Cold War reality. New scholarship, increasingly, leaves old labels behind.³⁵

Ideology is not to be confused with ideals. An idealistic foreign policy claims morality and doing good, but the security policies of the Cold War were seldom based on that, even if America claimed 'freedom' and 'democracy' and the Soviet Union claimed 'anti-imperialism' and 'peace'. Soviet internal conditions meant very little to American *realpolitik*, and American foreign policy would usually support capitalism over democracy.³⁶ The Soviet Union on the other hand, can hardly be called 'anti-imperialist', when one looks at Eastern Europe, and the peace rhetoric merely becomes laughable, coming from a state, with an unusual fondness of

³³ Some titles are Shaw 2001, Osgood, Kenneth A. "Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 2 (2002): 85-107, Lucas, Scott. "Beyond freedom, beyond control, beyond the Cold War: approaches to American culture and the state-private network." *Intelligence and National Security* 18, no. 2 (2003): 53-72.

³⁴ Leffler, Melvyn P. "New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconfigurations." *Diplomatic History* 19, no. 2 (1995): 173-196, Villaume, Poul. "Post-Cold War Historiography in Denmark." in Olesen 2004: 17-41, p. 33

³⁵ Leffler 1995, Suri, Jeremi. "Conflict and Co-operation in the Cold War: New Directions in Contemporary Historical Research." *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 1 (2011): 5-9. See also Mariager, Rasmus. "Den kolde krig i international og dansk historieforskning." In *Den kolde krig og Danmark. Gads Leksikon*, edited by John T. Lauridsen, Rasmus Mariager, Torsten Borring Olesen, and Poul Villaume, 720-746. København: Gads Forlag, 2011.

³⁶ Walter LaFeber, 'The Tension between Democracy and Capitalism during the American Century', *Diplomatic History*, 23 (1999), pp. 263-284. This view is contested by Tony Smith, *America's Mission*.

military parades and showing off hardware. Thus, I also distance myself from idealist lines of historiography (Gaddis not excluded³⁷), which claims the Cold War to have been a struggle of 'freedom vs. tyranny' or 'good vs. evil'.

To be sure, it is sometimes still possible, to some extent, to identify research in relation to the 'old' schools. You can write a big book on the waging of ideological cold war, and still believe that the Soviets started it. However, fewer researchers are occupied by questions of guilt, and most (as this one) now adhere to the standard academic phrase 'I'm afraid it's a bit more complicated than that.'

THIS THESIS IN EXISTING HISTORIOGRAPHY

In his comprehensive study of Truman's security policy *A Preponderance of Power*, Melvyn P. Leffler argues that the vital interests, or *core values* determined American foreign policy, not only in defending them, but also creating an environment in which they could grow and flourish.³⁸ The notion of security policy being led in order to not only protect core values, but also actively promote or preserve them, opens up for a view of the Cold War, which is broader than the action/reaction blame game of both orthodoxy and revisionism.

To determine core values, historians must identify key groups, agencies and individuals, examine their goals and ideas, and analyze how trade-offs are made. Decision makers and interest groups will have different and sometimes conflicting internal and external objectives. Core values are the goals that emerge as priorities after the trade-offs are made; core values are the objectives that merge ideological precepts and cultural symbols like democracy, self-determination and race consciousness with concrete interests like access to markets and raw materials; core values are the interests that are pursued notwithstanding the costs incurred: core values are the goals worth fighting for.³⁹

Core values are key to threat perception. The *worldview* of the actors is the basis on which interests are defined and policy built.⁴⁰ In the words of Cold War scholar H.W.Brands:

The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton University Press, July 1995).

³⁷ Leffler, Melvyn P. "Cold War and Global Hegemony, 1945-1991." *OAH Magazine of History* 19, no. 2 (2005): 65-72, p. 65

³⁸ Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Stanford University Press, 1993.

³⁹ Leffler, Melvyn P. "National Security." *The Journal of American History* 77, no. 1 (1990): 143-152, p. 145

⁴⁰ Pharo, Helge. "Post-Cold War Historiography." In Olesen 2004, 97-142, p. 135

(...) prior to policy are the ideas that inhabit the heads of the policymakers, shaping their perceptions of the world and informing their responses to those perceptions.⁴¹

'Reactive measures' depend highly on one's worldview. With Leffler:

Leaders everywhere usually see themselves acting defensively. (...) But the key to understanding their policies seems to be to grasp how particular leaders defined their interests (both domestic and international), conceived security and perceived threats (also both domestic and international).⁴²

Leffler has been criticised for neglecting ideology in determining core values⁴³ – a criticism he acknowledged:

Ideology, of course, would be a factor shaping the perception of threat, and culture would serve as a framework defining that, which was threatening as well as that which was desirable (interest).⁴⁴

The focus on core values, and their relation to threat perception is a major contribution to Cold War historiography. With it, the dichotomy of action and reaction is not reduced to a question of 'who started it'.

Another school deserves attention, especially in the light of the theoretical framework of this thesis: *corporatism*, as defined by Thomas J. McCormick. McCormick argued that Cold War history tended to overemphasise great powers, crisis-events, and the state while neglecting longer-term influences such as (social) structure and political culture.⁴⁵

Corporatism stresses the influence on, and interplay between, the state and large corporations (*syndicates*). Not necessarily moneymaking, they are defined as follows:

(...) interdependent and collaborating rather than autonomous and competing; endowed with de jure or de facto public authority rather than purely private; hierarchical and elitist rather than egalitarian;

⁴¹ Brands, H. W. "The Idea of the National Interest." *Diplomatic History* 23, no. 2 (1999): 239-261, p. 239

⁴² Leffler 1995, p. 186

⁴³ Walker, III, William O. "Melvyn P. Leffler, Ideology, and American Foreign Policy." *Diplomatic History* 20, no. 4 (1996): 663-674.

⁴⁴ Leffler 1995, p. 186

⁴⁵ McCormick, Thomas J. "Drift or Mastery? A Corporatist Synthesis for American Diplomatic History." *Reviews in American History* 10, no. 4 (December 1982): 318-330. Following discussion: Gaddis, John Lewis. "The Corporatist Synthesis: A Skeptical View." + Hogan, Michael J. "Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal." *Diplomatic History* 10, no. 4 (1986): 357-362 + 363-372. See also Schmitter, Philippe C. "Still the Century of Corporatism?" *The Review of Politics* 36, no. 1 (1974): 85-131.

tied to the State, rather than separate from it, by an amalgam of informal-to-formal mechanisms and linkages; and cooperating, with each other and the State, to manage society's major affairs through self-regulation or public-private power-sharing.

One example that fits remarkably well with this definition is organised labour.⁴⁶

Corporatism goes well hand in hand with looking at core values. Core values and threat perceptions are formulated within these circles with similar basic ideological values, and while there is room for change over time, these values are re-inforced, making for a continuous foreign policy.

I do not neglect outside factors in policy-making. While not believing reaction is mechanical, there are conditions on which to react. What I do believe to be of major importance though, is that structures and ideologies have a basic saying in *how* a country reacts. To sum up: this thesis, as far as international Cold War historiography goes, places itself within the view that *core values* and *corporatism* explains quite a deal as to threat perception and security policy practices, and that their roots are found in the ideology and world view of policymakers.

The corporatist notion of elite and state interaction has, in Cold War literature also been dubbed the *state-private network*, a term coined by Scott Lucas in his 1999 book *Freedom's War*. The term has since been widely used to describe waging of the Cold War, engaging private or seemingly private organisations. Groups that exist between public and private spheres can be called *semi-official organisations*.⁴⁷ Also here, the labour movement is a prime example of the private dimension being drawn into the security issues of the Cold War.⁴⁸

NORDEN AND THE COLD WAR

Historical studies of Norden in the Cold War have mostly focused on national aspects. No comprehensive volume on Nordic Cold War security exists, except if dealing with the

⁴⁶ McCormick 1982, p. 323-324

⁴⁷ Von Essen, Sarah. "NATO sikrer freden. Atlantsammenslutningen oprettelse og tidlige virke." *Arbejderhistorie*, no. 1 (2001): 38-54. See also Laville, Helen, and Hugh Wilford. *The US government, citizen groups and the Cold War: the state-private network*. Routledge, 2006.

⁴⁸ Lucas 2003. CIA was extensively involved.

relation between Norden and another country. Historians have looked at Norden in a longer time span.⁴⁹

Since the failures to establish a common defence union (1949) focus has mostly been on the security division of the area by titles such as *Just Good Friends* and *Brethren people, but not Brothers in Arms*.⁵⁰

Norden was, however, a frequent topic for political scientists during the Cold War. The 1960s saw a wave of research on Nordic integration and regionality. Here, the theory of the Nordic balance was launched – that Norden, with its different security orientations stayed ‘balanced’ between the two superpowers, which ensured a low tension in the area.⁵¹

These discussions continued into the 1970s, when increasing Soviet naval activities in the Baltic Sea and the North-East Atlantic, caused continued discussion of the balance.⁵²

Whatever one’s opinion of the balance theory, it gave rise to a discussion – and acknowledgement – of the similarity of Nordic security interests and the fact that Norden as a region had a distinct security pattern in spite of differences.

Increasing tension in the beginning of the 1980s renewed strategic focus on the ‘Northern Waters’, and the Soviet Atlantic and gave rise to a wave of new research and publications on Norden, a possible nuclear-free zone, the Nordic balance, Nordic unity and Nordic security problems.⁵³

⁴⁹ Gustafsson, Harald. *Nordens historia: en europeisk region under 1200 år*. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2007, Hovbakke Sørensen, Lars. *Slagsbrødre eller broderfolk: Nordens historie gennem 1300 år*. København: Aschehoug, 2004. See also Arter, David. *Scandinavian politics today*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999 and Hilson, Mary. *The Nordic model: Scandinavia since 1945*. London: Reaktion, 2008.

⁵⁰ Blidberg 1987, Olesen 1994

⁵¹ Ex. *Nordisk balanse*. Special issue of *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 2-3 (1964), Brundtland, Arne Olav. “The Nordic Balance.” *Cooperation and Conflict* 30-63, no. 2 (1966), Andréén, Nils. “Nordic Integration.” *Cooperation and Conflict* 2, no. 1 (1967): 1-25.

⁵² Ex. Holst 1973, Haskel 1976, Andréén, Nils. *Den Nordiska balansens framtid*. Stockholm: Centralförbundet Folk och Försvar, 1976, Brundtland, Arne Olav. “Nordisk balanse på nytt.” *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 3 (1976): 599-639. For a newer assessment of the balance theory, see Petersson, Magnus. “The theory and practice of the ‘Nordic balance’ during the 1950s and 60s, with special emphasis on Swedish-Norwegian relations”, n.d. <http://www.luftfart.museum.no/Engelsk/Research/foredrag/peterson.htm> – 25 June 2012

⁵³ Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Bjørn Møller, Håkan Wiberg, and Ole Wæver. *Svaner på vildveje?: Nordens sikkerhed mellem supermagtsflåder og europæisk opbrud*. Vindrose, 1990, p. 71, Sundelius, Bengt. *Foreign policies of Northern Europe*. Westview Press, 1982, Noreen, Erik. “The Nordic Balance: A Security Policy Concept in Theory and Practice.” *Cooperation and Conflict* 18, no. 1 (1983): 43-56, Andréén, Nils. “Nordic Integration and Cooperation — Illusion and Reality.” *Cooperation and Conflict* 19, no. 4 (1984): 251-262, Holst, Johan Jørgen. “The Pattern of Nordic Security.” *Daedalus* 113, no. 2 (1984): 195-225, *Flådestrategier og nordisk sikkerhedspolitik*. København: SNU, 1986.

Common themes have recurred over the years, such as theories on 'small states' theory, interest in detente, manoeuvring between superpowers and efforts to keep Norden a low-tense area.⁵⁴

As with the rest of the field, social and cultural themes have gained ground since the 1990s.⁵⁵

A major breakthrough in Swedish historiography deserves mention: the discovery that Sweden, in spite of official claims to neutrality, cooperated militarily with NATO. The extent and meaning of this cooperation are still debated, but what is important to Nordic historiography is the discovery that NATO countries Norway and Denmark were the closest cooperating partners, and to a large extent provided Sweden with the link to NATO. Extensive cooperation in the field of intelligence has been unveiled as well. This research, in my opinion, changes the picture of a divided Scandinavia and opens up for different pictures and interpretations of Nordic security.⁵⁶

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

A common trait in Scandinavia is commissioned and institutionally supported (and financed) research on the Cold War. A sub-genre is investigations into intelligence services, stemming from debates about their practices and powers. These have produced lengthy, and valuable, reports.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Petersen, Nikolaj. "'We Now Know'. The Nordic Countries and the Cold War: An Assessment." In Olesen 2004: 177-191, p. 189

⁵⁵ Petersen 2004, p. 180

⁵⁶ See ex. Agrell, Wilhelm. *Den stora lögnen: ett säkerhetspolitiskt dubbelspel i alltför många akter*. Ordfronts förlag, 1991, *Om kriget kommit... Förberedelser för mottagandet av militärt bistånd 1949-1969: betänkande av Neutralitetspolitikkommisionen. (SOU 1994:11)*. Stockholm: Fritze, 1994, Dalsjö, Robert. *Life-Line Lost: The Rise and Fall of "Neutral" Sweden's Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the West*. Stockholm: Santéus Academic Press Sweden, 2006, Petersson 2003a, Petersson, Magnus. "The Scandinavian Triangle: Danish-Norwegian-Swedish military intelligence cooperation and Swedish security policy during the first part of the Cold War." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no. 4 (2006): 607-632, Zetterberg, Kent, and Per Iko, eds. *Kvalificerat hemlig. Fyra studier om svensk underrättelsetjänst i Sverige*. Stockholm: Forsvarshögskolan, 2002, Petersson, Magnus. "Man lär sig ... 'vem man kan hålla i hand när leken blir allvar': Svensk militär underrättelsetjänst och Norge under första delen av de kalla kriget." In *Motströms. Olav Riste og norsk internasjonal historieskrivning*, edited by Sven G. Holtmark, Helge Ø. Pharo, and Rolf Tamnes, 257-294. Oslo: Cappelen, 2003 (2003b), Holmström, Mikael. *Den dolda alliancen. Sveriges hemliga NATO-förbindelser*. Stockholm: Atlantis, 2011

⁵⁷ Results from Norway include Lund 1996, Riste, Olav, and Arnfinn Moland. *"Strengt hemmelig": norsk etterretningsteneste 1945-1970*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997, and Bergh and Eriksen 1997 + 1998. Reports from the Swedish Security Commission (Säkerhetstjänstkommissionen) can be found on

Research commissions often express a trend in national debate and as such, one must read their conclusions with an eye for the national mood and debate climate. They can be icebreakers in questions of archive access, but all too often archives used by a commission remains closed, making it hard for other historians to follow.⁵⁸

Finland and Iceland has not, as Denmark, Norway and Sweden, seen official investigations into security service workings during the Cold War. Independent researchers have covered parts of it.⁵⁹

Denmark

In 1998, the story of a semi-private, social democratic intelligence organisation, *Arbejderbevægelsens Informations-Central* (AIC – the Labour Movements' Information Centre) unfolded in the Danish media. Discussions were rife with speculation and sensation.

AIC had been briefly mentioned in various publications, most notably the 1995 *Obersten og kommandøren* (*The Colonel and the Commodore*), which uncovered cooperation between social democracy and military security.⁶⁰

The main speculations about AIC were whether the organisation had functioned as a private intelligence service, registering names of communists based on legal political activities (such registrations were, as far as the public was aware, illegal in Denmark).⁶¹ Former AIC members denied this. Furthermore, suggestions were made that the AIC had been in contact with the Danish state security services and CIA, passing on information about Danish communists.⁶² Former AIC members denied this as well.

The Danish Government founded a commission in 1998 (at the height of the AIC debate) to investigate activities of the Danish police intelligence service, PET. The PET commission's

<http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/108>. In Denmark, the question has been investigated by the PET commission, <http://www.petkommissionen.dk/>. All websites accessed 22 June 2012

⁵⁸ Petersen 2004, pp. 178ff.

⁵⁹ For an overview of Finland until 2005, see Helkama-Rågård, Anna Katarina. "Det röda hotet från Finland. De finska kommunisterna som ett svenskt säkerhetsproblem". Helsingfors Universitet, 2005, pp. 22-23. Recent works by Kimmo Rentola, Mikko Majander and Jarkko Vesikansa has contributed to the area. In Iceland, this kind of research has primarily been done by Gudni Johannesson.

⁶⁰ Christmas-Møller, Wilhelm. *Obersten og kommandøren: efterretningstjeneste, sikkerhedspolitik og socialdemokrati 1945-1955*. København: Gyldendal, 1995

⁶¹ On the legal issues, see Laursen, Johnny. *Politiets efterretningstjeneste 1945-1968. PET's grundlæggelse og registreringer på det politiske område 1945-1968. PET-kommisjonenens beretning, bind 2*. København: Justitsministeriet, 2009, esp. pp. 41ff and 103ff.

report was published in 2009 and shed light on the subject of AIC cooperation with the security police. In the meantime, I also conducted extensive research into AIC and published a book on the subject in 2012.⁶³

Sweden

In 1973, the left-wing journal *FiB/Kulturfront* published a series of articles revealing a group within the military intelligence establishment named IB, which, helped by social democratic contacts, directed activities against the labour movement.⁶⁴ Over the years, the IB debate surfaced time and again, and various investigations – both public and private – tried to clear up the circumstances of the organisation.

One of them was *Kommunistjägarna* (The Communist Hunters, 1990) by journalists Thomas Kanger and Jonas Gummesson. It is over-dramatised, but still delivers a blow to those who denied collaboration between IB and SDP, and reproduces interesting documents.

An account was made in 1998, by the Swedish Intelligence Commission (*Försvarets Underrättelsenämnd*). It report primarily provides information on relevant archive material and brings interviews with some of those involved. It is valuable because social democrats finally admitted knowing about, and to a certain degree cooperating with IB. Other than that, no sensational conclusions were made – in fact not many conclusions were made at all. Rather, the information from archives and interviews are summarised (and left unchallenged) and readers left to draw their own conclusions.⁶⁵

When a Security Commission was formed, SDP decided to do their own investigation by someone who knew the party history and problems during the Cold War, but had not been involved with IB. Such a man was found in former party official and journalist/editor Enn Kokk. The result is *Vitbok* (White Book), based on archives and interviews. Kokk has been thorough and tried not to let his party sympathies get in the way of 'unpleasant' conclusions, but is not always successful. He devotes quite some space to defend party activities. He is not blind to

⁶² The fact that AIC is CIA spelled backwards is – despite speculations to the opposite – entirely coincidental. Debate in *Aktuelt*, *Berlingske Tidende*, *Information*, *Jyllandsposten* and *Politiken* 26 October 1998-5 November 1998

⁶³ Schmidt 2009a, Björnsson 2012

⁶⁴ Esp. Bratt, Peter, and Jan Guillou. "Hur IB kom till." *FiB/Kulturfront* 2, no. 9 (1973), Bratt, Peter, and Jan Guillou. "SAP och spionaget." *FiB/Kulturfront* 2, no. 17 (1973). Accessible at http://fib.se/fib_1/IB/ - 22 June 2012

⁶⁵ *Redovisning av vissa uppgifter om den militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten*. Stockholm: Försvarets underrättelsenämnd, 1998.

the democratically doubtful aspects, but still concludes is that in spite of mistakes, there is no reason to criticise the general activities of IB.⁶⁶

The most thorough research on IB was done by the Security Commission and published in 2002.⁶⁷

Norway

Norway has seen three major Government reports on the subject of intelligence (including cooperation with the Labour Movement) in the Cold War.

In 1993 the Justice Department asked for a historical account on police intelligence, leaving the task to historians Trond Bergh and Knut Einar Eriksen. The result is the two-volume *Den hemmelige krigen (The Secret War)* in 1998. In 1993 the Defence Department asked historian Olav Riste to write a similar account of the military service.⁶⁸

Furthermore, parliament decided in 1994 to have the legal aspects investigated. This resulted in what is popularly called the *Lund-report* (after commission leader, supreme court judge, Ketil Lund), which came out in 1996.⁶⁹

These accounts were largely the result of debates spurred by a number of books, starting with former party secretary Ronald Bye's political memoirs, *Sersjanten (The Sergeant, 1987)*.⁷⁰ Bye produced a series of books on the subject in the beginning of the 1990's, some factual, some fiction inspired by real circumstances. They caused quite a lot of debate and attention to the role of the labour movement in surveillance as did the diaries of LO-leader Konrad Nordahl (published 1991-92).⁷¹

⁶⁶ Kokk, Enn. *Vitbok: militärens hemliga nätverk i arbetarrörelsen*. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg, 2001, p. 483

⁶⁷ Lampers 2002

⁶⁸ Riste and Moland 1997. It deals only very shortly with the issue of social democratic participation in intelligence.

⁶⁹ Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 5, Lund 1996, p. 1

⁷⁰ Bye, Ronald. *Sersjanten: makt og miljø på Youngstorget*. Oslo: Gyldendal, 1987. On the archive, see pp. 71-76

⁷¹ Bergh and Eriksen 1998, vol. 2, p. 535, Lund 1996, pp. 105-107

Fragments: on the topic of this thesis

Not much has been written on the actual topic of the thesis, except for short mentions in a publications dealing with the issue in national terms.⁷² The only publication focusing solely on the subject is the fairly short 2001 article *Gemensam nordisk front (United Nordic front)* by Danish historians Klaus Petersen and Regin Schmidt.⁷³

One of the books that come closest to the nature and significance of the Nordic cooperation is a memoir by Tron Gerhardsen, son of the prominent anti-communist Rolf Gerhardsen, based partly on memory, partly on his father's papers.⁷⁴ According to Tron Gerhardsen many of these are/were (? – he burned some) about Nordic cooperation. Tron Gerhardsen states that the Nordic meetings were an important part of his father's anti-communist work.⁷⁵

Sven Aspling, in his memoirs, and Enn Kokk investigating IB, also both underlined the importance of the Nordic framework in fighting communism. Aspling confirms that the Nordic parties had 'un-announced' and somewhat secretive meetings.⁷⁶

Swedish journalist Mikael Holmström writes that since 1969, the party secretaries of Norden had a 'contact committee on security policy', which was based on informal meetings.⁷⁷ This might be worth looking at, some other time.

⁷² Bergh and Eriksen 1997, pp. 455, Lampers 2002, p. 284, Majander 2009, p. 144, Lahlum 2009, pp. 296-297, 299, Bjørnsson 2012, chapt. 6

⁷³ Petersen and Schmidt 2001

⁷⁴ Gerhardsen, Tron. *Einar og Haakon, Rolf og jeg: fra Arbeiderpartiets indre liv*. Oslo: Aschehoug, 2009

⁷⁵ Gerhardsen 2009, pp. 115, 119

⁷⁶ Aspling, Sven. *Med Erlander och Palme: Sven Aspling berättar för Arvid Lagercrantz*. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg, 1999, p. 78, Kokk 2001, pp. 100-102

⁷⁷ Holmström 2011, pp. 169-170, 435

3. ON ELITES & CORPORATIONS

It is often said that decisions, even in a democratic setting, are not made in plenum but in the hallways and behind the scenes. Of course, many decisions are made democratically but what happens behind the scenes is often essential: who speaks to whom, who is striking deals and making trade-offs? Different players are at work: lobbies, interest groups, businesses and corporations. This assumption is what lies at the base of the corporatist/social network theory applied in my thesis, not only when it comes to foreign policy, but as far as states and organisations go as well.

McCormick's syndicates (chapter 2), leads us back to a father of sociology, Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) and his *corporation*. A corporation as defined by Emile Durkheim in his 1893 dissertation *De La Division Du Travail Social (The Division of Labor in Society)* is not necessarily a moneymaking firm. Rather it is a unit of people 'bound together by 'material neighbourhood, solidarity of interests, the need of uniting against a common danger, or simply to unite'⁷⁸. The corporation is more about ideological uniformity and common identity, than anything else. In this definition the corporation can obviously be any organisation, but obviously, in this case we apply it to the political party or groupings within the labour movement. Like McCormick's syndicates, they are groupings that have some degree of power or leverage within society.

Discussions of corporatism and its role in governance are lengthy and complicated.⁷⁹ I will not attempt to contribute to them, but merely apply the notion as a framework for certain mechanisms in Scandinavian social democracy.

Corporatism is an integrated part of Scandinavian society, especially with organised labour's role as a key player.⁸⁰ With Swedish political scientist Leif Lewin, it is:

... officially sanctioned participation of organisations on decisions governing the affairs of the state or in their administration or similar actions carried out by organisations on behalf of the state.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Durkheim, Émile. *The division of labor in society*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1933, p. 16-17

⁷⁹ For a scratch in the surface, see Arter 1999 pp. 162ff., Christiansen, Peter Munk. "Leif Lewin, Samhället och de organiserade intressena, Stockholm: Norstedts, 1992; Bö Rothstein, Den korporativa staten, Stockholm: Nordstedts, 1992, 374 s." *Politica* 23, no. 4 (1992): 439-441

⁸⁰ Lewin, Leif. *Samhället och de organiserade intressena*. Stockholm: Norstedts/CE Fritzes, 1992, p. 92

The Swedes even have a name for it: *Harpseud democracy*, after the name of the Swedish PM's summer residence, Harpsund, where PM 1946-69, Tage Erlander, met with leading societal/economic groups and corporations (but not opposing political parties) to talk politics.⁸²

The workings of corporations and corporatism was analysed by American sociologist C. Wright Mills in his 1956 *The Power Elite*. According to Mills, the domains of power (economy, policy, military) had become centralised, institutionalised, larger and increasingly interlinked.⁸³ It might sound like one big deliberate conspiracy; however, Mills underlined that it is not; rather it is the function of overlapping interests and personal connections: a 'we-feeling', if one will, coming from similar outlooks or backgrounds. A 'network of informal connections' maintained coordination between domains.⁸⁴

Obviously there are differences of agreements within the power elite, but still there was an internal discipline and basic similarity of interest, or, with Leffler, a similar set of core values that emerged after trade-offs were made. This is especially true when it comes to security policy.⁸⁵

These mechanisms are not uniquely American: we now turn to Swedish political scientist Astrid Hedin. In *The Politics of Social Networks*, she outlines a theory for network interaction by which she explains change and transformation in a political structure as different from America as the former GDR.

THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL NETWORKS

Social network relations matter to politics. Starting up a new political organization is typically performed by a group of trusted friends, colleagues or buddies, drawing on their social network resources. Within an institutionalized group, social network relations pattern informal communication and cooperation. In organizational entrepreneurship, as well as in everyday institutional life, relations of interpersonal trust structure interactions.⁸⁶

⁸¹ Lewin, Leif. "The rise and decline of corporatism: The case of Sweden." *European Journal of Political Research* 26, no. 1 (1994).

⁸² Arter 1999 pp. 162ff., Haskel 1976, pp. 15-16

⁸³ Mills, C. Wright. *The power elite*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, pp. 6-9. Power defined as the ability to realise one's will, even if resisted by others.

⁸⁴ Mills 1956, pp. 11-12, 18-19, 278

⁸⁵ Mills 1956, pp. 282-283, 287-288, 292

⁸⁶ Hedin 2001, p. 13

This is the basic outline of Hedin's theory on social networks and their interaction with politics. The theory focuses on actual structures of an organisation or corporation as opposed to formal ones.

(Most) Humans are social beings that seek the company of like-minded people – this is at the basis of their integration in society and networks and enterprises are often based on a core of likeminded people. 'In search of trust and identity, individuals have a tendency to network with others who seem similar or whom they wish to resemble.' This is *similarity-interaction*. Similarity-interaction is determined by factors such as gender, race, social status, ideology, attitudes or line of work. Hence, homogeneity is rewarded.⁸⁷ A corporation or organisation can be a network, but a network can also both transcend and exist within a corporation, as inner circles, elites or informal groupings.⁸⁸

Trust is at the core of social networks, and an important commodity. If one is to work with someone they do not know, or needs to recruit, bridging often happens through a common acquaintance. Someone has a far better chance to 'get in' if recommended by a trusted person, or if known to have the right mind-set. It is a question of 'Who?' Who knows, interacted with, recruited or conferred with whom?⁸⁹

The practical function of the social network is 'exchange of resources and information'.⁹⁰

The social networks theory moves away from mostly structuralist institution theory: agency is 'embedded' in the system and the social network is a structure both 'limiting and enabling agency'.⁹¹ Networks are created and kept alive by actors but as they reproduce, they also act as socialising factors. They carry norms and cognitions, 'organisational memory, worldviews, ideological convictions, policy formulation, information, or solidarity'.⁹²

Agency is conditioned by (1) pre-existing, trust-carrying social network ties ("Whom do I trust?"); (2) deliberation and social influence through these social network ties to others who are trusted ("What do they say?"); (3) mobilization of resources through said network ties ("Can they help me with that?"); and (4) the social network basis of collective action ("Cooperate with trusted others.").⁹³

⁸⁷ Hedin 2001, pp. 125, 130-134, Mills 1956, p. 281

⁸⁸ Hedin 2001, pp. 82, 98, 139-140

⁸⁹ Hedin 2001, pp. 73, 76-77, 101-102, 130, 140, 234

⁹⁰ Hedin 2001, pp. 59-61

⁹¹ Hedin 2001, pp. 61-63, 65, 86

⁹² Hedin 2001, pp. 82, 87ff., 120

⁹³ Hedin 2001, p. 83

New members have the possibility of bringing new input and facilitate change but change usually happens slowly and often in connection with generation changes.⁹⁴

The influence and mechanisms of social networks increase in times of uncertainty, or when navigating in unknown waters. The upstart of the corporation can itself be facilitated by uncertain times. In such times, the demand and need for loyal and trustworthy people, is larger than in times of smooth sailings. Thus, social network theory is especially relevant in times of change or uncertainty, eternally or internally within the corporation.⁹⁵

Here, we see a resemblance to the mechanisms of securitisation. Uncertainty breeds increased powers to a trusted group of people.

⁹⁴ Hedin 2001, pp. 103, 109, 115, 134, 140

⁹⁵ Hedin 2001, pp. 15, 61-63, 123-125, 132ff. 234. A point also made by Mills 1956, p. 11

4. ON STATE, PARTY AND POST-WAR (SOCIAL) DEMOCRACY

LABOUR NORDISM

In the early and middle 19th century, the *Scandinavist* movement arose to promote cooperation, common culture, and political and military unions. It was mostly a movement among students, cultural elite and bourgeoisie. It died down when Sweden failed to support Denmark militarily in her 1864 war with Germany. Scandinavism was replaced by less ambitious plans of cooperation at lower levels – sometimes named the *Nordist* movement, which revived the idea of the Nordic *people*. Whereas the *Scandinavist* movement had been intellectual and upper class, the new movements sought to establish common ground from below.⁹⁶ Among these tendencies was cooperation between the newly established labour parties in Norden.

This cooperation was formalised by a series of Scandinavian labour congresses, the first of which took place in 1886 that marked important milestones in the development of Scandinavian labour.⁹⁷

The communiqué from the 1892 congress recommended forming Scandinavian federations. 1897's congress decided to form LO's in all three countries. 1912's congress underlined that the LO's should cooperate closely with the SDP's.

Another important 1912 decision was pointing out representatives from every main organisation to form a committee to implement decisions and lead cooperation: the Scandinavian labour movement's cooperation committee SAMAK (*Skandinaviska arbetarrörelsens samarbetskomité*) was born.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ Hovbakke Sørensen 2004, pp. 39ff, Hemstad, Ruth. "Scandinavianism, Nordic Co-operation and 'Nordic Democracy'." In *Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy*, edited by Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang, 179-193. Helsinki: Studia Fennica Historia, 2010, Østergaard, Uffe. "Norden – europæisk eller nordisk." *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 69–70 (1994): 7-37, pp. 10ff, Wiberg, Håkan. "Security Communities: Emmanuel Adler, Michael Barnett and Anomalous Northerners." *Cooperation and Conflict* 35, no. 3 (September 1, 2000): 289-298 (2000a), pp. 133-134, Archer, Clive. "The Nordic Area as a 'Zone of Peace'." *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 4 (November 1996): 451-467, pp. 458, 460, 462, Andrén 1984, p. 252, Solheim, Bruce Olav. *The Nordic Nexus: a lesson in peaceful security*. Praeger, 1994, pp. 38ff. See also Haskel 1976, pp. 22-23

⁹⁷ Blidberg, Kersti. "Socialdemokratin och Norden – synpunkter ur ett nordiskt samarbetsperspektiv." In *Socialdemokratin och svensk utrikespolitik: från Branting till Palme*, edited by Bo Hult and Klaus Misgeld, 184-194. Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska institutet, 1990, p 184. On the congresses, see Svensson, Lennart. "Arbetarekongresserna i Norden under 100 år." In *De nordiska arbetarekongresserna under 100 år 1886*.

⁹⁸ Svensson 1986, pp. 32, 51, 65, 71

The Scandinavian movements thus cooperated and developed along the same lines from the outset, and the Finnish and Icelandic movement were created to mirror their 'big brothers' (Sweden and Denmark).⁹⁹

After WWI, SAMAK was amputated as the Norwegian party split into three (see chapter 9). Informal contacts continued between Sweden, Denmark and the social democrats in Norway.¹⁰⁰

SAMAK was re-established in 1932, extended to include Finland and Iceland, and renamed the *Nordic Cooperation Committee*. Norway had observational status until LO re-joined in 1936 and the party in 1938, just before another war began and once again disrupted cooperation.¹⁰¹

According to Sven Aspling (Swedish party secretary 1948-62) each country's labour movement was developed and built through Nordic cooperation. Per Albin Hansson (Swedish PM 1932-36, 1936-46) made the same point in his 1934 speech about 'labour Scandinavianism'. By coining this term, he also tried to make the labour movement natural heir takers to the Scandinavianist movement and Nordic cooperation.¹⁰² It's not strange that he would do that; Nordic cooperation was generally popular. But it is probably not wrong that after the Scandinavianist movement died down, centre- and right wing circles never publicly cultivated Nordism in the same way as the labour movement. The Nordic SDP's cooperation dated back to, and was intertwined with the birth of the labour movement.¹⁰³

Although the formal body of cooperation was the 'Norden' organisations (founded in Scandinavia in 1919, Iceland in 1922 and Finland in 1924), and the Nordic Council (1952) social democrats tended to promote their central political vision – the welfare state – as the

⁹⁹ Helenius 1986, p. 152, Lahtinen, Esa. "Finnish Participation in Co-operation within the Nordic Labour Movement, 1880-1918." *Scandinavian Journal of History* 13, no. 1 (1988): 23-28, pp. 24-25

¹⁰⁰ Blidberg 1990, pp. 185-186, Steen, Reiulf. "Den norske revolusjonen." In *De nordiska arbetarekongresserna under 100 år 1986*: 213-232, pp. 217-219, Svensson 1986, p. 77

¹⁰¹ Blidberg, Kersti. *Splittrad gemenskap: kontakter och samarbete inom nordisk socialdemokratisk arbetarrörelse 1931-1945*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell international, 1984, pp. 10-11 + 39ff., 79. On Nordic cooperation during WWII, see chapter IV. See also Blidberg 1990, p. 148, 186, 192, Steen 1986, p. 220, Hemstad 2010, pp. 187-188

¹⁰² Hansson, Per Albin. *Demokrati: tal och uppsatser*. Stockholm: Tiden, 1935, pp. 167-177, Aspling, Sven. "Sverige under 100 år. Vägen till folkhemmet." In *De nordiska arbetarekongresserna under 100 år 1986*: 233-377, pp. 247-248, 272-273. Hemstad 2010, pp. 189-191. Hemstad, Ruth. *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter. Skandinavisk samarbeid, skandinavisme og unionsoppløsningen*. Oslo: Akademisk Publiserings, 2008, p. 195. See also Blidberg, Kersti. "Ideologi och pragmatism – samarbeidet inom nordisk socialdemokratisk arbetarrörelse 1930-1955." *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 69–70 (1994): 132-150

¹⁰³ Majander 2009, p. 123, Haskel 1976, p. 18

natural consequence of special Nordic values. In this rhetoric, Nordic cooperation was a logical function of these common (social democratic) values.¹⁰⁴

This was done most visibly on the 'Day of Nordic Democracy' in Malmö, Sweden, August 1935, a social democratic event, which by its title alone claimed Nordic democracy to be equal to Nordic *social* democracy and partisan standpoints to be a Nordic destiny. By elevating social democracy to Nordic democracy, social democrats promoted their political project as beneficial not just for the working class, but for the *people*.¹⁰⁵

To some extent they have actually succeeded in equating social democracy and Nordicness, even if it has also been suggested that the welfare state has deeper cultural and historical roots (see next section).¹⁰⁶

In Scandinavia, SDP's rose to power during the 1920's and assumed positions as the largest parties in the political arena. It led to a period of social democratic hegemony where SDP's ruled the countries alone (most notably in Norway), or as leaders of coalition governments (most notable in Denmark). This probably explains why they were successful in defining Nordic values and cooperation as especially social democratic.

BECOMING 'THE PEOPLE': DE-RADICALISATION

The labour movement had good conditions in Scandinavian culture with its high degree of institutionalisation and bureaucratisation. A soaring 90% of wage earners were members of a trade union at mid-century. Organisations participated and played a role in politics and society (corporatism).¹⁰⁷

The Scandinavian countries had political and cultural traditions that legitimised parties and disciplined organisations. According to historians and researchers in Nordic history and ideas, Bo Stråth and Øystein Sørensen, these phenomena date back at least to the

¹⁰⁴ Hansen, Svein Olav. "Foreningene Norden 1919-94 – ambisjoner og virkelighet." *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 69–70 (1994): 114-131, Wendt, Frantz. *Nordisk råd 1952-1978. Struktur - arbejde - resultater*. Stockholm: Nordiska Rådet, 1979, Hovbakke Sørensen 2004, pp. 67ff. 113ff., 134, 138, 142.

¹⁰⁵ Kurunmäki and Strang 2010, pp. 13-14, 21, 26, 32 quote p. 17 and Kurunmäki, Jussi. "'Nordic Democracy' in 1935. On the Finnish and Swedish Rhetoric of Democracy". In Kurunmäki and Strang 2010: 37-82. On the *folkhem*, see p. 71. Hemstad 2010, p. 190, Schouenborg, Laust. "The Scandinavian International Society: From Norden to the Northern Dimension?" London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010, p. 134.

¹⁰⁶ Kurunmäki 2012, p. 61, Stadius, Peter. "Visiting Nordic Modernity around 1900". In Kurunmäki and Strang 2010: 194-207, p. 206

¹⁰⁷ Haskel 1976, pp. 13-15, Arter 1999, p. 161

enlightenment. Which is usually seen as an urban aristocratic undertaking. They argue that in Scandinavia, it was marked by an inclusive and pragmatist tradition.¹⁰⁸

In the 19th century, peasant groups were promoters of education (the *folk high school* movement) and popular movements (co-operative farmers' enterprises and other interest groups).¹⁰⁹ Moreover, the states were participants and promoters of reforms in industry, religion and society: civil organisations and movements were seldom in opposition to the state, often in cooperation with it, and sometimes even fusing with it.¹¹⁰

... social democracy as a continuation/transformation of Lutheranism, parochial political culture, popular movements, and social liberalism, yes, indeed, even reform conservatism, could be seen as an expression of how differently the inherent tension contained in the freedom and equality ideals was handled in Scandinavia.¹¹¹

Even the traditionally most state-opposed ideology – liberalism – was not *laissez-faire*, but found an expression in which the state supported and cooperated with business enterprises in the 19th century to get the economy going, and business and its interest groups welcomed it.¹¹²

There was a high degree of continuity from this classical state-oriented liberalism to the merger of the social democrats and a successful capitalism 100 years later.¹¹³

For an analysis of the tendency of the labour movement to de-radicalise, we turn once again to C. Wright Mills and his 1948 *The New Men of Power*.

The relationship between labour and business, he argues, is governed by cooperation as labour, business and state generally have harmonious interests: secure labour relations means

¹⁰⁸ Aronsson, Peter. "Local Politics - The Invisible Political Culture." + Trägårdh, Lars. "Statist Individualism: On the Culturality of the Nordic Welfare State." + Stenius, Henrik. "The Good Life is a Life of Conformity: The Impact of the Lutheran Tradition on Nordic Political Culture." In Stråth, Bo, and Øystein Sørensen, eds. *The Cultural Construction of Norden*. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997: 161-171 + 172-205 + 253-285

¹⁰⁹ Stråth and Sørensen 1997, first chapter. *Sonderweg* is being used to characterise Norden being different throughout the volume, see esp. Witoszek, Nina. "Fugitives from Utopia: The Scandinavian Enlightenment Reconsidered". In Stråth and Sørensen 1997: 72-90

¹¹⁰ Trägårdh 1997, pp. 259-260

¹¹¹ Stråth & Sørensen 1997, p. 5, see also Witoszek 1997, p. 74. Danish leading social democrat Hartvig Frisch made this point in 1933. Kurunmäki and Strand 2010, p. 13, Nevers, Jeppe. "Reformism and 'Nordic Democracy'. A Journey in Danish Political Thought." In Kurunmäki and Strang, 2010: 165-178, pp. 175-196

¹¹² Nilsson, Torbjörn. "Scandinavian Liberalism - Prophets instead of Profits." In Stråth and Sørensen 1997: 206-230, esp. pp. 218-219

¹¹³ Stråth and Sørensen 1997, pp. 17-18

job security for the worker and steady production for the businessman. Higher productivity allows for higher wages (baking a bigger cake ensures that no one has to fight for the crumbs). This, Danish historian Dino Knudsen calls the 'ideology of productivity'.¹¹⁴ By 'peaceful inclusion' of the labour leader in the circles of power, stability is ensured; the labour movement gets benefits and not many people want to tear down a house they helped build. When included, unions will not only play by, but also reinforce the rules: as labour leaders become more powerful, they act more responsible towards the existing system. When a radical becomes a part of the system he is, by definition, no longer a radical.¹¹⁵

Mills, being a left-wing sociologist (and American), tends to hint that these developments are somehow cheating the labour movement; that they are mere mechanisms of repressive tolerance. One might reasonably ask if this is actually the case, at least in Scandinavia. When incorporated into the state, the labour movements did not just succumb to it; they changed it. The SDP's had power and their labour leaders were not reduced to errand boys for a capitalist bourgeoisie.

Another problematic area is Mills' analysis of the labour fight against communism; he tends to reduce it to a question of the labour leaders acting as agents for state and business, and their dissociation from communists having merely to do with communism's bad reputation and a risk of being stigmatised by cooperating with them.¹¹⁶ In Scandinavia this was far from the case. The hostilities were a consequence of contrasts within the movement (see chapter 5) and had minimal involvement from conservative and right wing parties. While Mills claims that ideology is irrelevant in the American fight between communism and moderate labour, it has been one of the 20th century's most ideological fights in Scandinavia.

We saw that the 1912 Scandinavian labour congress recommended intimate cooperation between the LO's and the SDP's. Their close cooperation was a foundation and pretext for labour movement activities.¹¹⁷ The Norwegian *Lund-report* dubs the SDP and LO 'siamese twins': they were not in a superior-inferior relation, but took care of the same interests, one on the labour side, one on the political. The marriage between organisation and party was a

¹¹⁴ Mills, C. Wright, and Helen Schneider. *The new men of power: America's labor leaders*. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1948, pp. 111 ff., 247, 269. Knudsen, Dino. *Amerikaniseringen af den danske fagbevægelse: Marshallhjælp, kold krig og transatlantiske forbindelser, 1945-56*. København: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2012, chapter 10. See also Carew, Anthony. "The politics of productivity and the politics of anti-communism: American and European labour in the Cold War." *Intelligence and National Security* 18, no. 2 (2003): 73-91

¹¹⁵ Mills 1948, pp. 153, 168-69, 229-230, 246-247

¹¹⁶ Mills 1948, pp. 190-192

¹¹⁷ Svensson 1986, p. 65, Steen 1986, p. 216, Aspling 1986, p. 237

defining trait, making the very term *labour movement* include not just both organisations but their very coupling. This was one of the things that gave the SDP's their broad electoral base.¹¹⁸

By linking themselves to a parliamentary (and ruling) party, the unions did, however, agree to play by society's rules. This was the first step in de-radicalising the movement. According to Swedish sociologist Bo Rothstein, it was also a premise for further labour empowerment. In order to uphold and expand support, the unions had to produce results for the worker. This was done by negotiation, reform and corporatist participation. The alternative, a full-blown revolution, was a very risky business with a small chance of succeeding – a hazardous 'one-shot' gamble. In the Scandinavian countries, the popular sentiment for a revolution was never really present either – and the SDP's were reformist. Instead, the workers' situation improved gradually, and with this, the labour movement became ever more tied to, and integrated into, the state. With Mills, 'Each reform achieved gives the reformer one more stake in the existing system.'¹¹⁹ If this strategy is successful (workers get better conditions; state and business get orderly labour), no one is likely to change it.

Through their skill, and broader political contacts (made by corporatist cooperation) labour leaders gain a more complex view of matters. The rise in power leads to a decline in revolutionary rhetoric often referred to as 'political maturity' or a more 'responsible' attitude. As the organisation becomes an integrated part of society, it identifies more with it. By this, it also becomes increasingly intolerant of radical elements.¹²⁰

When assuming power, SDP's of Norden established that they were reformist parties on the road of cooperation and pragmatism, by making economic deals with especially peasant's parties. At the same time they started appealing to the same parties' electoral bases. According to one of Rothstein's students, Torsten Svensson, this switch was strategic – it was an acknowledgement that the party could only go so far on labour votes alone. If it wanted to expand further, it would have to appeal to others doing hard work, like small-time peasant, fishers, etc.¹²¹ The definition of labouring people was extended beyond the industrial proletariat which widened the agitation base and paid off in all of Scandinavia.

¹¹⁸ Lund 1996, s. 999, Olofsson, Gunnar. *Mellan klass och stat: om arbetarrörelse, reformism och socialdemokrati*. Lund: Arkiv för studier i arbetarrörelsens historia, 1979, p. 154. See also Erlander, Tage, and Sven Erlander. *Dagböcker. 1945-1949*. Hedemora: Gidlund, 2001 (2001a), p. IX, Aspling 1986, p. 242, Svensson, Torsten. *Socialdemokratins dominans: en studie av den svenska socialdemokratins partistrategi*. Uppsala: Statsvetenskapliga föreningen i Uppsala, 1994, p. 52.

¹¹⁹ Mills 1948, p. 153, Rothstein, Bo. "Corporatism and Reformism: The Social Democratic Institutionalization of Class Conflict." *Acta Sociologica* 30, no. 3/4 (1987): 295-311, pp. 300-303.

¹²⁰ Michels, Robert. *Political parties: a sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1999, pp. 335-340

¹²¹ Svensson 1994, pp. 78ff, 107, 125, 151

An important marker of the transformation from class to people's parties was when the Swedish SDP (in the shape of PM Per Albin Hansson) took over the conservative notion of *folkhemmet* – the home of the people. The SDP's in all of Scandinavia adopted a vision and a rhetoric that was more national than international/revolutionary. It was no longer just about working class, but the nation and people. The nation *became* 'the people' and obviously, the state should be for the people as well. Social democracy was promoted as a national ideology.¹²²

Mills identified, the processes of de-radicalisation by way of cooperation and gradual improvement for the workers, securing stability and prosperity. But to suggest, that conservatives and business 'let' the social democratic parties in, to control them (as an act of oppressive tolerance) seems far-fetched. In view of labour/SDP strength, conservative and right wing parties hadn't much choice in the matter of whether they wanted to 'let in' social democrats. With Danish social scientist Laust Schouenborg: 'to argue that this was a fully calculated move on the part of the conservatives is probably to misinterpret the character of social democratic hegemony.'¹²³

THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC STATE

Erlander (Sweden) emphasised that they were all able to speak not only on behalf of the parties in their countries but of the whole nations as all three countries had social democratic Governments¹²⁴

Swedish PM Tage Erlander, at a party meeting in Stockholm 1948, with Danish and Norwegian PM's Hedtoft and Gerhardsen present.

When a political system incorporates a movement, it becomes more moderated to suit the political environment, but the opposite can happen as well: the political system can be adjusted to fit the movement.¹²⁵ This also happened in Scandinavia. Institutions such as unemployment-, educational- and social services were moulded and built to suit and serve the welfare state, especially in the post-WWII era. An example from Sweden is the steep rise in public funding for ABF (the labour movement's education league): the number of ABF

¹²² Svensson 1994, pp. 84-85.

¹²³ Schouenborg 2010, p. 166, Svensson 1994, p. 15

¹²⁴ Telegram, Jerram to Foreign Office, 19 March 1948. PRO, FO 371/71451: Meeting of Stockholm Labour Party.

¹²⁵ Building on Olofsson 1979, pp. 20, 154

secretaries increased from 5 in 1945 to 300 in 1973.¹²⁶ The growth of the education league was not special to Sweden – gradually they became (and still are) something close to a public education society not unlike the *folk high schools*.

The SDP's found themselves, in the words of Swedish sociologist Gunnar Olofsson *between class and state*. The term 'bourgeois labour party' has been used by communists somewhat condescending about social democracy, but if we free the term from negative connotations, it is actually quite fitting to describe a class-based labour party which has adapted to capitalist society and in turn adapted state values to suit the social democratic vision. And it worked: in today's Scandinavia, not even right wing parties want to get rid of the welfare state (and if they do, most dare not say it aloud). Instead of turning down capitalism, the social democrats became 'on speaking terms' with it, and developed it into welfare capitalism.¹²⁷

When SDP's achieved dominance over the state, it was natural to to consolidate the power of their siamese twin, continue and extend the cooperation between labour, state and industry.¹²⁸ Corporatism can be described as the very thing that allowed for the emergence of the 'social democratic state'. When SDP's integrated themselves into the state it was done by corporatist participation.¹²⁹ According to Rothstein, there is a relationship between strong corporatist states and states with a strong labour movement as the labour movement is an integrated part of wage and other financial negotiations.¹³⁰

Thanks to the organising hand of corporatism, the industrial workers, through their unions, gained a special influence over the building of the welfare state, and were transformed from protest group to the foremost social carrier of state interest.¹³¹

Being dominant in post-war Scandinavia, SDP's formed and managed states to reflect social democratic ideology into 'the third way' or the 'Nordic model' (a term which SAMAK has recently patented).¹³² The terms were coined and eagerly promoted by social democrats

¹²⁶ Olofsson 1979, p. 175

¹²⁷ Stråth & Sørensen 1997, pp. 14, 18, Schouenborg 2010, pp. 167-168

¹²⁸ Rothstein 1987, p. 306

¹²⁹ Lewin 1992, p. 93

¹³⁰ Rothstein 1987, pp. 296, 306

¹³¹ 'Tack vare korporatismens ordnande hand fick industriarbetarna via sina fackföreningar ett särskilt inflytande över välfärdsstatens uppbyggnad och förvandlades från missnöjesgrupp till den främsta sociala bäraren av statsintresset.' Lewin 1992, pp. 93-94

¹³² <http://www.samak-nordicmodel.org/sida4.html> – 13 August 2012

themselves. The social democracies of Scandinavia *connected* the seemingly opposite values: class and state.¹³³

The social democrats managed to shoulder the mantles of both monarchical statism and peasant populism by becoming, on the one hand, the party of state and, on the other, the voice of the 'people's movement'.¹³⁴

The process of state integration started with the national(ist)/Nordic rhetoric of the 1930s and gained full speed in the post-war years. Common to post-war Scandinavia was a strong SDP, with a vision for building up a welfare state – the vision that was interrupted by the war. In all three countries, SDP's held government power throughout most of the early Cold War (see table 3) making it possible to pursue nation building according to social democratic ideology – as the state was moulded to be the guarantor of that ideology. The political goal was to build a state with a higher degree of social security and a more equal distribution of goods.

Following the identification with the state, there emerged a lack of will and/or ability to distinguish party from state interests – including a lack of distinction between party and state means to obtain desirable outcomes (which in this logic, was all-purpose benign).

The state, the public apparatus, was the principal, governing, leading, and regulating tool in this project. (...) They [the social democrats] were – and felt like – the state bearing Party in a special way.¹³⁵

This strong identification between party and state meant that according to themselves, the SDP's – and related LO's – were the backbone of society.

¹³³ Olofsson 1979, p. 177, Misgeld, Klaus. "As the Iron Curtain Descended: the Co-ordinating Committee of the Nordic Labour Movement and the Socialist International between Potsdam and Geneva (1945-55)." *Scandinavian Journal of History* 13, no. 1 (1988): 49-63, p. 49

¹³⁴ Trägårdh 1997, p. 259

¹³⁵ "Staten, det offentlige apparat, var det bærende, styrende, samordnende og regulerende redskap i prosjektet. (...) De var – og kjente sig – på en særlig måte som det statsbærende partiet." Lund 1996, s. 998

5. SEEDS OF HATRED: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND COMMUNISM

It may seem weird that two parties at the same end of the political spectrum would wage war on each other. But the fight was rooted in a battle between the two movements over the right to represent the worker, and the way to socialism: revolution or reform?

Like communism, social democratic reformism emanated from Germany. Eduard Bernstein broke with the Marxist notion that revolution was needed to transform society. Instead he advanced the argument that the liberal-capitalist state, through reforms would be able to accommodate the needs of the working classes.¹³⁶ The root of the conflict was this question and, inherently, the relation to the existing state/capitalist society.

PRE WWII: PARTING

The international labour forum, the 2nd International (1889-1917) recognised (not without heated disagreement and exclusions) using the existing political apparatus as a means to promote labour interests.¹³⁷ When the Bolsheviks carried out a revolution in Russia in 1917 it was, by some, seen as a victory for the revolutionist branch of socialism.

In 1919, Lenin headed the formation of the 3rd or Communist International – known as the Comintern. Comintern was a centralist organisation with a high degree of power and influence over the communist parties (CP's) internationally. This was sanctioned in the 21 Moscow-theses, which members of Comintern was required to conform to.¹³⁸ Its program was – as opposed to the 2nd international – based on revolution.

The Labour and Socialist International (LSI) was formed in 1923. With the official establishment of two different internationals, the conflict in the labour movement was now institutionalised.¹³⁹

¹³⁶ Bernstein, Eduard. *Sosialismens forutsetninger*. Oslo: Pax Forlag A/S, 1973. Rothstein 1987, p. 299, Steger, Manfred B. *The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, esp. chapter 5, Marks, Harry J. "Reformism in the Social Democratic Party of Germany, 1890-1914." *The Journal of Modern History* 11, no. 3 (1939): 334-356, Esping-Andersen, Gosta, and Kees van Kersbergen. "Contemporary research on Social Democracy." *Annual Review of Sociology* 18 (1992): 187-208, p. 188

¹³⁷ Jul Nielsen, Niels. *Mellem storpolitik og værkstedsgulv*. København: Museum Tusulanum, 2004, p. 25

¹³⁸ Jansen, Trine S. "Komintern og dannelsen av de skandinaviske kommunistpartier." *Arbejderhistorie*, no. 3 (2003): 20-44, pp. 20-21

¹³⁹ Nevers 2010, p. 174

Comintern had a direct influence on the CP's in Norden. Besides becoming their leader, the Comintern from the outset became an important source of financial support for the new CP's.¹⁴⁰

The party that was to become SKP was formed in 1917 and DKP in 1919. They both supported Comintern and conformed to the 21 theses. In Norway, the labour party was initially positive towards Comintern and supported the theses, which led to a fraction breaking off and forming a proper social democratic party. Leading party member and ideologist Martin Tranmæl led the 'rebellion' in the Norwegian party. Haakon Lie and Rolf Gerhardsen who, ironically, since became some of the fiercest anti-communist of the party, supported him.¹⁴¹ However, Tranmæl and his followers had increasing troubles accepting the degree of control from the Comintern, which led to a fraction breaking off and forming the NKP in 1923. After that, the labour party abandoned the Moscow theses and re-joined with the social democrats.¹⁴²

The Finnish CP was founded in Moscow in 1918 by radicals from the SDP who had fled Finland when 'the reds' lost the civil war in 1918.¹⁴³ The Icelandic CP was founded in 1930 and was also loyal to the Comintern.¹⁴⁴ In 1938 another fraction broke off from the social democrats and, with the communists, formed the United Peoples' Socialist Party – the CP was dissolved.¹⁴⁵

The CP's were all splinter groups from existing socialist parties, and breaking out earned them the label that would also be the worst insult used by social democrats: 'splitters.' This is at the core of the animosity, since everyone believed that the labour movement should be united to reach their goals. Dividing the movement was a cardinal sin against its very ideological foundation and ability to function effectively. Obviously, there were disagreements as to who were responsible: the revolutionary communists tended to look at the social democratic will to cooperate with the existing bourgeoisie as a major betrayal.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁰ Holtsmark, Sven G. "Udenlandsk finansiering af de nordiske kommunistpartier, 1917-1990." In *Guldet fra Moskva. Finansieringen af de nordiske kommunistpartier 1917-1990*, edited by Morten Thing, 9-41. København: Forum, 2001.

¹⁴¹ Steen 1986, p. 226

¹⁴² For details about the formation of all three Scandinavian Communist parties, see Jansen 2003 and Upton, A. F. *The Communist Parties of Scandinavia and Finland*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973, chaps. 1-3. On Norway, see Lahlum 2009, pp. 39-41

¹⁴³ Helkama-Rågård 2005, p. 50

¹⁴⁴ Ólafsson, Jón. "The Nature of Friendship. Icelandic Socialists and Their Special Relations with the Communist International and CPSU According to Soviet Sources." In *Sovjetunionen och Norden: Konflikt, kontakt, influenser*, edited by Bent Jensen and Sune Jungar, 243-264. Helsingfors: FHS, 1997, pp. 246ff.

¹⁴⁵ Olmsted, Mary S. "Communism in Iceland." *Foreign Affairs* 36, no. 2 (1958): 340-347, p. 342

¹⁴⁶ Lorentz, Einhart. "Komintern." *Leksikon for det 21. århundrede*, 2003. www.leksikon.org – 31 July 2012

With the 21 theses and the degree of discipline demanded by the Comintern, communists became vulnerable to another attack that would be used again and again: social democrats could (rightly) claim that the CP's was ruled from 'outside' – Moscow.

Early on, Comintern laid down the 'united front strategy' as a parameter for its members. The tactic was creating 'unity from below' by cooperating with, and attempts to win over, social democratic workers, while rejecting their leaders. Communists were to fight social democracy and dissociate themselves with the social democratic labour organisations. 'Unity from below' was considered by social democrats to be the worst kind of treachery, as it rejected the labour bureaucracy, its leaders and shop stewards. It was basically a threat to the entire organisation they built in order to gain influence in society. Hence, in the vocabulary of the SDP's it was referred to as 'splitting policy'.¹⁴⁷

In 1928-29, Comintern sharpened its rhetoric and policy towards social democracy, as Stalin consolidated his grip on power in the Soviet Union. The term 'social fascists' to describe SDP's (formulated by Stalin already in 1924) now became an established part of Comintern vocabulary, encouraged, but the way, by Finnish communis leader Kuusinen. With the increasing power of SDP's they had become part of the bourgeoisie and had to be fought as such. The Comintern even welcomed Hitlers ban of the SDP and labour movement in Germany in 1933.¹⁴⁸ Pointing out social democrats as an enemy to be fought even before fascism left the social democrats as resentful towards communists as ever. Bad blood had become even worse.

While the Norwegian party was trying to find its feet (which sometimes meant attempts at reconciliation with the NKP), the SDP's of Denmark and Sweden spent much the 1920s and 1930s fighting communism.¹⁴⁹ To be sure, they propogated against the right wing too, but even right wing parties were partners in parliamentary negotiations whereas communists were nothing but pariahs and cooperation with them in any way, shape or form unacceptable.

In 1928, the Swedish SDP formed *Partistyrelsens Informationsavdelning* (the party committee's information department), and in 1935, the Danish party formed HIPA, *Hovedorganisationernes Informations- og Propagandaafdeling* (the central organisations' information and propaganda department). Both were propaganda departments directly under the party leadership geared to take up the fight against ideological enemies both left and right.

¹⁴⁷ Bjørnsson 2012, p. 22, Rohde, Peter P. "The Communist Party of Norway." In Upton 1973: 35-59, p. 41-42, 49, Svensson 1994, p. 61

¹⁴⁸ Lorentz 2003

Anti-communism was a big part of both organisations. Among the driving forces were Swedish party secretary Gustav Möller (member of consecutive Governments and sometimes credited as the father of the welfare state), Danish future prime ministers Hans Hedtoft (leader of HIPA) and HC Hansen.¹⁵⁰ With the forming of these organs, anti-communism was incorporated into the parties as a regular strategy, rather than an ideological theme. Anti-communism too, was institutionalised.

With this institutionalisation, the battle was made effective by a number of enterprises: from now on, the offices devoted to propaganda would make sure that it was streamlined and reached the right people, usually speakers, MP's, agitators and activists in the workplaces who would promote it further. Journals, collections of arguments and pamphlets (such as *Socialdemokratiske Noter* and *SAP information*) were printed for this use.

Specially fitting candidates were selected for union elections. Social democratic *clubs* (fractions or cells) were formed in the workplaces to counter communist fraction work and strengthen the social democratic basis of the unions. Communist strategy was closely followed and often mirrored. Union clubs and forceful agitation were some of the weapons. The union clubs often did intelligence-related work of informing party leadership of what went on and who were whom in the workplaces and communist union activists were, to some extent registered. The political orientation of union candidates was registered, as were people thought to be perceptive to SDP agitation.

While the Norwegians did not fight communism as fiercely before the war, soon after it, they developed a similar apparatus as the Danish and Swedish. Networks and ideological conformity ran these apparatuses. Party soldiers had to prove the right mind-set and loyalty by doing their bit for the party. Contacts were recruited among the trustworthy in the unions.

The promotion of the SDP as a 'peoples party' as opposed to the sectarian communists was part of the strategy too.¹⁵¹ Swedish political scientist Torsten Svensson claims that the de-radicalisation of the SDP and its switch from class to people's party was a strategy in distancing themselves from communism.¹⁵² This is hard to prove, since we don't know how what would have happened had there been no communists. But it seems sensible to suggest that de-

¹⁴⁹ Blidberg 1984, pp. 70ff., Blidberg 1994, pp. 138-139

¹⁵⁰ Lampers 2002, pp. 263-266, Löfgren, Ingemar. *Den socialdemokratiska partistyrelsens informationsavdelning under 1930-talet*. Stockholms universitet. Historiska institutionen, 1975, Bruhn Henriksen, Christian. "HIPA - propaganda- eller efterretningsorganisation?" *Arbejderhistorie*, no. 1 (2007): 1-19, Svensson 1994, pp. 63ff.

¹⁵¹ Svensson 1994, pp. 64ff., Bruhn Henriksen 2007

¹⁵² Svensson 1994, p. 63, 73ff.

radicalisation was a natural part of the reformist route taken (as suggested by Bo Rothstein)¹⁵³ and that, in distancing themselves from communism, the SDP would promote themselves as the responsible party with a wide appeal, as opposed to a small fanatic sect run by Moscow. The last point became especially important as the social democrats increasingly profiled themselves as carriers of national interest.

In 1934, Hartvig Frisch, Danish social democrat and editor at the party daily wrote the now famous book *Pest over Europa* (Plague over Europe). The book was a warning cry against the totalitarian threats on the European continent: bolshevism, fascism and Nazism. The basic dilemma between trade unionism and revolutionary struggle made any form of cooperation impossible, Frisch stated. He claimed that bolshevism (more accurately: Lenin at a congress in London in 1903) was responsible for splitting the international labour movement and that bolshevism had thus 'given' victory to Nazism and fascism in Germany and Italy, by weakening the labour movement. Communism was just as bad and had to be fought just as hard as fascism and Nazism – the means, according to Frisch, was closer cooperation between the Nordic democrats.¹⁵⁴ With this book, Frisch elevated the conflict from politisation to securitisation, by raising the bar for the consequences of communist 'splitting policy'. Where it had earlier been a serious nuisance, damaging to the labour cause, it was now a direct contributing factor to fascist dictatorship in Europe. It was the first of many securitising moves towards communism, and the conclusion was simple: communism had to be fought not only because of its splitting policy but also because of its totalitarian nature. Not only had they built a dictatorship in Russia – by splitting the labour movements, they enabled fascist dictatorship in the rest of Europe.

Frisch was not the only one to notice the rise of fascism and Nazism. In 1935, in the face of an ever-rising fascist threat, the Comintern's 'social fascist' strategy changed. From striving to expose social democrats as 'class enemies' they now promoted a 'people's front' which also allowed for cooperation at top-level with non-communist leaders – as long as they opposed fascism. This new strategy did not convince social democrats, who continued to look at communists with mistrust.¹⁵⁵ The Icelandic CP was replaced by a United People's Socialist Party in 1938.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵³ Rothstein 1987

¹⁵⁴ Frisch, Hartvig. *Pest over Europa. Bolschevisme - Fascisme - Nazisme*. København: Henrik Koppels Forlag 1933, pp. 8, 28ff, 142

¹⁵⁵ Jul Nielsen 2004, pp. 28-29, Kurunmäki 2012, p. 51. Rohde 1973, p. 49.

¹⁵⁶ Ólafsson 1997, pp. 250-251

Then came the war. Even if it disrupted many things in both Denmark and Sweden, the uncompromising anti-communism of the SDP's was not one of them. After the German attack on the Soviet Union, Nazi occupation forces ordered Danish police to imprison Danish Communists – but this development left the SDP unaffected as shown in a circular letter from the Danish SD leadership to its organisations in 1941. The letter came in response to communists joining the SDP to avoid incarceration, and the message was clear:

Whether the Communists through many years have tried to carry out their intentions by directing hateful, reckless attacks on our party or by hypocritically offering a united front or the likes, the Social Democratic party has, in every situation, consequently refused to have anything to do with them. This attitude of rejection continues to be an obligation to every Social Democrat anywhere the communists might operate, including the unions.¹⁵⁷

Attitudes were the same in Sweden, where the Soviet Union's fight against Hitler Germany did not impress the SDP.¹⁵⁸ In 1943, a circular letter went out from the party leadership with the following words:

We must not ignore that the real battle between Social Democrats and Communists is fought in the workplaces. Those who do not control this battle will be the losing part.¹⁵⁹

No one had forgotten the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact just a few years earlier, and perhaps even more important: no one had forgotten who, in their eyes, had split the labour movement and tried to sabotage the social democratic vision.

POST WWII: CEMENTING

During the war, the organs for international labour cooperation had been dismantled. The LSI collapsed in 1940 and Comintern in 1943. They were replaced in 1951 and 1947 respectively.

In 1945, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) was formed, with broad international participation including the Nordic countries.

¹⁵⁷ Kommunisterne og Vort Parti. 7 July 1941. ABA, 500, 514, 1

¹⁵⁸ Svensson 1994, p. 69

¹⁵⁹ 'Vi ska icke förbise, att den verkliga kampen mellan socialdemokrater och kommunister föres på arbetsplatserna. De som ej behärskar den kampen där bliver den förlörande parten.' Message from the party leadership, 1943. Svensson 1994 p. 70

The issue of an international with participation of labour parties was trickier. In considering the re-formation of the socialist International, the issue of eastern participation was a stumbling block. The Scandinavian parties were wary of cooperating internationally with CP's and even SDP's from the eastern zone as they were believed to be tightly supervised and controlled from Moscow.

Norway's Haakon Lie promoted a socialist conference for Marshall countries only in 1947, whereas the Danes and Swedes hesitated to cement the division of the world in this way. This is a dilemma that would show itself again and again for the Scandinavian SDP's. While preferring an international security environment marked by bridge building and negotiations, they truly disliked communists. With a large part of the world gone communist, anti-communism and the ideals of non-bloc policy were weird ideological bed partners. It is, by the way, interesting that roles were now reversed; while between the wars Denmark and Sweden had been the most adamant about not cooperating with communism, Norway was now more aggressive.

The problem of the socialist international however, solved itself in the course of 1947 and 1948.

The social democrats had all their suspicions confirmed with the founding of the Communist Information Bureau, Cominform in 1947. It was a Soviet response to what was perceived as an ideological build-up in the West, primarily with the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan. The Cominform was perceived as a successor to the Comintern, as one of its purposes was to strengthen the discipline of the Western CP's who abandoned the peoples' front line.¹⁶⁰ The social democrats were confirmed in what they had believed all along: the communists were not national freedom fighters, but merely the instrument of Moscow.

Contributing to the split and the acceleration of the Cold War, was two major forming events in 1948: a communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the signing of a treaty of 'Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) between Finland and the Soviet Union had the Nordic governments worrying about their fate as international tension rose. Rumours were all over Norden about a forthcoming invasion in Denmark, a Finland-style pact on the way to Norway and a Communist *coup d'état* in Finland.¹⁶¹ The role played by local CP's in taking over the East European countries left no doubt as to what they would do if given the opportunity: these events proved to the social democrats that communists really *were* acting as agents for a foreign power.

¹⁶⁰ Lauridsen et. al. 2011, pp. 389-390, Lie, Haakon. *Skjebneår 1945-50*. Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1985, pp. 217-220

If one wants to pinpoint the moment when the social democratic conflict with communism was fully securitised, this might very well be it.

In 1948, the last of the social democratic parties in Eastern Europe were purged and forced to unite with CP's. With no SDP's from Eastern Europe, the question of how to cooperate with them was no longer an obstacle. The Western parties could thus form an international, which in reality consisted of Marshall countries, but without declaring this as a goal in itself and further upset European tension.¹⁶²

As 1947 proceeded, the international tensions became apparent in WFTU as well. Tensions blew open when Western participants supported the Marshall Plan, which WFTU had condemned.¹⁶³ According to many Western labour movements WFTU had at this point, become nothing more than a front organisation for the Cominform and Soviet Foreign policy. In 1949, the Western countries left the WFTU and formed the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).

¹⁶¹ Lie 1985, p. 269, Lahlum 2009, p. 268, Helkama-Rågård 2005, p. 45, Olesen and Villaume 2005, p. 92

¹⁶² Misgeld 1988, pp. 54ff., Blidberg 1994, pp. 140-142

¹⁶³ Already in 1947, Haakon Lie suggested forming an international for those countries supporting the Marshall Plan. Björk, Kaj. *Kallt krig. Mäanniskor och idéer*. Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1990, p. 39, Lie 1985, pp. 213ff., 229

6. EDUCATE! AGITATE! ORGANISE!

The Social Democracy today is manifestly in the process of turning into a powerful bureaucratic machine employing an immense army of officials, turning into a state within a state.¹⁶⁴

This is how Max Weber described the German SDP in 1907, and rightly: in just one year, the party had increased its membership figures from 384.000 to 530.000, and was developing a well-structured party organisation which, especially between the wars, was mimicked by other North European SDP's. Like ideology, organisational inspiration for the Nordic SPD's came from Germany, which is why the ideals and mechanisms of organisation in Germany are applied here.¹⁶⁵

Starting this section with Weber might seem trite, but it is not irrelevant. Weber wrote many of his works while the SDP was on the rise, and often looked towards them when writing about organisation, authority and its new forms. The parties, and especially the SDP with its rapid rise in member figures, employed an increasing number of officials needed to run the new party 'machines', or apparatuses.¹⁶⁶

Theory from the beginning of the century can seem out-dated. But the organisation work against Communism, which was carried out during the Cold War, had its roots just there. The organisation of the SDP's in both Germany and Norden took their form in the early 20th century and this was the organisation, which they brought into the post WWII world.

To understand the parties' structure, Weber claimed, one had to look at how *authority* was established within them, as their aim itself was to obtain authority (defined as the ability to command a given group of subjects).¹⁶⁷ Party leadership demanded strict discipline. This may correspond badly with an organisation that is democratic in principle, but to explain this phenomenon, we turn to a friend and colleague of Weber's: Robert Michels.¹⁶⁸ Michels, himself a socialist, was preoccupied by the schism between the socialist cries for democracy

¹⁶⁴ Max Weber 1907, cited in Marks 1939, p. 349

¹⁶⁵ Berger, Stefan. "'Organising Talent and Disciplined Steadiness': The German SDP as a Model for the British Labour Party in the 1920s?" *Contemporary European History* 5, no. 2 (1996): 171-190, p. 180, Stadius 2010, p. 241, Kirby, David. "The Finnish Social Democratic Party and the Bolsheviks." *Journal of Contemporary History* 11, no. 2/3 (1976): 99-113, p. 109, Lahtinen 1988, p. 23, Rohde 1973, p. 5.

¹⁶⁶ Weber, Max. *Makt og byråkrati*. Oslo: Gyldendal, 1971, pp. 22-23, 25-26, 28-29, 67-69

¹⁶⁷ 'Herrschaft', sometimes also called 'domination'. Weber 1971, p. 68. On the translation issue, see Weber, Max. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*. London: William Hodge & Co. Ltd., 1947, p. 139, note 4

¹⁶⁸ It is even said that Weber, in his writings on parties, was influenced by Michels. Michels 1999, p. 21

and the oligarchical structures which emerged in the German SDP.¹⁶⁹ In his *Political parties* from 1911 (revised in 1915), he explored this schism and formulated *the iron law of oligarchy*. Whether or not this law is universal, we shall leave to others to discuss. We shall, however, note that the German socialist party and trade union movement in the 1910s was the main object of Michels' study, and that it does apply to the structure that was developed in the Scandinavian SDP's and upheld until the early 1960s. It goes:

It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organisation says oligarchy.¹⁷⁰

When a group (in this case, the party), exceeds a certain quantity its tasks become ever varied. They can no longer be taken care of by any given party member. It needs (and becomes an) *organisation*, to function and act rationally and people who are devoted full-time to run it.¹⁷¹ Those that do, become the bureaucracy.¹⁷² As the tasks become larger in numbers and more varied, it is necessary to delegate – often according to areas of expertise.¹⁷³ The alternative would be short-term employment and forced changes in posts. While perhaps more democratic it is also unpractical, disruptive and makes for a less efficient organisation.¹⁷⁴

But the effectiveness of the bureaucracy also gives increased authority to it deciding on, and carrying out, a course of action. These thoughts were put forth already by labour movement founder Lasalle: a fighting party should abide by the 'laws of tactics': if success was to be secured, the rank and file had to blindly obey the leadership. A battle leaves no time for lengthy discussion.¹⁷⁵

To exert authority, leaders need people who will take orders and at the same time be a part of authority, willing to work for it for a longer period of time and be interested in its maintenance. This is, in the words of Weber, the *apparatus*. It is not clear whether Weber meant that the apparatus and the bureaucracy are the same. They seemingly serve the same

¹⁶⁹ Michels 1999, pp. 15, 50-51

¹⁷⁰ Michels 1999, p. 364

¹⁷¹ Michels 1999, pp. 61-62, 72-73

¹⁷² Weber 1971, pp. 121-123, Michels 1999, p. 260

¹⁷³ Michels 1999, pp. 65-67, 192

¹⁷⁴ Michels 1999, pp. 124-125

¹⁷⁵ Weber 1971, p. 86, Michels 1999, pp. 73, 78-79

functions, and hence we will assume that they are the same.¹⁷⁶ The party apparatus itself is divided into sub-hierarchies and little oligarchies.¹⁷⁷

The SDP's demanded discipline; no one was to act autonomously, but in accordance with the political and organisational guidelines set out by the leadership. A worker representing the party should act accordingly whenever he found himself discussing politics or attending any kind of arrangement. Failure to comply with these practices could lead to exclusion from the party.

For such authority to function, it needs to be to be legit in the eyes of its subjects. Weber operated with three types of legitimate authority: legal, traditional and charismatic. Since the SDP's were relatively new, they hadn't really any traditions granting them legitimacy, so we will look at the other two. The first is reasonably straightforward: authority rests on a set of laws and regulations, administered by officials (a bureaucracy). Leaders will either have their authority bestowed upon them by election, appointment or by order of succession.¹⁷⁸

Appointment, or employment in the labour movement, would be made by already existing leadership according to whom they saw fit; as they tended to employ someone they already knew or someone who had proven himself to be of the 'right' mould (the social network was in place and did the job), continuity was also secured this way.¹⁷⁹

Even elections were often times merely an acclamation of a candidate already selected by the apparatus, and his election was a mere formality.¹⁸⁰ His candidacy would rest on his qualities and points of view. When electing union officials and shop stewards, social democrats had merely one choice: vote for the man whom the leadership condones. Tactics demanded that only one social democrat was on the ballot (so as to not waste votes). Failure to support the candidate would lead to repercussions and if there weren't any fitting candidate, the party apparatus would move someone in from another place. Even if members thought that a communist candidate was the best man for the job, they were not to vote for him.¹⁸¹

When electing officials and delegates, the common party member lets go of direct control – they transfer their sovereignty. Still, having voted for their own leaders, gives the member a sense of control and influence (and legitimacy to the apparatus), which also brings

¹⁷⁶ Ex. Weber 1971, pp. 108, 121, 123, 137. In an ideal, or pure bureaucracy, the bureaucrat is not affected by political views.

¹⁷⁷ Michels 1999, pp. 73, 202

¹⁷⁸ Weber 1971, pp. 91-92, 107

¹⁷⁹ See also Michels 1999, p. 127

¹⁸⁰ Weber 1971, p. 111, Michels 1999, p. 122, 124, 126, 167

¹⁸¹ Bjørnsson 2012, p. 59

him to tolerate more from these leaders than he would from someone from the 'outside'. One's 'own' oligarch has a longer leash. The leaders' position of being in charge of, and carrying out, the will of the people, makes disobedience seem undemocratic and destructive. The leader is only enforcing the will of the party, and its voters.¹⁸²

This tendency is enforced by a tendency of the official to identify himself with the party. He is not a person with special interests and pet peeves, he is the personification of the party and its will – and hence, obviously, the will of the members. This is seldom the result of power-thirst or manipulation, but of real conviction. Any attack on any leader is hence, an attack on the whole party and as such, unacceptable.¹⁸³

Those venturing criticism or disobedience, especially at times of ideological emergency, were silenced, stigmatized or in some cases even excluded.¹⁸⁴ We see some of the effects of securitisation here: by invoking a rhetoric of battle, and painting a clear picture of the enemy, the party leaders were able to uphold discipline with methods normally not accepted in a democratic setting. We also see the effects of ideological pressure or turmoil on the network: the grip is tightened. The greater the unity, the fiercer the battle power.¹⁸⁵ This, in itself, granted legitimate authority to the leadership.

As for charismatic leadership, Weber spoke of charisma mainly in one person. How a charismatic leader can have authority is easily understood; but a 'pure' charismatic leadership falls apart with the leader's death or loss of credibility. The ideological foundation of a movement such as the labour movement can be said to have a charismatic character in itself and that gives he who serves it a sense of calling. Continued discipline from those who are ruled is also better secured by a 'cause', than by the feeble power of a charismatic leader.¹⁸⁶ Loyalty to the cause can 'outgrow' a leader and gives the continuity needed for the apparatus to keep running. When participants enter voluntarily, it strengthens their loyalty and sense of purpose and the efficiency rests on this loyalty.¹⁸⁷

The labour movement in Norden has indeed had many charismatic and popular leaders, but the movement survived them. Securing the *continuity* of the organisation is key and this is

¹⁸² Michels 1999, pp. 166, 213-218

¹⁸³ Michels 1999, pp. 221-222

¹⁸⁴ Michels 1999, p. 155

¹⁸⁵ Michels 1999, p. 193

¹⁸⁶ Weber 1971, pp. 109-110, Michels 1999, p. 136, Weber, Max. *Udvalgte tekster, bind 2*. Edited by Heine Andersen, Lars Henrik Bruun, and Lars Bo Kaspersen. København: Hans Reitzels Forlag, 2003, pp. 158-159

¹⁸⁷ Hedin 2001, p. 32

what the bureaucracy does. Hereby, traditions are also established that gives the authority legitimacy.¹⁸⁸

An important charismatic figure in the labour movement was not only the leader, but also the agitator. A gifted orator able to command the attention and respect of the common members were, according to Michels, able to make a world of difference; he was at the very basis of the labour movement.¹⁸⁹

Agitators would not only be speaking at meetings and the likes but to an equal degree be political motivators in day-to-day life at the workplace, never backing down from discussions with communists. The value of 'man to man' agitation was perceived to be high. To the most committed agitators, the social democratic cause was almost religious, and they were preaching the gospel.¹⁹⁰ Hence, several people can have charisma, making for continuous (charismatic) authority.

In organising the parties, such 'charismatic' activities as information and propaganda were key. As we have already seen, the very 'battle units' of the Swedish (Partistyrelsens Informationsavdelning) and Danish (HIPA) SDP's were propaganda departments. A powerful weapon here was the party press. In the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s they had – apart from the national daily – a number of local newspapers. It was the organ through which the highest leaders could speak directly to the people. The party press was an important guideline for the workers and, published by the party, it carried the authority and weight of not only the leadership, but also the collective. Censorship of unwanted opinions was not uncommon. Journalists and editorial staff were not elected for a job at the press, but appointed according to their analytical, political and ideological skills.¹⁹¹

Related, the parties had their own printing and publishing houses – they published books, journals, pamphlets and everything in between, which served to get the message across. The Danish SDP publishing house *Fremad* and the Swedish *Tiden* was founded in 1912. The Norwegian Labour Party's Publication House was founded in 1914. In 1933 it changed name to *Tiden* (same as its Swedish counterpart).

Another thing that was set in system during the 1920s and 1930s was schooling and educational activities. The education leagues ABF (*Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund*) in Sweden (founded in 1912), AOF (*Arbejdernes Oplysningsforbund/Arbeidernes Opplysningsforbund*) in

¹⁸⁸ Weber 1971, pp. 93, 100-102

¹⁸⁹ Michels 1999, pp. 98-100

¹⁹⁰ Lie, Haakon, Hilde Harbo, and Hans Olav Lahlum. *Slik jeg ser det nå*. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2008, p. 50. About the socialist agitator, see Johannesson, Kurt, ed. *Agitatorerne. Arbetarrörelsen och språket*, 1. Stockholm: Carlssons, 1996.

¹⁹¹ See also Michels 1999, p. 159

Denmark (1924) and Norway (1932) were committed to education of, and for, the people – not unlike the folk high schools of the previous century. They grew into large educational and cultural institutions and remain so to this day.¹⁹² The education leagues were not bad propaganda and schooling platforms either. Sometimes agitation and propaganda was even a more important purpose of party schooling than general education.¹⁹³

Besides organisation and agitation, activation was a key proponent. Passive party members should be encouraged to participate in the battle against both communism and the right wing. In the workplaces and unions, organisation consisted of forming union clubs whose work should be coordinated centrally. The goal was to reach and organise people at all levels. This also included leisure, sports and culture activities.¹⁹⁴

An English socialist brochure from 1883 encourages its readers with the words: 'Educate! Agitate! Organise!'¹⁹⁵ It is as clear as it gets. This rallying cry was at the basis of all socialist activity.

Once established, the authority of the bureaucracy is next to impossible to break. Those that are 'ruled' by it depend on it to take care of their interests and they cannot simply take over because it now runs with specialised functions that are brought together as a whole. Tearing it down would create chaos.¹⁹⁶ Even the leader becomes dependent on the various experts for counselling, since the tasks are too many and varied for him to keep hold of.¹⁹⁷

The power of the expertise is enforced by the further education and specialisation of the official, which creates a party elite, and the distance between it and the common party member is enlarged.¹⁹⁸

By these mechanisms the rank and file obey the leaders as patients do a doctor; they haven't got the knowledge or skill to do otherwise.¹⁹⁹ Because of the specialisation of tasks, the common party member has not the slightest possibility of supervising the leadership's every action, and the officials have not the time to consult the masses on every question of importance. By necessity the official must make decisions on his own and the masses must

¹⁹² <http://www.aof.no/>, <http://www.aof.dk/>, <http://www.abf.se/> - 27 June 2012

¹⁹³ Lahlum 2009, p. 93. Many communist-fighters have been through a post in the educational leagues, most notably a young Haakon Lie, who ran the Norwegian AOF in 1932-33. Lahlum 2009, pp. 80-81, 89, 91, 101

¹⁹⁴ On organisational moves and strategies between the wars, see Berger 1996, and Jul Nielsen 2004, pp. 49-52

¹⁹⁵ Cited in Johannesson, Kurt. "Agitatorn som hot och ideal." In Johannesson 1996:10-49, p. 10

¹⁹⁶ Weber 1971, p. 141

¹⁹⁷ Weber 1971, p. 149

¹⁹⁸ Michels 1999, pp. 68-70, 108, 111-112, 124

¹⁹⁹ Michels 1999, p. 114

trust that he does so on their behalf. The alternative is not having anyone do anything for one's interests at all.²⁰⁰

Moreover, many workers seemed just fine with this division – even grateful that someone took on the task.²⁰¹ We must not forget that the labour movement and trade unions actually secured benefits for their members. Loyalty and discipline was often secured simply by providing benefits, both short- and long term.²⁰²

Still, the power of the party apparatus did not go uncriticised. In Scandinavia, there is a (quite derogatory) term for the power-drunk career unionist/party official, who's lost touch with the people he represents; *pamper/pamp*. No doubt the party and its structures creates the *pamp*, and he bears a striking similarity to the oligarchs described by Michels.

In 1978 Swedish left wing sociologist Göran Therborn coined the term *cadre administration*.²⁰³ The term covers the phenomenon that a bureaucracy is managed by ideological fellows – as opposed to the Weberian ideal bureaucracy, in which the public official or civil servant does not let his own political or ideological beliefs interfere with the management of the state.²⁰⁴ Cadre leadership is 'to a large extent, a question about inspiration, persuasion, threats, ideals and leadership.'²⁰⁵ Recruitment for officials of the organisation will, accordingly, be made from those who have proved themselves ideologically suitable. The party apparatuses were indeed filled with the 'right' people who had proved themselves ideologically. Not anyone could walk in from the street and be a party official – people had to prove themselves by work in the unions or organisations.²⁰⁶

Therborn, defining the cadre administration, was (as Hedin) writing about the Eastern European communist system. Ironically, it also applies to social democratic leadership as shown by Bo Rothstein in *The Social Democratic State*:

[Cadre management] is not built on neither the staff's expertise, nor its ability to implement and follow rules, "but on their *commitment* for the organisation's goals and 'line'". [Cited from Therborn 1980, p. 53] Moreover, the cadre administrator's task is not firstly to govern through mandatory, legally

²⁰⁰ Michels 1999, pp. 71-74, 111, 137, 165

²⁰¹ Michels 1999, pp. 86ff, 111

²⁰² Michels 1999, pp. 138-139

²⁰³ Therborn, Göran. *Vad gör den härskande klassen när den härskar? Statsapparater och statsmakt under feodalism, kapitalism och socialism*. Stockholm: Zenit, 1980, p. 52

²⁰⁴ Rothstein, Bo. *Den socialdemokratiska staten: reformer och förvaltning inom svensk arbetsmarknads- och skolpolitik*. Lund: Arkiv, 1986, s. 65-68. Also Hedin contrasts her theory to the Weberian bureaucracy. Hedin 2001, pp. 58, 128-129

²⁰⁵ 'Det är i stor utsträckning en fråga om inspiration, övertygelse, hotelser, förebildlighet och ledarskap.' Therborn 1980, p. 53.

binding decisions. Instead governing takes place through persuasion, ideological influence and mediation. The recruitment for a cadre administration is based upon ideological orientation, and the socialisation processes are extensive.²⁰⁷

Of course, parties change. The SDP's of today are not the SDP's of 100 years ago. But with the continuity of the bureaucracy, change takes time; it often happens only after the new ideas have been brewing and spreading for quite some time, and in connection with a change of generation.²⁰⁸

MIRRORING THE ENEMY

Social democratic leaders and tacticians were themselves aware that the organisation methods employed especially in fighting communism, was not democratic.

The fact that the communists themselves were very disciplined and centrally run, gave the SDP's a need to be equally structured and in control of their 'troops'. Often, both before and after the war, social democrats directly copied communist tactics to gain influence and control in the labour movements. It was an outspoken necessity.²⁰⁹

One can say that the mechanisms of securitisation as at play; the enemy was so extreme that one had to go to the same extreme measures to counter him, and to preserve democracy one would have to use undemocratic methods.

But as opposed to working with state intelligence, which sometimes could give scruples, there were no signs of the social democrats having moral headaches using tactics similar to those of the communists in the workplaces: they were simply doing what was found necessary and it was solely a labour issue.

While there were party members who suffered under this tight discipline, the movement as a whole did not protest – and hence, to use the language of securitisation, the audience was convinced. What made regular party members accept an undemocratic organisation was probably a mix of several factors: the mechanisms of organisation and authority described above, the benefits that the movement secured them and last but not least, ideological

²⁰⁶ Ex. Lahlum 2009, p. 403

²⁰⁷ Rothstein 1986, p. 67, drawing on the "clan"-notion as defined by Durkheim 1933, p. 175 via Ouchi, William. "Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (1980): 129-132

²⁰⁸ Michels 1999, p. 123

²⁰⁹ Petersen, Klaus, and Rasmus Mariager. "Socialdemokratiet og forholdet til DKP under den første kolde krig." *Arbejderhistorie* 2004, no. 4: 55-76, p. 66, Bjørnsson 2012, pp. 51-52

conformity: most common social democrats were no more happy with communism than was the leadership.

When the communism threat vanished, this changed and the members started demanding a more democratic organisation. Hence, a common and present threat went a long way in securing discipline.

7. DENMARK

AIC

AIC (*Arbejderbevægelsens Informations-Central – The Labour Movement Information Center*) was founded in 1944 to launch a post-war propaganda offensive for the SDP. Very quickly it became clear that the main target for AIC's campaigns would be the Danish Communist Party, DKP.

AIC was a continuation of HIPA, which ceased to exist during the occupation of Denmark. The main sponsors were the SDP and the LO. The board consisted of leading members of social democratic and labour organisations. Many were up-and-coming politicians, mayors, members of parliament and ministers, e.g. Hans Hedtoft and HC Hansen, party leaders and later PM's and Eiler Jensen, LO-leader.²¹⁰

AIC was in charge of SDP propaganda: election campaigns, economic programs and, of course, anti-communist campaigns. In the 1945 post-war election, DKP obtained 18 seats in parliament – SDP lost the exact same amount of seats.

Besides traditional propaganda such as posters, leaflets, public meetings and speeches, AIC formed a network of partisan contacts in the workplaces and unions. They were assigned to distribute propaganda material, engage in discussion with co-workers, and report back to AIC about moods, communists and their activities. The pamphlet *AIC-nyt* was printed for contacts to keep updated and have strong arguments ready. The contact net supplied AIC with information on what questions the communists were discussing and organising campaigns on. This made it easier to campaign against them.

The most active AIC member was Urban Hansen. He joined the board in 1946 and in 1947 became a 'secretary' in AIC, the battle against communism becoming his full-time occupation. He became the embodiment of AIC to the extent that many still think of him as its leader (which he wasn't). His closest colleague, Frank Christiansen, took over his job in 1956, when Urban Hansen became Mayor of Social Affairs in Copenhagen (later to become Head Mayor).²¹¹

²¹⁰ Bjørnsson 2012, pp. 29-32

²¹¹ Bjørnsson 2012, pp. 37ff.

Urban Hansen defined the AIC secretary. They were all-round employees, who took care of correspondence and meetings but mostly – and most importantly – functioned as 'field players' in the workplaces. Here, they kept in contact with shop stewards and the contact network, supported partisans that were under pressure from communists and established social democratic *clubs*. The clubs were little cells consisting of loyal social democratic workers, and their main task was being up to date with communist activities and counter them. The clubs were built to mirror the communist fractions. They were usually small – only a handful of people were needed, providing they were active and bright.

An important part of the work in the clubs was securing social democratic majority in the union boards. This was done not only by campaigning but also by securing a massive turnout of social democratic voters for the union assemblies. The social democratic candidate was picked among the most loyal men, and it was key to have only one on the ballot.

Social democratic workers were told not to sign protests or join strikes or committees, which had participation from communist workers. To do so could lead to exclusion from the local union or club. Communists, as a part of the 'unity from below' policy, would frequently start initiatives among the workers and the social democratic network was to prevent all participation of partisans in such initiatives. They would also report to the AIC about who were behind them.²¹²

Besides the work in the clubs, which was always surrounded by an aura of discretion, AIC had a number of tasks, which enjoyed more publicity. Besides campaigning and producing propaganda material, they published the monthly journal *Social Democratic Notes*, containing articles and commentaries, statistics, caricatures, etc.²¹³

AIC went about its business until 1962, a year which saw changes in both leadership and staff. The 1960's proved turbulent for the AIC, trying to maintain its position while also redefining itself, due to the fast shrinkage of DKP. SDP was cutting funds for AIC during the 1960's, and in 1973 the LO leadership decided to close AIC and incorporate its tasks (by then reduced to be purely informative) into the LO organisation. Communism was as good as dead, winds of *detente* blew internationally, and a change of generation in both party and workplaces rendered the old intelligence-like activities of the AIC unnecessary. A couple of intelligence-scandals during the 1960s also made that kind of activity less tolerable.²¹⁴

²¹² Björnsson 2012, chapter 3

²¹³ *Social Democratic Notes* was first published in 1929 by AIC's predecessor, HIPA and continued until 1961

²¹⁴ Björnsson 2012, pp. 31-32, 73ff.

INTELLIGENCE AND REGISTRATION²¹⁵

One of AIC's tasks was making statistics showing the division of strength in Copenhagen unions. They were made once or twice a year and, in numbers and per cents, showed communist domination (or lack thereof) in the unions. The numbers were published in *Social Democratic Notes*. When debates over this practice first arose in 1971, AIC insisted that the statistics were made up purely of numbers, not names. When the debate surfaced again in 1998, old members of AIC held on to that statement.²¹⁶

However, if one looks into British and American archives, it quickly becomes clear that the statistics contained more than numbers (and that copies went to the British and American embassies); they contained names on every Communist union board leader in Copenhagen, plus names on those not affiliated with any party and those who were members of the SDP but cooperated with communists.

In order to make the statistics the AIC sent out a questionnaire after each general assembly in the unions. On this questionnaire the contact person was not only required to write the name of the board leader, but everyone who had been on the ballot. One must assume that a large quantity of these questionnaires were filled out correctly (otherwise it would not have been possible to make the statistics), which means that the AIC held names, not only of communist board leaders but also board members and candidates, that is, the most active communists in almost every union in Copenhagen.

The statistics were made from 1947 through to the closure of the AIC in 1973 but at some point names were excluded, probably in 1961-62 when there was a large change in staff. Attempts were also made to put together statistics for other parts of the country, but these do not seem to have been successfully carried out in any systematic way.

When communists held conferences or public (and even closed) meetings, AIC sent a contact person, to report what had happened at the meeting: what was being discussed, and who discussed it? Who went and who decided what delegates to send? When answered satisfactorily, it gave a good picture of the hierarchy among the communist workers in the affected factories. It also resulted in long lists of names being sent back to the AIC office. AIC must have had an extensive file on the Danish communists although a central register has never been found.

²¹⁵ Based on Björnsson 2012, chapter 4

²¹⁶ Björnsson 2012, pp. 9ff.

Besides the regular contact people AIC also made use of other people in strategic places. From 1947 onwards, AIC had one or more contacts inside DKP. It is not possible to say whether someone from the social democratic ranks joined DKP, or whether AIC established a contact to someone who was already a member, but fact is that AIC was able to get their hands on internal (and confidential) circular letters from DKP. Hence, AIC often knew what campaigns or activities the communists were planning before they were carried out, and was able to make a detailed map of the DKP organisation, its districts, division of labour, member fees, owned property, etc.

Other informants could be a school director willing to give information about DKP schooling activities (held in the evenings in a public school in Copenhagen), or colleagues at the social democratic newspaper who analysed the economic situation of the communist ditto. Often information could be gained just by buying the communist newspaper to see what campaigns were being run and what arguments to counter.

Although these were all useful sources, there is no doubt that the most valuable source of information and intelligence was the network in the workplaces. In this, AIC had an extensive pool of knowledge about communist activities, not to mention the opportunity to find out quickly what was going on or who was who. In fact, when it came to knowledge of communism in the labour movement, AIC in the 1940's and 1950's exceeded both of the state intelligence services. Which is probably one of the reasons that the intelligence services came to AIC.

Everywhere that DKP was active, or thought to be behind a campaign, AIC kept an eye on them. The battle was not confined to workplaces and unions, but took place in other organisations such as the anti-nuclear movement, tenants' organisations, etc. When the communists spread activities to civil organisations, AIC would follow. AIC took it upon themselves not only to battle communism in the labour movement but in society as a whole.

CONTACT TO OTHER ANTI-COMMUNIST ORGANISATIONS

In 1950, social democratic prime minister Hans Hedtoft reorganised Danish intelligence.

In the years leading up to the reorganisation, AIC's main contacts in the state security apparatus was within the military intelligence (named FE after the reorganisation). Several foreign political reports found their way from FE to AIC. These reports, in turn, were the basis of articles and pamphlets from the AIC.

AIC supplied FE with information on communist agitation and infiltration in relevant unions, and what communist shop stewards were instructed to do in case of a war. AIC also helped screen potential civilian employees for 'sensitive' workplaces (military or strategically important production). Danish defence wanted reliable workers in their industries, and AIC, through the clubs, helped select them.

The reorganisation included a clear division of labour between military and police intelligence, FE and PET, to avoid the same work being done twice: civilian and domestic matters were to belong under PET, and it seems that from then on, PET undertook the contact to AIC.

AIC was, throughout the 1950s (and a bit into the 1960s) PET's main source of information on labour issues. The PET commission concluded that the benefit of this contact for AIC was that they alone controlled whom in the labour movement would be labelled suspicious. However (paying no mind to modesty) I have in my own research found several examples of PET, or someone from the PET helping out AIC with information as well.²¹⁷

A few people such as Urban Hansen and his protégé Frank Christiansen, by way of an informal network, probably undertook the contact. This network, which also counted various private and semi-private organisations (such as CCF and the Home Guard) was the backbone of the anti-communist movement and it ensured loyalty, secrecy, and thereby freedom of operation.

Moreover, AIC had on its board a quite a few big names in politics. Those politicians, both responsible for running the state and AIC could make a shortcut by involving the party organisation in state security. AIC has aided the government more than once in keeping control of the labour movement and attending to matters of national security.

AIC was a semi-private organisation if there ever was one. It was a private party organisation but became but gained a function to government and official intelligence services. It was run by, and collaborating with both private and public actors through a network of personal acquaintances and trusted partners. It was made up of likeminded individuals and held together by inter-personal trust and common ideological beliefs. It had, at least in its 1940s and 1950s prime, all the traits of the Durkheimian corporation and/or McCormicks syndicate.

²¹⁷ Schmidt 2009a, pp. 54ff. Bjørnsson 2012, pp. 146-147, and this thesis, chapter 18. See also Andersen, Mads Lykke, Jonathan Reinhardt, Charlotte Rosen, and Peer Henrik Hansen. "AIC, efterretningstjenesteren og begyndelsen af den kolde krig." *Arbejderhistorie*, no. 2 (2009): 18-34

8. SWEDEN

Also in Sweden, communism was relatively popular immediately after World War II. SKP got 10,3% of the votes at the national election in 1944, as opposed to 4,2% in 1940 – at the expense of social democratic votes.²¹⁸

In 1945 there was a large strike in the metal industry led by communists who had won control over several important unions. The party worked closely with LO and took an active part in all elections within LO-branches and unions.²¹⁹ The methods included collecting information on the political affiliation of all election candidates, coordinate the votes and mobilise voters not least those without a known political affiliation. This campaign helped the social democrats win the congress.²²⁰

This experience confirmed the conviction that party clubs in the workplaces were necessary. The districts were appointed with organising the clubs, which in the words of Sven Andersson had to consist of 'the most suitable party friends' from the different workplaces.²²¹

Paul Björk and Arne Pettersson, both employed in 1947, built the party organisation in the workplaces. Like Urban Hansen they travelled around the country setting up clubs. The procedure was a lot like the one used in Denmark – they teamed up with those most dependable and loyal who in turn found out about the workers' political sympathies and organised the agitation accordingly. Local contacts had to be ready and able to have a go at the communists at every given opportunity. To help perform this task, the party regularly sent the confidential pamphlet *Argument* (similar to AIC-nyt) to its contacts from June 1947.²²²

The party sought to place the best agitators in the regions most vulnerable to communist influence and held courses to better equip the shop stewards for the battle. Mapping the political division of strength to steer propaganda and union elections was an integrated part of this work.²²³ Paul Björk also wrote articles for the social democratic newspaper *Morgon-Tidningen* on the communist threat.²²⁴

²¹⁸ Kanger, Thomas, and Jonas Gummesson. *Kommunistjägarna: socialdemokraternas politiska spioneri mot svenska folket*. Stockholm: Ordfront, 1990, p. 15. Kanger and Gummesson states that the communists got 3,5% in 1940, but the Swedish statistical bureau states 4,2 - http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart____32065.aspx

²¹⁹ Kokk 2001, pp. 84-85, Kanger and Gummesson 1990, pp. 11-14

²²⁰ Lampers 2002, p. 272, Kokk 2001, p. 86, Kanger and Gummesson 1990, s. 18-20

²²¹ "de lämpligaste partivännerna". Lampers 2002, p. 273, Kanger and Gummesson 1990, pp. 24-27

²²² Lampers 2002, pp. 274-279, Kanger and Gummesson 1990, p. 13

²²³ Kokk 2001, pp. 87-88 og Kanger and Gummesson 1990, pp. 38-39, 41-43

²²⁴ Lampers 2002, p. 303. These articles caught the attention of the American embassy, who initiated a working relationship with Björk which brought him on a study trip to the US. Lampers 2002, pp. 290ff. A number of articles were published in 1950 with the help of the local ECA mission. Björk, Paul.

Party work in the factories continued unabated in the time to come. Björk and Pettersson turned to their local contacts if they needed information on a given person, club or fraction.²²⁵ In 1950, names were collected on those in the unions who had voted against collective affiliation with SDP.²²⁶

In 1955 Arne Pettersson initiated organising a central file on contacts in the most important unions and clubs in Sweden. He went about it by writing to the different party districts, asking for a list of reliable people to function as contacts.²²⁷

From then on, the work of the party organisation was pretty much 'business as usual' throughout the 1950's and 1960's. In 1958, 1961 and 1965 the Party carried out nation-wide investigations of the industrial/political situation, which is to say they statistically mapped the political division of strength in all of the country's LO-unions.²²⁸

From the mid-1960's, a small group of people from the inner party circle formed the 'K-group' (K is probably for Kommunist), consisting of leading party and LO representatives. There is not much research on it, but it seems that it continued to exist for some years into the 1970's.²²⁹ After this, the active anti-communism within SDP faded – probably caused by the fading of communist influence and the advance of a new radical left wing.²³⁰

PERSONNEL CONTROL

After the war, 'personnel control' – controlling who would be employed at 'sensitive' workplaces such as military production units or construction at defence sites – became relevant in Sweden as in Denmark. From a military point of view, exclusion of communists from being employed in the military industry was a matter of public safety, especially after 1948. The SDP gave a helping hand.²³¹

PM Tage Erlander argued in parliament that communism should be fought openly, by democratic means and 'objective information'. In his diary in 1950, he wrote that Sven Andersson wanted to take 'major' action on the communists, including involving the secret service. Erlander wrote that Andersson might be right from a tactical point of view, but that it

Remote control: Swedish socialdemocracy looks at communism. The ECA Special Mission to Sweden, Stockholm, 1950.

²²⁵ Kokk 2001, pp. 87, 92, Kanger and Gummesson 1990, p. 45

²²⁶ Lampers 2002, p. 297

²²⁷ Lampers 2002, pp. 106, 448, Kanger and Gummesson 1990, pp. 79-80

²²⁸ Kokk 2001, pp. 93-94, Kanger and Gummesson 1990, pp. 115-117

²²⁹ Lampers 2002, p. 340

²³⁰ Which, by the looks of it, it was left to IB to watch.

²³¹ Lampers 2002, pp. 281-283, 303, Kokk 2001, pp. 88, 155-156, 407 Kanger and Gummesson, p. 62

was 'frightening' to listen to him. He also wrote the same year that one should not 'babble openly about these things.'²³² There was a difference between what was said in public and what was done behind the scenes. Erlander seems to have been conflicted, but in the end accepting.

Police intelligence seemed reluctant to deal with personnel control – possibly because they had been compromised by far too many registrations during the war years, and had trouble finding their ground afterwards. Moreover, the party did not trust the police's ability to tell a communist from a radical social democrat (which indeed, they were not always able to). To include these subtleties, it would take the work of the people on the spot – social democratic employees.²³³

This suited the military very well – it was easier and involved less friction if they themselves had direct contact with the labour movement. According to the Commander in Chief of the Swedish armed forces 1951-61, Niels Swedlund, 'cleaning' workplaces lay with the workforce. The difficulty was the Swedish labour market agreement, according to which it was nearly impossible to make regulations about a certain political grouping, so dismissal or replacement had to happen with the consent of the relevant union – that way, the dismissed worker could not go to his union for support. In 1952 LO-spokesman Axel Strand hinted that LO would probably not intervene in favour of a dismissed worker in such cases.²³⁴

THE MAKING OF GROUP B/IB

Birger Elmér, who was to become the leader of IB, was employed at Defence Foreign Division in 1951. His main task was analysing Soviet propaganda. In 1953, when he was leader of the military-psychological department, he met Defence Minister Torsten Nilsson. Around this time, the party trusted Elmer with courier tasks (after making sure he was a social democrat).²³⁵

Elmér enjoyed the trust of Erlander and Nilsson and, according to himself, had good relations with Paul Björk, Arne Pettersson, Stig Lundgren (all employed at the party secretariat

²³² "babbla offentligt om dessa ting." Lampers 2002, pp. 63, 68-70, Erlander, Tage, and Sven Erlander. *Dagböcker. 1950-1951*. Hedemora: Gidlund, 2001 (2001b), pp. 95, 104

²³³ Kokk 2001, p. 112

²³⁴ Lampers 2002, pp. 72, 78ff., 110ff.

²³⁵ Lampers 2002, pp. 93-94, 503

in the beginning of the 1950s) and party treasurer Ernst Nilsson. According to Elmér, Björk, Pettersson and Lundgren connected him with the right people in the labour movement.²³⁶

In 1953 Elmér arranged for Arne Pettersson to speak at the Defence Staff on party activities in the workplaces and they agreed to establish a more steady cooperation.

Until 1957 Elmér remained in the Defence Foreign Division, and the contact to social democrats from 1951-57 can be characterised as a business he ran 'on the side'. The cooperation was widened and organised under the name Group B from 1957, incidentally, when former party secretary Sven Andersson took over as Defence Minister.²³⁷

On October 1st 1958, Elmér was formally employed as director. Group B acquired a civil cover firm with the not entirely misleading name *Collector*.²³⁸ He hired a couple of office clerks and Arne Petterson's brother, Karl-Erik Pettersson, brought in from Norrköping where he had been a union representative. According to Elmér, Pettersson was hired to be a connecting link between Group B and social democrats in the workplaces. In 1959, Ingvar Paues was hired. He had performed different tasks for the party, including work in Norrbotten. Supposedly, it was because of this work that Paues was asked by Karl-Erik Pettersson to join Group B.²³⁹

In building up this field organisation, Elmér made good use of the existing workplace network build up by Arne Pettersson in 1955.²⁴⁰ SDP was not the sole architect of Group B. It was mostly a result of internal military decisions, even if SDP had a direct interest in a section working with 'suspicious' elements in the labour market. The first reports from Group B were about communist activities and infiltration in the labour movement.²⁴¹ Through the years, it has been denied that any official party resolution or decision was at the foundation of Group B/IB. But even in the absence of such, the contacts between party and military seem to have been sanctioned by a silent consent in the party elite.²⁴² It seems that several of those actively involved did not care too much whether their work benefitted Group B or the party as it often did both.²⁴³

²³⁶ Lampers 2002, pp. 95-99, 103, Kokk 2001, pp. 412-414, Vinge, Per Gunnar. *Säpochef 1962-70*. Wahlström & Widstrand, 1988, pp. 44, 65

²³⁷ Lampers 2002, pp. 100ff., Kokk 2001, p. 101

²³⁸ Lampers 2002, pp. 489ff.

²³⁹ Lampers 2002, pp. 139ff

²⁴⁰ Lampers 2002 pp. 450-451

²⁴¹ Lampers 2002, p. 129

²⁴² Lampers 2002, p. 116

²⁴³ Lampers 2002, pp. 342-346

GROUP B AT WORK

Group B's work with the labour movement wasn't so different from that of the party itself. Officials travelled around the country making contacts with reliable and well-connected partisans. Whether or not someone met these criteria was found out by contacting the region's local party organisation. The interest was centred on who were active communists, who had been schooled in the East Bloc, and how SDP activities were organised in the workplace. If a potential new contact were suspicious, Group B's representative would refer him to the party secretary (Sven Aspling in those years) who would vouch for the collaboration. This prompted some contacts to think that they collected information for the party, not the military intelligence. New employees were usually also recruited through party contacts.²⁴⁴

Group B created a file on Swedish communists around 1959 and started writing more frequent reports containing information on communist strength in different areas. During this time Elmér frequently (about once a week) met with Defence Minister Sven Andersson. At one occasion Aspling was also present.²⁴⁵

In 1961 and 1962 Group B hired another two social democratic officials and the registration of communists increased considerably until 1963. In Norrbotten, one of the most intensively watched regions, 2.500 names on communists were registered between 1960 and 1963.²⁴⁶

In the beginning of the 1960's there was not much contact between Elmér and his superiors in the military. Certain questions were instead discussed directly with Sven Andersson.²⁴⁷ The party was closer at hand: many Group B-employees had strong ties with SDP and the youth league SSU (young social democrats could be chosen to do their military service in Group B), which gave the work a strong partisan character.²⁴⁸

According to a document from 1962, Group B's main tasks were supervising communism membership and infiltration in the labour movement. At this time, Group B had already mapped the situation in several of Sweden's big industries including Volvo, AGA and

²⁴⁴ Lampers 2002, pp. 350-353, 434, Kokk 2001, pp. 421ff., 482, Vinge 1988, p. 44

²⁴⁵ Lampers 2002 p. 144

²⁴⁶ Lampers 2002, p. 356ff.

²⁴⁷ Lampers 2002, pp. 162, 166, 171ff.

²⁴⁸ Lampers 2002, pp. 169-170

LM Ericsson – work in which social democrats with substantial union experience were key resources.²⁴⁹

With help from party leadership, Karl-Erik Pettersson was removed in 1963 – according to Elmér he was not capable of separating things and considered everything left of the SDP national treason.²⁵⁰ There was a fine line between threat assessment and paranoia.

From 1963, information was also passed on the police intelligence with some regularity.²⁵¹

In 1963 the hectic registration of communists in the labour movement stopped. It can be because the job was considered done – but probably also had to do with the transfer of Karl-Erik Pettersson. In 1965 Group B was merged with the T-office. The new section was named IB and Birger Elmér was appointed leader. Since came the 1973 scandal when the group was revealed performing a wide range of more or less democratically sound intelligence tasks.²⁵²

As in Denmark it was cooperation, which would have never been possible in a state, which was not dominated by a social democratic governments. Also in Sweden, the line between state and party were very hard to draw in these years.

²⁴⁹ "Det handlede huvudsakligen om att samla in och registrera uppgifter om i stort sett alla kommunister och kommunistympatisörer man kunna komma över" Lampers 2002, pp. 166-169. For examples, see Vinge 1988, pp. 46ff.

²⁵⁰ Lampers 2002, pp. 179ff.

²⁵¹ Lampers 2002, pp. 350, chapter 12

²⁵² One IB agent has since told his story which includes infiltrating the Palestinian liberation movement. Ekberg, Gunnar. *De ska ju ändå dö: tio år i svensk underrättelsetjänst*. Stockholm: Fischer & Co, 2009.

9. NORWAY

– All methods were not equally fine and democratic. They never have been in the Social democratic party.²⁵³

– The Labour party is no bloody Sunday school!²⁵⁴

HAAKON LIE AND ROLF GERHARDBSEN

Like in Denmark and Sweden, communists were popular in Norway after the war. NKP obtained 11,9% of the votes in the national election in 1945, as opposed to 0,3 in 1936 (see table 4.2).²⁵⁵

The anti-communist work quickly gained a strong focus and one of the main organisers was Haakon Lie, appointed as party secretary in 1945. Lie was uncompromising style, in some opinions bordering on fanatic, especially when it came to communism. Lie himself would say that he was tolerant towards the tolerant and intolerant towards the intolerant.²⁵⁶

With a burning heart and a formidable intellectual endowment, he is an impressive personality. Organiser, tactician, agitator, inspirer: A Social human being and a work horse. His friends' friend and his opponents' hardwearing chopping block. Loved and hated, hated and loved – this is no conceited servile description of Haakon.²⁵⁷

He was staunchly pro-American and often criticised the detente-oriented policy of the Nordic countries towards the Soviet Union. From having been one of those adhering to the Moscow-theses during the pre-war split in the party, he developed an uncompromising anti-

²⁵³ 'Alle metoder var ikke like fine og demokratiske. Det har de aldri vært i sosialdemokratiet' Gerhardsen 2009, p. 211

²⁵⁴ 'Arbeiderpartiet er fan ingen søndagsskole!' Legendary quote by Haakon Lie.

²⁵⁵ Lund 1996, p. 994, Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 134

²⁵⁶ Gerhardsen 2009, pp. 55, 113-114, 225ff., Bjørlo, Stein. "Et bål av vilje. Haakon Lie - et portrett." In *Arbeiderhistorie 2005*. Oslo: ARBARK

²⁵⁷ 'Med et brennende hjerte og en formidabel intellektuell utrustning, er han en imponerende personlighet. Organisator, taktikker, agitator, inspirator: Et sosialt menneske og et arbeidsjern. Sine venners venn og sine motstanderes uslitelige hoggestabbe. Elsket og hatet, hatet og elsket – det er ingen oppblåst servil beskrivelse av Haakon.' Bye 1987, p. 78

communism matched by few and came out of the 1930s as one of their fiercest opponents.²⁵⁸ Lie would refer to the importance of the work for both party and state.²⁵⁹

Haakon Lie worked with Rolf Gerhardsen (employed at *Arbeiderbladet*, and brother of PM Einar Gerhardsen 1945-51, 1955-63, 1963-65) in his anti-communist ventures. The pair was present at a top government meeting in 1948 regarding measures against sabotage and coups in factories and government administration, and building up a stay-behind apparatus.²⁶⁰ None of the two were employed in government but officially worked solely for the party. It was Rolf Gerhardsen and Lie who built up social democratic intelligence activities, based upon a network in party, government and state intelligence.²⁶¹

In 1945, SDP set up a special labour committee with representatives from party, LO and AOF, which organised the battle against communism in the labour movement from 1945 to 1947. Means varied from mobilising votes for union elections, to registering political affiliation of named persons. The committee asked contacts to send in lists of shop stewards after union elections, where a 'K' beside a name would mark a communist.²⁶² It also built up and maintained the contact net around the country, consisting of reliable shop stewards in the workplaces. They had two primary tasks: representing party views and engaging in discussions (a task for which they were prepared by material sent to them from the party) and reporting back on moods, discussion topics and the political division of strength. This involved names on leading and active communists, and lists of unions dominated by communists.²⁶³ Other means were courses and information work, meetings and schooling in agitation and argumentation. The journal *Arbeidsplassen* (*The Workplace*) was distributed among contacts, and usually contained harsh attacks on communists.²⁶⁴

An anchor in the work (a 'missionary and disciple') was the district party secretary: someone in each district with the responsibility of organising unions, clubs, study groups, etc. Often, a local 'communist problem' was not resolved until a secretary was employed to deal with it.²⁶⁵

²⁵⁸ Lahlum 2009. On Lie's increasing mistrust of Communism and the Soviet Union, see pp. 105-107, 113, 127, 209, 230-231

²⁵⁹ Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 462. Tranmæl is characterised by Swedish international secretary Kaj Björk as the 'spiritual leader' of the Norwegian SDP. Björk 1990, p. 43

²⁶⁰ Njølstad, Olav. *Jens Chr. Hauge: fullt og helt*. Oslo: Aschehoug, 2008, pp. 336, 378

²⁶¹ Gerhardsen 2009, p. 125

²⁶² Lund 1996, p. 1033, Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 136, Johansen, Viggo, Pål T. Jørgensen, and Finn Sjøe. *Vi som styrer Norge: Arbeiderpartiet og de hemmelige tjenestene*. Oslo: Aventura, 1992, pp. 14-15

²⁶³ Bergh & Eriksen 1997, pp. 459-463

²⁶⁴ Lund 1996, p. 1035, Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 455

²⁶⁵ Bergh and Eriksen 1997, pp. 452-453. Quote by Bye 1987, pp. 46-47

As in Sweden and Denmark the military, concerned about communist activities (especially after 1948), turned to those already involved in mapping communists the unions and industries. To meet military needs, a small group of people from the party was gathered. It was called 'the Office', and the military intelligence section Fst II paid its secretaries. They collected names by using the social democratic contact net and sometimes district secretaries were given a small amount for their efforts. Special attention was paid to the Finnmark district, the Norwegian equivalent of Swedish Norrbotten.²⁶⁶

Four 'information secretaries' in the districts of Finnmark, Nordland/Troms, Bergen and Oslo were used specifically as 'help personnel in the surveillance service.' Lie and Rolf Gerhardsen were involved in the arrangement as well as Defence Minister Jens Christian Hauge and the coordinating secretary for the security service Andreas Andersen (both social democrats).²⁶⁷ Besides collecting names on communists, the Office was also paid by Fst. II to send someone to a festival in East Berlin and hold a conference on a weapon factory.²⁶⁸

Around 1951 there was some correspondence as to the future of the Office, which indicates that as far as the military was concerned, the job was done and a register on communists had been set up. The leader from April 1951, Sverre Sulutvedt, (who also ran the aforementioned labour committee at one point) wrote in early autumn that the communist file now held around 10.000 names.²⁶⁹ The Office does not seem to have continued after 1951 – but its personnel, as they moved on to other positions in the party or labour organisations, remained part of the anti-communist network.²⁷⁰

It is highly possible that also POT benefitted from the work of the Office.²⁷¹ As in Sweden and Denmark, cooperation with police intelligence gave the social democrats an opportunity to control who was deemed dangerous or unreliable. Both Lie and Rolf Gerhardsen had contacts in the security police.²⁷² Lie would encourage partisans to cooperate with the security police – apparently the security police valued him highly and some of his books and manuscripts about communism were used in the education of secret service officers.²⁷³

²⁶⁶ Lund 1996, pp. 1002-1009. Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 478

²⁶⁷ Riste and Moland 1997, pp. 65-68. See also Njølstad 2008, p. 389-390

²⁶⁸ Lund 1996, p. 1004, Bergh and Eriksen 1997, pp. 474-483

²⁶⁹ Lund 1996, p. 1003

²⁷⁰ Lund 1996, pp. 1016-1017, 1027

²⁷¹ Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 469 + 1998, p. 377, Lund 1996, pp. 1010-1015

²⁷² Gerhardsen 2009, pp. 114-115, 129, Lund 1996, pp. 1028ff., 1034ff., 1043. On who knew what in the party leadership, see pp. 1065ff.

²⁷³ Lund 1996, pp. 1040-1043, Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 450

Haakon Lie has since denied any knowledge of the Office and its work, or any file on communists. The Lund-report concludes that he must have known but suggests that he perhaps forgot.²⁷⁴ The words of Tron Gerhardsen are more direct: he flatly states that Haakon Lie (and Defence Minister Jens Chr. Hauge, for that matter) lied to the Lund-commission.²⁷⁵ According to Tron Gerhardsen, it was also a given, that PM Einar Gerhardsen knew about (albeit perhaps not in detail), and silently approved of, his brother Rolf's activities without speaking too much about them.²⁷⁶

I did not need a Lund-commission to know that Rolf had a good contact to civil and military intelligence. The road from the conspirative and secretive war years to the Cold War was not long, neither for him nor Haakon Lie. Now, the enemy was the Soviet-loyal communists, in the workplaces and elsewhere in society. It was a war without room for nuances. A time in which an insignificant difference of opinion became dangerous, and equating those who differed in opinion with espionage for Moscow was close at hand. (...)

I can assure you, that the gentlemen Haakon Lie and Rolf had vast and substantial personal knowledge about people who could harbour the slightest bit of communist-sympathy or leftism. Everything was about people. 'Did he vote for a communist-friendly chairman in the union? Did he walk in a protest march? Did he participate in organised travels east of the Iron Curtain? Was he a part of organised peace work? Had he been a member of the communist party?' Names, names and more names.²⁷⁷

Also LO leader Konrad Nordahl had a wide range of contacts in anti-communist work. These are widely documented in the literature, but as this thesis focuses mainly on the party and its secretaries, it will be left out for now. Nordahl and Lie, though politically on the same

²⁷⁴ The same goes for Defence Minister Jens Chr. Hauge. Lund 1996, pp. 1010, 1024-1025, 1038. On Lie's recollection issues, see Lahlum 2009, pp. 304-305

²⁷⁵ Gerhardsen 2009, pp. 121, 125, 128-129. For an evaluation of Lie's involvement an level of knowledge, see Lahlum 2009, pp. 292ff.

²⁷⁶ Gerhardsen 2009, pp. 117-118

²⁷⁷ 'Nå trengte jeg inden Lund-kommisjon for å vite at Rolf hadde god kontakt med den sivile og militære etterretning. Veien fra de konspirative og hemmelige krigårene til den kalde krigen var ikke lang, verken for ham eller Haakon Lie. Nå var de Sovjet-lojale kommunistene fienden, på arbeidsplassene og ellers i samfunnet. Det var en krig uten rom for nyanser. En tid da en ubetydelig avvikende mening ble farlig og de lå snublende nær å sette likhetstegn mellom annerledestenkende og spionasje for Moskva. (...) Jeg kan forsikre om at herrene Haakon Lie og Rolf hadde svært omfattende og betydelig personkunnskap om mennesker som kunne ha den aller minste kommunistssympati eller venstrevri. Alt handlet om mennesker. 'Stemte han på en kommunistvennlig klubbformann i fagforeningen? Gikk han i protesttog? Reiste han på organiserte turer øst for Jernteppet? Var han med i organisert fredsarbeid? Hadde han vært medlem av kommunistpartiet?' Navn, navn og atter navn.' Gerhardsen 2009, pp. 112-113, see also p. 166

page, were personally at odds.²⁷⁸ Therefore, he was not involved in the work Lie did across the borders of Norden (although he might have done his own).

HAWKS AND DOVES: THE SPLIT

Stalin's death in 1953 gave way to a thaw in the Norwegian-Soviet relationship, and apart from in Finnmark, communism was on the wane. However this meant no relaxation on party level in battling communism.²⁷⁹

The thaw in Soviet-Norwegian relations also meant an opening for delegations exchanges. In this connection, as with festivals and union organisations, SDP and POT cooperated on counter-intelligence.²⁸⁰

But a thaw there was. PM Einar Gerhardsen, as the first leader of a Western government, visited the Soviet Union in 1955. Haakon Lie was not happy about this visit, and according to his biographer, this was the first seed of the conflict.²⁸¹

The PM's wife Werna Gerhardsen had visited in 1954. After her visit she continued to socialise with a secretary at the Soviet embassy whom she had met during the trip. These relations were fairly disturbing to POT, not to mention the anti-Soviet wing in the party, first and foremost Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, Haakon Lie and Konrad Nordahl who were kept informed by POT. Partisans close to Werna Gerhardsen reported to POT on her meetings with the Soviet embassy secretary (which the PM was not pleased to find out).²⁸²

No one suspected her of being an actual agent, but being naive was bad enough. Nordahl wrote in his diary in 1958:

It is a horrible business. It can destroy SDP as governing party.²⁸³

Contacts faded out when the embassy secretary returned to the Soviet Union in 1958. However, suspicions against Mrs Gerhardsen continued – in 1964 when Khrushchev visited,

²⁷⁸ Lahlum 2009, pp. 244, 237

²⁷⁹ Bye 1987, pp. 22-23, Bergh and Eriksen 1998, pp. 74-75, 87-88

²⁸⁰ Nordahl, Konrad, and Ketil A. Nordahl. *Dagbøker. Bd 2, 1956-1975*. Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1992, pp. 369-370, Bergh and Eriksen 1998, pp. 87-88, 399ff.

²⁸¹ Lahlum 2009, pp. 352-353. Lie does indeed not talk kindly of it in his own memoirs. Lie, Haakon. ... *slik jeg ser det*. Oslo: Tiden, 1975. pp. 112ff. On Werna Gerhardsen's visit, see Bye, Ronald, Finn Sjøe, and Alf R. Jacobsen. *De visste alt: en dokumentasjon om niende etasje*. Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1993, pp. 23-25

²⁸² Nordahl 1992, pp. 12, 22, 24, 36, 59, 67, 161

²⁸³ Nordahl 1992, p. 161. Lie seems to have had the same concern. Lahlum 2009, p. 357, Bergh and Eriksen 1998, pp. 306-307

Nordahl wrote that the Soviet Union thought her to be among their best friends in the country.²⁸⁴

In the summer of 1957, the SDP congress rejected stationing nuclear weapons in Norway. While Haakon Lie 'hit the roof', it might not have bothered Einar Gerhardsen entirely.²⁸⁵ Following this, Gerhardsen strongly objected to stationing nuclear missiles on Norwegian soil at a December 1957 NATO-meeting. During Easter 1958, a renegade group of social democrats made SDP parliament members and numerous trade unions sign a resolution against nuclear weapons in West Germany. It has since been named the 'Easter rebellion'. Lie hit the roof once again. Upon finding out that a small group without the support of the party leadership initiated it, most signatories turned around and supported the leadership. However, it revealed deeper problems. The 'hawks' of the party considered the affair a direct consequence of Gerhardsens speech in NATO (and it had indeed been presented as such), and his reaction was watched closely and with suspicion.²⁸⁶

It wasn't just about nuclear weapons – it was also a divide between personalities: the uncompromising pro-Western Lie and the pragmatic détente-oriented Gerhardsen. More generally, it was a battle in all of the party about the party line and the attitude to the Soviet Union and NATO. It was a show of unity when the party excluded an opposition group around the publication 'Orientering', but too much damage had already been done.

It seems that the Gerhardsen wing became more detached from the intelligence-related activities, which was, by now, centred primarily around primarily Haakon Lie and Konrad Nordahl, who also received reports on the Gerhardsen family.²⁸⁷ Rolf Gerhardsen was as anti-communist as ever, but he was also loyal to his brother, even if he disliked some of the people in Werna and Einar Gerhardsen's circle (especially Werna's socialising with Soviets). From the mid-1950s, Rolf Gerhardsen became less rigid and more open to debates within the party, something that Haakon Lie disliked.²⁸⁸

The long working relationship and friendship between Lie and Rolf Gerhardsen suffered and the old friends ended up exchanging curses in the party building elevator. Perhaps Lie was

²⁸⁴ Bergh and Eriksen 1998, pp. 308-309, Nordahl 1992, p. 317

²⁸⁵ 'Haakon fly forbanna.' Gerhardsen 2009, pp. 168-169. Just how much Haakon Lie disapproved is evident from Lie 1975, pp. 88-90, 98-99. For Einar Gerhardsen's view, see Gerhardsen, Einar. *I medgang og motgang: Erindringer 1955-65*. Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1972, pp. 116-119. Lahlum 2009, pp. 359-358

²⁸⁶ Bye et.al. 1993, pp. 81ff., Nordahl 1992, pp. 156-158. On the easter affair, see Lie 1975, pp. 141ff., Gerhardsen 1972, pp. 295ff. Lahlum 2009, pp. 368, 388ff.

²⁸⁷ Gerhardsen 2009, pp. 160, 169, 200, 228, 235, Lahlum 2009, pp. 392-394

²⁸⁸ Gerhardsen 2009, pp. 72, 87, 101, 103ff, 161ff., 238, 262

disappointed that Rolf Gerhardsen not only remained loyal towards his brother, but also his refusal to 'talk some sense' into Einar Gerhardsen.²⁸⁹

The split in SDP came to a showdown at an assembly in 1967, when Gerhardsen publicly suggested removal of Lie from the secretary position.²⁹⁰ Lie though, stayed on for another two years.

The cooperation between party, labour movement and security police ebbed out in the beginning of the 1970's, due to a reduced threat from the communists and shifts in the leaderships in both labour movement and POT.²⁹¹ Just as was in other countries, national communism died down, *detente* swept the world and old networks waned away.

²⁸⁹ Gerhardsen 2009, pp. 228ff., 269-270, Lahlum 2009, pp. 439-. It is striking that he hardly mentions Rolf Gerhardsen in his 1975 memoir, even when talking about the 'heavyweights' at Arbeiderbladet. Lie 1975, p. 13

²⁹⁰ Nordahl 1992, pp. 344-345. Gerhardsens speech is cited in e.g. Bye 1987, pp. 80-81

²⁹¹ Lund 1996, p. 1090

10. SCANDINAVIA: COMMON CONCLUSIONS

In the three Scandinavian countries, we see a lot of common denominators. CP's emerged strengthened from the war. Their relative popularity at the first post-war elections (see tables 4.1-4.3) was due to communist resistance work during the war and the Soviet Union's role in fighting Nazi Germany.

However, most Social Democrats in Norden entered the post-war period suspicious as ever.²⁹² It would take more than 4 years of resistance work to convince the SDP's that communists were not the same as always. Few had forgotten the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and communist resistance having come along only when Hitler broke the pact.

From the outset, the Scandinavian SDP's started planning the battle against communism in the labour movement. The apparatus and networks from the 1930s were still fairly intact, and now activated again. It was primarily done by building clubs in workplaces and unions, mimicking the small communist fractions. It was done in a very hands-on, man-to-man way at times – like coming to peoples' homes and making them go and vote in a union or national election.²⁹³

The post-war strengthening (or rather, comeback) of the tension between social democrats and communists was mostly about hegemony in the labour movement, key to the post-war build-up of society – something for which the social democrats had many plans and high expectations. The battle was still mostly political. The party apparatuses and strategies were the same as before.

The events of early 1948 and not least, communist accept of them, led to an increasing rejection of the communists. Not only a competitor in the labour movement, they were now looked upon as henchmen for a foreign power with aspirations of creating satellite states. From discussing communist influence in the labour movement, and how to deal with it tactically, the Nordic parties were now talking about communism as a threat to vital parts of society. Shortly after Finland and Czechoslovakia, Gerhardsen held his 'Kråkerøy speech' in which he stated that communism was a threat to Norwegian democracy, and for those who had joined the NKP in good faith, it was time to get out. Similar points were being expressed from party leadership

²⁹² Lie 1985, p. 22-23. The book is not only a historical account but also an excellent testimony of the attitude towards communism.

²⁹³ Lie 1985, pp. 78-79, Lahlum 2009, pp. 237-238 282, 361, chapter 18

in Sweden and Denmark²⁹⁴ In his opening speech at the 1948 Party Congress, PM Tage Erlander said:

A labour movement lead by communists would seriously threaten the possibilities of a calm development of society and thus obstruct the development of national prosperity²⁹⁵

Sometimes it is claimed that February 1948 represented the final break between the SDP's and CP's, but actually, it was just a cementation of realities.²⁹⁶ There had never really been a bond to break. However, it did cement the fears and suspicions of the SDP's and it certainly represented the final step in securitisation of the conflict. It was established that communists were not only a political enemy, but also a threat to national security.

Securitisation also meant an engagement of the labour movement in the Cold War. Labour officials and rank and file were now told that their efforts were needed not just for the sake of the movement, but the whole country.

One might suspect that social democrats gave securitisation an extra notch to gain support for their battle for the labour movement. While this cannot be ruled out, one must not be mistaken: the fear was very real. Haakon Lie would say to his closest partisans in confidential settings: 'I'll end up in Siberia – and so will you!'²⁹⁷

The dangers of communism were perceived to be bigger than their political influence through representation would suggest. A well-functioning labour movement was key to building up industrial societies, and the fear of sabotage and espionage was widespread. Haakon Lie stated in 1952 that the Communists represented a permanent danger on two fronts: the labour movement and unions, and industries important for the military preparedness of Norway.²⁹⁸ The battle now had these two fronts. The labour front was not neglected, and not taken any more lightly, just because securitisation had set in. In a way, that was a battle for security as well. The SDP's had a political project – the welfare state. Their vision was only possible to carry out with the support of the labour movement. A communist-dominated movement was a threat to the entire political foundation of the SDP's. The development in light of the state-integrated SDP, is almost a given: social democrats believed that keeping

²⁹⁴ Lie 1985, p. 267. On the Kråkeroy speech, see Bergh and Eriksen 1997, pp. 150ff. Lahlum 2009, pp. 268-270

²⁹⁵ '...en av kommunister ledd fackföreningsrörelse skulle allvarligt hota möjligheterna till en lugn samhällsutveckling och därmed hindra välstandsutvecklingen.' Kanger and Gummesson 1990, p. 16

²⁹⁶ E.g. Lahlum 2009, pp. 268-269

²⁹⁷ 'Jeg havner i Sibir - og det gjør dere også!' Lahlum 2009, p. 274

²⁹⁸ Bergh & Eriksen 1997, p. 448

communists in check was a common interest shared by state, party and labour movement. State and party interests were thoroughly mixed up when it came to fighting communism, and the blurring of borders between them did not become any less.

State organisations and party could complement each other: the state had the economic resources, the party and the labour movement had the personal knowledge about those environments in which the communist were and they had the practical political judgement.²⁹⁹

As the party apparatuses became increasingly concerned with communism, they also came to function as an intelligence source. If someone centrally at the party needed information, the party secretary or one of the main communist-fighters would write the relevant union, district or organisation asking about information on named persons, or names of people suspected of being communists. Other times they would ask about communist tactics or strength.³⁰⁰ This was obviously impossible without the network. It consisted of the apparatuses and their loyal contacts. The SDP's were indeed ideological corporations with large human resources.

Securitisation gave way to a democratically doubtful practise in which SDP's cooperated with state intelligence services. There is no doubt that intelligence services benefitted from social democratic connections.

An obvious advantage was for the SDP's to be able to control who were deemed untrustworthy in personnel control questions, and be able to 'save' partisans from ending up on police lists. One must assume that a near monopoly of labour market surveillance suited the parties well. It was *their* field, and they had the expertise.

Speaking of personnel control: in the late 1940s and some way into the 1950s the SDP's had a huge say in whether or not someone could get hired at a sensitive workplace, and they would cooperate with the relevant authorities to secure important industries. This is an area in which one of their main strengths were: the widespread access to knowledge about almost every worker in the country made them very powerful in deciding who was a security risk. While it was very rare for someone to actually be fired (labour market laws and all), the SDP could actively prevent someone from being employed or promoted.³⁰¹

²⁹⁹ 'Statsorganer og parti kunne utfylle hverandre: Staten hadde de økonomiske ressursene, partiet og fagbevegelsen hadde personkunnsken om de miljøer der kommunistene fantes og de hadde det praktisk-politiske skjønnet. Lund 1996, s. 999

³⁰⁰ The examples are endless. A few: Lahlum 2009, p. 299, Bjørnsson 2012, chapter 4, Kanger and Gummesson 1990, pp. 12, 18

When the limits of cooperation are vague and undefined, they allow for different interpretations by the involved actors. Cooperation of this kind can be interpreted both as a firm and regular cooperation and sporadic and informal contacts. The definition will vary depending on whom you ask, but this author leans towards regular cooperation.

Swedish Sven Andersson has argued that there was no cooperation, because there was no giving or taking of orders and no operative coordination, but this rigid definition of cooperation seems to be directed more at distancing the party from intelligence work than actually characterise the relation. There can be no doubt that high ranks of the party knew – and approved – of such relations just by not expressing any wish to stop them. Of course there could be no official blueprint. Cooperation had to be kept informal and handled through informal networks and contacts.

Swedish party Secretary Sven Aspling has rejected that democratic principles were broken or that the party abused its power. In stating this, he refers to the undemocratic nature of communism. According to him, it would have been downright 'irresponsible' for the SDP's not to do what they did.³⁰² This touches upon an interesting point in the perception and self-image of social democrats in Scandinavia: the undemocratic nature and subversive designs of the communists was a threat to democracy to an extent that they could only be met with undemocratic countermeasures, and being not only communism's main enemy but also state-bearing parties, the SDP's were, in their own eyes, self-entitled to do the job. The ends justified the means, and letting be (or just leaving it to the security services) would be downright irresponsible.

The obvious counterargument is that intelligence activities within the parties went on before securitisation set in. But the threat against the labour movement and the social democratic vision was serious enough in itself.

Enn Kokk makes a point of stressing that official security and party battles against communism were two different things, as the latter was done from a position of ideology and political interest.³⁰³ But is it, in reality, possible to totally separate the two? To presume that the work of the state intelligence services in the first Cold War had nothing to do with the social democratic work that they depended upon seems a bit optimistic. Vinge is right to point out that developments must be seen in the context of activities started by the party already in the 1930s.³⁰⁴ Even though party elite did not participate operatively in state intelligence work, it does not seem realistic that it could have even been carried out the way it did without help

³⁰¹ Lahlum 2009, p. 293

³⁰² Aspling 1999, pp. 76-78. See also Kokk 2001, p. 103

³⁰³ Kokk 2001, p. 99

and blessing from the party. The social democratic contact net and workplace organisation was the very backbone of post-war intelligence in the labour movement.

There are also those who find that party and intelligence were 'in bed together' to an extent that it was not possible to distinguish.³⁰⁵ This is an overstatement. The organisational separation was upheld, contacts were kept informal, and none of the parties had total insight into each others business and work. But there was clearly shared interests and a division of labour which worked for both parties. Moreover, the security services was run by social democratic ministers who knew the people engaged in the labour movement. The social democratic state was the 'invisible hand' that (sometimes also visibly) tied it together.

The SDP's were oligarchies at this time. The bureaucracy enforced the guidelines and demanded strict discipline. Only the ideologically suitable advanced, and party leadership set out the course. Any disagreements were to be held inside the inner circle.

The party leader (not seldom also PM) was the face of the party. His responsibility was setting out the overall political direction of the party and the nation's policy. The LO leader would be in command over, and have responsibility for, labour issues. In different countries, there could be other leading characters, ideologues, political specialists, editors, etc. The success of these characters would often be based on charisma and ability. Lastly, the party secretary was the organiser and tactician, with responsibility for running the party apparatus and keeping in contact with all its subdivisions. The party secretary, therefore, concentrated on those things that were not parliament- or government oriented.³⁰⁶

Nowhere would this double function of the SDP's more visible than in organisational vs. foreign policy. Since the social democrats were not only anti-communists, but also governing parties of small nations in the vicinity of the Soviet Union, it was a balancing act between fighting 'their own' communists and staying on the (relatively) good side of Moscow. Swedish Social Minister Gustav Möller expressed the schism at a SAMAK 1948 meeting where he stated that the battle against domestic communism should be escalated but at the same time, to avoid suffering the fate of Finland, it was necessary to act as good neighbours towards the Soviet Union.³⁰⁷ A concern along the lines was visible at an international (Western) labour conference in early 1950 that produced a document condemning Cominform and its peace propaganda as hypocritical. The neutral countries insisted that the resolution condemn the Cominform, not

³⁰⁴ Vinge 1988, p. 54

³⁰⁵ Such as Kanger and Gummesson 1990, p. 5

³⁰⁶ Inspired by Lahlum 2009, pp. 232-234

³⁰⁷ Lie 1985, p. 255

the Soviet Union.³⁰⁸ In one 1947 anecdote from Norway, reported by an American diplomat, a Soviet diplomat called Haakon Lie, to complain about his writings in *Arbeiderbladet*, which the Soviet diplomat found to be anti-Soviet. Lie rebutted: 'I write about the Norwegian Communist Party, not about the Soviet Union. And that I seek to crush the Communist Party, I believe you are very well aware.'³⁰⁹

The SDP's found themselves in this schism time and again, and in Norway it was close to breaking up the party. The division of labour within the party oligarchy was most visible in this area. While Prime and Foreign Ministers and state bureaucracy worried about the Soviet Union, the party secretary and organisational apparatus worried about domestic communism.

³⁰⁸ Which annoyed Haakon Lie, who wanted a more integrated NATO policy. Lie 1985, pp. 421-422

³⁰⁹ 'Jeg skriver om det norske kommunistpartiet og ikke om Sovjetunionen. Og at jeg forsøker å knuse kommunistpartiet er du sikkert alt klar over.' Quoted in Lahlum 2009, pp. 250-251. Perhaps needless to say, Russian embassy personnel were forbidden to be in contact with Haakon Lie.

11. FINLAND

TANNER, LESKINEN AND THE LEGACY OF WAR

The story of Finnish SDP's early Cold War is to a high extent a story of its Nordic ties and tense relations to the Soviet Union. A leading figure was Väinö Tanner, Foreign Minister (1939-1940), Trade Minister (1940-42) and Minister of Finance (1942-44) when Finland fought the Soviet Union (The Winter War 1939-40, The Continuation War, 1941-44). In 1946 he was sentenced to 5,5 years in prison for 'war responsibility', along with other social democrats. When a social democratic government released him in late 1948, it was criticised by the communists and Soviet press.³¹⁰ Tanner became a symbol of fighting the 'foreign gods' as he himself worded it. After the war, the anti-communist Tanner wing dominated the party. Tanner also had a strong Nordic orientation.³¹¹

The attitude was, as explained by Finnish historian Mikko Majander:

After five years' hard struggle on the battlefield, it was close to treachery to give in to the Soviet Union and the communists in peacetime.³¹²

A central figure in the Tanner wing was Väinö Leskinen, who had fought in both the Winter and Continuation Wars. He was an MP and held different ministerial positions throughout the 1950s and 1960s, but perhaps most importantly, he was party secretary in 1946-57. Like Tanner, Leskinen valued the Nordic cooperation highly.³¹³ Another central person to the intelligence work of the party was Veikko Puskala.³¹⁴

A group of young social democratic war veterans had formed the anti-communist group 'the socialist Brothers in Arms'. After the war, the Soviets forced it to dismantle, but the 'brotherhood' went on.³¹⁵ Leskinen was a member, as was Unto Varjonen (party secretary 1944-46, and a friend of Rolf Gerhardsen).

³¹⁰ Kronvall, Olof. *Den bräckliga barriären: Finland i svensk säkerhetspolitik 1948-1962*. Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 2003, pp. 92-93

³¹¹ Majander, Mikko. "Tillbaka till den nordiska gemenskapen. De finska socialdemokraterna och Norden 1944-1948." *Historisk Tidskrift för Finland* 82, no. 1 (1997): 45-76, pp. 48ff., Kronvall 2003, p. 23, Helenius 1986, pp. 156, 164. Rintala, Marvin. "Vaino Tanner in Finnish Politics." *American Slavic and East European Review* 20, no. 1 (1961): 84-98

³¹² Majander 1997, p. 51

³¹³ Svensson 1986, p. 80

³¹⁴ Majander 2009, p. 131, Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 456

³¹⁵ Björk 1990, p. 65

In politics the SDP was not up against a traditional CP, but the Finnish People's Democratic League – Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto – SKDL. Officially, it was a left-wing coalition party meant to represent everyone left of the SDP. In the eyes of the SDP's, SKDL was mainly a cover-organisation to give the communists a friendlier face. SKDL was not – as was FKP – a member of Comintern.³¹⁶

In 1946-48 Finland had a coalition government, which included the SKDL. During this time the security police STAPO (VALPO in Finnish) was under communist control as the communists had the Ministry of Interior.³¹⁷ After the 1948 elections, a minority government led by the SDP took over. The security police was reformed and a new security service, SKYPO, formed. 'Dissolving STAPO has obviously not closed down this part of communist activities, but at least it is now not paid for with the state's means' the Finnish SDP told the brother parties at a SAMAK meeting in March 1949.³¹⁸

President Paasikivi (1946-56, National Coalition Party) maintained a line of friendship and conciliation towards the Soviet Union (the Paasikivi line), which aimed at keeping the Soviets happy in foreign and security policy, hoping to obtain freedom in domestic affairs. The Paasikivi line was widely unpopular with the Finnish social democrats.³¹⁹ It was continued by President Kekkonen (1956-1982, Agrarian Party, from 1965, Centre Party), and hence dubbed the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line (in 1954 when Kekkonen was PM, Leskinen said of him that he had sold the country)³²⁰

The Agrarian Centre Party usually held government by coalition and SDP rejected coalitions with the SKDL until 1966. An SDP minority government ruled in 1948-1950, 1956-57 and 1958-1959. In these instances, the moderate Karl-August Fagerholm was PM. During the 1950s and early 1960s, Moscow looked upon the SDP as unfit for government and at times exerted pressure on Finland to avoid it.

³¹⁶ Helkama-Rågård 2005, pp. 52-53. For a detailed account of the political relationship between the SDP and the FKP immediately after the war, see Beyer-Thoma, Hermann. *Kommunisten und Sozialdemokraten in Finnland 1944-1948*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harassowitz, 1990

³¹⁷ Kronvall 2003, p. 21, Helkama-Rågård 2005, p. 43

³¹⁸ Reports for SAMAK meeting, March 1949. AAB 1001, Da L0028, Nordisk samarbeid. Isungset, Odd and Morten Jentoft. *Verkebyllen: om menneskeskjebner og agenter i kald krig*. Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1995, p. 85, Helkama-Rågård 2005, p. 45

³¹⁹ Kronvall 2003, p. 191, Kuusisto, Allan A. "The Paasikivi Line in Finland's Foreign Policy." *The Western Political Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (1959): 37-49. It was continued under Kekkonen's presidency (1956-1982) under the term the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line.

³²⁰ Erlander, Tage, and Sven Erlander. *Dagböcker. 1954*. Hedemora: Gidlund, 2004, p 47.

THE FCMA TREATY

On 22 February, President Paasikivi received a Soviet invitation to sign a pact similar to those signed with Hungary and Romania. The letter quickly became known and caused much nervousness in Norden. Was a Nordic country about to end up as a Soviet satellite? On 6 April the treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) was signed. Finland escaped the East European fate and maintained a large measure of domestic freedom but as we have seen, the presidents maintained a foreign policy that would not damage or challenge the Soviet Union. It was a delicate balance, but the Finns made a sharp distinction between themselves and the lesser fortunate Soviet satellites.³²¹

Fagerholm told his colleagues in Oslo that Finland, all things considered, had done relatively good.³²² And she had kept her possibilities for Nordic cooperation. The Soviet Union viewed Nordic cooperation with suspicion as a way of integrating Finland in an anti-Soviet 'bloc' (they were not altogether wrong). Her reservations made Finland an 'observer' to Nordic cooperation in the second half of the 1940s and she did not join the Nordic council until 1955. The other Nordic countries offered sympathy and, as it were, a 'life-line' for continued contact to the West. Norden was a most welcome tie to the West, even if the Finns had to watch their steps. If the door could not be wide open, Nordic cooperation was Finland's window to the world and an opportunity to identify as something other than a Soviet-sphere country.³²³ Various social networks were of the utmost importance for Finland, as expressed by Leskinen in 1946 at a point where the future of Finland was very uncertain: 'We in the eastern zone cannot write about the truth. Our only opportunity comes through personal contact.'³²⁴

Finnish attachment to Norden might best be expressed by President Kekkonen's 1960 speech in which he stated that even if all of Europe turned communist, Finland would remain a Nordic democracy.³²⁵

³²¹ Ørvik Nils. "Nasjonal sikkerhet og nordisk balanse." *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 2–3 (1964): 233-274, p. 249, Majander, Mikko. "The Limits of Sovereignty - Finland and the Question of the Marshall Plan in 1947." *Scandinavian Journal of History* 19, no. 4 (1994): 309-326, p. 325, Majander 2009, p. 127

³²² Majander 1997, p. 71

³²³ Majander 1997, pp. 68, 72, 74, Majander, Mikko. "Kommunistisk frontorganisation eller vörnare av det västerländska samhällssystemet? Den finska fackföreningsrörelsen i det kalla kriget 1947-51." *Arbetarhistoria* 60, no. 4 (1991): 27-31, pp. 30-31, Majander 2009, p. 124, Kurunmäki 2010, pp. 54-55, Hansteen, Wilhelm. "Hvilken rolle spiller de nordiske land, samlet og enkeltvis, for vestmaktene og hvilken interesse har disse av å holde dem utenfor en øst-vest konflikt?" *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 2–3 (1964): 199-207, p. 199, Lindbäck-Larsen, Odd. "Konkluderende bemerkninger." *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 2–3 (1964): 343-350. (1964a), p. 345, Hanhimäki, Jussi M. *Scandinavia and the United States: an insecure friendship*. New York, N.Y.: Twayne, 1997, p. 108

³²⁴ Leskinen at SAMAK, quoted in Misgeld 1988, p. 54

FINLAND AND SAMAK

In Finland, people in all circles are aware that Finland in all aspects belongs to the Soviet Union's sphere of power. Nor are we blind to the possible military-political consequences that this new situation may bring about further down the line.

It is natural that this adaptation is not easy for the people of Finland. It is hardly compatible with Finnish mentality that these results, so important from the Soviet point of view, are reached through force and humiliations.³²⁶

These were the words of a Finnish delegate at a SAMAK meeting in January 1946.

At the February 1948 SAMAK meeting, the Finnish delegation, much to the regret of Leskinen was not able to participate in a discussion about the Marshall Plan, and had to leave Finland out of a declaration signed by the other four countries. At this occasion, Leskinen pleaded for Nordic neutrality. A Western-leaning Scandinavian bloc was frightening for Finland: 'Do you not understand that this will mean that Finland will be in a war against Sweden', Leskinen said.³²⁷

In SAMAK, the Finnish SDP had a forum in which to discuss their problems with communism and the Soviet Union. The support of the Nordic labour movements was an important 'mental resource' to the Finns.³²⁸

But they also found a practical support system. In 1949, social democratic small farmers had broken out from the small farmers' union federation (as it was communist) and formed their own. Now, the new federation needed acknowledgement. Leskinen wrote his colleagues to ask for the new Finnish organisation to be recognised in the Nordic federation of small farmers. After some investigation, Oluf Carlsson wrote back that the new Finnish federation would be recognised, but that they, because of protocol, could not attend an upcoming meeting.³²⁹ In October 1949, Lindblom wrote to his Nordic fellows to ask them not to send representatives to the Finnish woodworkers' forthcoming congress, as the woodworkers had been excluded from SAK. Eiler Jensen answered that he could not decide what the individual

³²⁵ Stadius 2010, p. 238

³²⁶ 'I Finland er man i alle Kredse klar over, at Finland i alle Henseender hører til Sovjet-Unionens Magtsfære. Man er heller ikke blind for de eventuelle militærpolitiske Konsekvenser, som denne nye Situation kan føre med sig i en fjernere Fremtid. Det er naturligt, at denne Tilpasning ikke er let for Finlands Folk. Det er næppe foreneligt med finsk Mentalitet, at man ved Tvang og Ydmygelser naar til denne Udgang, som er særdeles vigtig fra Sovjet-Unionens Synspunkt.' Minutes from SAMAK meeting 5-6 January 1946. ABA 500, 323, 1

³²⁷ 'Förstår Ni inte att detta betyder att Finland kommer i krig med Sverige.' Minutes from SAMAK meeting 7-8 February 1948. ABA 500, 333, 1. Majander 1997, pp. 64, 70

³²⁸ Majander 2009, pp. 61-63, 128

unions would do; however he had informed the relevant social democratic union leaders of the situation and assured Lindblom, that if Danish representatives were sent, they would advocate social democratic views.³³⁰ A similar situation arose in early 1950, when a 'Central Organisation for Building Workers' invited Danish unions to a conference in Helsinki. As the invitation did not go through the usual channels and looked 'strange', some Danish unions wrote LO to ask whether or not the conference had LO backing. Eiler Jensen wrote Lindblom at SAK and found out that the Finnish organisation was a member of WFTU. Jensen wrote the Danish unions that he advised strongly against going to the conference.³³¹ In a situation where every small gain from the communists was a battle, such support from the Nordic labour apparatus was a massive advantage. The labour movement was a central scene for exchange of contacts and ideas.³³²

The other Nordic parties generally showed consideration and understanding for the Finnish situation. A point was made of showing Nordic unity. Leskinen asked Swedish international secretary Kaj Björk to represent Finnish labour interests at SI, and Björk reported back in detail about the Western labour cooperation in which the Finns could not participate. The Nordic delegate at international labour gatherings usually spoke for the Finns.³³³

Moscow and the Finnish communists tried in the beginning to distance Finland from Norden, but it had no resonance with the workers – in the words of Mikko Majander, they would rather be like Sweden than Poland.³³⁴

THE NORWEGIAN CONNECTION

During the war, Leskinen had good contacts to Haakon Lie and Rolf Gerhardsen. They fought on different sides in principle, but were united by their anti-communism.³³⁵ Through their Norwegian connections, the Finns had contact to a broader international anti-communist network. Lie tried to have Finns join the Congress for Cultural Freedom and offered Leskinen a paid trip to Brussels.³³⁶

³²⁹ Correspondance, Leskinen/Carlsson, June 1949. ABA 500, 807, 1. Leskinen to Aspling, 7 June 1949. ARBARK SE 1889, E2B, 04 1949

³³⁰ Correspondence Lindblom/Jensen, October 1949. ABA 1500, 1330, 0002

³³¹ Correspondance January 1951. ABA 1500, 1330, 0014

³³² Majander 1997, p. 76.

³³³ Majander 1997, p. 73, Majander 2009, p. 126, Björk 1990, p. 66

³³⁴ Mikko Majander at the conference *Intelligence and Security in the Cold War around the Baltic Sea* NORCENCOWAR/Turku University, 28-30 juni 2010

³³⁵ Helenius 1986, p. 166, Gerhardsen 2009, p. 116

³³⁶ Majander 2009, p. 139

Norway took a special interest in Finland for fear that their vulnerable situation could also damage Norway. While the Finnish SDP was officially closest to – and had a special relationship with – the Swedish party, the Norwegians and Finns had a special covert relation.

In early 1948, Rolf Gerhardsen asked Andreas Nøkleby, journalist on a social democratic newspaper (who had earlier travelled in Finland and made good contacts with Finnish social democrats), to go to Finland to report. His reports, and other intelligence including photographs from border regions and a copy of the Finnish SDP's communist register (from Puskala), went not only to the Norwegian SDP, but also Fst II that partly sponsored the venture.³³⁷

One of Nøkleby's reports is in the Norwegian archive. It is based on conversations with social democrats and centres on the FCMA-negotiations and the communists. According to the report, President Paasikivi originally wanted to have the negotiations in Helsinki, but was persuaded by the social democrats to go to Kremlin, rather than having 'the communists, hiding behind the Russian delegation, with their communist-controlled radio and their communist-controlled Stapo, encourage marches and demonstrations.'

In the upcoming election the social democrats expected a communist defeat – even in Lappland, where a mere 6 social democratic officials were up against 30 communist. On the elections being fair, the social democratic contacts believed that they would be – and if the communist were to try something, counter-measures had been prepared. Counter-measures were also prepared in case the communists tried to stir up trouble during the negotiations. These 'counter-measures' are not elaborated, but according to Mikko Majander, the SDP had arranged meetings all over the country swearing to fight a military pact in particular and the communists in general. They had also prepared for a communist coup, and formed an alternative leadership in case of the existing one being imprisoned. The report also contains information about the police unions, which were controlled by communists, all with 'cars and weapons.'

In spite of all this, the Finnish partisans were not too worried about the situation becoming the same as in Czechoslovakia: the communists were not as strong as they had been, and the Soviets would probably not go to such extremes in light of the international situation.³³⁸

This was the kind of intelligence that both Fst II and the Norwegian SDP got out of having a partisan stationed at the embassy.

³³⁷ Isungset and Jentoft 1995, pp. 25ff. Lund 1996, s. 1031, Majander 2009, p. 131, Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 457

In these years, according to Mikko Majander, there was – also in Finland – a blurred and sometimes non-existing line between intelligence and party work. American contacts stated in 1950 that the best place to go for political intelligence was the social democratic network.³³⁹

Later in 1948, party official Joachim 'Jack' Helle, replaced Nøkleby as 'social attaché' at the Norwegian embassy in Helsinki. Defence Minister Jens Hauge appointed him. The Foreign Ministry did not pay his salary as is routine with diplomats: it was paid by the military intelligence service whose chief, Vilhelm Evang, regularly visited him. Helle built a contact net of Finnish social democrats, even one in the military. In 1949, he reported that the communists had built a covert network where they, among other things, mapped buildings and communications lines. This was all information from Finnish partisans.³⁴⁰

Magnus Bratten (LO secretary 1945-49) followed Helle in 1950. He continued the contact to anti-communist partisans, began organising a stay behind-network in cooperation with American and Britons, and ran operations where Finnish citizens went across the border to observe and report on the Soviets. According to Helle himself, these activities were blueprinted by Gerhardsen (not clear which Gerhardsen). He too had the title 'social attaché', was paid by the military and was not on the Foreign Ministry's list of diplomats.³⁴¹

Thus, the Norwegian party used their government position to keep a partisan in the Finland embassy to collect intelligence through Finnish partisans. At one point, Defence Minister Hauge wanted similar arrangements in Stockholm and Copenhagen, but it doesn't seem to have become reality.³⁴²

How long these networks existed is, as often, unclear, and later troubles within the Finnish SDP (to which we shall return) might have made it more difficult.

WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM THEIR FRIENDS: FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR ANTI-COMMUNISM

Battling communism was no small enterprise. When the SDP started an organisation campaign in 1945, the Nordic labour movements helped their sister party financially (as they

³³⁸ Confidential report, March 1948. AAB 1889, Da, L0020, Finland. Majander 2009, p. 131, Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 457

³³⁹ Mikko Majander at the conference *Intelligence and Security in the Cold War around the Baltic Sea* NORCENCOWAR/Turku University, 28-30 juni 2010

³⁴⁰ Isungset and Jentoft 1995, Riste and Moland 1997, pp. 32 ff., Majander 2009, pp. 131, 135, Borgersrud, Lars. *Fiendebilde Wollweber: svart propaganda i kald krig*. Oslo: Oktober, 2001, p. 97

³⁴¹ Majander 2009, p. 138. For the story of Norwegian operations from Finland, see Isungset and Jentoft 1995, pp. 15, 42 ff., Riste and Moland 1997, pp. 96 ff., Also Lie was involved in some of the operations in Finland. Njølstad 2008, p. 399

³⁴² Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 458, Njølstad 2008, pp. 400-402

had during the Winter War). The first year, a third of the costs (1 million mark/35000 SEK) was covered by the Swedish SDP and the support continued the following years. In 1948, the Scandinavian LO's supported the Finnish SDP by 100.000 SEK. Besides this, local unions also received financial support from Nordic sister organisations.³⁴³

In November 1948, editor of the Finnish Swedish-language paper *Svenska social-Demokraten*, Hagman, wrote Oluf Carlsson to ask for financial support from the Danish party. To underline the seriousness of the situation he compared the paper to the Swedish-language communist publication, *Ny Tid*, which came out 6 days a week, while he could only afford to send out *Svenska social-Demokraten* 3 days a week.³⁴⁴ The outcome is not apparent from the archive, but Hagman was able to raise the number to 6 times a week shortly thereafter. In early summer of 1949 Hagman wrote to Sven Aspling because he was in danger of having to go back to 3 times a week. Once again he underlined the necessity of combatting the communist equivalent, which had the backing of a superpower. Through Leskinen, a budget for the paper was sent to members of SAMAK and Hagman pleaded for a decision on the forthcoming meeting in July. In August, Oluf Carlsson wrote Sven Aspling that the Danish party and LO had agreed to contribute with 10.000 DKK (7.500 SKK or approx. 300.000 mark) and asked how to get the money to the right place.³⁴⁵ Since the Scandinavians usually made the same decisions in such cases (although with differences in amounts given) one must assume that the others also donated.

At a January 1949 meeting between the Nordic LO leaders, it was discussed whether to economically support a Finnish labour school that needed money to be built. On account of the 'difficult economic conditions' for SAK, Eiler Jensen declared that the Danes were ready to support the school, whereas the Norwegians and Swedes needed to discuss the matter. It might have been the Kiljava institute, for which the Scandinavians donated 10.000 kroner (approx. 300.000 mark).³⁴⁶

In September 1949, SAK wrote Danish LO and requested economic support to prevent a division:

³⁴³ Majander 1997, pp. 58-60, Majander 2009, p. 145, Erlander 2001b, p. 149. Norway – in total secrecy – donated 12 cannons during the war. Lahlum 2009, pp. 126-127

³⁴⁴ Toivo Hagman to Oluf Carlsson, 8 November 1948. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 04 1949

³⁴⁵ Correspondance May-June 1949. ARBARK 1213, A1, 6, SAMAK 1949. Carlsson to Aspling, 26 August 1949. ARBARK 1880, E2B, 04 1949

³⁴⁶ Minutes from meeting, 8 January 1949. ABA 1500, 1063, 0008. Majander 2009, p. 141

It is clear that whether or not FFC [SAK] remains whole or the movement is divided, the battle within the labour movement and at the labour market will be fought to the bitter end. This battle will not be easy. It requires strength, and above all, means.³⁴⁷

One year later, it seems the request was still pending.³⁴⁸ Aku Sumu and Olavi Lindblom of SAK wrote on the progress of the 'violent' communist campaign against the social democrats that had begun in 1949. To counter the campaign, the social democrats had employed temporary officials and spent a lot of money. The campaign was not entirely unsuccessful – in the late 1940s social democrats and other non-communists held a majority by 152 seats against 65 in SAK; however some unions had been taken completely over.³⁴⁹ Strike campaigns and threats of unrest over salary question continued to stress the social democrats:

We are dealing with a communist campaign, which neither in methods nor means, seems to know any limits. As far as we know, the Finnish Communist Party has some hundred agents around the country in its service. In some districts, the proportion between social democrat and communist paid officials can be as much as 2 to 40. During the autumn strike movement, we have become aware that about 200 agents educated at the so-called University for Western Minorities, has come to Finland and been spread all over the area.

Of course, exact information on the communist way of financing its activities, cannot be obtained. At any rate it is out of the question that their visible income in the shape of member's fees etc. covers the expenses. Something could be said about the fact that the big business Seximo, which takes care of all imports from the Soviet Union, has recently put 60 motorbikes at the FKP's disposal and that it, in different portions, has given tens of millions specifically to promote FKP's labour activities.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁷ Det är klart, att om än FFC förblir helt, eller rörelsens splittras, kommer kampen inom fackföreningsrörelsen och på arbetsmarknaden att fortgå till ett bittert slut. Denna kamp kommer inte att vara lätt. Den fordrar krafter och fremförallt medel.' Finnish SAK to Danish LO, 1 September 1949. ABA 1500, 1330, 0002

³⁴⁸ Ejnar Nielsen to Konrad Nordahl, 4 October 1950. ABA 1500, 1330, 0011

³⁴⁹ Attachment to report, undated. ABA 1500, 1069, 0004

³⁵⁰ Vi har att möta en kommunistisk kampanj, som varken I fråga om metoder eller resurser tycks känna några gränser. Så vitt vi vet har Finlands Kommunistiska Parti I sin tjänst hundratals agenter runt om i landet. I vissa distrikt kan proportionen mellan socialdemokratiska och kommunistiska avlönade funktionärer förhålla sig som 2 til 40. Under höstens strejkrörelse har vi fått reda på, att ca 200 vid det s.k. universitetet för västerns minoriteter I Sovjetunionen utbildade agenter komit över till Finland och spritts ut över fältet.

Självfallet kan exakta uppgifter om kommunisternas sätt att finansiera sin verksamhet icke erhållas. I varje fall är det uteslutet, att deras synliga inkomster i form av medlemsavgifter m.m. Täcker utgifterna. Någoting torde emellertid kunna utläsas ur det faktum, att den stora affärsfirman Seximo, som ombesörjer all import från Sovjetunionen nyss ställt 60 st. Motorcyclar till FKP:s friaförfogande och att den I olika poster skänkt tiotal miljoner fmk att användas uttryckligen för att främja FKP:s fackliga verksamhet. Aku Sumu and Olavi Lindblom 30 October 1950. AAB 1579, Dd, L0104, Skandinaviske forbindelser, Finland. See also Majander 2009, p. 140

It was to combat these odds, that SAK now asked their Nordic brother organisations for a loan of 20 million Finnish mark over 10 years. In December 1950 it was decided that the Swedes donate 75.000 SEK, the Norwegians and Danes 50.000 NOK and DKK (approx. 6,5 million marks).³⁵¹

Money wasn't all the Finnish party received, and the Nordic sister parties were not the only benefactors. In 1949, Norwegian Defence Minister Jens Christian Hauge saw to it that a donation of 225 tons of oranges was made to the Finnish SDP. The donation was officially made by a Norwegian labour movement's organisation that acted as a mediator. In reality, the money came from a Norwegian military intelligence service account, but Majander estimates that American sources were behind the donation. Haakon Lie has stated in an interview that it was only right for the Finns to receive their own 'Marshall money'.³⁵² Haakon Lie and Rolf Gerhardsen was involved in the orange operation (perhaps even as initiators – Gerhardsen put Leskinen in contact with Hauge). The oranges were sold in Finland, where they were luxury goods. In 1949, the Finnish SDP made 55 million mark selling oranges. They expressed their gratitude towards both the US and the Norwegians and explained that the money was immensely important for the Finnish labour movement.³⁵³ Tron Gerhardsen writes that not until he read Majander's 2009 article did he understand the many references to oranges in his fathers' notebooks. When asking his mother why Rolf Gerhardsen always hummed to himself while eating oranges, his mother would just shake her head.³⁵⁴

Apart from the oranges, the Finnish SDP imported coffee and made 30 million marks selling it in Finland. The Scandinavian labour movements found different ways of helping out their Finnish brothers; there was a general shortage of goods and through their Nordic contacts the Finnish partisans got their hands on fish, sugar, cigarettes, stockings, chocolate, soap and other produces, which was sold at great profits. The imports were registered as charity donations, which allowed for eased taxes and import tariffs. Most parties (and the church) financed their activities through these kinds of import deals after the war (the communists specialised in Swiss watches), which is probably the reason that no one has been interested in a large investigation. However, according to Mikko Majander, the SDP were by far the ones

³⁵¹ Majander 2009, p. 140

³⁵² Majander 2009, pp. 132-134, Njølstad 2008, pp. 397-398. Majander at the conference *Intelligence and Security in the Cold War around the Baltic Sea* NORCENCOWAR/Turku University, 28-30 juni 2010, Lahlum 2009, p. 292. The irony of this arrangement in the light of the many slanders against communists for receiving money from Moscow seems to have been lost on Lie.

³⁵³ Majander 2009, pp. 132ff., Njølstad 2008, p. 398

³⁵⁴ Gerhardsen 2009, pp. 115-116

who received most outside support. In 1954 the SDP was been freed in court for economic criminality.³⁵⁵

Support from the American labour movement was arranged through Irving Brown, European director of the AFL (who visited Finland in 1949). They helped with money, a printing machine, and cars.³⁵⁶ 10 Buicks from the US were donated to the Finnish SDP via the Swedish party in 1951. The party took 8 in use and the final two were prizes in lucrative lotteries.³⁵⁷ Some say that the AFL-money came from CIA, but there are also examples of Finnish social democrats having a direct connection to CIA, from which they received regular aid (approximately 10.000 US dollars a month, even though irregularities sometimes arose). The American support lasted until the mid-1950s. In fact, until the mid-1950s, 80% of the Finnish party activities were financed from outside the country.³⁵⁸

The financial support from the brother parties went on all through the 1950s. As late as 1960, the leadership of the Swedish-language paper – now named Svenska Demokraten – once again turned to their Nordic brothers and asked for financial help. From Norway, the answer was positive, and Sweden donated as well.³⁵⁹

There are no precise numbers of how much Finnish social democrats received in total. Majander estimates that Sweden and USA donated the largest amounts.³⁶⁰

It has been shown that the Nordic SDP's were right when they argued that the communists received 'outside' financial support.³⁶¹ However Finnish communists were not entirely wrong either when accusing the social democrats for being sponsored by the US. American and Soviet money were used to fight the Cold War in Finland, as in so many other places.

Receiving money from the brother parties was not wrong in any eyes. Covert funds from a superpower were altogether different. Hedtoft, in a rant against communism, made the statement in 1950-51, that if someone who was 'run' from the outside, it made no sense to talk

³⁵⁵ Meeting of Nordic party accountants, 28 September 1951. AAB 1001, Da, L0041, Danmark. Majander 1997, pp. 58-60, Majander 2009, pp. 134, 138, 141, 145, 147, and at the conference *Intelligence and Security in the Cold War around the Baltic Sea* NORCENCOWAR/Turku University, 28-30 juni 2010

³⁵⁶ Majander 1991, p. 30, Majander 2009, p. 138

³⁵⁷ Majander 2009, p. 145. Isungset and Jentoft 1995, p. 46

³⁵⁸ Majander at the conference *Intelligence and Security in the Cold War around the Baltic Sea* NORCENCOWAR/Turku University, 28-30 juni 2010. See also Isungset and Jentoft 1995, p. 72 according to which CIA received intelligence in return.

³⁵⁹ Correspondence, August-October 1960. AAB 1001, Da, L0209, Finland, Ernst Nilsson 15 October 1960. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 12 1959-60

³⁶⁰ Majander 1991, p. 30, Majander 2009, p. 147

³⁶¹ Majander 2009, p. 140. The support from Moscow is documented in Thing 2001

about integrity. Erlander had a more complex view. About the Finnish 'Marshall money', he wrote in his diary: 'So here we are. Morals are not as simple as Hedtoft thinks.' Leskinen denied to at least the Swedish LO, that they received support from the Americans.³⁶² So sensitive was the issue, that even among brothers, only a small closed circle knew.

SAK, WFTU AND ICFTU

SAK gained a lot of members after the war and became a powerful societal factor.³⁶³ However, the SDP did not dominate the labour movement in the same way as their Scandinavian neighbours. SAK had communists in its leadership under chairman Eero Wuori (1937-45), and social democrats feared 'losing' SAK altogether. Thus, they started an organisation campaign in the summer of 1945, including building a contact net similar to that of the Scandinavian countries. It paid off: in 1947, after a campaign promoting Nordic democracy, the social democrats assumed dominance over SAK.³⁶⁴

In 1949, Finnish communists initiated a wave of strikes, which were condemned by the social democratic SAK-leadership. The social democratic government saw it as an attempt to shake the foundations of Finnish society, and was ready to meet the communists with police and military, if necessary. They had all strategically important installations under surveillance. Fagerholm underlined that Finland should and would not suffer the fate of Czechoslovakia.³⁶⁵ The Swedish military attaché in Helsinki wrote in 1950 that the issue of dominance in SAK was paramount for the Finnish attitude to the Soviet Union as the organisation had an influential position in society.³⁶⁶

In 1949 the Scandinavian labour movements joined the newly formed Western ICFTU. SAK dared not follow suit, but they continued cultivating relations with their Nordic sister organisations. SAK worked along the same lines of the Nordic LO's whenever possible, and closely followed the development in ICFTU.³⁶⁷ In May 1950, delegates from SAK decided break off organisational ties to WFTU, followed by drawn-out negotiations between SAK and WFTU.³⁶⁸ After a visit from WFTU, Olavi Lindblom sent a confidential résumé to Swedish LO

³⁶² 'Och där står vi alltså. Moral är inte så enkelt som Hedtoft inbillar sej.' Erlander 2001b, pp. 106, 149

³⁶³ Majander 1991, p. 27

³⁶⁴ Majander 1997, pp. 59, 67

³⁶⁵ Majander 1991, p. 137

³⁶⁶ Kronvall 2003, pp. 188-190

³⁶⁷ Majander 1991, p. 29

³⁶⁸ SAK to Danish LO, 18 April 1951. ABA 1500, 1330, 0013. Majander 1991, p. 29-30

Chairman Axel Strand, which was also received in the Danish LO. According to this résumé, WFTU had made scarcely hidden threats:

Your geographical situation is the same as your internal situation. You have very good connections to the Scandinavian countries and you sustain the necessary good neighbourly relations to the Soviet Union by being members of an international organisation, whose framework makes cooperation with the Soviet Union possible. (...) If you break with this international organisation, it will be easy to get the impression that you break connections with the Soviet Union as well.³⁶⁹

In 1951 the social democrats gained an overwhelming majority at SAK's IV congress, and shortly thereafter SAK left WFTU. In order to not provoke the Soviet Union too much (and in the name of neutrality) they stayed out of the ICFTU, kept up courtesy exchanges and visits with the Soviet Union, and gave their unions freedom of affiliation. The communist-led unions and federations continued within the WFTU framework.³⁷⁰

Lindblom continued to keep his friends informed, and relations to the Soviet Union offered the possibility of observing and reporting. After attending a conference in Moscow in spring 1952, he wrote a report on the proceedings and his observations on Soviet policy. The report was in English to also be read by ICFTU and TUC general secretaries Oldenbrook and Tewson.³⁷¹

In 1955 the Soviet Union loosened its grip and Finland was recognised as a UN-member and a Nordic council member. In 1957, SAK even joined the ICFTU.

³⁶⁹ 'Edert geografiska läge är detsamma som Edert interna läge. Ni har synnerligen goda förbindelser med de skandinaviska länderna och ni upprättholder det nödiga goda grannförhållandet till Sovjetunionen genom att vara medlem en internationell organisation inom vars ram samarbete med Sovjetunionen är möjligt. Alla vet, att Sovjetunionen är världsfederationens viktigaste organisation. Det är den organisation, som bäst respekterar världsfederationen, dess beslut, stadgar och offentliga uttalanden. Bryter Ni med denna internationella organisation, kan den uppfattningen lätt uppstå, att Ni bryter förbindelserna även med Sovjetunionen.' Résumé of meeting in Helsinki, 9 June 1950. Attached to letter 28. July 1950. ABA 1500, 1330, 0008. See also Majander 1991, p. 30

³⁷⁰ Majander 1991, pp. 30-31

³⁷¹ Lindblom to Jensen, 3 May 1952 with attached report. ABA 1500, 1330, 0018

TROUBLES

In 1954, there was a struggle between social democrats in the Workers' Athletic Union. In 1955, a left-wing group of social democrats (with the support of communists), assumed control of the Athletic Union, over which Leskinen had presided until then.³⁷²

The split festered and culminated in an extraordinary party congress in April 1957 where Tanner, supported by Leskinen, narrowly won leadership of the party over chairman since 1946, Emil Skog (Defence Minister 1948-50, 1951-1953, 1954, Finance Minister 1957). The beaten minority were referred to as Skogists. SDP also got a new party secretary: Kaarlo Pitsinki of the Leskinen wing. Skog was unpopular with the right wing of the party, as he had, according to Lindblom (who was himself discharged as SAK secretary), cooperated with communists more than once. One of their leaders was Veikko Puskala who, according to Lindblom, had led the campaign against Leskinen already since 1954.³⁷³

The SDP was effectively divided into two groups. The Leskinen/Tanner wing controlled the party, whereas the Skogists controlled SAK. In 1959 Skog left the SDP with his supporters, and formed his own party.³⁷⁴

After visiting Finland in autumn 1957, Swedish LO-leader Arne Geijer thought it impossible to take sides, partially because it was about personalities clashing. SAK was nervous about the Swedes taking sides in favour of the Leskinen wing, but Geijer assured them that this was not the case. Geijer obviously had some sympathy for the Skogists.³⁷⁵ Aspling followed the situation from the other side through his personal friendship with the counsellor at the Swedish embassy in Helsinki, who passed on inside-information from his conversations with sources in the Finnish party.³⁷⁶

The Scandinavians were confused. They talked about mediating, but ultimately agreed that attempts to interfere would be hopeless. Arne Geijer had already failed.³⁷⁷ Lie flat out

³⁷² Helenius 1986, p. 168. Report on developments in Finland, presented at SAMAK meeting, 29-30 November 1957. ABA 500, 807, Finland

³⁷³ 'P.M. om läget i arbetarrörelsen i Finland, 12 October 1957. ABA 500, 807, 2,

³⁷⁴ 'P.M. om läget i arbetarrörelsen i Finland, 12 October 1957. ABA 500, 807, 2. Helenius 1986, p. 168, Kirby 1979, p. 174, Arter 1980, p. 377

³⁷⁵ Report by Arne Geijer on Finland, 28 October 1957. AAB 1579, Dd, L0315, Finland

³⁷⁶ Correspondence, September 1957 and letter, 22 November 1957. See also letter from Aspling, 13 January 1958. ARBARK E2B, 11 1956-58

³⁷⁷ Correspondence, January-February 1958. ABA 500, 807, Finland, Kronvall 2003, p. 330

stated that he did not have the nerves to attend the 1957 Finnish party congress.³⁷⁸ On the basis of not knowing enough, the Icelandic party stayed out altogether.³⁷⁹

At any rate, it could not have been popular with the other Nordic movements, when SAK and the Soviet TUC issued a joint statement of friendship on 30 June 1958. Nor was it popular that unions and federations affiliated with SAK, and thus ICFTU, were at the same time affiliated with WFTU.³⁸⁰ Such a federation was the Finnish Bricklayers, which led directly to the Scandinavian Bricklayers' Federation being dissolved by the other Nordic unions.³⁸¹

While not taking sides officially, the circle around the Scandinavian party secretaries continued to correspond confidentially with the 'right'/Leskinen wing in charge of the party. After all, Leskinen had been a part of the anti-communist cooperation and one of the Finnish party's most staunch anti-communists since the late 1940's, and he had close relations to the other party secretaries. New Finnish party secretary Pitsinki, being in the Leskinen wing also kept in frequent contact.³⁸²

In December 1958 Lie went to Finland to update himself on the situation, and upon his return, the Norwegian SDP donated 10.000 NOK to the Finnish party as a show of support. Aspling wrote Pitsinki that if they were in need, the Swedes would also be willing to raise support.

The Finnish troubles also received the attention of their American friends and benefactors. Victor Reuther of the AFL-CIO, after conferring with the US State Department, wished to support the Finnish Tanner/Leskinen leadership, possibly financially. Lie was positive, but thought that the money would have to be camouflaged. Trouble was, they needed the support of Arne Geijer, who was the chairman of ICFTU and he seemed sceptical. Lie wrote Pitsinki in early 1959 that he was flat out disappointed with Geijer and Aspling for not processing the case.³⁸³ Lie, however, did not give up: he wrote Morgan Philips of the British Labour Party, stating that the Swedish SDP had given double the amount of Norway to the Finns and that Denmark would probably donate as well. Now he wondered whether the British

³⁷⁸ Haakon Lie to Helene Halava, 8 February 1957. AAB 1001, Da, L0131, Finland

³⁷⁹ Emil Jonsson to SAMAK, 3 February 1958. ABA 500, 807, Finland

³⁸⁰ Joint communique, 30 June 1958. AAB 1579, Dd, L0315, Finland. SAMAK statement of 27 September 1958. AAB 1579, Dd, L0344, Finland

³⁸¹ Norwegian Bricklayers' Union to the SDP, 5 May 1959. AAB 1579 Dd, L0344, Finland

³⁸² E.g. Lie to Pitsinki, 13 January 1959, Lie to Leskinen, 16 February 1959. AAB 1001, Da, L0184, Denmark. Pitsinki to Rolf Gerhardsen, 30 January 1958. AAB 1001, Da, L0161, Finland. Aspling to Leskinen, 28 January 1958. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 11 1956-58

³⁸³ Lie to Pitsinki, 17 December 1958, Lie to Aspling, 23 December 1958. AAB 1001, Da, L0161, Denmark. Pitsinki to DNA, 22 December 1958. Lie to Pitsinki, 6 and 13 January 1959. AAB 1001, Da, L0184, Finland. Aspling to Pitsinki, 18 December 1958. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 11 1956-58.

party was willing to help. He thought it paramount to assist with more than words when it came to oppose Soviet pressure and keep Finland democratic – he feared (not altogether unjustified) that Khrushchev would topple the social democratic-led coalition government.³⁸⁴

At the March 1959 SAMAK meeting, Pitsinki thanked his Nordic brothers for all their help and advice, and stated that ‘something is unquestionably rotten in Finland’ with 8 changes of government in the last 3 years and the communists emerging as the largest party after the last elections. The economy was bad, and unemployment soared. The split wasn’t all about communism – those warring each other had earlier fought communism side by side. According to Leskinen, the troubles basically stemmed from lack of political agreement on how to transform the country from an agrarian to an industrial society. Nevertheless, Leskinen dubbed his political opponents ‘dictatorship aspirers’.³⁸⁵

In April 1960, the party congress re-elected Tanner as chairman and Pitsinki as party secretary. In May, at a SAK council meeting, Skogists (with communist help) outvoted the social democrats. Non-communist unions began leaving SAK at a high pace.³⁸⁶ In July 1960, some of these started work on a new labour organisation, which they reported at a Nordic labour conference in September (where SAK was not represented). The Scandinavian LO’s agreed to wait with a final decision until the new organisation had been formally founded, but thought that they would support it.³⁸⁷ On 5 November, a congress in Helsinki founded a new TUC.³⁸⁸ Norway’s Alfred Skar was there and reported. The new organisation wanted to be a member of both ICFTU and SAMAK and Skar recommended that the Scandinavian LO’s recognise it – he nurtured no hope of reconciliation within SAK. In late November Jaakko Rantanen of the new LO guested the Danish LO who congratulated him on the new organisation and expressed support and willingness to cooperate.³⁸⁹

The question was treated at an extraordinary Nordic labour conference on 8 December 1960. The conference decided following:

³⁸⁴ Lie to Morgan Philips, 2 March 1959. AAB 1001, Da, L0184, Finland

³⁸⁵ Pitsinki’s report and Leskinen’s speech enclosed with SAMAK resumé, 23 March 1959. ABA 500, 331, 2. See also Aspling to Alsing Andersen, 3 February 1959. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 12 1959-60

³⁸⁶ Party international newsletter, 26 April 1960 and 9 June 1960. ABA 1500, 1330, 026.

³⁸⁷ Nordahl to Arne Geijer and Eiler Jensen, 8 July 1960, correspondence about conference, August 1960 and resumé of meeting in Stockholm, 12-13 September 1960, resumé by Alfred Skar. AAB 1579, Dd, L0372, Nordisk fagl. samarbeid. See also resumé by Arvid Lundström, ARBARK 2964, F25B 02, Nordiska fackliga konferenser 1960

³⁸⁸ ‘Strictly confidential’ report by Alfred Skar, 15 September 1960. AAB 1579, Dd, L0372, Nordisk fagl. samarbeid. Helenius 1986, p. 169

³⁸⁹ Report by Alfred Skar, 8 November 1960. AAB 1579, Dd, L0372, Finland. Resumé of meeting, 24 November 1960. ABA 500, 807, Finland

The conference recognises the message that it has been necessary to found a new trade union congress in Finland on a clearly democratic basis. (...)

After having weighed up the development and situation in Finnish labour, the conference recommends that the Scandinavian trade union congresses (...) establish cooperation with the new trade union congress in Finland. (...)

The final decision on the stance towards FFC [SAK] is put off to a later Scandinavian labour conference.³⁹⁰

Even though the decision was put up, the conference's attitude was obvious, with the wording about the new organisation being founded on a 'clearly democratic basis.'

The new Finnish LO became an ICFTU member and Finland now had two TUC's represented in ICFTU. The situation was so confused in early 1961, that none of them were invited to an ICFTU executive meeting and the Scandinavians agreed not to invite any Finns to congresses that year. However, when it was time for a SAMAK meeting, debate arose about what to do. Arne Geijer had the answer: none of the organisations should be invited officially, but unofficially, one could ask the party members that they included people from LO in their delegation. The preferences were clear: SAK cooperated with Moscow. None of the Western TUC's accepted the invitation to the SAK congress in May 1961.³⁹¹

In October 1961, the Finnish LO applied for financial support from AFL-CIO. These made their support dependant on the attitude of the Swedish LO. Arne Geijer, however, would not recommend support while the situation was still unclear. He thought the best strategy was to wait until the official decision about who to cooperate with.³⁹² It was decided in 1962. At the May 1962 SAMAK meeting, Finnish LO representatives were there officially, and Finland was given the secretariat for 1963.³⁹³

³⁹⁰ 'Konferansen tar til etterretning meldingen om at det har vært nødvendig å danne en ny landsorganisasjon i Finnland på et klart demokratisk grunnlag. (...) Etter å have vurdert utviklingen og situasjonen i finsk fagbevegelse, vil konferansen anbefale at de skandinaviske landsorganisasjonene (...) opptar samarbeid med den nye landsorganisasjonene i Finnland. (...) Den endelige avgjørelse om stillingen til FFC utstår til en senere skandinavisk faglig konferanse.' Resumé of Scandinavian labour conference 8 December 1960. AAB 1579, Dd, L0372, Nordisk fagl. samarbeid

³⁹¹ Communique, 10 December 1960. AAB 1579, Dd, L0372, Finnland. At the conference was presented an overview of what unions were members of SAK, LO and without membership. Resumé of Scandinavian conference of LO chairmen, 9 March 1961, correspondence, Geijer/Nordahl, March-April 1961. AAB 1579, Dd, L0409, Nordisk fagl. samarbeid. Resumé of SAMAK meeting, 13-14 May 1961. ARBARK 1213, A1, 9, Nordiska Samarbetskommittén 1958-61

³⁹² Resumé of Scandinavian labour conference, 17 October 1961. AAB 1579, Dd, L0409, Nordisk fagl. samarbeid

³⁹³ Material from SAMAK meeting in Copenhagen, 5-6 May 1962. ABA 500, 331

After the debacle (or perhaps because SDP reached an all-time low in the 1962 elections), some soul searching apparently emerged in parts of the SDP. In 1963 the moderate Paasio was elected as party chairman over Tanner, paving the way for a less rigid anti-communist stance. He resumed cooperation with SKDL (they joined in a coalition government in 1966) and even straightened out the relationship with the Soviet Union. In 1969, LO and SAK re-merged under the SAK name. Even Leskinen bettered his relations to Kekkonen and the Soviets. He held the position of Foreign Minister in 1970-71. This turn in attitude surprised and disappointed many of his fellow social democrats in Finland and Norden.³⁹⁴

³⁹⁴ And pissed Haakon Lie right off. Lahlum 2009, p. 455-456. Arter 1980, p. 374, Helenius 1986, pp. 170-171. Björk 1990, pp. 75-76

12. ICELAND

A STORY OF TURMOIL

When the Icelandic SDP was formed in 1916, Iceland was still a Danish colony and the Icelandic party also received financial support from its Scandinavian brothers in the 1920s and 1930s.³⁹⁵ When Iceland declared independence from Denmark in 1944, the social democrats were the only Icelandic party who wanted to wait until WWII was over to negotiate independence with Denmark.

As in Finland, the communists in parliament was organised in a 'people's front' party, the Socialist Party (SP). Although considered by the SDP to be dominated by communists, the socialist party was not a Comintern member, even if close ties to CPSU were maintained.³⁹⁶

Another common trait with Finland was the SDP's relative lack of political power, especially compared to the SP. The SDP received only 16,5% of the votes at the national election in 1949 while the socialist party received 19,5% of the overall vote.³⁹⁷ The socialists were not marginalised political outcasts. The social democrats thought they served the Soviet Union, but the Icelandic worker was not convinced.³⁹⁸ The socialists' stance on independence and their resistance against the US military airbase in Keflavik were probably important reasons for their popularity. The Soviet Union was not always perceived as the biggest problem in a country where American troops – much to the dissatisfaction of many Icelanders – were permanently stationed. A contributing factor to the socialists' popularity was probably also the lack of labour movement foundation in the SDP. Of seven parliament members in 1949, only one had a background in the working class/labour movement.³⁹⁹

The SP assumed power over ASI in 1944. By forming an alliance with two centre-conservative parties, the social democrats regained control of ASI in 1948, a move that was not popular with all Icelandic workers. Assuming control also marked the beginning of an offensive against communists/socialists in the labour movement. In the opinion of many,

³⁹⁵ Kjartansson 1986, p. 204, Fridriksson, Thorleifur. "Economic assistance from the Nordic social democratic parties to Icelandic social democracy, 1918–1939: Internationalism or manipulation?" *Scandinavian Journal of History* 13, no. 2 (1988): 141-165

³⁹⁶ Fridriksson, Thorleifur. *Den gyldne flue: De skandinaviske socialdemokratiers relationer til den islandske arbejderbevægelse 1916-56: internationalisme eller indblanding?* København: SFAH, 1990, pp. 87ff., Ólafsson 1997, Ólafsson, Jón. "Decomposing capitalism: socialists in power, Iceland 1956-1958." *Bifröst Journal of Social Science*, no. 1 (2007): 18-30, Kjartansson 1986, pp. 201-202

³⁹⁷ Numbers from Fridriksson 1990, p. 146

³⁹⁸ Fridriksson 1990, p. 111, Olmsted 1958, s. 347

³⁹⁹ Fridriksson 1990, pp. 97-98, 146-147, Olmsted 1958, p. 343

socialists were harassed and more than once, the ASI board had their decisions overturned by congress delegates.⁴⁰⁰

Party discipline was not a given for the Icelandic social democratic worker. They were not necessarily averse to cooperating with communists e.g. during strikes. This common ground was due to right-wing governmental economic policy, which left large parts of the working and peasant population unemployed and poor.⁴⁰¹

In connection with large strikes in 1952, the Icelandic labour movement received financial help from the ICFTU. Communist union members had also applied for support from the WFTU, but Eiler Jensen wrote the ICFTU and assured that social democratic union members would reject any funding from the WFTU.⁴⁰² If Icelandic workers would not adhere to party discipline, the Danish and European organisations would do their bit.

The other Nordic social democrats received news of Icelandic conditions through the party-state network: in 1947, the Danish legation in Reykjavik sent home reports on strikes, including communist policies and tactics. The Foreign Minister (who did not belong to a political party) passed it on to the (liberal) Minister for Labour and Social Affairs who, in confidentiality, sent it to the Danish LO. It thus seems that even right-wing ministers viewed the LO as a natural partner to the state with whom it was relevant to share such information.⁴⁰³ The Danish example does not stand alone: A report on communist losses in the Icelandic unions, written by the Norwegian legation in Reykjavik went through the Norwegian foreign ministry to party secretary Haakon Lie in 1948.⁴⁰⁴

Perhaps these connections were deemed necessary, because Icelandic partisans were sometimes slow with the news. 1952 strikes in Iceland made front pages in the Danish communist daily *Land og Folk*, and was used actively in communist agitation. The Danish SDP complained that while the communists seem to be very well informed, the social democrats lacked the proper information to counter them on the Iceland question.⁴⁰⁵

It seems that the Icelandic party did something about this call for information. In 1953 the social democratic leader of ASI, Jon Sigurdsson, informed the Danish comrades that the

⁴⁰⁰ Olmsted 1958, p. 345, Fridriksson 1990, pp. 99-100, 114, 119-121

⁴⁰¹ Fridriksson 1990, pp. 125-126, 129ff.

⁴⁰² Correspondence, December 1952. ABA 1500, 1337, 0026. Eiler Jensen to ICFTU, 20 December 1952. ABA 1500, 1337, 0025

⁴⁰³ Report from Icelandic legation, 8 July 1947, passed on to LO 25 July 1947. ABA 1500, 1337, 0022

⁴⁰⁴ Report, 15 March 1948. AAB 2483, Dc, L0002, Island

⁴⁰⁵ Letter to Vilhjalmur S. Vilhjalmsson, 19. December 1952. ABA 1500, 1337, 0026

secretary from a leading union, from which they were about to receive a letter, was a communist.⁴⁰⁶

One of the reasons that the Icelandic SDP was sometimes out of touch, was their isolation from the Nordic brothers and hence, a lack of new inspiration, ideas and development which the Nordic network exchanged. The absence of Icelandic partisans at meeting and conferences was, as party leader Stefansson wrote Sven Aspling in October 1951, not because of a lack of interest, but a lack of financial resources – traveling the Atlantic was costly and the Icelandic party was short of economic means:

I hope that my party and I will later have an opportunity for more participation in the social democratic labour movements' cooperation in Norden. Our party and movement need it. And we are working hard to make sure that we won't be annihilated or isolated from our brother parties in Norden, due to large distances and poverty.⁴⁰⁷

Aspling responded by assuring that also he wanted Iceland to remain a part of the cooperation and that they were 'an important link in the Nordic chain'. He invited them to the Swedish party congress in 1952. Stefansson went, and found the congress 'useful for me as a social democrat and party leader.'⁴⁰⁸

An opposition group within the party surprised the leadership at the party congress in November 1952 by nominating head of the strike committee, Hannibal Valdimarsson, as party leader, which resulted in the overthrow of Stefansson. Valdimarsson was, many felt, connected to the common party member and he was active in the labour movement and the strikes. Under Valdimarsson's leadership, the SDP adopted a US-critical line, called for restrictions for US personnel and resisted more troops and new defence facilities.⁴⁰⁹

Valdimarsson took over a party in severe financial problems. Especially the newspaper *Althydubladid*, which was deemed to be of the utmost importance in campaigning and

⁴⁰⁶ Telegram, 28 September 1953. ABA 1500, 1337, 0030

⁴⁰⁷ 'Jeg haaber at jeg og mit parti senere kan faa lejlighed for større deltagelse i den Socialdemokratiske arbejderbevægelses samarbejde i Norden. Vort parti og bevægelse trænger til det. Og vi arbejder kraftigt paa at vi ikke paa grund af store afstande og fattigdom, bliver udslettede eller isolerede fra vore broderpartier i Norden.' Jóhansson to Aspling, 30 October 1951. ARBARK 1213, A1, 6, SAMAK 1950-51

⁴⁰⁸ Aspling to Jóhansson, 9 November 1951. ARBARK 1213, A1, 6, SAMAK 1950-51. Letter from Stefansson to Aspling 23 June 1952. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 07 1952

⁴⁰⁹ Fridriksson 1990, pp. 148, 152, 160-162.

agitating, was on its knees. The director of the Norwegian party press, Johann Ona came to Iceland in 1953 to investigate, and found an economic and administrative mess.⁴¹⁰

In 1953, SDP only got 15,6% of the votes reducing them to six MP's, while the SP had seven. SDP was now the second smallest party in Iceland.⁴¹¹ Valdimarsson started an offensive to renew the party image, get in contact with the workplaces and win more members. He turned to the Scandinavian LO's to receive help with schooling. In 1953, it was agreed that two young union members from Iceland should go on a study trip to Denmark and Norway to learn about organisation work. They were to lead the battle within the communist-dominated union 'Dagsbrún' and needed to be properly equipped.⁴¹² It might have been one of these who, in 1954, participated in a union course in Denmark and wrote a letter to thank the Danish party; he was sure that he had learned a lot and would make use of it.⁴¹³

Valdimarsson wanted to refute accusations that he was playing into the hands of communists, and at various occasions he stressed the difference between SDP and the 'Moscow henchmen.' The accusations were partly made from within the SDP, especially the overthrown Stefansson whose wing remained powerful within party leadership.⁴¹⁴

With this, a battle started for the right to represent the Icelandic SDP to the Nordic brother parties. After Valdimarsson became leader, the connections to Denmark were reduced, which he sought to better by writing Hedtoft in June 1953 reporting on the recent elections.⁴¹⁵ But Valdimarsson was not the only one keeping in touch: Stefansson asked the Danish party not to grant Valdimarsson any of the money that he was asking for. Hedtoft replied that he was confused, as he had not received any requests for money. Furthermore, he had met Valdimarsson and thought him to have acted correct and loyal to both party and Stefansson. He advised Stefansson, 'as an old friend', to set aside his personal feelings and not go against a democratically elected leadership. Even if there were disagreements, Hedtoft advised that the most important thing was to keep the party together.⁴¹⁶

Stefansson did not take Hedtoft's advice. In November 1953 he wrote a confidential letter to Hedtoft in which he, once again, advised that the Nordic parties did not support the leadership by fulfilling their recent wish for financial support. It was to be treated at the upcoming SAMAK meeting, but Stefansson recommended postponing the decision. Stefansson

⁴¹⁰ Fridriksson 1990, pp. 163-166, 181-184. Report on the finances of Althydibladid, ABA 500, 856, 3

⁴¹¹ Fridriksson 1990, p. 175. Résumé of SAMAK-meeting, 4-5 December 1954. ABA 500, 328, 4

⁴¹² Fridriksson 1990, p. 156. Correspondance, April-June 1953. ABA 1500, 1337, 0028. Jón Sigurdsson to Konrad Nordahl Norwegian LO. AAB 1579, Dd, L0178, Skandinaviske forbindelser, Island

⁴¹³ Letter from participant Gudmundsson, 5 September 1954. ABA 500, 854, 8

⁴¹⁴ Fridriksson 1990, pp. 150-152, 167. See also pp. 170-172

⁴¹⁵ Valdimarsson to Hedtoft, 17 July 1953. ABA 500, 854, 8

⁴¹⁶ Hedtoft to Stefansson, 13 April 1953. ABA 39, 27, Stefansson, Stefan J

warned that Valdimarsson wanted cooperation with communists. Hedtoft sent a copy of the letter to his partisans in the Nordic parties and LO's, complaining that Stefansson was putting them in an awkward situation. He had answered that it was not possible to postpone the question but also asked Stefansson for more information.⁴¹⁷ Stefansson wrote back with a report and repeated his request not to support the new leadership. The report was prepared by partisans said to be especially knowledgeable, claimed to contain only 'facts and objective observations.' It argued that Valdimarsson and party secretary Gylfi Th. Gisslasson (also elected in 1952) were bad for the party, caused splits and opposed cooperating with centre- and right wing parties (including government coalitions). It criticised their opposition to NATO, American presence in Iceland, and the 'anti-American' adopted by Althydubladid after the takeover. It went on to state that Valdimarsson supported and recommended cooperation with communists (his brother was even one!) and receiving money from the WFTU during strikes. The report stated that Valdimarsson's wing was a minority within the party.⁴¹⁸

Stefansson's letter, forwarded by Hedtoft to the other Nordic countries prompted Konrad Nordahl to ask Johann Ona for his opinion. Ona thought Stefansson's letter was depressing and that he had trouble separating party business from his personal antipathies. As for Stefansson's wish for the Nordic colleagues to hold back financial support, Ona thought that this could lead to Althydubladid going under altogether. He also pointed out that economic troubles had in fact started under Stefansson's leadership, and it was unfair to punish Valdimarsson for it. Stefansson stated that Valdimarsson and Gisslasson had voted against Iceland joining NATO, but Ona thought that this was too simplified a version. They had, Ona wrote, been willing to vote for it, but wanted stricter conditions on base rights. Ona explained that as long as the SDP cooperated with the right wing in ASI's leadership, many workers would support communists. He found Stefansson's attempts to 'diminish' Valdimarsson unsympathetic and stated that at the last two congresses, Valdimarsson had led the battle against communists. He didn't think Stefansson to be a reliable source of information (as he was obviously bitter) and thought it 'incorrect' for Stefansson to send all these reports without giving the opposite side a chance to explain their view. The appropriate thing to do would be to ask Stefansson not to send more. Nordahl sent Ona's report to the other Nordic countries.⁴¹⁹ Haakon Lie concluded that the Icelandic party line had not changed after Valdimarsson had taken over, and that the situation could mostly be ascribed to 'typical internal Icelandic bickering'.⁴²⁰ Stefansson maintained that

⁴¹⁷ Hedtoft to Leskinen, Einar Gerhardsen, Konrad Nordahl, Tage Erlander, Aksel Strand and Eiler Jensen, 14 November 1953, Stefansson to Carlsson, 5 December 1953. ABA 500, 856, 1

⁴¹⁸ 'Beretning om forholdene i Islands Socialdemokrati.' ABA 500, 856, 2

⁴¹⁹ Letter from Konrad Nordahl, 11 January 1954 with report, 7 January 1954. ABA 500, 856, 2

⁴²⁰ '...typisk indre islandsk krangel.' Letter from Haakon Lie, 28 May 1954. ABA 500, 856, 2

his information was 'objective' and thought it 'unfortunate' to reward Valdimarsson's 'tactics'.⁴²¹

Even if the Danish party showed irritation over the approaches from Stefansson, they were not completely immune to his warnings. In June 1954, Oluf Carlsson wrote the Norwegian SDP, that Stefansson had visited Denmark and stated that supporting Valdimarsson equalled supporting communists agendas, that his brother was a communist (which, however, Valdimarsson didn't make a secret of), and that 18 of 26 party board members had signed a draft resolution for Valdimarsson to step down from his position as editor of *ALthydudbladið*.⁴²²

Later that summer, Valdimarsson wrote Carlsson to correct what he found to be mistakes. He explained that the 'old' leaders wanted to cooperate with the right wing, which was unpopular with workers. He underlined his own anti-communist achievements and thought himself to be the most hated person by communists in Iceland. He thought it necessary for the social democrats to move left, but did not think that this would mean any danger of drifting 'into communist waters.'⁴²³ He made a point of distancing himself from communism. In January 1954, he stated:

It is absolutely certain that the most important task in the Icelandic labour movement is to wrest the power in the country's largest unions from the hands of the communists.⁴²⁴

SETTING THE ICELANDIC HOUSE OF LABOUR IN ORDER: SCANDINAVIAN INVOLVEMENT

During 1954, the Danes decided to have a closer look at Iceland. In July Hans Rasmussen, MP and leader of the federation for metal workers, went to Iceland to participate in a Nordic metal workers' conference. He concluded that Stefansson's time was over. However, he also had an unsettling conversation with Valdimarsson who revealed that he preferred cooperation with communists rather than the right wing, and that he thought it necessary to gather the Icelandic labour movement in a common front (as we know, 'common' or 'united' front was a communist buzzword). According to Rasmussen, Valdimarsson was not of the anti-

⁴²¹ Stefansson to Oluf Carlsson, 17 February 1954. ABA 500, 856, 2

⁴²² Letter from Oluf Carlsson, 4 June 1954. ABA 500, 856, 2

⁴²³ Valdimarsson to Oluf Carlsson, 10 July 1954. ABA 500, 856, 2

⁴²⁴ "Men det er sikkert og vist, at den vigtigste opgave i islandsk arbejderbevægelse er at fravriste kommunisterne magten i landets største fagforeninger." Fridriksson 1990, p. 190

communist nature, which was essential for social democrats. He also noted that many Icelanders believed the communists to be less dogmatic than in other countries.⁴²⁵

Rasmussen was convinced that '...if we are to pick up the pieces of the social democratic party in Iceland, it is probably necessary with a strong initiative from the social democratic parties in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.' This included sending someone to the upcoming party congress and support the election of Haraldur Gudmundsson, a more 'appropriate' social democrat. Moreover someone should have a serious word with Valdimarsson. Rasmussen thought it would be a mistake to let the Icelanders mind their own business and hope for the best. He sent the report to PM Hans Hedtoft, Foreign Minister HC Hansen and LO leader Eiler Jensen.⁴²⁶ A few months later, he offered economic support for the SDP election campaign in ASI, which the leader Jon Sigurdsson, accepted.⁴²⁷

The September 1954 party congress elected Haraldur Gudmundsson new leader. Danish LO secretary Kai Nissen and Rolf Gerhardsen from Norway participated in the congress. Gerhardsen and Nissen also met with Haraldur Gudmundsson, Gudmundur Gudmundsson (new vice chairman), Stefansson and MP Emil Jonsson. They spoke about the agitation and organisation work necessary to defeat Valdimarsson who now planned to become leader of ASI. A reconstruction of the party and its economy waited: a task, which required money. The Icelanders had not forgotten Rasmussen's offer of financial help and Kai Nissen repeated it. LO and SDP in Denmark donated a total 15.000 kroner as did the Norwegians and Swedes.⁴²⁸

SDP also wanted to gain control over the People's House in Reykjavik. The house was owned by a limited company, and socialist-dominated unions owned some of the stock. The company sometimes secretly supported the SDP economically. First step in a reconstruction was to convince the socialists to sell their stocks, which they had hitherto denied. If they continued to deny, the plan was to increase the capital stock and secure overwhelming SDP majority. In this scenario, economic support for the SDP had to continue in secrecy.⁴²⁹

The reason for fighting Valdimarsson was that he now openly wanted ASI to be a non-political organisation, based on class instead of politics. He was opposed to having right-wing

⁴²⁵ Letter and report from Rasmussen, 23 July, 1954. ABA 500, 856, 2

⁴²⁶ '...skal vi redde stumperne for socialdemokratiet i Island, så er det sikkert nødvendigt at tage et stærkt initiativ fra socialdemokratiet i Danmark, Norge og Sverige.' Letter + report from Rasmussen, 23 July, 1954. ABA 500, 856, 2

⁴²⁷ Sigurdsson to Rasmussen, 4 September 1954. ABA 500, 856, 2

⁴²⁸ Undated report from 1954. AAB 1001, Da L0080, Island. Report from Kai Nissen, 22 September 1954. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 10 1955. Circular letter from Hedtoft/Carlsson, 1 October 1954. ABA 500, 856, 2. Letters from Sven Aspling and Gudmundsson, October-December 1954. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 09 1954. Fridriksson 1990, p. 211. Report on Icelandic SDP economy, undated. ABA 500, 856, 3

⁴²⁹ Report on Icelandic SDP economy, undated. ABA 500, 856, 3

representation in the board. Furthermore he did not consider the majority of SP voters hard-core communists. Kai Nissen talked to Valdimarsson in person, telling him that he found it hard to understand that Valdimarsson would let his party down. Apparently Valdimarsson had not understood this attitude, even stating – the horror! – that cooperation with communists was not such a crime bearing in mind that they did control some of the strongest unions. Social democrats in Iceland were now divided into two groups: 'traditional' social democrats and 'hannibalists'.

Valdimarsson succeeded and was elected the new ASI leader at the September 1954 congress. After this, the board consisted of 9 hannibalists, two 'traditional' social democrats, and six socialists. One of the 'conservative' social democrats was on the verge of resigning from the board, but was convinced by Norwegian LO-leader Konrad Nordahl to stay and try to influence things whenever possible. One consequence of the new leadership was a decision to allow the excluded communist-dominated *Idja* (the factory workers' union and the 3rd largest union in the country) back into ASI, much to the discontent of SDP.⁴³⁰

The SDP was unsure of what to do about Valdimarsson, but Nordahl had the solution: exclude Valdimarsson from the party's labour committee and party meetings and await his actions in the future. This was done, accompanied by a statement that Valdimarsson had acted out of accordance with the party and that he did not, and was not allowed to, operate or speak on behalf of SDP. These restrictions were to be in effect for as long as Valdimarsson cooperated with communists and a committee would observe the development. He was anything but formally excluded, as the leadership feared exclusion would split the party.⁴³¹

At the December 1954 SAMAK meeting, Icelandic party chairman Gudmundsson, stated that it was really communists that had elected Valdimarsson as chairman for Althydusamband and that it had been perceived by them as a major victory for the 'unity' line. He stated that Valdimarsson was entertaining the idea of making Althydusamband into a political party and the next two years were crucial to whether the Icelandic labour movement would fall in the hands of communists once again. As for cooperating with ASI, both Nordahl and Hans Rasmussen recommended wait-and-see policy. There were no signs of Althydusamband wanting to leave ICFTU.⁴³²

⁴³⁰ Fridriksson 1990, pp. 196ff., 217ff, 'Rapport fra Kai Nissen vedrørende Islands faglige Landsorganisations kongres I tiden 18.-22. november 1954.' 1 December 1954. ABA 500, 856, 2.

⁴³¹ Report by Konrad Nordahl. AAB 1001, Da, L0080, Island. Résumé of SAMAK-meeting, 4-5 December 1954. ABA 500, 328, 4. Fridriksson 1990, pp. 225-226 + 229, 236-237

⁴³² Résumé of SAMAK-meeting, 4-5 December 1954. ABA 500, 328, 4. Résumé of labour conference, 3 December 1954. AAB 1579, Dd, L0205, Nordisk fgl. samarbeid

The Nordic social democrats now kept Valdimarsson at arm's length. When he visited Denmark in early 1955 no one had time to see him (consider that Nordic social democrats usually welcomed each other warmly).⁴³³ Oluf Carlsson spoke to a leading SDP member, Jonsson, who had no faith in Valdimarsson being able to handle the communists and Carlsson wrote to Haakon Lie that 'the rest of us' weren't likely to believe this either.⁴³⁴

The Danish SDP also seemed to grow increasingly impatient with their Icelandic partisans. At the December 1954 SAMAK meeting, they asked for further financial support, which started bothering the Danes.⁴³⁵ However, they decided to donate again if the other Scandinavians did the same. The Norwegians made the same decision, while the Swedes by September 1955, had still not made a decision. In December, the Swedish SDP and LO finally decided to donate 45.000 SEK, after a few reminders (in an urgent tone) from Iceland.⁴³⁶ In a letter to Oluf Carlsson and Sven Aspling, Haakon Lie expressed the view that more financial support was not beneficial before the Icelanders increased the effectiveness of the party organisation. Instead of financial, he suggested 'technical' support in the form of schooling.⁴³⁷ At the December 1954 SAMAK meeting, there had been talks of sending an Icelander to Sweden to study organisation. Aspling repeated the invitation and it was agreed to send a man who would also go to Norway. The planner of the trip was Stefan Johann Stefansson, who had thus come in from the cold and was once again trusted by his Nordic fellows.⁴³⁸

In late October, Danish LO invited union leaders to Denmark to study union work and organisation. The Danish Embassy in Reykjavik was asked to extend the invitation to 'two younger, democratic Icelandic trade unionists. The two social democrats gladly accepted the invitation, and the trip was planned for the summer of 1956.⁴³⁹

The Icelanders were also sent material on party organisation to inspire the work ahead of them.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³³ Letter from Valdimarsson, 30 March 1955. ABA 500, 854, 8

⁴³⁴ Carlsson to Lie, 9 February 1955. ABA 500, 801, 1, 7

⁴³⁵ Carlsson to the Swedish and Norwegian parties, 24 January 1955. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 10 1955, Carlsson to HC Hansen, 2 December 1955. ABA 500, 856, 3

⁴³⁶ Correspondence Aspling/Stefansson, June-September 1955, Aspling to Stefansson, 8 December 1955. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 10 1955. Letter from H Gudmundsson, 7 November 1955. ARBARK 1213, A1, 8, Nordiska samarbétskommittén 1954-56. Stefansson to Aspling, 18 January 1956. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 11 1956-58

⁴³⁷ Lie to Carlsson and Aspling, 28 November 1955. ABA 500, 856, 3

⁴³⁸ Correspondence Aspling/Stefansson, January-September 1955. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 10 1955

⁴³⁹ Correspondance Eiler Jensen/Begtrup, October-November 1955 and May 1956. ABA DK 1500, 1337, 0031

⁴⁴⁰ Letter from Oluf Carlsson, 1 April 1955. ABA 500, 854, 8. Correspondance Ingimundsson/Aspling, January-February 1955. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 10 1955

As opposed to Valdimarsson, no one was too busy for the many Icelandic visitors to Scandinavia in 1955: vice chairman of the SDP, MP Gudmundur Gudmundsson went on a tour of Norway, Denmark and Sweden. From conversations with him, Kai Nissen and Oluf Carlsson learned that the situation had become worse. The party leadership tried to reason with Valdimarsson who, apparently, did not understand that he was only a tool for the communists. He thought he had influence and even talked about extending the cooperation into the political scene. Party secretary Gylfi Gisslasson visited Denmark a couple of weeks after Gudmundsson and confirmed the bleak picture. Shortly thereafter party chairman Haraldur Gudmundsson visited Denmark, and said that it might be time to consider excluding Valdimarsson for good.⁴⁴¹

At this point Oluf Carlsson view was that the Icelandic communists were as disciplined and determined as anywhere else, and that they were controlling Valdimarsson – not the other way around.⁴⁴² In October 1955, he wrote Gudmundsson and informed him of an article in the Danish communist daily, reporting on on-going negotiations about a political cooperation on the Icelandic left.⁴⁴³

Apart from their partisans, the Scandinavian countries continued to keep themselves updated through the official legations in Reykjavik and the Foreign Ministries.⁴⁴⁴

The situation was difficult for the LO's. ASI was, officially, an ICFTU-member and led by a social democrat. It was difficult to break contact as the following case demonstrates: in 1955, strikes broke out. The strike committee was dominated by socialists, as were most participating unions. Still, in May 1955, the Scandinavian LO's decided to donate 25.000 SEK, 15.000 NOK and 15.000 DKK for the striking workers. The money was donated to avoid speculations that the Nordic countries did not support their brothers (which would in turn damage the anti-communist battle in Iceland), and certify that ASI was still an ICFTU member. Furthermore, most social democrats in Iceland had supported the strike.⁴⁴⁵ There was, thus, some outward show of solidarity with ASI, but it was not to be confused with actual feelings of brotherhood:

⁴⁴¹ Haraldur Gudmundsson to Oluf Carlsson, 11 March 1955. ABA 500, 854, 8, and Aspling, Stefansson to Aspling 11 March 1955. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 10 1955. Summary of conversation with Gudmundsson, 1 August 1955, summary of conversation with Gisslasson, 1 September 1955. ABA 500, 856, 3. Summary of conversation with Gudmundsson, 15 September 1955. ABA 500, 856, 2.

⁴⁴² Carlsson to Oluf Bertolt, AOF, 18 August 1955. ABA 500, 856, 3. See also Carlsson to Lie, 9 February 1955. AAB 2483, Dc, L0008, 1955

⁴⁴³ Carlsson to Gudmundsson, 19 October 1955. ABA 500, 856, 2

⁴⁴⁴ E.g. Begtrup to Kai Nissen 17 March 1955. ABA 500, 854, 8. Report 30 November 1954, to Sven Aspling. the Swedish Foreign Ministry, ARBARK 1889, E2B, 10 1955

⁴⁴⁵ Résumé of nordic labour conference 14 May 1955. AAB 1579, Dd, L0205, Nordisk fagl. samarbeid. Fridriksson 1990, pp. 238ff.

when Finnish SAK suggested inviting representatives from ASI to the upcoming SAMAK labour conference in November 1955, reactions in both Norwegian and Swedish LO were less than enthusiastic.⁴⁴⁶ Eiler Jensen contacted the Icelandic party to get their opinion. Gudmundsson answered that Valdimarsson was still agitating for political cooperation with the communists and hence would not recommend inviting him or anyone from ASI.⁴⁴⁷ At the SAMAK meeting Gudmundsson explained that the 'everything-but-actual-exclusion' was still in effect. He also confirmed that the communists worked for a 'people's front', which Valdimarsson had spoken in favour of.⁴⁴⁸

On March 22, 1956, Valdimarsson was finally excluded from the SDP.⁴⁴⁹ For the summer 1956 elections, Valdimarsson and his supporters formed an alliance with the SP (The Peoples' Alliance), based on a programme formulated by ASI. The SDP formed an opposing alliance with the Progressive Party. After the election, the social democratic-progressive alliance was just two parliament seats short of a majority, and thus faced a troublesome dilemma: cooperate with the Peoples' Alliance or be outside of influence. They chose the former and Valdimarsson's dream of a broad cooperation on the left thus came true, even though some of the participants were dragging their feet.⁴⁵⁰

Kai Nissen of Danish LO participated in ASI's congress in November 1956. The congress passed a statement expressing hope that American troops would leave Iceland soon. Valdimarsson was re-elected (without opposition) and the rest of the board consisted of 8 SP members, 5 of which were thought to be Moscow loyalists. Nissen concluded that Valdimarsson's strategy of making the communists less 'dangerous' by cooperating with them had failed. However, he thought the possibilities for social democratic influence were better than 2 years earlier, even if qualified people were needed.⁴⁵¹

Immediately after ASI's congress, the Icelandic SDP had their congress from which Nissen also reported. It sanctioned the exclusion of Valdimarsson and stated that the time was not ripe for pulling out American troops. A new party leader, Emil Jonsson, was elected, as Gudmundsson was to become ambassador in Norway. Jon Sigurdsson returned to the labour committee and was optimistic about the future and the ability of the social democrats to 'see

⁴⁴⁶ Correspondance Swedish/Norwegian LO, 3 and 8 October 1955. AAB 1579, Dd, L0205, Nordisk fagl. samarbeid

⁴⁴⁷ Résumé of labour conference, 18 November 1955. ARBARK 2964, F25B, 02, Nordiska fackliga konferensen 8/11 1955. Letter from Haraldur Gudmundsson, 7 November 1955. Résumé of nordic labour conference 14 May 1955. AAB 1579, Dd, L0230, Island

⁴⁴⁸ Résumé of SAMAK meeting, 19-20 November 1955. ABA 500, 329, 1

⁴⁴⁹ Fridriksson 1990, pp. 244-251

⁴⁵⁰ Fridriksson 1990, pp. 251-253, Kjartansson 1986, p. 208

⁴⁵¹ 'Rapport fra Kai Nissen om Islands faglige Landsorganisations (A.S.I.) kongres i tiden 20.-25. november 1956', 6 December 1956. ABA 500, 856, 3

through' the communists.⁴⁵² He and Kai Nissen discussed a closer cooperation between Iceland and the Nordic countries (including Finland), which would be a 'great support'. He relied on Denmark to circulate his wishes to the other Nordic parties and LO's.⁴⁵³

The Scandinavian LO's found a *modus vivendi* with ASI. At a 1958 IFL conference it was decided to undertake a study, resulting in recommendations for Iceland.⁴⁵⁴ In October Alf Andersen of Norwegian LO went for a trip to Iceland to help the labour movement with organisation issues. To this means he would also bring an overview of the organisation in Scandinavia.⁴⁵⁵ He went by invitation from Valdimarsson at the expense of ASI, and it was cleared by the Norwegian LO. Andersen's mainly helped with wage negotiations, tariffs, and organising the unions. It was done in open cooperation with Valdimarsson, who was very grateful.⁴⁵⁶

For the 1958 ASI and SDP congresses, Oluf Carlsson went. Valdimarsson was re-elected as ASI chairman, and communists were still on the board.⁴⁵⁷ Norwegian LO also received a report on the congress from the Embassy in Iceland through the Foreign Ministry, recommending closer contact between the Althydusamband to keep it in contact with the Western countries.⁴⁵⁸ It seems the Scandinavian LO's more or less gave up and chose to work with Valdimarsson in order to not alienate him too much. From 1958, Icelandic trade unionists continued going to Norway and Denmark for training.⁴⁵⁹

In 1960, Norwegian Paul Engstad represented the Scandinavian LO's at the November ASI congress. His report was hardly encouraging: the progressives and social democrats withdrew from the board. In spite of this news, the Scandinavian LO's didn't react. Somehow, the Icelandic situation had become permanent and considered hopeless.⁴⁶⁰ Engstad, however, continued to correspond with Icelandic comrades, and they agreed to have Icelandic

⁴⁵² 'Rapport fra Kai Nissen om den islandske socialdemokratiske partikongres i tiden 26. til 29. november 1956.', 13 December 1956. ABA 500, 856, 3. Note, 22 March 1957. ABA 500, 856, 2

⁴⁵³ Note, 22 March 1957. ABA 500, 856, 2

⁴⁵⁴ Report from Gilchrist, Reykjavik, September 10 1959. PRO, FO 371/143153: Report on the Trade Union developments in Iceland

⁴⁵⁵ Andersen to Einar Nielsen, 28 August 1958. AAB 1579, Dd, L0315, Danmark

⁴⁵⁶ Correspondence August-September and telegram 15 November 1958. Andersen's report, 28 October 1958. AAB 1579, Dd, L0315, Island. See also LA report 1/1960, April 1960. PRO, LAB 13/1348

⁴⁵⁷ Report by Carlsson, late 1958. ABA 500, 856, 4

⁴⁵⁸ Report from Reykjavik embassy, 3 September 1958. AAB 1579, Dd, L0315, Island

⁴⁵⁹ Letter from Chancery, Reykjavik to Northern Dept., 15 December 1958. PRO, LAB 13/1305

⁴⁶⁰ Resumé of Scandinavian labour conference 8 December 1960. AAB 1579, Dd, L0372, Nordisk fagl. samarbeid

participants come to Norway and participate in an AOF course on labour and information issues.⁴⁶¹

In July 1961, Valdimarsson invited representatives from Scandinavian LO's to visit for two weeks in the summer of 1962 to become better acquainted with Iceland, its inhabitants and situation. They accepted – after having discussed it for some time and made sure there would not be differences in stances.⁴⁶² Upon their return, Norwegian Parelius Mentzen wrote a report, focusing on labour and economic condition in Iceland, not mentioning conflicts or differences in the labour movement itself. He seemed to genuinely like Valdimarsson.⁴⁶³ The Scandinavian LO's held a civil tone, and sometimes mediated in internal conflicts between organisations.⁴⁶⁴ When a conflict broke out in June, Denmark, Sweden and Norway agreed to donate each 20.000 kr. to the Althydusamband.⁴⁶⁵

The Icelandic SDP was still very much in conflict with ASI and continued to keep their comrades in Scandinavia updated, not sparing any descriptions of Valdimarsson's doubtful partners: 'a majority of hard-core Moscow-communists (...) and some progressive representatives who are actually communists.'⁴⁶⁶ In spite of such reports the SDP's in Scandinavia seems to have given up Iceland at this point. Eiler Jensen admitted to the American embassy in 1961, that he had his doubts about what to do with Iceland.

There is some thought that a last look at the Icelandic labor scene should be made, including a possible effort to set the Icelandic house of labor in order.⁴⁶⁷

Nothing came of it. Valdimarsson continued to preside over the Althydusamband until 1971 and the Social Democrats continued to be a middle-size party, participating in government only as a minor partner.

⁴⁶¹ Ivar Viken to Paul Engstad, 18 Februar 1961 and Engstad to Sigurdsson, 23 Februar 1961. AAB 1579, Dd, L0409, Island

⁴⁶² Correspondance July 1961-May 1962. AAB 1579, Dd, L0401

⁴⁶³ Letter and report by Parelius Mentzen, July-August 1962. AAB 1579 Dd, L0401, Island

⁴⁶⁴ As in the case of the trade unions which was denied membership of Althydusamband. Correspondance October 1961 - May 1962. AAB 1579, Dd, L0409, Island

⁴⁶⁵ Resumé of labour conference, 30 June 1961. AAB 1579, Dd, L0409, Island

⁴⁶⁶ 'et flertall av hardkokte Moskva-kommunister (...) og noen framstrittsvenlige representanter som faktisk er kommunister.' Report by Jon Sigurdsson AAB 1579, Dd, L0401, Island

⁴⁶⁷ 'Possible Visit of Scandinavian Trade Union Leaders to Iceland', 9 August 1961. NARA, RG 84, Classified General Records 1959-61, box 36, læg: 560 – Labor, FY 59-60-61

13. ODD ONES OUT: COMMON CONCLUSIONS

In international security, Finns are well respected for standing up to the Soviets (...), while Iceland is notorious for firing shots at British trawlers (...)⁴⁶⁸

This picture of Finland and Iceland and their people as somewhat unruly, rough-and-ready natures goes some way within the framework of this thesis as well. Their labour movements were in no way as neat and orderly as the Scandinavian and as social democrats would want them to be. There seems to have been two reasons for this:

1) Communists that were not sectarian outcasts. In both countries, the CP's succeeded in representing themselves parliamentary as part of a bigger left-wing alliance that were not members of the Comintern. Even if social democrats thought that this was only facade, it did manage to give them a different, independent image than the henchmen of Moscow in the Scandinavian countries.

2) Bigger support for communism itself. This is tricky to explain (unless one goes with Oldenbroek's climate theory), and cannot be done satisfactorily. However, I will point out some core areas in which Finland and Iceland differed from Scandinavia. And although it is not within the scope of this thesis to investigate the reasons in depth, I argue that they are connected to the relative popularity of communism.

In industrialisation and hence labour movement and welfare state, Finland and Iceland were 'latecomers' compared to their Scandinavian neighbours.⁴⁶⁹ And they never developed into *social democratic states*. They lacked the Scandinavian experiences of the 1920s and 1930s, which in turn, had much to do with history: they were not independent states until 1917 and 1944 respectively. In Finland, a civil war severely weakened the socialists. The CP was only founded after independence and looked a much stronger alternative. In Iceland, issues of independence were also connected to the status of the SDP. The Icelandic party was a 'little brother' of the Danish – but most Icelanders were tired of being Denmark's 'little brother'. It did not help the SDP that they were the only party who wanted to postpone the Icelandic declaration of independence in 1944.

Theirs was a history of internal turmoil, and at least the SDP's of the days thought that turmoil meant communist possibility for growth.

⁴⁶⁸ Ingebritsen, Christine. *Scandinavia in world politics*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006, pp. 75ff.

⁴⁶⁹ Schouenborg 2010, pp. 134ff.

There might also be issues of language, geography and cultural traditions, which set them apart from their Scandinavian brothers, but how this affected the development of modern society, I dare not guess.

However: although latecomers, and not social democratic states, they did, in time, develop a welfare apparatus. How to explain this? There are several possible explanations: first, while not social democratic states, both Finland and Iceland had strong labour movements. Communists and alliances left of the SDP's however were serious competition for the political power, which split the labour vote into to almost equal blocs. This, however, did not prevent the fact that the level of organisation was high, and the labour movement thus had an important participation in society. Also Finland and Iceland saw broad political agreements between left and right in the thirties, albeit not led by a predominant SDP.⁴⁷⁰ Though different in tradition, there were also similarities. The desire to belong to the Nordic region, can be a factor as well: as Scandinavia increasingly promoted the welfare state as part of not only national, but a special Nordic identity, the countries that wanted to be part of this region internalised it.⁴⁷¹ Whether caused by cultural/historical factors or internalisation, all five Nordic countries did share central core values.

Regardless of the reasons, the SDP's of Iceland and Finland were under pressure, and again and again, the Scandinavian parties and labour movements stepped in to help their 'little' brothers' be it in the shape of financial or organisational aid. But all of their efforts did not prevent the internal skirmishes of the Finnish and Icelandic labour movements to blow up time and again. As long as the parties could not persuade the union constituency to grant them the dominance over the labour movement, which they so longed for, conflict was unavailable.

What – if any – actual difference all this help made is hard to estimate and takes exercises in counterfactual guesswork, which I dare not engage in. But one thing is certain: the Nordic cooperation between the labour movements did provide the SDP's of Finland and Iceland with an invaluable support system and a context in which to belong and identify. The Nordic network engaged and incorporated the movements on the periphery and tied them to the community and the ideological corporation of the *brethren people*.

In 1960, Eisenhower stated that the Scandinavian countries' labour movements were of high value for the US in the battle against communism in Iceland and Finland.⁴⁷² Undoubtedly

⁴⁷⁰ Schouenborg 2010, pp. 137, 142-143, ex. Majander 1991, p. 27

⁴⁷¹ Argument promoted by Schouenborg 2010, p. 140

⁴⁷² Holmström 2011, p. 292

they were of high value to the Finnish and Iceland SDP's also, regardless of whether they had an actual influence on communism.

14. COOPERATION: THE ANTI-COMMUNISM OF NORDEN

As the political power constellation on both sides of the border puts us in the same boat, and at any rate gives us many similar problems to deal with, I assume that the cooperation and contacts will be as intimate as possible.

Swedish party secretary Sven Andersson to Norwegian ditto, Haakon Lie, 16 October 1945

We fully agree that we should now try to establish a real Nordic cooperation.

Lie to Andersson, 18 October 1945⁴⁷³

Cooperation between the labour movements of Norden was more than official meetings; it was a day-to-day operation both at top and union levels. Representatives and speakers visited each other's meetings, seminars, courses and congresses; they compared political programs, goals and problems, exchanged information and experiences. At labour conferences abroad, just one delegate would often represent the Nordic countries.⁴⁷⁴

When SDP's were in government in Scandinavia, SAMAK served not only as a labour movement forum but also, to some degree, a consultation forum on national and foreign policy, especially in the early Cold War.⁴⁷⁵

If one had enquiries or needed information about anything in another Nordic country, the party secretary was the man to turn to – also when it came to communism. If the communists published something on another Nordic country, one could write and ask if it was true.⁴⁷⁶ Haakon Lie's biographer writes that Lie frequently received reports on communism in Sweden and Finland.⁴⁷⁷ This is true, but he wasn't the only one. The party secretaries

⁴⁷³ 'När nu den politiska maktställningen på ömse sider om gränsen gör att vi sitter i samma båt, och i varje fall får många liknande problem att ta ställning till, förutsätter jag att samarbetet och kontakterna blir så intima som möjligt.' - 'Vi er så helt og fullt enige i at vi nå skal prøve å få i stand et virkelig nordisk samarbeid.', AAB 1001, Da L0005, Sverige

⁴⁷⁴ Usually Danish LO leader and ICFTU vice president, Eiler Jensen, or Kaj Björk, Swedish international secretary 1947-55. Résumé of labour conference, 7 December 1950 in Oslo. AAB 1579, Dd, L0128, Nordisk samarbeid - Faglig konferense. Björk 1990, p. 48

⁴⁷⁵ Hovbakke Sørensen 2004, p. 59

⁴⁷⁶ Correspondance, Carlsson/Lie, May 1947. AAB 1001, Da, L0015, Danmark. Correspondance Carlsson/Aspling, July 1947. ABA 500, 825, 1

⁴⁷⁷ Lahlum 2009, p. 292. A copy of AIC's yearly report for 1947 found its way to Haakon Lie. AAB 2483, Dc, L0001, Danmark

generously shared information, and if one needed elaboration, it was only to ask. They also exchanged anti-communist material both as orientation and inspiration.⁴⁷⁸

The secretaries also exchanges tips and experiences on organisation work and party structure, ways and means of attracting members, details on information work and propaganda methods, organisation of shop stewards, branches and districts, incomes and expenses.⁴⁷⁹ Also LO officials, organisation secretaries, information/press officials and AOF's worked together and cooperation moved across sectors and departments as well as borders.

The exchanges were sometimes confidential, when they revolved around the parties' core activities. When AIC wrote Norwegian LO for information on the labour movement's activities in the recent 1949 national election campaign, Norwegian LO underlined that 'the information we give here, and the circular letters we enclose must not be published in any form.'⁴⁸⁰

Besides providing information, exchanges could also spark initiatives: in an undated (presumably late 1940s) circular letter Swedish Paul Björk wrote party officials that the SDP press in Norway and Denmark gave daily reports on members leaving the CP's. Björk liked the idea, and encouraged officials to send in reports on such resignations with details on the individuals, and their reasons for leaving.⁴⁸¹

Another purpose of the exchanges was enquiries and warnings about suspicious characters or communists: in 1947, a Dr. Heerfordt from Denmark contacted the Norwegian SDP with a proposal on Scandinavian peace cooperation. They wrote Danish Alsing Andersen to enquire about this Heerfordt character. Alsing Andersen wrote back that he was not to be taken seriously.⁴⁸² Another man named Prien started to appear at meetings arranged by the SDP in Slesvig, Denmark. Prien had been in Sweden during the war, and the Danish party had suspicions about his credibility. Sven Andersson confirmed them: Prien was not only 'cantankerous' but 'a highly doubtful person'. Sven Andersson obtained information about

⁴⁷⁸ As was the case with the 1946 pamphlet 'The Communists' Political Merry-Go-Round' from Denmark. 'Kommunisternes politiske Karrusel' Carlsson to Andersson, 25 August 1946. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 01 1946. Carlsson to Aspling, 3 November 1948. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 03 1948

⁴⁷⁹ Letter from Sundrønning, 20 July 1948. ABA 500, 801, 1, 3. 'Norge.' and 'Finland.' ABA 522, 47, AIC. Kommentar til den nordiske arbejderbevægelses fredsprogram (...), Aksel Zacchariassen to Aspling, 22 February 1949. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 04 1949

⁴⁸⁰ '...at de opplysninger vi her gir og de rundskriv som vedlegges, ikke i noen form offentliggjøres.' Alfred Skar to AIC, 17 October 1949. ABA 500, 800, 6

⁴⁸¹ Circular letter from Paul Björk, ARBARK 1889, F15D, 05 1947-1949

⁴⁸² Correspondance Sundrønning/Alsing Andersen, December 1947. ABA 500, 801, 1, 2, November 1947

Prien through unspecified Swedish state authorities.⁴⁸³ Being the state bearing party had its advantages.

Through the frequent contacts and interactions, friendships between party secretaries and officials developed. This was especially true for Oluf Carlsson (1945-61), Haakon Lie (1945-69) Sven Aspling (1948-62) and Väinö Leskinen (1946-57). Rolf Gerhardsen lived in Sweden during some of the war, where he formed friendships with Tage Erlander, Sven Aspling and Sten Andersson, all friendships that lasted a lifetime.⁴⁸⁴ In 1949, Leskinen was invited by Rolf Gerhardsen to come to Norway to rest after having served in time in prison for driving drunk.⁴⁸⁵ Leskinen's connections to Haakon Lie went back to the Winter War.⁴⁸⁶ Rolf Gerhardsen and Sven Aspling frequently vacationed together.

Contacts in the Nordic labour movement followed the mechanism of the social network, in which personal contacts and homogeneity were key connectors. Bridging and new contacts were arranged through already trusted persons and social connections and the common ideological foundation was key to the development of relations.

In May 1947 leader of AIC, Sigvald Hellberg, wrote the Swedish party with a request that an AIC representative, MP Kaj Bundvad visit the Swedish partisans in order to gather information about their propaganda and organisation work. Hedtoft recommended the visit and vouched for Bundvad's credibility by describing him as 'one of our most valuable colleagues.' The Swedish party welcomed Bundvad and invited him to participate in a conference for Swedish editors, but also expected something in return: 'We assume that you are willing to share information about your information central's activities.'⁴⁸⁷ The visit was a success. Bundvad wrote a letter to thank Sven Aspling for the hospitality shown to him and his wife, – 'We feel that we have known you for many years' – the valuable information and talks about various issues. Bundvad invited Aspling and his wife to visit him in Denmark.⁴⁸⁸

Outside of this myriad of day-to-day contacts, the Nordic SDP's also met in a formal setting. SAMAK, the cooperative committee started meeting again in 1945.

⁴⁸³ 'kverulantisk (...) högst tvivelaktig person.' Sven Andersson from Carlsson, 13 August 1947. ABA 500, 825, 1. Andersson to Carlsson, 19 September 1947. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 02 1947

⁴⁸⁴ Gerhardsen 2009, pp. 47-48, 115

⁴⁸⁵ Majander 2009, p. 132

⁴⁸⁶ Majander 2009, p. 129

⁴⁸⁷ 'en af vore værdifuldeste [sic] medarbejdere.' – 'Vi utgår ifrån, att Du är beredd att lämna upplysningar om Eder informationscentral verksamhet.' Correspondance AIC/Swedish party, May-June 1947. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 02 1947

⁴⁸⁸ 'Vi synes, at vi har kendt Jer i mange Aar'. Correspondence Bundvad/Aspling, November 1947. ARBARK 0037, 3, 047

15. 1945-49: STARTING UP AGAIN

THE OFFICIAL SETTING: SAMAK

SAMAK had its first post-war meeting in Stockholm, July 1945, with representatives from all five countries present. It was marked by optimism and statements underlined Nordic unity and democratic ideals.

More serious matters were also discussed: one item on the agenda was 'The position on the communists'. The reason was, in part, the ongoing 'unity negotiations' between social democrats and communists in Norway, Finland and Denmark. Few social democrats wanted unification, but the idea was popular among many workers and it would be unwise to reject it directly. Negotiations mostly took the form of both parties waiting for a breakdown and then blame one another.⁴⁸⁹

Hans Hedtoft (Danish SDP leader who nurtured a deep animosity towards communism⁴⁹⁰) stated that the reason for negotiating was testing communist willingness to cooperate. There was no way of getting around them considering their popularity. However, he stated, the Danish party did not expect positive results. Norwegian party leader Einar Gerhardsen used a less hostile rhetoric, but underlined that negotiations in Norway were directed at an organisational cooperation, not 'united front'.⁴⁹¹ Fagerholm from Finland noted that while communist leaders behaved correctly and seriously in politics, the communist constituency and local branches had some troubles suddenly cooperating with a party, which, before the war, had been deemed 'social fascists'. He said that none of the social democrats wanted a conflict with the communists just now, 'for reasons that I think you all understand very well.'⁴⁹² Perhaps he hinted at the communist Minister of Interior and security police.

The presence of communists in the SAK leadership troubled SAMAK. While not controlling it, their presence was so strong that they had to be taken into consideration if any official invitations came. If communist representatives were to participate, SAMAK meetings

⁴⁸⁹ 'Den politiske Situation i Danmark efter Valget den 30 Oktober 1945.' Report for SAMAK, January 1946. ABA 500, 323, Herr Oluf Carlsson. Material from SAMAK, 13-14 July 1945. ABA, 500, 322, 2. Note to editors. AAB 1001, Da, L0004, Samlingsforhandlingene mellem DNA og NKP 1945. Lidegaard, Bo. Jens Otto Krag: 1914-1961. København: Gyldendal, 2003, p. 221, See also Petersen and Mariager 2004, p. 61, Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 133-135, Lie 1985, pp. 45-47, 51ff, 66-67, 76, 126-128, Lahlum 2009, pp. 209, 230, Lund 1996, p. 995, Bye et.al. 1993, pp. 30-31

⁴⁹⁰ See i.e. his 1933 publication: Hansen, Hans. *Kommunisterne splitter: Et Opgør med de kommunistiske Splittelsesmænd paa Grundlag af officielle Aktstykker*. København: Fremad, 1933.

⁴⁹¹ Minutes, 13-14 July 1945. ABA 500, 322, 2

⁴⁹² '(...) orsaker, som jag tror att ni alla mycket väl förstar.' Minutes, 13-14 July 1945. ABA 500, 322, 2.

would lose their confidentiality and air of brotherhood. The Swedes made it clear that it was not acceptable to have communists present. A solution was reached: SAK would not be officially represented in SAMAK, but the Finnish SDP would. As social democratic SAK leaders often also had a leading position in the party, SAK was unofficially represented through these.

The Icelandic ASI was communist-controlled. Norwegian LO leader Konrad Nordahl, mentioned that separate labour conferences just for social democratic TUC's might be necessary: '...great difficulties arise, when communists assume leading positions in the labour movement.'⁴⁹³

Discussions about communism also went along general lines, dealing with its position in society and the CP's composition and personalities.⁴⁹⁴ All in all, communism, and how to deal with it, was a big issue at this first SAMAK meeting: in the minutes from the meeting, the word 'communist' is on almost every page of the 31-page summary.⁴⁹⁵

In between SAMAK gatherings, the parties kept each other updated on the progress (or lack thereof) in the unity negotiations. Norwegian documentation on the negotiations was spread and read with interest in Danish social democratic circles.⁴⁹⁶ When negotiations broke down in Norway and Denmark, the Swedish party sent out a book, obviously blaming everything on the communists.⁴⁹⁷

SAMAK met again in January 1946. Although not a separate item on the agenda, communism was still an issue. The Danish SDP was painfully aware (and a bit surprised) that they had lost 18 parliament seats to the communists in the October 1945 elections and hence missed out on government power.

That unity negotiations had failed in Denmark was, the SDP thought, partly due to the fact that communists would not commit to democracy in spite of the wartime 'lesson in dictatorship'. Copies of correspondence between the DKP and SDP were enclosed with the Danish report, mainly on SDP refusing cooperation unless DKP clearly and publicly distanced

⁴⁹³ '...stora svårigheter uppstår, när kommunisterna kommer i ledande ställning inom fackföreningsrörelsen.' Minutes, 13-14 July 1945. ABA 500, 322, 2. Majander 1997, pp. 57-58

⁴⁹⁴ Minutes, 3-4 July 1945. AAB 1001, Da L0005, Nordisk samarbete

⁴⁹⁵ Minutes, 13-14 July 1945. ABA 500, 322, 2

⁴⁹⁶ Letter from Hedtoft/Carlsson, 30 November 1945, ABA 1500, 1234, 0002; Carlsson to Norwegian LO, 19 December 1945. AAB 1579, Dd, L0002, Skandinaviske forbindelser; Letter to Hedtoft, 26 July 1945. ABA 500, 800, 3 and documentation, 801, 1

⁴⁹⁷ *Hur enigheten torpederades: enhetsförhandlingarna mellan socialdemokrater och kommunister i Norge och Danmark*. Stockholm: Tiden, 1945.

itself from dictatorship and spoke in favour of democratic socialism.⁴⁹⁸ Hans Hedtoft hinted once again that the reasons for negotiating had been mostly tactical. He added that the SDP faced a reorganisation and an ideological showdown with communism.⁴⁹⁹

Norwegian party vice chairman Trygve Bratteli spoke of the necessity to win back the votes gained by communists. A second round of unity negotiations was underway in Norway, but Bratteli was not optimistic. The Norwegian plan seemed to be for the SDP to 'swallow' the communists in a unification. Martin Tranmæl, however, did not believe in unification but isolation: 'If there is to be a communist party it is to be a sect.' Government coalitions with communists were out of the question.⁵⁰⁰

A Finnish representative, Härmä stated that their experiences in the field of cooperation had not been all negative. SAK employed communist officials, and communists also participated in all state committees where they assumed a discrete role. Finnish secretary Unto Varjonen, had a different view: he stated that though the relationship between social democrats and communists officially was OK, they were in a tough battle for the hearts and minds of the Finnish population. Political cooperation with the communists was a necessary evil, due to outside pressure (and a tendency to friendliness towards the Soviet Union even in right-wing circles).⁵⁰¹

Swedish delegate August Lindberg also noted that the communists had behaved themselves in the last 2 months; he found this to be a reason for suspicion rather than reassurance. He did not think, though, that the communist problem was serious. PM Per-Albin Hansson thought that whatever the reasons had been for negotiating, it was time to realise that cooperation was impossible. Swedish delegate Gunnar Andersson cemented that standpoint by stating that he did not think there should be any cooperation with communists within the Socialist International either.⁵⁰² The Swedes and the Danes at this meeting were the most inflexible in their attitude towards the communists or, at any rate, the ones in a position to say it out loud.

Speaking of what one was not able to say out loud: as for the written correspondence between meetings, the Finns needed a special arrangement: Oluf Carlsson sent the SAMAK minutes to Sven Andersson of the Swedish party with the words: 'We understand from the

⁴⁹⁸ 'Den politiske Situation i Danmark efter Valget den 30 Oktober 1945.' Report for SAMAK, January 1946. 'Forholdet til Kommunisterne.' January 1946. ABA 500, 323, Herr Oluf Carlsson

⁴⁹⁹ Minutes from SAMAK 5-6 January 1946. ABA 500, 323, 1

⁵⁰⁰ 'Skal vi have et Kommunistparti, saa skal det være en Sekt.' Minutes from SAMAK 5-6 January 1946. ABA 500, 323, 1. See also Bergh and Eriksen 1997, pp. 135-136

⁵⁰¹ Minutes from SAMAK 5-6 January 1946. ABA 500, 323, 1

⁵⁰² Minutes from SAMAK 5-6 January 1946. ABA 500, 323, 1

Finns, that we should not send such material to them, but let it go through you, as you should be able to send it in a more secure way.' The Swedish connection was also used when the Danish party shared their pamphlet 'The communists' Political Merry-Go-Round' with the Finns.⁵⁰³

Danes and Swedes gathered for a conference about post-war issues in Copenhagen, May 1946. The agenda had two items: the battle against communism, and the social democratic post-war program. In the event, the first item took up all the time so the second was postponed for some other time. From Denmark, labour officials from Copenhagen participated along with AIC officials and board members such as Lars M. Olsen, Urban Hansen and leader of the SDP's youth league, DSU, Per Hækkerup (later to become Foreign Minister). From Sweden came officials from Skåne and Malmö (South Sweden) party districts.⁵⁰⁴

Olsen started by giving an overview of the communist position since 1939, including the popularity gained through resistance work. He touched upon the unity negotiations and described the communist fraction work and political stance. He went on to describe the social democratic countermoves, which he thought to have gained some momentum. Social democrats should be activated for the battle through the unions.⁵⁰⁵

A discussion followed about problems and possible solutions. Swedish participants stated that while communism in Norway and Denmark might have culminated, they were not sure that this was the case in Sweden. They did not feel threatened by the communists politically but agreed that the battle was for the unions. There was overall agreement that it was necessary to activate party members and strengthen propaganda. The communists' weak spot was their 'dictatorship of the proletariat' parole, and the undemocratic nature of their 'ideal society', the Soviet Union. However, Olsen pointed out that on-going trade negotiations between Denmark and the Soviet Union might prompt the SDP to hold back a little on the anti-Soviet slogans for now.⁵⁰⁶

It was time, once again, to activate and organise the party members and to engage them in the battle. The old slogan: Educate! Agitate! Organise! was as relevant as ever. A résumé of the conference went straight to Hans Hedtoft.⁵⁰⁷

⁵⁰³ Carlsson to Andersson, 30 March 1946 and 25 August 1946. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 01 1946

⁵⁰⁴ 'Referat af dansk-svensk socialdemokratisk Konference i København, søndag den 5. Maj 1946.' ABA 500, 514, 5

⁵⁰⁵ 'Referat af dansk-svensk socialdemokratisk Konference i København, søndag den 5. Maj 1946.' ABA 500, 514, 5

⁵⁰⁶ 'Referat af dansk-svensk socialdemokratisk Konference i København, søndag den 5. Maj 1946.' ABA 500, 514, 5

⁵⁰⁷ Poul Hansen to Hans Hedtoft, 6. maj 1946. ABA 39 29, Korrespondance 1946. Marts. April. Maj

At the next SAMAK meeting in July 1946 communism was mentioned less: the Swedes shortly stated that a suggestion from communists about cooperation in the elections had been rejected, and that communist campaigns had not been successful. The Norwegian report was equally brief on the subject, shortly informing that unity negotiations were not an issue at the moment.⁵⁰⁸ Most detailed was the Danish report, which stated that communist attempts at unity negotiations had stopped after SDP and LO had shown their talks of democracy to be 'dishonest'. The Danish report informed that the battle within the unions had strengthened and that establishment of social democratic clubs had been intensified.⁵⁰⁹

In April 1947, talks of unification in Norway surfaced once again with the so-called 'Vestfold proposition', thought out by none other than Haakon Lie. In a letter from Lie to Sven Aspling, we find a reason for the madness: Lie assured Aspling that, once again, negotiations were merely a tactical move. The proposition was a repetition of one that the communists had rejected once before, and therefore, SDP was certain that they would reject it once again, at the same time exposing their un-democratic nature:

Obviously, none of us believe for a second that there will be unification with the communists. As long as the Russian government wishes to keep the communist parties as a tool in its defence- and foreign policy, we will have such a party in Norway as well. But the task is to reduce that party to a sect – by peeling off the groups that aren't religious Moscow-worshippers. It is no easy task at the moment; but one of the means is to put the responsibility for the political division where it belongs. (...) Thus, you must consider the "Vestfold proposition" in this context. It is thought by us to be a offensive drive against the communists.⁵¹⁰

Earlier in 1947 there had also been some cooperation between the Finnish social democratic and CP's. Like Lie, Leskinen assured Aspling that it was only for tactical reasons.⁵¹¹

⁵⁰⁸ Swedish and Norwegian reports for SAMAK 18-19 July 1946. ABA 500, 323, 3

⁵⁰⁹ Danish report for SAMAK, 18-19 July 1946. ABA 500, 323, 3

⁵¹⁰ 'Det er selvsagt ingen av oss som et øyeblikk tror at det vil bli noen samling med kommunistene. Så lenge den russiske regjeringen ønsker å ha kommunistiske partier som redskap i sin forsvars- og utenrikspolitikk vil vi ha et slikt parti i Norge også. Men oppgaven er å redusere dette partiet til en sekt – ved å skalle av de gruppene som ikke er religiøse Moskva-tilbedere. Det er ingen enkel oppgave nå; men et av midlene er å få ansvaret for den politiske splittelsen lagt der hvor det hører hjemme. (...) Se altså "Vestfoldforslaget" på denne bakgrunnen. Det er fra vår side tenkt som et offensivt framstøt mot kommunistene.' Lie to Aspling, 18 April 1947. ARBARK 0037, 3, 047. Same argumentation was repeated by Lie 1985, pp. 134-136. See also Bergh & Eriksen 1997, p. 135

⁵¹¹ Correspondance Läskinen/Aspling, February 1947. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 02 1947

Lie expressed what was also pointed out at the Danish-Swedish conference, that domestic communism was merely an instrument for a foreign un-democratic power. At the Nordic labour congress in Oslo 1947 (the first since 1920) a major point was that of 'democratic socialism'. The underlining of democracy throughout the communiqué referred explicitly to Nazi Germany, but there is no doubt that it also hinted at the Soviet Union and communism.⁵¹²

As all attempts at unification purposely failed and the attitude towards communism settled back into its openly hostile pre-war level, the topic became less discussed in SAMAK, often just shortly mentioned in the reports. Reading the official minutes, one does not get the impression that it was a major issue.⁵¹³

Finland diverged: their report for the August 1947 SAMAK meeting, spoke at length about communist policy and stated that although large parts of the labour movement no longer believed in the communist 'people's democracy', the situation was dangerous:

We face a decisive battle between social democrats and communists for the determining influence in the labour movement, and this battle even settles the question of the country's political independence and the democratic order of society.⁵¹⁴

The Finnish and Checkoslovakian situations had a direct influence on the February 1948 SAMAK meeting: Finland was unable to participate in discussions about the Marshall Plan, which clearly did not please Väinö Leskinen.⁵¹⁵

Swedish party leader and PM Tage Erlander stated in the opening speech, that it was up to the SDP's to show that 'the socialist goal cannot be reached by means which include giving up freedom.' According to Hedtoft it was clear whose side the Nordic people were on.⁵¹⁶

Norwegian representatives connected the international situation to the domestic. Gerhardsen spoke of Swedish and Norwegian communist attempts to sabotage transports to the

⁵¹² Svensson 1986, p. 81

⁵¹³ Reports for SAMAK, January 1947. ABA 500, 324, 1

⁵¹⁴ 'Vi står inför en avgörande kamp mellan socialdemokrater och kommunister om det bestämmande inflytandet inom arbetarrörelsen och i denna kamp avgörs även frågan om landets politiska självständighet och den demokratiska samhällsordningen (...). Report for SAMAK, August 1947. ABA 500, 324, 2

⁵¹⁵ Minutes from SAMAK 7-8 February 1948. ABA 500, 333, 1

⁵¹⁶ 'att det socialistiska målet icke kan mås med medel som innebär avkall på friheten.' Minutes from SAMAK 7-8 February 1948. ABA 500, 333, 1

Ruhr-district and infiltrating shipping unions. Nordahl thought that the Norwegian communists' aim was to be powerful enough to immobilise the Norwegian merchant fleet.⁵¹⁷

Haakon Lie was asked by the Swedish hosts to talk about the international development, as he had 'been most insisting when it came to a tough attitude towards the eastern parties.'⁵¹⁸ He stated that the development in the international labour movement paralleled the increasing tension in international politics, especially after the formation of Cominform in September 1947. He spoke in favour of a West European socialist international, and underlined the need for the Nordic countries to show their Western affiliation. He strongly advocated leaving WFTU and forming a labour organisation for Marshall countries.⁵¹⁹

Lie was, through the party-state network, well informed. From the Norwegian foreign ministry, he received 'in strict confidentiality' a report about the situation in Czechoslovakia, written by an 'official' who had been in Prague.⁵²⁰

While Haakon Lie wanted a visible stand, Swedish Social Minister Gustav Möller addressed a schism of the Scandinavian governments: he wanted good neighbourly relations to the Soviet Union, but at the same time he wanted the line against the domestic communists strengthened. Here, he worded the delicate line between the ideological battle against communism and *realpolitik* which most of the Nordic countries were to walk in the years to come.⁵²¹

While still unsure of how to deal with it, the conclusion was clear: communists were no longer a nuisance or a rival, but a security threat.

In May 1948, Rolf Gerhardsen and Einar Gerhardsen's secretary Arnfinn Vik came to Stockholm to discuss the battle against communism with Tage Erlander. According to Erlander's diary, they, like Nordahl at SAMAK, seemed genuinely worried about communist plans of paralysing important Norwegian industries and shipping.⁵²² In the years to come, they would take considerable measures to secure it: when Norway joined NATO in 1949, communists were expected to try to sabotage weapon imports from the US. Nordahl hired former labour committee secretary Ivar Hobbelhagen in a special position from 1950, to secure unloading of NATO materiel in Norwegian harbours. He was paid by Haakon Lie/the party. Hobbelhagen cooperated with the military security service, Fst. II, local secretaries and the leadership of the

⁵¹⁷ Minutes from SAMAK 7-8 February 1948. ABA 500, 333, 1, Lie 1985, p. 253.

⁵¹⁸ '...hårdest har drivit linjen om klart språk mot ostpartierna'. Aspling to Lie, 26 January 1948. ARBARK 1213, A1, 5, SAMAK 1947-48

⁵¹⁹ Minutes from SAMAK 7-8 February 1948. ABA 500, 333, 1, Lie 1985, pp. 245ff.

⁵²⁰ AAB 2483, Dc, L0005, 1948

⁵²¹ Minutes from SAMAK 7-8 February 1948. ABA 500, 333, 1

⁵²² Erlander 2001a, p. 224, Holmström 2011, p. 105. On the Norwegian fleet issue, see Borgersrud 2001, Lahlum 2009, pp. 271-273

Seamen's Federation, Ingvar Haugen.⁵²³ Haugen also cooperated with Lie and Rolf Gerhardsen, corresponded with several other labour movement officials in order to secure 'reliable' people for the unloading and made lists of political affiliations of the workers who would be affected. He initiated committees for the task in other Nordic countries, arranged anti-communist campaigns within the Seamen's Federation and had Norwegian seamen report from trips to the Soviet Union. In 1950 it was decided that communists could not be employed in paid positions within the Seamen's Federation.⁵²⁴

The elevation of communism from a labour to a security issue might be the reason that it was toned down at the next SAMAK meeting in October 1948. The Danish and Norwegian reports only shortly mentioned communist policies and campaigns.⁵²⁵

Finland was the one country reporting on communism in detail. The Finnish report informed that FKP-leaders had been in Moscow where they had received both a reprimand for the lack of results in Finnish politics and instructions for the future. Furthermore it spoke of the (still unidentified) 'safety measures' taken by the police during and after the FCMA-negotiations (see chapter 13). However, the Finnish people were, according to the SDP, opening their eyes to the undemocratic nature of communism and this was visible in the national election results.⁵²⁶

LABOUR CONFERENCES

LO-leaders began having separate labour conferences in connection with SAMAK meetings. At such a meeting in October 1948, SAK secretary Olavi Lindblom gave a presentation on communist activity against the new social democratic minority government in Finland. The communists had started strikes, but failed to turn them into a larger movement and Lindblom considered it a victory for social democrats. He also expressed optimism regarding the division of strength within the unions even if a number of large unions were communist-dominated. More serious was the anticipation of a communist attempt to split SAK and form their own TUC, which could have grave consequences for wage negotiations.

⁵²³ Nordahl, Konrad, and Ketil A. Nordahl. *Dagbøker. Bd 1, 1950-1955*. Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1991, pp. 14-16. Lie has denied this. Lahlum 2009, p. 302. At one instance, Lie was said to himself show up at an unloading to commandeer his 'troops' in case of unrest. Borgersrud 2001, p. 99

⁵²⁴ Lund 1996, pp. 1046-1047, Gerhardsen 2009, p. 140, Nordahl 1991, p. 33, Borgersrud 2001, esp. pp. 35ff. and chapter 3, Lahlum 2009, pp. 255-256

⁵²⁵ Reports for SAMAK, 30 October 1948. ABA 500, 333, 2

⁵²⁶ SKDL had lost 11 seats. See also Puskala to the Danish SDP, 14 July 1948. ABA 500, 807, 1

On the practical side, a Finnish suggestion was accepted that the Nordic countries exchange district officials on trips to study information- and propaganda activities – the other countries would gladly receive a delegation, but were not sure that they would send one.⁵²⁷ The Finns might have needed it the most.

The conference also discussed delegations to East countries. Nordahl thought that exchanges could not be avoided as long as Norway and the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations and their labour movement were members of the same international organisation. Visits could even result in critical reports, exposing downsides of Soviet society. WFTU was the subject of a lengthy discussion. Danish LO chairman Eiler Jensen found the organisation to be dominated by communist attitudes and mistrust and he foresaw the next congress to be 'stormy'.⁵²⁸

By the next Nordic labour meeting in March 1949, the conflict had blown open: UK, US and the Netherlands had left WFTU. Under these circumstances, Eiler Jensen did not see any future for the Nordic countries within WFTU. Nordahl and Swedish LO-leader Aksel Strand also thought that it would be just a matter of time before they followed suit. SAK had joined WFTU as late as 1947 and owing to the 'current situation' they could not leave. ASI had only just recently been taken over by social democrats and chairman Helgi Johannesson hoped that Iceland would follow if and when the other Nordic countries left WFTU.⁵²⁹

But just because they left, they didn't lose track: an undated report in the Swedish archive (presumably from the early 1950s), gives an overview of WFTU and its youth league. It is filled with names of Nordic members and leaders, and a list of leading personalities in Sweden, Denmark and Norway.⁵³⁰

At the March 1949 SAMAK meeting, the report from Iceland told of communist tactics and details of union elections. Swedish, Danish and Norwegian reports gave short information on communist campaigns but also stated that communist popularity was on the wane, politically and in the unions. The Finnish report was, once again, the most grave. However, the Finns also shared the good news that the communist-dominated security police, STAPO had been dissolved. They reported that the communists had speculated a lot about the

⁵²⁷ Report by Lindblom, sent from Sweden to Norway and Denmark, 17 November 1948. ABA 1500, 830, 5

⁵²⁸ Minutes from Nordic labour conference, 29 October 1948. AAB 1579, Dd, L0047, Skandinaviske forbindelser - Nordisk samarbeid

⁵²⁹ Minutes from SAMAK meeting, 5-6 March 1949. ABA 500, 334, 1. See also resumé of meeting between Swedish, Norwegian and Danish LO leaders, 18 January 1949. AAB 1579, Dd, L0083, Nordisk samarbeidskomité

consequences of Denmark and Norway joining NATO and directly hinted that there would be Russian countermoves.⁵³¹ Leskinen warned that Finland would probably become a base for Soviet propaganda and perhaps even illegal activities towards Denmark and Norway.⁵³²

BACK IN SAMAK

Communism resurfaced as a major issue at the SAMAK meeting in July 1949. It was held in Iceland in an attempt to tie them closer to the Nordic community. One item on the agenda was 'Ways and means to prevent the division of the labour movement.' As division was synonymous with communism, this item was solely dedicated to them. Perhaps the reason was that it was a problem for the hosts. Icelandic Jon Sigurdsson reported that even though social democrats now held the majority in ASI, their overall position in the labour movement was weak and needed consolidation.

The reports from Scandinavia were fairly alike: communism was mostly a problem in larger cities (in Sweden also in Norrbotten which had a 'strong and lasting communist influence'). Communists had begun targeting organisations outside of the unions, where they had generally lost influence. Moreover they concentrated on certain areas, geographically or by trade, thus making the effort stronger and more focused in these areas. Where communists did have support, it was often due to one charismatic person. In the battle for the unions, adapting communist methods was necessary – one might even have something to learn from them in terms of discipline and organisational skills. A valuable remedy was the information publications and pamphlets sent out to contact people, club members and shop stewards (the Swedish *Argument*, Danish *AIC-nyt*, and Norwegian *Arbeidsplassen*): small publications with social democratic views and arguments on current issues and debates, for partisans to use in discussions.

The Finns also mirrored communist tactics in order to curb them: 'we have to follow their preparations and adapt their methods'. Leskinen pointed out, that to do this, one had to follow the communist preparations. Without information on communist tactics, one could not combat them to the same extent. This was a main reason for the intelligence activities carried out by the SDP's.

⁵³⁰ Documents about WFTU. ARBARK 1889, F15D, 07 1952-63, 1952 Kommunistiska partier (Internationella enheten)

⁵³¹ Reports for SAMAK, March 1949. AAB 1001, Da L0028, Nordisk samarbeid

⁵³² Minutes from SAMAK, 5-6 March 1949. ABA 500, 334, 1

Leskinen also pointed out that communists did much of the anti-communist work themselves, as their positive attitude towards the Soviet Union was widely unpopular. Nevertheless he foresaw that in Finland, they would remain relatively strong in the future. There was general agreement that activating SDP members in the struggle was necessary.⁵³³

In sum: educate, agitate, organise.

Everyone agreed that communism in Norden had to be fought tooth and nail – cooperating in this venture seemed like a logical step. Many of those concerned with the question on a daily basis wished to debate it with their Nordic counterparts. In March 1949, one of Norway's main communist-fighters, Hjalmar Dyrendahl, wrote Sven Aspling that during a recent conference, he regretted not having had time to talk to him 'about such things which are the same in this country as in yours.'⁵³⁴

Now, in SAMAK, Sven Aspling suggested that the Nordic countries should exchange information on these matters. Norwegian representative Thorbjørn Henriksen agreed, and thought it useful to have special gatherings of the party secretaries in the future to talk specifically about issues concerning communism and how to fight it.⁵³⁵ SAMAK had quickly become a somewhat large gathering with 5-10 delegates from each country, thus ceasing to be a proper venue for confidential talks. With the July 1949 suggestion of separate conferences, a new forum was created.

Even with a new security service, Finland was still not considered 'safe'. The minutes from the 1949 SAMAK meeting was still not sent by normal mail, for fear that it would be seen by the wrong eyes. Instead Oluf Carlsson sent a copy to Sven Aspling to get it to the Finns by more secure ways.⁵³⁶ The Swedish connection was also used in August when Eiler Jensen invited Olavi Lindblom to a Nordic meeting about the situation in the Socialist International (SI) – even if the Finns could not join the other Nordic countries in any action they might take against the WFTU, Jensen wanted Lindblom to be informed about what was going on.⁵³⁷

⁵³³ Minutes from SAMAK, and Norwegian report. July 1949. AAB 1001, Da L0028, Nordisk samarbeid. Swedish report, ABA 1500, 1064, 0003

⁵³⁴ Dyrendahl to Aspling, 5 March 1948. AAB 1001, Da, L0030, Sverige

⁵³⁵ Minutes from SAMAK, and Norwegian report. July 1949. AAB 1001, Da L0028, Nordisk samarbeid. Swedish report, ABA 1500, 1064, 0003

⁵³⁶ Carlsson to Aspling 31 March 1949. ARBARK 1213, A1, 6, SAMAK 1949

⁵³⁷ Jensen to Lindblom, 27 August 1949. ABA 1500, 1064, 0007

A SPECIAL MEETING: HELSINGBORG 1949

The first in a row of party secretary conferences took place at a Helsingborg (Sweden) restaurant on 18 November 1949. Apart from the party secretaries from Denmark (Carlsson), Norway (Lie), Sweden (Aspling) and Finland (Leskinen), communist-fighters Urban Hansen, Paul Björk and Rolf Gerhardsen were present.⁵³⁸

There is no full résumé from the meeting, just Oluf Carlsson's hand-written notes, which are fragmented and hard to read. Lines are sometimes jotted down without context. An example is the line 'Do you want to become a professional revolutionary?' randomly written in the middle of the résumé of Paul Björk's speech. The same goes for a remark on surveillance. Thus, Carlsson's notes give a clue, if not all the details, as to the topics discussed: while we don't know what was said about surveillance, we know it was mentioned. As Carlsson already knew about Danish conditions, he hasn't taken detailed notes when Urban Hansen was speaking – hence we know even less of what he said.⁵³⁹

Carlsson didn't make the notes any easier to decipher by randomly mixing the Scandinavian languages. Nonetheless, it is possible to make an outline of the meeting's progression:

Communist organisation

Some time was devoted to an overview of the CP's and their activities during and after the war, including organisation, campaigns, strikes, tactics and intellectuals. They also discussed social democratic countermoves, like how to dominate open meetings by planning for the speakers and sitting positions in advance (a well-known and used tactic both for communists and social democrats⁵⁴⁰). There was also some discussion about apartment blocks, probably referring to communist infiltration of tenants' organisations.

In SKP, there had been a split between party leader Sven Linderot and party secretary Fritjof Lager (described as a hardliner), leading to large defections and general pessimism in the party. A Norwegian delegate spoke of the NKP's relation to Kominform and the Soviet Union. There was some uncertainty as to how many details of the NKP program were dictated from

⁵³⁸ Correspondence between secretaries, November 1949. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 04 1949. Carlsson's notes. ABA 500, 514, 8

⁵³⁹ 'Ønsker du blive yrkesrevolutionær?' Carlsson's notes, 18 November 1949. ABA 500, 514, 8

⁵⁴⁰ Schmidt 2009a, pp. 32-33

Moscow. DKP leader Aksel Larsen was one of the communist leaders who had visited the Soviet Union.

Leskinen reviewed the Finnish communists and the SKDL, which he stated, was officially an independent party, but effectively controlled by communists. According to him, 42 out of 51 of their MP's were communists. The communist problem was worst in the workplaces and unions, and Leskinen said that there really wasn't any sign of them getting weaker.

Militancy

Norwegian social democrats had organised a 'plant defence'. Its task was to secure important industries in a crisis (usually meaning war, civil war, *coup d'état* or attempt at it). Especially industries that secured important functions in society (electricity, water, communication) or produced for the military had to be held free of communist hands and protected against attacks or sabotage in a crisis. The plant defence consisted of workers with the right (social) democratic attitude and was organised in cooperation between the local union, trusted union representatives and the employer.⁵⁴¹ The first Norwegian plant defences were built illegally but were since sanctioned by the (social democratic) Defence Minister and once built, they openly joined with the Home Guard. They were partially paid for by the military security service, and part of a larger stay behind network.⁵⁴² Carlsson was very interested in obtaining more information about the plant defence system.

There was some speculation about an NKP military apparatus, but the speaker noted that NKP was not very active in the Home Guard. He stated that their exercises had no military significance, but were merely designed to create a 'certain atmosphere'. Also in Denmark there had been rumours of 'illegal groups' after the coup in Czechoslovakia.⁵⁴³

Finances

The economy of the CP's was an often-recurring theme, as social democrats were certain (rightly, as it turned out⁵⁴⁴) that they were not surviving on their own – there had to be money flowing in from the east.

⁵⁴¹ Carlsson's notes 18 November 1949. ABA 500, 514, 8.

⁵⁴² Riste and Moland 1997, pp. 35-36, 79

⁵⁴³ Notes from meeting 18 November 1949. ABA 500, 514, 8

⁵⁴⁴ Documented in Thing 2001

According to the Norwegian speaker, the economy of the NKP was not too good. He gave an approximate figure of members and paper circulation. The SKP seemed to have had substantial funding before the national election, but now, as their Norwegian comrades, seemed less fortunate. Paul Björk reported on communist publications and finances. They were strongest in Norrbotten where, according to Björk, SKP had 10 officials and 3 cars at its disposal.⁵⁴⁵ Also Urban Hansen and Väinö Leskinen gave information about communist fundraising and newspaper sales.

Lastly, the participants spoke of the future: about publishing common pamphlets, exchanging records, and organising courses and schooling. The current task was to keep an eye on the communists. The goal was to be quickly informed of any communist plans or activities, so as to be able to react swiftly. In this, contacts in the workplaces were indispensable.⁵⁴⁶

Afterwards, Sven Aspling wrote Lie to thank him for the get-together. He promised to return about a similar meeting next year.⁵⁴⁷

1945-49: IN CONCLUSION

Whatever post-war sympathy there might have been for communism, the SDP parties and labour movements of Norden did not share it. As soon as they were able to gather again, they were preoccupied with the enemy that was still active and present. Communism enjoyed popularity in the Nordic countries, even to the point that the SDP's had to put on a show of good will in unity negotiations. This was, obviously, just for show. The war had changed nothing for the ideologues and labour leaders of the 1930's. They had not forgotten who had been the main threat to their political project.

The initial concentration on communism was within the labour movement: economies and industries had to be built up, and in this venture the workers and their organisations would play a crucial part. Controlling this powerful part of society was, therefore, just as crucial.

No one seemed to nurture any sympathies for the Soviet Union either. Its undemocratic nature was frequently mentioned, either as a warning of what the communists really were and wanted for Norden, or as a good argument against them. No one doubted that the domestic CP's were run by Moscow. As international relations soured, this would become a key part of

⁵⁴⁵ The issue was the object of an article by Paul Björk called 'Mystery Money'. Björk, 1950, pp. 16-22

⁵⁴⁶ 'vide 2 timer før, hvad der skal ske.' Carlsson's notes 18 November 1949. ABA 500, 514, 8

⁵⁴⁷ Aspling to Lie, 12 December 1949. AAB 1001, Da, L0030, Sverige

the threat perception: Moscow imposed its will on small, defenceless countries, and they had help from local CP's. The domestic communists went from being a political rival to a security threat, and with that, the decade-long rivalry became securitised.

As securitisation set in, SAMAK became an increasingly unfit forum to discuss the communist threat. SAMAK meetings were for labour questions, party programmes and general political discussions; it was not for confidential exchanges or detailed strategy planning. Communism was mostly discussed in 'overriding terms' at SAMAK.⁵⁴⁸ This became truer as the years progressed. Immediately after the war, there was a tendency to discuss communism at a detailed level, but with the 1949 decision to move this discussion to a more confidential forum – the party secretary meetings – communism was mainly mentioned in SAMAK in general political terms or in cases relating to foreign policy and/or international communism.

The November 1949 meeting in Helsingborg came to be the first in a series of confidential meetings in which the party secretary and one of the lead communist-fighters from each country participated. The tone was confidential and so was the information. In one of the last pages of his notes, Oluf Carlsson wrote, and underlined: 'Only a few know about these meetings.'⁵⁴⁹

The meetings were almost exclusively concerned with communism and followed a certain pattern: a representative from each country summarised their respective situations in regards to communist strengths, weakness, politics, campaigns and what else might be considered relevant (which was almost everything). Then, a discussion followed, in which the participants exchanged views, tactics, future plans and agreed on possible countermeasures. Information would not only revolve around communism in the labour movement, but also security matters such as sabotage, communist militancy and safeguarding industries.

Sven Aspling has later denied that these meetings contained talk of named individuals.⁵⁵⁰ But as we can see already from this first meeting, that is not correct.

The circle around the party secretary meetings was a small network, formed in a time of uncertainty. The mood of urgency – securitisation – created a wish for a new forum in which to deal with the new threats. It was only natural that the participants were those in the middle of the party organisations. They had contacts low and high, and in this case just as important: across borders. They knew each other in advance, from organisation work and the war years and trusted each other. The officials brought in had shown their value through battling

⁵⁴⁸ 'övergripande former'. Lampers 2002, p. 283

⁵⁴⁹ 'Kun få ved besked om disse møder.' Carlsson's notes 18 November 1949. ABA 500, 514, 8

⁵⁵⁰ Aspling 1999, p. 78

communism in their country, something that was also done in close contact with the party secretaries. Though some might not have known each other, the corporation – the ideological organisation and setting in which they worked – bound them together and provided trust.

But it wasn't just any odd group of likeminded individuals. They were in the centre of large powerful parties and movements, which gave them both financial and organisational opportunities to carry out their work. They had the support of the state in more than one way; not only did they have a common threat perception with the states, they also had their close friends and partisans running it.

16. 1950-54: SETTLING INTO THE COLD WAR

Social democratic attitudes towards communism in 1950 was marked by the outbreak of the Korean War in June and a forceful 'peace campaign' from the communists.

The peace campaign was orchestrated by the communist-dominated World Peace Council (WPC), and culminated in March with the Stockholm Appeal, a worldwide petition against nuclear weapons. In all Scandinavian countries, peace committees emanated from the WPC during 1949-1950, all connected to the national CP.⁵⁵¹

With the breakout of the Korean War in June 1950, the fear and tension of 1948 was enhanced, and stressed the immediacy of the communist threat and the possibility for a new war. According to Finnish historian Jussi M. Hanhimäki, the Korean War was one of the single most formative events for Norden in the Cold War, creating 'a genuine war scare (...) from Helsinki to Reykjavik'.⁵⁵² The final communiqué from SAMAK in December 1950 held 'communist aggression' responsible for the war.⁵⁵³

At the SAMAK meeting in May 1950, both Swedes and Norwegians reported on decreased communist influence. In the October 1949 national elections in Norway, the NKP had lost all their seats in parliament. Internal disputes had weakened them politically and in the unions. In Finland, on the contrary, communists had had some success with strikes and they had formed a new labour organisation, which effected SAK membership figures negatively. At the same time, communists had gained territory within SAK. In conclusion, the Finnish report foresaw tough battles ahead.⁵⁵⁴

The tone from the Finns was equally serious at the December 1950 SAMAK meeting. Their report stated that it would be 'naive to underestimate the significance of communist influence in our country'. But in spite of the circumstances, Finland, according to the report, held on to its 'internal independence'.⁵⁵⁵

The Finnish problems were an object of interest to the Nordic brothers: a Finnish report dealing mostly with communist tactics during salary negotiations went to the Nordic parties after the May 1950 SAMAK meeting, and in Denmark it was distributed to a relatively small

⁵⁵¹ *Danmark under den kolde krig: den sikkerhetspolitiske situation 1945 – 1991, Bd.1* København: DUPI, 2005, pp. 385-388

⁵⁵² Hanhimäki 1997, p. 38

⁵⁵³ Minutes from SAMAK, December 1950. ABA 500, 325, Den nordiske samarbejdskomité, Møde i Oslo December 1950

⁵⁵⁴ Reports for SAMAK, Maj 1950. ABA 500, 325, Nordisk samarbejdskomité Møde Oslo maj 1950. Rapporter og protokol

⁵⁵⁵ Report for SAMAK, December 1950. ABA 1500, 1066, SAMAK-møde december 1950 i Oslo

circle, including Hans Hedtoft, HC Hansen, Urban Hansen and other AIC board members.⁵⁵⁶ The Finnish report for the December 1950 SAMAK meeting, giving a status of communist influence, was also passed on to AIC, Paul Björk and Haakon Lie.⁵⁵⁷

A SECOND MEETING: STOCKHOLM 1950

The party secretaries had a second meeting on 16 March 1950 in Saltsjöbaden, Stockholm. Attendees were Veikko Puskala and Aino Anto (Finland), Oluf Carlsson and Urban Hansen (Denmark), Sven Aspling and Paul Björk (Sweden) and Haakon Lie and Rolf Gerhardsen (Norway).⁵⁵⁸ Anto, filling in for Leskinen, was employed at the party office and dealt with 'all sorts of information-, propaganda- and opinion work.'⁵⁵⁹

Carlsson took notes again.⁵⁶⁰ Moreover the Swedish military intelligence service archive holds a résumé. According to Lampers 2002, the report was originally in Finnish, which explains why it speaks especially of Finnish interests, and 'VL' (Vainö Leskinen).⁵⁶¹ The résumé remarks that since Danish is a hard language, a lot of it has been lost in translation. Another thing, which the résumé specifically mentions is the way the information had come around. It states:

Common to all these accounts was that the observation- and surveillance activities has developed and become more systematic, even that one had not held back in taking bold steps, in the gathering of information and in the actual battle in the field. Judging from the fact that both the Norwegian and the Swedes had detailed shorthand notes from secret communist meetings, the relevant party [one or two words erased] must have had special listening devices at their disposal.⁵⁶²

⁵⁵⁶ 'Arbetsmarknadskrisen våren 1950', 23 May 1950. ABA 500, 807, 1, AAB 1001, Da, L0035, Finland

⁵⁵⁷ ABA 522, 48, 1957. Kommunister. Copy marked 'Paul Björk', AAB 2483, Dc, L0001, Finland

⁵⁵⁸ Leskinen to Lie, 20 June 1950. AAB 2483, Dc, L0001, Finland. Correspondance, February-March 1950. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 05 1950. 'Sammankomst av nordiska socialdemokrater 16/3 1950 i Stockholm', Fst/In det 1 nr IH 425 In 22/7 1950. Fst/Säk (H) F VIII B, volym 5. MUST.

⁵⁵⁹ Correspondance Leskinen/Lie, June-July 1950, AAB 2483, Dc, L0001, Finland and Leskinen/Aspling, June-July 1950. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 05 1950

⁵⁶⁰ '16-3-50' ABA 500, 514, 9

⁵⁶¹ Lampers 2002, p. 285, n67

⁵⁶² 'Gemensamt för alla dessa redogörelser var att observations- och övervakningsverksamheten utvecklats och blivit mera systematisk, och att man inte ens väjt för att ta lite friska tag lika litet vid anskaffningen av underrättelser som i den egentliga striden på fältet. Att döma av att såväl normmännen som svenskarna hade noggranna stenograferade anteckningar från de hemliga kommunistmötena, måste man på vederbörande håll [erased] haft till sin disposition särskilda lyssnarapparater.' 'Sammankomst av nordiska socialdemokrater 16/3 1950 i Stockholm', Fst/In det 1 nr IH 425 In 22/7 1950. Fst/Säk (H) F VIII B, volym 5. MUST.

We cannot tell if a participant or an intelligence officer has made this judgment. Neither can we be a 100% sure that the information actually did come from buggings carried out by social democrats. They might have been carried out by security police and then passed on to social democrats, or they might be the result of access to 'insiders' (albeit very centrally placed) in the CP's. What we can say, however, is that it bears testimony of access to highly confidential means or sources.

Communist organisation, finances, campaigns and contacts

The meeting started with an exchange of written reports and detailed descriptions of the communist situation in each country.

NKP was in turmoil, with leading figures Peder Furubotn and Emil Løvlien facing each other in an internal split. The party had around 14.000-16.000 members, 10.200 of which paid members' fees. Both Furubotn and Just Lippe (though on each side of the warring wings) had direct contacts to Moscow, and the Norwegian representative thought that Lippe reported results of 'NKP surveillance' to the Soviet Union.

DKP had issued a renewal of member cards (also mentioned in a PET report for the second quarter of 1950⁵⁶³), which probably served the purpose of better organisation. They had weakened after the latest elections and suffered from bad economy. Carlsson's notes mention a typesetting machine, probably a referral to a common practice in which Moscow supported foreign CP's and their newspapers with technical equipment, instead of cash. Also Danish communists were visiting the East Bloc.

SKP member figures were uncertain – somewhere between 36.000 and 47.000. They ran with a yearly deficit of 700.000 SEK and losses were covered from Moscow. Still, they were extending the number of paid officials. They had 5 district offices in Stockholm, 4 in Gothenburg. They had also started an offensive with new dailies and youth departments.

In Finland they controlled two radio stations in the North of the country.

The communists cooperated across the Nordic borders: Norwegian communist Løvlien had recently been to a Scandinavian communist meeting in Gothenburg.

However, the Swedes were optimistic: communist popularity was declining and SDP countermeasures were many. Communists knew that mistrust towards the Soviet Union was one of the reasons for their declining popularity, and it was all about using this. The SDP publishing

⁵⁶³ Report 3/1950, 'Kommunismen i Danmark i perioden 1. april - 1. juli 1950' ABA 39, 50, 10

house Tiden were to publish a book about the Soviet work camps, as told by an 'active party friend from Norbotten' who had spent some years there himself. The party friend was probably Ragnar Rudfalk and the book *Jag jobbade i Sovjet (I Worked in the Soviet Union)*, which was published in 1951.⁵⁶⁴

Another important reason for communist decline was, according to the Swedes, the strength and organisation of the SDP. One tactic was making people attend important meetings by having contacts who each answered for 10-12 people. If someone didn't show, the contact person would go get him, by car if needed.

Another thing that made communism less popular, according to the Swedes, was good labour conditions. Aino Anto admitted that difficult economic circumstances in Finland gave communists more support. The SDP's were aware of the benefits of 'positive anti-communism.'

An overriding theme was the communist peace campaign, and how to counter it. The Norwegian representative presented a flyer in which they propagated against the campaign, but flyers were not enough: it was agreed that a common countermove should be discussed planned at an upcoming congress in Copenhagen.

Moreover, the meeting discussed communism in other West European countries, and useful publications.

Sabotage and security

As we have seen, NATO membership made the Norwegians step up security in the harbors when American material was due to arrive. The Danes were concerned about communist activity in this connection too. They wanted to find out in advance were to expect trouble, so they could direct the ships to 'friendly' harbours controlled by social democrats. Furthermore, they had listed persons who had unloaded German ships during the war, as these could now be expected to help the communists (why they would do that is unclear). The Danish representative gave an overview of communist strength in the relevant unions and noted that the French merchants' unions had increased contacts with Danish communists lately. The Norwegian efforts in this area had been a success: at the SAMAK meeting a few months later, they reported that an attempt to prevent the unloading of armament shipments had been a complete failure, attended by only '20-30 housewives.'⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶⁴ Rudfalk, Ragnar. *Jag jobbade i Sovjet*, Stockholm: Tiden, 1951

⁵⁶⁵ Report for SAMAK, May 1950. ABA 500, 325, Nordisk samarbejdskomité Møde Oslo maj 1950. Rapport og protokol

As we remember, Oluf Carlsson had been particularly interested in the Norwegian plant defences. Denmark did not have it, and party leader/PM Hedtoft was concerned: in December 1949, shortly after the first party secretary meeting, he wrote the civil defence stating that Norway and Sweden, had made preparations to protect and/or destroy important industries in case of an invasion. He was troubled that Denmark didn't have similar plans.⁵⁶⁶

At this meeting Carlsson (and Hedtoft) got the details he wanted: a written report thoroughly describing the formation and organisation of the plant defences, which had started in early 1948. It would be directed by the Home Guard and consist of local workers. The organisers had begun by identifying plants and industrial sites, which could be regarded as targets. A reliable social democrat was chosen as coordinator in each of the plants. The coordinator then planned, in cooperation with the local Home Guard district and the plant leadership, for measures to be taken in the event a crisis and handpicked reliable men to secure the procedures. According to the Norwegian report, both the employers' and employees' organisations had been enthusiastic and cooperative, as had plant leaders and shop stewards. Due to lack of weapons and equipment, the process had initially been slow – however, the pace had picked up and the proper materials were now available. Official guidelines for the establishment of plant defences was set by the Defence Department, 12 May 1949 and were included in the report.⁵⁶⁷

Danes and Norwegians, at this point, seem more interested in counter-sabotage and protection of key industries than Finns and Swedes. This was probably due to their newly obtained membership of the Atlantic Pact, which was fiercely opposed by communists. Communists were feared to try and obstruct weapons deliveries and defence reorganisations, brought about by NATO membership.

To round off the meeting the participants talked about common questions for the future and the development of the cooperation. Another meeting was planned for Helsinki in the summer.⁵⁶⁸

That meeting ended up being postponed. Instead, Aino Anto went to Norway and Sweden in July to study propaganda. Leskinen asked to make sure that Anto was able to study

⁵⁶⁶ Letter from Hedtoft, 27 December 1949. ABA 50, G.I.7

⁵⁶⁷ 'Organisering av bedriftsvern i Norge', 14 March 1950. ABA 500, 514, 9

⁵⁶⁸ All information about this meeting, unless otherwise noted, is from '16-3-50' ABA 500, 514, 9 and 'Sammankomst av nordiska socialdemokrater 16/3 1950 i Stockholm', Fst/In det 1 nr IH 425 In 22/7 1950. Fst/Säk (H) F VIII B, volym 5. MUST.

propaganda and information work, 'both official and unofficial'. Both Aspling and Lie promised to give him all the information he wanted.⁵⁶⁹

It was not unusual for individuals to go on 'study trips' to the other Nordic countries. Paramount for the success of such trips was that the network secured the right contacts. Hence, a traveller often came with a letter of recommendation. In 1953, when a Swedish editor was going on an 8-week trip in Finland, Swedish party accountant Ernst Nilsson wrote Puskala to tell him that the editor was fully reliable, and that Puskala could safely answer any question he might have.⁵⁷⁰

BETWEEN MEETINGS

Party secretaries were not the only ones who cooperated on issues concerning communism and national security, and the plant defences was not the only area in which Denmark drew inspiration from Norway: ahead of a visit to Oslo, Danish PM Hedtoft wrote his Norwegian colleague Einar Gerhardsen that he wanted to know more about the Norwegian reorganisation of both the police and military intelligence services. For this, he hoped to be able to talk to Minister of Defence, Jens Christian Hauge, and Rolf Gerhardsen (note that Rolf Gerhardsen, officially employed at *Arbeiderbladet*, was considered an intelligence expert).⁵⁷¹

Classification of people also continued as a part of the Nordic cooperation. In June 1950, Norway's Gunnar Sand wrote Paul Björk asking about a Swedish communist. Björk answered that he was well known in Stockholm, a leading force in the railroad workers' union and had been employed by the SKP. Björk promised Sand to keep an eye on said communist and report on any news.⁵⁷²

When one Danish C. Møller wrote Norwegian SDP offering to sell a collection of documents on Scandinavian communism, Lie wrote Carlsson and asked if the texts had 'any value whatsoever?' If this was the case, Lie asked Carlsson to order him a few copies.⁵⁷³ Apparently, Møller's writings were useful: his offer can also be found in the Swedish archive,

⁵⁶⁹ Correspondance Leskinen/Lie, June-July 1950, AAB 2483, Dc, L0001, Finland and Leskinen/Aspling, June-July 1950. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 05 1950

⁵⁷⁰ Nilsson to Puskala, 8 April 1953. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 08 1953

⁵⁷¹ Hedtoft to Gerhardsen, 6 December 1950. ABA 39, 26, Einar Gerhardsen

⁵⁷² 'PB' to Sand, 15 June 1950. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 05 1950

⁵⁷³ Lie to Carlsson, 23 March 1950. AAB 1001, Da, L0034, Danmark

with the ordering slip cut off.⁵⁷⁴ Both the Danish and Swedish SDP's proceeded to receive Møller's anti-communist publications regularly until at least 1958.⁵⁷⁵

Sometimes information about communists even popped up unexpected: in May 1951 Urban Hansen sent the Norwegian partisans a copy of 'Realitet' – the publication of the small middle-right wing party 'Retsforbundet' as in contained an article suggesting forming a similar party in Norway. Haakon Lie wrote back that, 'believe it or not', the organiser was none other than excluded communist Furubotten, who was completely isolated politically and apparently on the lookout for new connections.⁵⁷⁶

There was also, still, exchange of speakers and meeting participants. In September 1950, Oluf Carlsson spoke at a Norwegian meeting for 'our best shop stewards' on election campaigns. He and Aspling spoke on the same subject at another meeting that night.⁵⁷⁷ Exchanges of course participants also continued, as did exchange of propaganda and help obtaining it.⁵⁷⁸ The Norwegian party were so thrilled with the Danish social democratic movie 'Freedom obliges' (starring Danish heartthrob Poul Reichardt as the good social democrat) that they asked if they could keep the copy they had borrowed. Lie promised to make sure that it would be used 'well and for a long time.'⁵⁷⁹

Cooperation also took place in organisations which were not (officially) social democratic: in November 1950, Gunnar Sand, upon starting up the Norwegian defence propaganda organisation 'Folk og Forsvar', wrote AIC for information about the similar Danish organisation 'Folk og Værn' (both meaning 'people and defence'). Poul Hansen at AIC passed on the question to partisan Victor Gram who was a member of the Defence Committee and involved with the organisation. Gram saw to it that Sand received the relevant information. Sand was very pleased with the material, and in return he sent information on labour market conditions, which Poul Hansen/AIC had requested for an argument with the communists.⁵⁸⁰

Many of the 'private' (or semi-private) anti-communist organisations of the early Cold War had prominent social democrats on their boards and received public funding, such as the Atlantic Association. Another such organisation was the (CIA sponsored) Congress for Cultural Freedom. Haakon Lie started it in Norway and wrote Carlsson to ask about proper Danish

⁵⁷⁴ Letter from C Møller, 16 March 1950. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 05 1950

⁵⁷⁵ April, October and December 1957, January-March 1958. ABA 522, 48, 1957 + ARBARK 1889, F15D, 07 1952-63, 1952 Kommunistiska partier (Internationella enheten)

⁵⁷⁶ Correspondance Hansen/Lie, May 1951. AAB 1001, Da, L0041, Danmark

⁵⁷⁷ Lie to Carlsson, 18 September 1950. AAB 1001, Da, L0034, Danmark

⁵⁷⁸ Alsing Andersen/Oluf Carlsson to the Norwegian party, 7 June 1950. AAB 1001, Da, L0034, Danmark. Letter from Gunnar Sand, 19 April 1950. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 05 1950

⁵⁷⁹ Letter to Carlsson, 7 September 1951. AAB 1001, Da, L0041, Danmark. Lie to Carlsson, 3 Oktober 1951. ABA 500, 514, 11

⁵⁸⁰ Correspondance Hansen/Sand, November 1950. AAB 1001, Da, L0034, Danmark

speakers (the SDP was also involved in CCF in Denmark). Carlsson (after conferring with Minister of Education, Bomholt) recommended three names to Lie, including architect Poul Henningsen whom he thought to be a good spokesperson for the social democrats. However 'as you know, it is always difficult, when you don't know people yourself, to classify them correctly.'⁵⁸¹ In 1954 Lie was in contact with Niels Matthiassen (later to become party secretary and Minister of Culture) of the Danish Atlantic Association about establishing a Norwegian branch of the Atlantic Association. This was done in spring 1955.⁵⁸² In August 1956, the Atlantic Association in Denmark was to have a convention, and an obvious topic was, according to Matthiassen, the communists' new people's front tactics. He wrote Haakon Lie to ask if he (who had vast knowledge of international communism and communist tactics) would speak at the convention.⁵⁸³

Cooperation on anti-communism was not confined to a narrow circle of party secretaries but spread across several organisations. They were in principle private, but in practice a part of a wider state-private network. It was often the same people who moved in and out of the different organisations, which secured ideological conformity, continuity and access to relevant contacts. Social democrats were on the lookout for communists everywhere and hence involved themselves anti-communist organisations outside of the labour movement.⁵⁸⁴

NAMES: HELSINKI 1950

The postponed summer 1950 party secretary meeting took place 23-26 November 1950 in Helsinki.⁵⁸⁵ This time, there is a proper résumé: 14 typewritten pages. As a Dane wrote it, the Danish report is not mentioned.

However, we are not totally in the dark about what the Danes presented: in December, the American embassy in Copenhagen forwarded a report 'prepared by responsible members

⁵⁸¹ Carlsson to Bomholt, 26 September 1950. 'Som du ved, er det altid svært, når man ikke selv kender folkene at klassificere dem korrekt.' Carlsson to Lie, 3 Oktober 1950. ABA 500, 514, 9. Probably, no one was aware that it was CIA-sponsored. Lahlum 2009, pp. 290-291, Philipsen, Ingeborg. "The congress for cultural freedom in Denmark." *Intelligence and National Security* 18, no. 2 (2003): 237-253.

⁵⁸² Lie to Matthiassen, 21 August 1954. AAB 1001, L0078, Danmark. Correspondence Lie/Matthiassen, February-April 1955. AAB 1001, Da, L0092, Danmark.

⁵⁸³ Correspondence Lie/Matthiassen 24 August 1956. AAB 1001, Da, L0112, Danmark

⁵⁸⁴ Von Essen 2001

⁵⁸⁵ Coorespondance, Leskinen/Lie, September 1950. AAB 2483, Dc, L0001, Finland, and October 1950. AAB 2483, Dc, L0001, Nordisk samarbeidskomité. Correspondance Leskinen/Carlsson, September 1950. ABA 500, 807, 1

of the social democratic party'.⁵⁸⁶ According to the American sender, the report was presented at a recent SAMAK meeting in Oslo. If this is the case, it has been distributed confidentially, as it is not among the SAMAK archive material with the other reports. Another possibility is, of course, that it was presented at the (also recent) Nordic secretary meeting, but that the Americans misunderstood or were somehow misinformed. The report contains much the same type of information as was given at the party secretary meetings, and the 'responsible members' probably did not write two different reports simultaneously. So even if the report might have been presented at the SAMAK meeting, it is safe to assume that its contents were also presented at the party secretary meeting.

Much of the report's content is similar to two quarterly 1950 PET reports in Hans Hedtoft's archive. Sometimes the information is alike sentence-by-sentence; sometimes the report gives information from the PET reports in a summarised form.⁵⁸⁷ This, and the fact that the social democratic report is a condensed version of information in two separate PET reports, points to the social democratic report being built on the PET reports, not the other way around. This will be elaborated in the end of this section.

According to the American embassy, the report was 'an array of semi-public facts or statements rather than the result of careful intelligence work' and they considered valuable only as a 'social democratic appraisal of the communist position in Denmark.'⁵⁸⁸ A harsh verdict on content presented by the police security service to the PM.

Communist organisation and tactics

The Finnish host said that the foreign policy situation was unchanged and that the Soviets attempted to create goodwill. The SDP found the official foreign policy weak, and too acquiescent.

A series of communist strikes had recently ended, but some destabilisation remained, as did animosity between different labour groups. More strikes were anticipated, as the communists dominated some large unions, both within and outside SAK. But instances of 'Titoism' also caused division among the communists.

⁵⁸⁶ 'Social Democratic report on Danish Communism.' 15 December 1950. NARA, RG 59, Dec. File. 1950-54, Box 3778

⁵⁸⁷ 3/1950, 'Kommunismen i Danmark i perioden 1. april - 1. juli 1950' and 4/1950, 'Kommunismen i Danmark i perioden 1. juli - 1. oktober 1950.' ABA 39, 50, 10

⁵⁸⁸ 'Social Democratic report on Danish Communism.' 15 December 1950. NARA, RG 59, Dec. File. 1950-54, Box 3778

The many communist officials were educated at the party school Sirola that held courses ranging from six months to two years. Communists from Norway and Sweden also attended the school. Other officials were educated at regional evening and weekend courses. The representative said that the pupils received 100 hours of teaching within three months, from teachers who were permanently employed. According to a letter from SAK leaders Lindblom and Sumu to their Scandinavian colleagues around the same time, 200 agents from the so-called 'University for Western minorities' in the Soviet Union had been spread in Finland.⁵⁸⁹

The Swedish communists had, at the election for parliament in 1950 received 4,9% of the votes. The Korean War had not influenced the election as much as the SDP had hoped (even though it was a drop from 11,2 in 1946⁵⁹⁰). The communist problem got worse the further north one got, but overall trends were good. Compared to 53 parliament seats in 1946, SKP now had only 16. In the district councils they had also diminished drastically. In the unions, they followed a strategy of employing their best people in places where social democrats were weak. Their shop stewards were then elected not as communists, but as talented labour representatives. For propaganda and recruitment means, the communists divided residents in given areas into four categories: members, sympathisers, indifferent and opponents. Having once determined who belonged where, the communists concentrated their propaganda on the two middle groups [a tactic much like the one used by social democrats, IB]. An area, in which a future battle was expected, was salary. The Swedish communist movement suffered from internal divisions.

Also the NKP had only recently recovered from an internal battle. The now expelled Peder Furubotn was still active and the NKP leadership warned about him. But in spite of reminiscences from the split, communists stood united in the workplaces. NKP had around 10.000 members (a drop compared to the figure of 14.000-16.000 presented at March party secretary meeting). The four most powerful men in NKP were Lippe, Dalland, Løvlien and Strand Johansen. Communist activities, bot regarding peace and salaries had not won any major support. Nonetheless, the Norwegian SDP was busy publishing: they worked on three pamphlets to distribute in the workplaces: one on slave work in the east, one on social legislation in the Soviet Union and one on the Russian labour movement.⁵⁹¹

⁵⁸⁹ Letter from Sumu and Lindblom 30 October 1950. AAB 1579, Dd, L0104, Skandinaviske forbindelser, Finland. 'Sammendrag af forhandling i Finland 23.-26. Novbr. 1950.' ABA 522, 48, 1957. Kommunister. There are more similarities between Lindblom and Sumu's report and the one given at this party secretary conference. Also the swedish security police was interested in the Sirola institute as it educated infiltrators for Sweden. Helkama-Rågård 2005, pp. 146-147

⁵⁹⁰ http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart____32065.aspx – 9 March 2011

⁵⁹¹ 'Sammendrag af forhandling i Finland 23.-26. Novbr. 1950.' ABA 522, 48, 1957. Kommunister.

Also the Danish party was divided in two fractions: one around leader Aksel Larsen and another around vice chairman Alfred Jensen, but rumours had it that a third one, an 'intellectual group' had formed around Børge Houmann. Politically, the DKP centered on taxes, housing, wages, and unemployment and of course the peace question, which was driven vigorously. Attempts at strikes and unemployment conferences had been unsuccessful and no Danish labour organisations were affiliated with the WFTU. Danish students had withdrawn from the communist-dominated International Students Union. Recent municipal elections had reduced communist influence in all regions, from 76 representatives to 24 total, completely excluding them in some districts. In the national elections they had gone from 6,8% votes in 1947, to 4,6% in 1950. The same trend was present in the trade union movement, leading to a low political profile: the communists presented themselves in a more 'conciliatory' manner. Outside of Copenhagen there was only one full-time organiser. Cells were reported to have increased in size in Copenhagen, but gotten smaller in the provinces. The Danish report also gave results of the recent trade-in of membership cards in DKP: specifics of the return results, by percentages, age groups, gender, occupation and locality. DKP was forming new district brigades to school party members in 'special work' and obtain better contact with the 'greater population'. The report cites a communist directive. It also refers to 'local conferences' in which the DKP discussed how to better influence the youth. Examples had been seen of supervisors in workplaces trying to 'proselyte' their subordinates.

Communists had tried to hinder the unloading of arms from America in Danish harbours. However, due to agreements with the social democratic dockworkers' chairman everything went smooth with only minor demonstrations. The matter had been given attention in Moscow radio.

Finances

When it came to financials, DKP was in the red. All paid officials in the provinces (except one) had been laid off, and the districts owed money to the central party. It had been noted that Eastern legations overcharged for visas, but whether or not the money went to DKP or in the pockets of the legation personnel was unclear. One legation employee had been 'recorded' to have a bank account with 35.000 DKK. The economy of the communist daily, Land & Folk, was also bad, and artificially maintained – the authors of the report guessed that

money obtained through 'voluntary overtime' was in reality from Cominform.⁵⁹² Employees at the social democratic press was sometimes asked to work out a hypothesis on the finances of Land & Folk, based on their experience in running a paper. They always came to the conclusion that the communist daily had to be in the red.⁵⁹³

The Norwegian SDP had prepared a larger study: they had investigated communist wartime economy, by reading through NKP correspondence from the war. The conclusion was that, during the war, NKP had received about a million NOK from 'outside' (ie. Soviet) sources. Now, the NKP were busy fundraising, but seemingly without much luck. They had two daily newspapers, one in Oslo and one in the Finnmark.

The SKP economy was hard to figure out: they seemed to lack money in some areas, but not in others. A fundraising for the communist paper 'Ny Dag' had only had minor success, but still, they had bought a flying machine to distribute papers. They ran different companies, for example in the photography business, selling cameras.⁵⁹⁴

The Finnish communists were, 'without a doubt' receiving from other sources than membership fees. The Russian trading company Seximo was thought to be one of the more generous ones. The communists had 60-70 Russian motorbikes to do courier service during strikes and to deliver 'secret depeches'. According to the aforementioned letter from Lindblom and Sumu, Seximo had paid for these motorbikes.⁵⁹⁵ To the regret of the Finnish representative, it was difficult to keep oneself informed of the activities of such companies when the social democrats were not in government. However, some information did come through to the SDP:

One has received the message that the Russians in Swedish banks has started speculation in Finnish marks and it turns out that after they have started this, the currency of the Finnish mark has gone up.

As had also been reported by Lindblom and Sumu there was a significant disproportion between the number of communist and social democratic paid officials: 40 to 2 in some districts. The Finnish representative at this meeting confirmed this picture. According to him it totalled as much as 800 to 60 in March 1950, but the communists were still hiring in anticipation of the election. There were rumours of a budget for salaries alone of 200 million

⁵⁹² 'Social Democratic report on Danish Communism.' 15 December 1950. NARA, RG 59, Dec. File. 1950-54, Box 3778

⁵⁹³ Bjørnsson 2012, p. 111

⁵⁹⁴ 'Sammendrag af forhandlinger i Finland 23.-26. Novbr. 1950.' ABA 522, 48, 1957. Kommunistler.

⁵⁹⁵ Letter from Sumu and Lindblom, SAK, 30 October 1950. AAB 1579, Dd, L0104, Skandinaviske forbindelser, Finland

FM per year. Communist fundraising results far outweighed those of the other Scandinavian countries. Rumours spoke of a figure as high as 1 million.

In figuring out the economies of the CP's, the social democrats seems to have relied mostly on open sources, rumours, company registers, and account hypotheses, which account for the many uncertain estimates. But there were also bits and pieces of information which one much assume was not public; like the legation employee with a large bank account, or Russian speculation in Finnish banks. None of this was something that labour officials could have found out 'on their own', and perhaps the Finnish representative gave some of the answer as to the source, when he stated that this sort of information was easier to come by when in government.

No one doubted that money flowed in from the Soviet Union.

Eastern connections

Norwegian communist leader Just Lippe were said to have close contacts to 'highest Russian authorities', but contacts were also made on lower levels. Several Swedish communist officials had visited countries in the East Bloc, but did not talk about it openly. Instead, they started discussions about the 'peoples democracies' in the workplaces and sought to arrange 'objective' information meetings.⁵⁹⁶

According to the Danish representative, travels to the East Bloc were separated into two kinds: 'official' traveling such as trade delegations and 'clandestine trips' undertaken by DKP leaders and officials. Regarding the latter, the Danish report offered a separate list of travellers' names if anyone wanted it (the names are to be found in the synchronous PET-report).⁵⁹⁷

In Finland, delegations to the East were common, due to the political situation. While not happy to engage in frequent exchanges, the contacts gave the Finnish SDP a possibility to gather intelligence directly: union delegations had visited the Soviet Union and upon their return, gave details on various aspects of Soviet society.

Due to Finland's vicinity to the East Bloc, there were escapées and attempts, by refugees from the Eastern countries (including some from the Polish legation), to defect via Finland. It was estimated that 170 people had fled to Sweden via Finland since the end of the war. Such refugees was valuable when they came with information:

⁵⁹⁶ 'Sammendrag af forhandlinger i Finland 23.-26. Novbr. 1950.' ABA 522, 48, 1957. Kommunistler.

⁵⁹⁷ 'Social Democratic report on Danish Communism.' 15 December 1950. NARA, RG 59, Dec. File. 1950-54, Box 3778. The names are in the PET reports, 2/1950, 3/1950, 4/1950. ABA 39, 50, 10

A couple of Russian prisoners who has escaped from a camp between the White Sea and Lake Onega [in Karelia, IBJ], tells that south of the camp the area is unchanged, but that north of it, there has been built roads and rocket tracks. There is very efficient control, also with civil traffic, as guards has been posted on mountains and hills.⁵⁹⁸

Soviets had shown interest in displaced Balts living in Danish refugee camps – an attaché had made several attempts to talk to, or influence, the displaced persons. He did not convince a single one to return to the Soviet Union.

Haakon Lie introduced the question of delegation exchanges with Yugoslavia. Not only did he think that Yugoslavia should be supported because they were in opposition to the Soviet Union. He also thought that as long as Stalin was preoccupied with Tito, Finland and Norway had a better chance of being left in peace.⁵⁹⁹ He hoped to be joined by the Danish and Swedish labour movements, but stated that Norway would probably go forward on her own anyway. When he took it up at the next SAMAK meeting however, both Erlander and Hedtoft doubted that direct support would be popular as the Tito-regime, in spite of the fallout with Stalin, was still a regime. Thus they rejected participation.⁶⁰⁰ However, at least the Danes turned to Norway and Lie for advice, when faced with sending a delegation off to Yugoslavia.⁶⁰¹

Names

At this secretary meeting we see evidence, for the first time, of something, which had been practiced by the SDP's for some time: registration of named communists and their activities. Now, some of these names were offered to the circle of party secretaries (besides mentioning leading and known figures). Besides offering names on eastern travellers were not the Danish report also contained a list over leading DKP figures, who had resigned or been excluded from the party, and in some instances why.⁶⁰²

⁵⁹⁸ 'Et par russiske fanger, der er rømmet fra en lejr mellem Hvidehavet og Onegasøen, fortælle, at syd for lejren er området uforandret, men nord for er bygget nye landeveje og raketbaner. Der føres meget effektiv kontrol også med den civile trafik, idet der er posteret vagter på fjelde og bakker.' 'Sammendrag af forhandlinger i Finland 23.-26. Novbr. 1950.' ABA 522, 48, 1957. Kommuniste.

⁵⁹⁹ 'Norsk forslag.' ABA 522, 48, 1957. Kommuniste.

⁶⁰⁰ Minutes from SAMAK, December 1950. ABA 500, 325, Den nordiske samarbejdskomité, Møde i Oslo December 1950

⁶⁰¹ Correspondence, Alsing Andersen/Lie July-August 1951. AAB 2483, Dc, L0001, Danmark

⁶⁰² 'Social Democratic report on Danish Communism.' 15 December 1950. NARA, RG 59, Dec. File. 1950-54, Box 3778. Such a list is also in the PET reports. 2/1950, 3/1950, 4/1950. ABA 39, 50, 10

Also the Finnish hosts brought names to meeting. They gave names (and in one instance the address) of internationally active Finnish communists. One was a former general of the Russian army who had written a book under a pseudonym. Besides his private home he had a house, which was frequented by several Russians. He was a teacher at Sirola and co-owner of a business, which produced communist propaganda. Another named businessman was said to have good contacts with the former and current state police and have many connections in Stockholm. A businessman from Norway seemed to leave bouts of communist leaflets behind his visits to various places. He was also said to have contacts to the Russian military attaché in Finland.⁶⁰³ Such information was of direct use to the other SDP's, as they would now know who to keep an eye out for, if someone suspicious entered the country.⁶⁰⁴

Militancy and sabotage

The Finnish representative stated that the communists were very interested in 'military questions'. A former officer of the flying police apparently led a group of communist cadres 'in police, army and arsenal areas' consisting of former STAPO officers, which had been fired during Fagerholm's reorganisation of the security police.⁶⁰⁵ As they still had their pension as former state employees, they were 'cheap labour' for the communists. In towns containing weapons arsenals, FKP prepared education of battalions consisting of 1.000 men. However there were not always that many communists in the towns, which was why the party had made it mandatory for communists within a radius of 50 km to participate. Communists, the Finnish representative stated, had a substantial influence on the civil workers in the arsenals.

The communist leadership ordered young people, who had been drafted, to report back to the party about their military service. These cadres formed a net of observers from which the FKP obtained information. 'Thus, it is not possible for the army to make the slightest move, without the party knowing about it'.⁶⁰⁶

With the outbreak of the Korean War, there had been some Soviet exercise movements close to the Finnish border but things were now calm again.

⁶⁰³ 'Sammendrag af forhandlinger i Finland 23.-26. Novbr. 1950.' ABA 522, 48, 1957. Kommunisten.

⁶⁰⁴ Lie's biographer states that the Nordic cooperation did not contain personal data on communists; clearly, it did. Lahlum 2009, p. 299

⁶⁰⁵ 'politi, armé og arsenalområder'. 'Sammendrag af forhandlinger i Finland 23.-26. Novbr. 1950.' ABA 522, 48, 1957. Kommunisten.

⁶⁰⁶ 'Det er derfor ikke muligt for hæren at foretage den mindste bevægelse, uden at partiet ved besked.' 'Sammendrag af forhandlinger i Finland 23.-26. Novbr. 1950.' ABA 522, 48, 1957. Kommunisten.

Otherwise, communists did not have much support in the regular police forces or among army officers. Security police had, according to the Finnish representative, good contacts to PM Kekkonen who had given them orders to observe social democratic strikes. Observations were then passed on to the employers.

The Norwegian representative told of an instance of sabotage on the military airbase Bardufoss, north of Narvik. Two of seven bunkers containing ammunition and weapons had exploded and another two had been destroyed. Damages amounted to a cost of 2-3 million NOK. Due to the explosions, flying was impossible on the base. The night after the sabotage, telephone lines to another airbase, Solna, had been cut and at the same time there had been Soviet overflights in the Finnmark. All of this had resulted in extra guards at military depots and extra means to police and military security services to expand with more personnel.

The Danish report also spoke of 'instances of fire and disturbance of factory operations', (i.e. sabotage), and specifically mentioned two cases – a fire at shipyard B&W and a destroyed machine at radio company Bang & Olufsen. Communists held some positions in the city administration and were thought to gather information on 'internal conditions' which they 'undoubtedly' made use of. As an example, a named communist who had worked at a police office had provided the party with information from a strike at the factory Lyac.⁶⁰⁷

The communist military organisation was thought to be led by one [H.N.] and consist of about 4.000 armed communists organised in different rifle clubs, one of them named 'Dannevirke'.⁶⁰⁸ The rumour about the 4.000 armed communists circulated already in 1948, when PM Hans Hedtoft talked about it in a meeting the Foreign Policy Council.⁶⁰⁹ It has never been confirmed. The Danes reported that a communist conference had discussed preparing for illegal activities, but party leadership has preferred to 'consolidate legal activities'.

Danish communists had also tried to join the Home Guard, but a 'five man committee familiar with the local connections of the candidates' screened those applying. Moreover the report cited a letter on military and militarisation written in January 1950 from the chairman of DKU (Danish Communist Youth League) to the chairman of NKU.⁶¹⁰

⁶⁰⁷ 'Social Democratic report on Danish Communism.' 15 December 1950. NARA, RG 59, Dec. File. 1950-54, Box 3778

⁶⁰⁸ 'Social Democratic report on Danish Communism.' 15 December 1950. NARA, RG 59, Dec. File. 1950-54, Box 3778

⁶⁰⁹ Heiberg, Morten. *Stay-behind og Firmaet. Efterretningsvæsen og private antikommunistiske organisationer i Danmark 1945-1989. PET-kommissionens beretning, bind 5.* København: Justitsministeriet, 2009, p. 25 and Schmidt, Regin. *PET's overvågning af Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti 1945-1989. PET-kommissionens beretning, bind 6.* København: Justitsministeriet, 2009 (2009b), p. 96.

⁶¹⁰ 'Social Democratic report on Danish Communism.' 15 December 1950. NARA, RG 59, Dec. File. 1950-54, Box 3778

What kind of information was this?

The judgements in this section are made from an estimate of what the parties were capable of, without having direct intelligence sources. At this meeting, especially the Danish and Finnish reports stick out.

The Finnish report was not only longer than the others, but contained a lot more information – including information that can hardly have been obtained by the SDP organisation alone. Information about activities and conditions within army and police leaves the impression of having been collected from sources with some sort of relation to intelligence services.

As for the Danish, we already know that it was based on a PET report. Obviously PET could (and probably have) build their report partially on information from the SDP. But the social democratic contact net was usually not capable of obtaining information on e.g. the financial situation of Eastern legation employees. This is a cautious guess – but the information is so alike that the two types of reports have not been written independent of one another. Since the SDP report is the shortest (and even refers to more detailed information, available in the PET-reports) the most likely scenario is that the SDP report – presented in a Nordic forum – was built on reports from the security service.

Likewise, the Norwegian information about sabotage, Soviet overflights and military guard personnel, was not your usual party business. At this meeting, the Swedes were the only ones who did not present information on national security matters.

The ties between intelligence and party are hard to pinpoint. This is an area, if any, in which the state-private social network filled its function and things were kept confidential and informal. Moreover, information was mixed up. The line between party politics and national security was completely blurred at this point, and the SDP's did not shy from collecting information about the latter (and intelligence services wanted information about the former), if they were in a position to do so. It does not necessarily mean a sanctioned cooperation. Those in the higher ranks might have had perfect deniability, but it only takes one contact to have a connection. At any rate, it is obvious that none of these party organisers had scruples using intelligence contacts; it was not a practice that was questioned.

THE PEACE CAMPAIGN

At the Helsinki meeting the communist peace campaign was a central theme. In Sweden, communists had gained some support for the Stockholm appeal, and driven a large campaign on Korea in the workplaces. The SDP would now try to better the situation, and peace propaganda had to be strengthened. About the communist peace drive in Finland, the representative referred to a written report (which had presumably been distributed to the participants). As for the Korean War, it had been difficult for the Soviet Union to make the Finnish people believe that South Korea was to blame.

Lie put forth an outline for a social democratic peace manifest. He asked the participants to discuss the question at home, before it would come up in SAMAK in December.⁶¹¹ If the other countries thought it was a good idea, they should each send one representative a day in advance of the SAMAK meeting to discuss the question of a Nordic social democratic peace movement. Lie thought it would be the best answer to the communist peace campaigns.⁶¹²

Ahead of the December 1950 SAMAK meeting, both the Norwegian and Swedish delegation had made an outline of a peace manifest to counter the Stockholm appeal. When presented, Haakon Lie stated that the Norwegian outline was inspired by a recent party secretary conference. While most delegates were in favour of an appeal, they also agreed that the communist peace talk actually had resonance in the public. Thus, wording was essential. Too 'meagre' a resolution would not have any effect, but at the same time it could not be too provocative either.⁶¹³

The Norwegian outline had already been overtaken by events (Chinese intervention in Korea), and it was decided to further discuss the campaign in a special committee (consisting of Hedtoft, Erlander, Nordahl and Lie) on 21 January 1951. They agreed on a text based on the Swedish outline.⁶¹⁴

The manifest was entitled 'Peace and understanding in the world' and left no doubt about who was considered responsible for the international situation:

North Korea's attack on the South Korean Republic and China's open support to the violators of peace show that the communists do not hesitate in consolidating and expanding their positions by military means. When the Scandinavian countries and the other free nations of the West are now

⁶¹¹ 'Konferencen i Finland, Novbr. 1950.' ABA 500, 325, 5

⁶¹² 'Norsk forslag.' ABA 522, 48, 1957. Kommunisten.

⁶¹³ Minutes from SAMAK, December 1950. ABA 500, 325, Den nordiske samarbejdskomité, Møde i Oslo December 1950

⁶¹⁴ 'Den nordiske arbejderbevægelsens fredsmanifest 1951' - the story of the peace manifest, told by Haakon Lie, September 1994. AAB 2483, Dd, L0005, "Fred med frihet..."

increasing their military preparedness to ensure their safety, it is because international communism's aggressive conduct in the later years has caused fear of a third world war.⁶¹⁵

The manifest recommended solving international problems within UN, and stated that once tension had ceased, arms reductions could begin. The manifest was hardly controversial in its recommendations, although responsibility for the current situation was placed on the communist countries.

On 27 January 1951 the SDP's of Iceland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden and the LO's of Norway, Sweden and Denmark published the manifest through the party press in each country and sent it to the labour organisations and unions affiliated with LO, who were urged to endorse the manifest.⁶¹⁶ In Denmark alone, 48.000 pamphlets were sent out to the workplaces through AIC.⁶¹⁷

Sven Aspling wrote Haakon Lie that reception had been well in the Swedish press except, of course, for the communist paper *Ny Dag*, which he described as 'sulky'.⁶¹⁸ In Norway, it was reported, the manifest had also been received well, even outside of the Labour Movement, and provided a good foundation from which to resist communism.⁶¹⁹

In all of Scandinavia, campaigns emanated from the manifest. The following example is from Denmark: on 5 February, the Danish party sent out a copy of the manifest to all its organisations with a letter on how to proceed. The manifest should be made into posters to be hung by shop stewards, and pamphlets brought to every household in the country by post. In accordance, and after agreement, with the Norwegian and Swedish parties, the letter urged to have meetings on the peace program and vote for an endorsement of the manifest. An empty form was attached, which should be filled with information about peace events and attendance. The party press should give publicity to such meetings and all 'shop stewards and agitators' were to promote the manifest. Lastly, the letter stated that the Women's International democratic Federation (WIDF) was communist and that membership of WIDF was not compatible with membership of SDP.⁶²⁰

⁶¹⁵ 'Nord-Koreas angreb på den syd-koreanske republik og Kinas åbne støtte til fredsbrøderne viser, at kommunisterne ikke betænker sig på at befæste og udvide deres positioner ved hjælp af militære midler. Når de skandinaviske lande og Vestens øvrige frie nationer i dag øger deres militære beredskab for at betrygge deres sikkerhed, skyldes det, at den internationale kommunismes aggressive optræden i de senere år har fremkaldt frygt for en tredje verdenskrig.' Attachment to circular letter 3/1951. ABA 1500, 1068, 0001

⁶¹⁶ Circular letter 3/1951, 26 January 1951. ABA 1500, 1068, 0002

⁶¹⁷ Résumé of AIC board meeting, 9 January 1952. ABA 522, 41, Protokol 1949-1954

⁶¹⁸ Aspling to Lie, 27 January 1951. AAB 2483, Dc, L0003, Sverige

⁶¹⁹ Report for SAMAK, 17-18 February 1951. ABA 500, 326, 1

⁶²⁰ Circular letter from the party (Hedtoft/Carlsson) 5 February 1951, enclosed manifest, and letter from Carlsson to Eiler Jensen, 6 February 1951. ABA 1500, 1236, 0004

The enclosed copy of the manifest was a printed version with information on its background. Under the slogan 'Peace with freedom', it read:

With this peace program we want to, with all our power, turn ourselves against those who *speak* of peace and arms reductions in the democratic countries – and at the same time *are happy* with giant arms increases in the communist countries and *rejoice* in communist acts of aggression. (...)

The so-called "People's democracies" in Eastern Europe are building up their war machine at a brisk pace. And how many men bear arms in China? (...)

We fight the hypocritical agitation of the communists. (...)

*It is (...) the fault of the communists, that the world has not been rid of the nuclear fear a long time ago.*⁶²¹

The peace campaign was symptomatic of the changed environment in which the SDP's now fought communism. The fight had once and for all been elevated from the unions and shop floors into international politics. It was no longer the business of the labour movement, but of everyone fighting for democracy. It had not only been securitised but also internationalised.⁶²²

However, internationalisation excluded those who could not admit being insecure: as the struggle became public and international, the Finns could no longer participate. They still – and often – spoke and wrote of their communist problem in confidence. But the Finnish situation prevented the SDP and SAK from openly participating in protests against their 'friends' in the Soviet Union.

The peace campaign were evaluated at the SAMAK meeting in Stockholm in February 1951, where it was also discussed how to wage the campaign in the future (by, for instance connecting it to the 1 May celebrations). The overall response to the manifest was deemed to be good in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Even in Finland it had been used as a starting point for debates in local unions.⁶²³

'Peace' was the one of the most persuasive communist causes, which is why the social democrats found it necessary to counter it on such a large scale. The problematic nature of the

⁶²¹ 'Vil vil med dette fredsprogram vende os af al magt mod dem, der *taler* om fred og afrustning i de demokratiske lande – og samtidig *glæder* sig over kæmperustningerne i de kommunistiske lande og *jubler* over kommunistiske angrebshandlinger. (...) De såkaldte "Folkedemokratier" i Østeuropa bygger i rask tempo deres krigsmaskine op. Og hvor mange mand har Kina under våben? (...) Vi bekæmper kommunisternes hykleriske agitation. (...) *Det er (...) Kommunisterne skyld, når verden ikke forlængst er befriet for atomfrygten.*' Peace manifest pamphlet. ABA 1500, 1236, 0004. Italics as in the manifest.

⁶²² Petersen and Mariager 2004, p. 58

⁶²³ Résumé from SAMAK, 17-18 February 1951. ABA 500, 326, 1

peace question is illustrated by an exchange between Lie and Carlsson in 1954: Lie wrote Carlsson to ask about a name that had popped up in Norway, a retired engineer who was an SDP member, but apparently involved in communist peace work. Carlsson knew (or found out) about the man and wrote back that it was mostly his wife who was active (although not a CP member). The husband was mostly 'along for the ride' and Carlsson thought it might be due to the fact that the engineer's wife was a lot younger than him. Excluding him from the party had not been considered. The Danish SDP had discussed the issue and agreed that when it came to peace work (as opposed to participation in other communist front organisations) it was best to be a little careful with the exclusions.⁶²⁴ Peace was an appealing cause, and many did not know that communists ran the organisation they supported.

SPECIAL MEETINGS CONTINUED

On 20-22 April 1951, a party secretary conference took place at Hotel Dovrefjell in Dombås, Norway. Urban Hansen had wished for a more 'solid' foundation for the meetings and Lie suggested that apart from reports from each country, there'd be presentations on 'The theoretical schooling's part in communist cadre policy' by Andreas Andersen who was director of the Defence's civil schools and member of the Norwegian secret services' coordination committee. Paul Björk would talk about 'The work in the field' and Carlsson suggested an item called 'Titoism'.⁶²⁵

Unfortunately, sources only give us a resume of the first day so what was said about the two latter items, we don't know. The Danish report is preserved. We have only Oluf Carlsson's (still fragmented) notes as a source to the rest of the meeting.⁶²⁶

According to the latest information, DKP had 20.000 members. A reorganisation had increased the number of districts. While more meetings were held by a small number of persons in private flats, there was also a tendency towards more and larger public meetings. From this, the Danes concluded that DKP ran two parallel tracks: while they sought to obtain a better image in the public they were also, through decentralisation, preparing for a possible transformation to illegal activities. A statistical report on the strength in the unions from AIC was presented, and the report told of communist tactics (including a large, but failed campaign

⁶²⁴ Carlsson to Lie, 8 February 1954. ABA 500, 801, 1, 7

⁶²⁵ Planning correspondance February-March 1951. AAB 1001, Da, L0047, Nordisk samarbeid, AAB 2483, Dc, L0001, Nordisk samarbeidskomité, ABA 500, 514, 11 + ABA 500, 801, 1, 6

⁶²⁶ Carlsson's notes, 20 April 1951. ABA 500, 514, 11, Konference i Norge 20.-22. april 1951.

for 'unity' in the workplaces), citing communist leaders at length on the need for fraction work and activities. A six-week DKP schooling course had taken place in Copenhagen, but there were no details on the content. DKP seemed to have taken over some control from Cominform, and thus obtained a higher degree of independence.

The economy of the DKP was not good, in spite of a recent fundraising effort. For instance, local DKP branches couldn't pay the rent for meeting rooms. Because of their debts, a 'literature campaign' had been initiated to promote sales of communist literature. A visit from Soviet writer Ilja Ehrenburg had been a fiasco – the writer had not come close to attracting the crowds, which the DKP had hoped for. The economy was bad for the party paper *Land & Folk* either – however, communists were said to have good relations to, and influence on people working in film and radio.

The Danish report listed all the known traveling by communists to the East Bloc in the last months. But there was also a graver instance. In 1950, a Danish union delegation had visited Moscow for the first time. Four of the delegates were social democrats, out of which one came back with a positive view on the Soviet Union. Hence, he had been invited to speak at communist meetings. This was the main fear of what could happen when people went to Russia; that they came back with a positive image (which was indeed the purpose of the invitations). In the 1950's, traveling to foreign countries was not normal for the average worker, and a trip abroad could be a big temptation. The travels were popular among communists: in DKP, on district level, there was a wish for more travels, but party leadership informed that it was up to the Soviet Union alone who would visit and when.

The report went on to describe internal division and battles within the DKP, which had been encouraged by excluded members of the NKP, Furubotn and Arvid Jensen. The pair had visited Copenhagen and Stockholm to establish connections with Danish excluded communist Richard Jensen. The report cited Danish communist leader Ib Nørlund at length as he warned his partisans against these troublemakers.

The communist peace campaign had, according to the Danes, followed the same lines as in Norway and focused on criticism of the Atlantic Pact, hoping to strike a chord within larger sections of the population. A counter campaign had been arranged not only by the social democrats but also by the newly formed Atlantic Organisation, which sent out the publication 'Democratic Letters'. The report deemed the majority of the Danish population to be pro-NATO.⁶²⁷

⁶²⁷ 'Stillingen i Danmark omkring 1. April 1951.' ABA 500, 514, 11

The report does not contain anything that the social democrats couldn't have found themselves – however, it is interesting to note the lengthy citations of internal DKP instructions. Presumably, the social democratic source(s) in DKP had been in use.

Each country gave their usual reports: Leskinen spoke of domestic and economic policy, communist strength within SAK and its affiliated unions and details of a communist propaganda offensive. The Swedish representative gave an overview of communist strength (34.000 members and a Ny Dag circulation of 17.000), and tactics, such as the 'unity line' and the forming of 'non-political' unions and federations. The Norwegian delegate gave an overview like the Swedish (however, he reported only 8.600 members), and spoke of festivals, a peace congress, Furubotn, arms legislation, Russian influence in Scandinavia and a signature campaign.

As announced, Andreas Andersen spoke of communist schooling and cadre politics. He dealt mainly with strategies and techniques, organisation of cells and cadres. He also gave an overview of topics in which communists were schooled, such as CP history, Stalin and the revolution and communist growing pains. That Andersen was well informed about communist schooling and cadre work, is not odd considering his position coordinating intelligence in Norway. This position is also what is notable about his presence: Andreas Andersen was a government official and a key actor in coordinating intelligence.⁶²⁸ While he was a social democrat, he was employed in a position, which he had not been elected for, and therefore, principally, his party colours shouldn't matter. In reality they did; he was trusted from resistance work during the war (with Rolf Gerhardsen), involved in the post-war communist registrations and handpicked for the intelligence coordination position with the blueprint of Rolf And Einer Gerhardsen, Defence Minister Hauge and Haakon Lie.⁶²⁹ This is an example of cadre administration, the social network and the state-private network in practice; a man from within party ranks was chosen, because one could thereby secure his ideological conformity and loyalty. And here he was now; sharing knowledge from his governmental position at what was principally a party-only event. He participated because he was a trustworthy partisan *and* because he had relevant knowledge from his official job. Party and state had never been more mixed up and the SDP's had already taken it upon themselves to look after both. Andersen's presence at this meeting is as neat an illustration of this point as one could ask for.

⁶²⁸ Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 180, Riste and Moland 1997, pp. 30-31

⁶²⁹ Berlin, John Daniel. "Andreas Andersen: outsider i maktens høyborg. En utenrikspolitisk biografi". Universitetet i Oslo, 2007

The German connection

The anti-communism of the Nordic SDP's was no isolated phenomenon. ICFTU had a leading role in Western labour anti-communism, and the Nordic partisans were no strangers to this wider European network. In February 1951, Oluf Carlsson wrote Aspling and Lie that Hedtoft had met a man called Vanek at a Dutch party conference. Vanek held 'a very important job' at Radio Free Europe and was interested in information material from the social democratic parties and labour movements of Scandinavia. Aspling and Lie was urged to send him some. From Denmark, Vanek also received material from the Foreign Ministry's press bureau, probably incited by Hedtofts.⁶³⁰

By this time, the Nordic party secretary meetings had become a regular event, and according to Swedish international secretary, Kaj Björk, it was a good model to copy internationally. He wanted to suggest it at an ICFTU meeting in London in August 1951, were he would be representing the Nordic countries. He wrote Lie, Leskinen and Alsing Andersen with the suggestion, and got positive responses. While Björk thought a regular ICFTU conference on communism would be too 'heavy', he wanted other countries that were close geographically or politically to have regular conferences based on the Nordic model. Important information from these conferences could then be spread wider through ICFTU. However, the suggestion did not ignite major enthusiasm, except for with the German representative Ollenhauer, who was interested in this model and wished to speak further to the Nordic parties about it.⁶³¹

Relations between the Nordic and (West) German SDP's were not new. The Danish and German parties had, as neighbours, traditionally been close. Immediately after the war, the Danish and Norwegian SDP's advocated a quick resumption of connections with the German partisans.⁶³² Thus, contacts were in place, and used. In 1946, a German report on communist conduct in Western Europe, unity negotiations and communist influence in the German labour movement reached the Danish party. The Nordic parties regularly received information on communism from the comrades in West Germany.⁶³³ In 1950, through Paul Björk, Haakon Lie

⁶³⁰ Carlsson to Aspling and Lie, 21 February 1951. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 06 1951. Carlsson to Lie, 17 March 1951. AAB 2483, Dc, L0001, Danmark

⁶³¹ Correspondence Björk/Lie, August-September 1951. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 06 1951

⁶³² Misgeld 1988, p. 62

⁶³³ SOPADE Informationstjeneste, 5 November 1946. ABA 500, 514, 5. Letter from Schumacher sent from Sven Andersson to Einar Gerhardsen, 9 May 1947. AAB 2483, Dc, L0004, SPD - Tyskland

obtained a list (made by 'our party friends') over former Nazis, now working for the communists in East Germany.⁶³⁴

Relations to the German party also extended to the education branch, as the ABF and Norwegian AOF worked together on having a former German refugee in Sweden, Fritz Fricke come and talk at courses on the LO schools. Later on there is examples of common German-Nordic union courses, arranged in cooperation with Fricke.⁶³⁵

Up to and during World War II, Willy Brandt of the German SDP spent several years in Scandinavia, where he developed close connections to the Norwegian and Swedish parties. He lived in Oslo after the German SDP was banned in 1933, and in Stockholm during the war, where he was a frequent guest in Rolf Gerhardsen's exile home. He held Norwegian citizenship in the same period, and became fluent in Norwegian.⁶³⁶ He has written several books in Scandinavian languages about Norway and Norden during and after World War II.⁶³⁷ In the post-war years, Brandt served as Norwegian press attaché in Berlin and as correspondent for Scandinavian newspapers (while at the same time reporting back to the Norwegian SD government) until 1948 where he, once again, became a German citizen and active in the German SDP – while still keeping his partisans in Norway informed.⁶³⁸ In March 1948, Haakon Lie wrote to the Danish party, asking them to help out Willy Brandt who was now the German social democratic representative in the Allied Control Commission. He also worked for the German party press and was about to write a series of articles on the labour governments in the Nordic countries. Oluf Carlsson accordingly sent a pile of information material to Brandt.⁶³⁹

Brandt's position in Berlin was, by the way, replaced by *Arbeiderbladet* journalist Per Monsen who was tied to Norwegian intelligence – it was allegedly set up by Rolf Gerhardsen.⁶⁴⁰

⁶³⁴ Björk to Lie, 21 Februar 1950. AAB 2483, Dc, L0003, SPD – Tyskland

⁶³⁵ Letters, 10 and 16 May 1951, AAB 1579, Dd, L0119, Arbeidernes Opplysningsforbund. Résumé of meeting in AOF, 17 July 1953, 16 January and 13 December 1954. AAB 1579, Dd, L0171 and L0223, Arbeidernes Opplysningsforbund.

⁶³⁶ Aspling to Lie, 12 December 1949. AAB 1001, Da, L0030, Sverige. On Brandt's stays in Oslo and Stockholm, see his memoirs: Brandt, Willy, and Sven Åhman. *Att ta parti för friheten: min väg 1930-1950*. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1983 and Brandt, Willy. *Erindringer*. København: Munksgaard, 1990, esp. pp. 93ff, 121ff. Gerhardsen 2009, p. 28

⁶³⁷ Among them are: Brandt, Willy. *Norge ockuperat och fritt*. Stockholm: Kooperativa förbundet, 1943, Brandt, Willy. *Norden i Nürnberg*. Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska institutet, 1946, Brandt, Willy. *Nürnberg - Norge - Dommen*. Oslo, 1946, Brandt, Willy. *Norwegens Friheitskamp 1940-1945*. Hamburg: Verlagsanstalt Auerdruck, 1948.

⁶³⁸ Brandt 1990, pp. 132, 138-140, Brandt, Willy. *Min vej til Berlin*. København: Schønberg, 1970. pp. 48ff., 96ff., 136ff., Borgersrud 2001, pp. 57-58, Lie 1985, p. 133

⁶³⁹ Correspondance, March 1948. ABA 500, 801, 1, 3

⁶⁴⁰ Borgersrud 2001, pp. 59ff, 69

At the November 1949 party secretary meeting in Helsingborg, Rolf Gerhardsen had talked about Willy Brandt, followed, in Carlsson notes, by the cryptic sentence: 'a man in the embassies'.⁶⁴¹

Talks of a German representative participating in a SAMAK meeting had been discussed as early as 1946.⁶⁴² In 1950 there had been talk about meeting Ollenhauer in connection with the December SAMAK meeting in Oslo. However, both Sven Aspling and Oluf Carlsson thought that having him present at the actual meeting could lead to misunderstandings. Better to have an informal lunch or dinner meeting outside of the SAMAK forum. In the end though, Ollenhauer did not make it to Oslo as political events forced him to stay in Germany.⁶⁴³

The West German social democrats were not idle when it came to communist fighting, and certainly not inferior to their Nordic comrades: they had their own anti-communist organisation named Ostbüro. In 1946 the SPD in East Germany had been forced to amalgamate with the CP, forming the Sozialistische Einheitspartei, SED. Ostbüro was established to keep in contact with social democratic partisans. Besides upholding this contact, Ostbüro worked with propaganda, espionage, counterespionage and agents in East Germany on a level that equalled it to a full-fledged security- and intelligence organisation, working directly for the SPD.⁶⁴⁴ Ostbüro had contacts to the Norwegian SDP and later leader of Swedish IB, Birger Elmér.⁶⁴⁵

There had been talks of including a West German representative in the party secretary meetings. When planning the 26-28 October 1951 meeting in Copenhagen, Oluf Carlsson reminded the other secretaries about this, and accordingly, an invitation was extended to Fritz Heine, a leading figure within the SPD, in charge of propaganda. Carlsson described it to Heine as a small conference on 'problems in connection with the communists'.⁶⁴⁶ Heine accepted the invitation and took Stephan Grzeskowiak, leader of Ostbüro, with him.

At this point the Norwegian SDP officially criticised their German sister party for resisting West German integration into NATO.⁶⁴⁷ But beneath the surface, they still cooperated against their common enemy.

⁶⁴¹ 'en mand i ambassaderne'. Carlsson's note, 18 November 1949. ABA 500, 514, 8

⁶⁴² Sven Andersson to Norwegian SDP, 17 December 1946. AAB 1001, Da, L0017, Nordisk samarbeid

⁶⁴³ Aspling and Carlsson to Lie, 2 December 1950. AAB 1001, Da, L0037, Nordisk samarbeid.

Ollenhauer to Lie, 7 December 1950. AAB 2483, Dc, L0003, SPD – Tyskland

⁶⁴⁴ Buschfort, Wolfgang. *Das Ostbüro der SPD: von der Gründung bis zur Berlin-Krise*. München: Oldenbourg, 1991.

⁶⁴⁵ Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 458. Lampers 2002, p. 98

⁶⁴⁶ 'Probleme in Verbindung mit den Kommunisten'. Correspondance on conference, ABA 500, 514, 11. Appelius, Stefan. *Heine: die SPD und der lange Weg zur Macht*. Essen: Klartext, 1999.

⁶⁴⁷ Misgeld 1988, p. 62

Besides Rolf Gerhardsen, Andreas Andersen participated from Norway once again. He filled in for Haakon Lie who was in California writing the history of the NKP with Walter Galenson (academic, former labour attache in Norway and Denmark and later to become a prominent figure in the ILO).⁶⁴⁸ From Sweden Aspling came as usual, whereas Arne Pettersson had replaced Paul Björk permanently. Björk had left for Norrbotten to become editor in chief of the local party daily *Norrländska socialdemokraten*, as part of an effort to strengthen the anti-communist effort there. From Finland came Väinö Leskinen, Veikko Puskala and Minister of Trade Tervo Penna. Urban Hansen and Oluf Carlsson once again represented the Danes. The three items on the agenda were: 1) Reports from the Nordic countries 2) Report from Germany, 3) Intellectuals.⁶⁴⁹ The full Finnish report has survived. Once again, the Danish résumé does not give details about the Danish report.

Norway and Sweden

The Swedish and Norwegian situations were fairly alike.

NKP's position in the labour movement as a whole was still weak – stable, but not progressing. They held no major unions and only had 4-5 paid officials. The member figure given at this meeting was 8.000, their election campaign had been unsuccessful, and their activities were described as 'lame and modest'.⁶⁵⁰

In Sweden, the communist percentage of votes was at an all-time low – 4,8%. Membership had gone from 65.000 in 1946 to 35.000, especially losing ground among the youth. In one area, the communists had expanded – their paper, *Ny Dag* had gone from morning to evening paper, increasing its circulation to 38.000. All in all though, they were not very influential: they had only had 9 delegates out of 350 at the LO Congress. A wave of strikes had been irritating but no cause for alarm. The decline had also led to cutbacks in organisation work.

Communist main strength in both Norway and Sweden lay in larger cities and in the northern areas. Communist efforts were centred there, and in large industries and places where they already held ground. Sometimes they would move organisers from another place to these areas to hold their ground. In Sweden, the industries with the most communist influence were woodworks, transports, mining and metal. The communist percentage of votes at the last

⁶⁴⁸ Lie to Aspling, 1 November 1951. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 06 1951

⁶⁴⁹ Correspondance on conference, ABA 500, 514, 11. Resume of meeting in Copenhagen 26-27 October 1951. ABA 522, 16, AIC. SUKP's 20. kongres ...

⁶⁵⁰ Carlsson's notes. ABA 500, 514, 11

election had been as high as 18,8% in Norway's Finnmark district, where the communists had a strong organisation apparatus, with 'employed officials, spies and Russian agents'.

Social democrats were convinced that their hard work in the unions and workplaces paid off. The communist decline in the Swedish unions was thought to be mostly due to the activities of the social democratic union clubs.⁶⁵¹ In Norway, the social democrats had ignored the communists in the election campaigns, but Rolf Gerhardsen was not sure that it had been a wise strategy. In the party secretary circle no one thought communism should be silenced to death, but rather fought vigilantly. The Swedes had set in 'special action' in the troubled areas (one of the measures being placing Paul Björk as editor in chief of *Norrländska*). As for agitation, the communists' weak spot was – still – foreign policy. They were more successful with domestic issues such as housing and salaries.

In Sweden, communists had tried to once again promote the workers' unity issue, urging to take action from 'below' and avoid the social democratic labour hierarchy.⁶⁵² While the communists called it unity, it was, for social democrats, splitting work at its worst.

But it wasn't just in the unions that communist waged campaigns. In Sweden, a culture journalist at Morgon-Tidningen had been in Moscow and afterwards had an unfortunate influence on other intellectuals. In Norway, on the other hand, communists had not had much luck among intellectuals.

The peace campaign was also on the wane: as for NKP, 'They have not yet dared to publicise any numbers on signatures in the latest peace campaign.'⁶⁵³ In Sweden they were thought to push the question further in the time to come. One problem that the Swedes wished to 'clear up', was the question of social democrats who had signed the Stockholm appeal.

As far as travels to the East Bloc went, the NKP received money to arrange it. The inviting countries also made sure that formal issues such as passports were taken care of. Thus, traveling communists did not have to worry about long drawn-out bureaucratic arrangements. Leading communist Strand Johansen had been in the Soviet Union for 2-3 months.⁶⁵⁴

⁶⁵¹ A point also made by Aspling in the foreword to Björk 1950, p. 2

⁶⁵² Resume of meeting in Copenhagen 26-27 October 1951. ABA 522, 16, AIC. SUKP's 20. kongres ... + 'Kommunismen i Sverige', ABA 500, 514, 11

⁶⁵³ 'Man har endnu ikke vovet at offentliggøre noget tal for underskrifter paa den sidste fredsappel'. Resume of meeting 26-27 October 1951. ABA 522, 16, AIC. SUKP's 20. kongres ... + 'Partistillingen i byene', ABA 500, 514, 11

⁶⁵⁴ Resume of meeting 26-27 October 1951. ABA 522, 16, AIC. SUKP's 20. kongres ... + 'Kommunismen i Sverige', ABA 500, 514, 11. Strand Johansen ended up dying in the Soviet Union. He went there for mental care in 1955 and never came back. Lahlum 2009, p. 287

Finland

While things overall looked good for Sweden and Norway, the Finns were, as usual, less enthusiastic. According to the résumé, everyone at the meeting could not help but note the pessimism. The legal work of the communists had not changed and it was very hard to obtain information about their illegal activities. However, the Finnish representatives were not totally without sources – they stated that: ‘People [presumably someone with whom they had connections, IBJ] now has knowledge of the borders, so that no legal trips are made without being registered’.⁶⁵⁵ In spite of this, though, leading communists were able to travel to the Soviet Union without being registered by Finnish authorities. The trick was simple: before crossing the border, they entered an official Soviet train wagon, which the Finnish border control did not have authority to check.⁶⁵⁶ The Finns wanted an increased Nordic cooperation on border control, which, according to the résumé was to be discussed at yet another ‘special meeting’ (of which, if it took place, there is unfortunately no records).

The Finns thought communist successes to be a consequence of increased anti-Americanism. There had been instances of border guards arresting what turned out to be agents for the British and Americans. The work of these agents was characterised as ‘clumsy and politically very damaging as it leaves the communists with all to good a hand’.⁶⁵⁷ To make matters worse, PM Urho Kekkonen was the leader of the influential ‘Finnish-Russian Society’, which gave the Soviet Union too much positive recognition.⁶⁵⁸ (Swedish international secretary Kaj Björk, once, wittingly coined the term ‘Kekkoslovakia’ referring to Kekkonen's friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union.)⁶⁵⁹

A few war prisoners had come back from the Soviet Union and they seemed to have been treated badly.⁶⁶⁰

The main lines of communist propaganda were on economic questions. Youth propaganda was centred on the Berlin-festival, where a well-organised and effective campaign had been waged in all organisations controlled by the communists and in unions where they had sufficient foothold. 1.200 Finns had ended up going to the festival, but due to a critical

⁶⁵⁵ Man har nu kendskab til grænseovergangene, saa der er ingen legale rejser, som ikke registreres.’ Resume of meeting 26-27 October 1951. ABA 522, 16, AIC. SUKP’s 20. kongres ...

⁶⁵⁶ ‘Rapport för partibyråernes möte i Köpenhamn den 27-28.10.1951.’ ABA 500, 514, 11

⁶⁵⁷ ‘Finnerne karakteriserer dette arbejde som kluntet og i politisk henseende uhyre skadeligt, fordi det gav kommunisterne alt for gode kort paa haanden.’ Resume of meeting 26-27 October 1951. ABA 522, 16, AIC. SUKP’s 20. kongres ...

⁶⁵⁸ Resume of meeting 26-27 October 1951. ABA 522, 16, AIC. SUKP’s 20. kongres ...

⁶⁵⁹ Björk 1990, p. 70

⁶⁶⁰ Resume of meeting 26-27 October 1951. ABA 522, 16, AIC. SUKP’s 20. kongres ...

Finnish press, the propaganda outcome afterwards was limited. Communist work among intellectuals had increased, with many going to Eastern countries.

The Finnish report gave details of discussions in the FKP's inner circle about a visit by two party officials to Moscow. During the visit they had had to call the powerful Finnish communist Hertta Kuusinen to Moscow straighten out differences in opinion with the Cominform.

The Finns went on to treat the question of FKP preparing to go illegal. While the communists wanted broad support for propaganda and parliamentary work, a small disciplined party was more efficient for illegal work. The message in party circles was: 'In reality, a small but well-organised and educated communist party is a stronger revolutionary weapon than a necessarily heterogenous, mass party.'⁶⁶¹ There had been signs over the last couple of months that the party was preparing for a transformation to illegality. One was a rise in companies formed in the names of private communists that did 'business' with the Russian trading company Seximo and even had influence as 'finance and business centres'. Other signs were an increasing 'motorisation' of the party in the form of more cars and motorcycles.

The Sirola School had a new leadership and old activists were being recruited as teachers.

During the latest period of time, even communists who have been passive and got their illegal education before the war, have once again been dragged back into the activities, even under such pressure that resistance has led to suicide and attempts at suicide.⁶⁶²

The Finnish sources had noticed an increasing communist interest in military and defence questions, depots, surveillance, etc. Young communists within in the army had been known to pass on information to the FKP (as also stated at the previous meeting) and the party tried to get communists into officers' schools. They had even tried to recruit officers to the communist cause if they thought it was possible. The report mentioned four names as leaders of the FKP's illegal activities. According to the Finnish report, FKP leadership had had talks with Cominform about their attitude to armed activities. Cominform had advised against it. Cominform also kept an eye on the economic situation and military industries.

⁶⁶¹ 'I själva verket är et litet, men välorganiserat och utbildat kommunistparti ett starkere revolutionärt vapen än ett oundvikligt heterogent massparti.' 'Rapport för partibyråernes möte i Köpenhamn den 27-28.10.1951.' ABA 500, 514, 11

⁶⁶² 'Under sista tiden har även kommunister, vilka har varie undandragna och fått sin illegala utbildning före krigen, ånyo dragits med i verksamheten, till och med med sådana sanktioner, att motsträvigheter lett til självmord och sjäkmordsforsök.' 'Rapport för partibyråernes möte i Köpenhamn den 27-28.10.1951.' ABA 500, 514, 11

In spite of all this hardly encouraging information, the Finnish report concluded that if there were no 'alarming changes' in the international situation, one did not expect any disturbing actions from FKP or Cominform. Aggressive propaganda would probably continue, even if the only danger in this was that social democrats should become too used to it and put their guard down.⁶⁶³

The Finnish information is, once again, characterised by a high degree of confidentiality, such as information on internal discussions in the FKP leadership, how FKP leaders travelled to the Soviet Union, what businesses were owned by communists, what the party leadership had discussed with the Cominform, who said what to whom (and when), what measures were being taken by communists in relation to illegal work and so forth. The report is full of expressions such as 'one has learned...', 'it has been noted that...', 'one has become aware...', without specifying the sources of the information or the identity of 'one. But it could hardly all be social democratic workplace contacts. Clearly someone had connections, be it a social democratic intelligence network, parliamentary contacts (whole not leading it, the SDP did participate in coalition governments throughout the 1950s), security services, social democratic intelligence officers – or a mix of all.

Once again, it should be noted that all of this information might not be true – the communists themselves might even have fabricated some of it. But that does not change the fact that 'one' (and probably several 'ones' around the country) collected this information. True or not, intelligence material (presumably highly classified) made it to the secretary of the Finnish SDP and from there to the Nordic party meetings.⁶⁶⁴

One might ask at this point; why even bother having party secretary meetings, since the Finns seemed to be the only ones experiencing real problems? The answer is twofold.

First, as can be seen from the Norwegian and Swedish reports, it was the firm belief that social democratic efforts were part of the reason for communist decline, and that if such efforts were relaxed the communists would immediately use it to gain ground again. Letting one's guard down because the communists seemed toothless was considered one of the most dangerous things to do.

Second, as was expressed most vividly in the Finnish report, size did not necessarily matter: a small, disciplined and well-oiled CP was able to do as much damage as a large

⁶⁶³ 'Rapport för partibyråernes möte i Köpenhamn den 27-28.10.1951.' ABA 500, 514, 11

heterogeneous one. The worries in this direction were not only related to fraction work in the unions, but equally in relation to subversive or illegal activities. While communism became less of a force in the unions and parliamentary politics, the security angle was no less serious.

This is another one of those meetings from which there is only a résumé from the first day. Thus, we know not what the German guests told their colleagues. However, they apparently considered it a success. At the end of the meeting, Heine expressed the wish that the Germans could arrange such a conference in the future – a wish he repeated in writing to Oluf Carlsson shortly thereafter.

The Nordic secretaries had already agreed on Stockholm for the next meeting and discussed whether it was desirable to have Germans attend that as well. They agreed, however, that it should be purely Nordic, as there were after all great differences between the Nordic and German problems. However there was no reason not to accept the German offer some other time.⁶⁶⁵

SAMAK 1951-54: THE FINNISH GAFFE & PHASING OUT COMMUNISM

At the SAMAK meeting in November 1951, domestic communism does not take up any space in the discussions on record. Communism was debated in international terms: Germany, Spain and Eastern European exile parties. In the prepared Danish report, some space was devoted to communist strikes and demonstration campaigns, referring to internal DKP reports. The Danish report also told of the social democratic press' publication of an internal circular letter from DKP. Even if communism was no longer a big issue at SAMAK proceedings, the Danes apparently had no problem letting the other delegates know that they had (at least occasional) access to internal DKP papers.

From Finland came good news: at the summer election in SAK, the social democrats had won a majority in the organisation of 152 to 70. This had opened the door for endorsing a delegate decision from May 1950 breaking off relations with WFTU and reject requests from excluded communist unions to re-enter SAK.⁶⁶⁶ At the labour conference, SAK chairman Aku Sumu stated that the Soviets were 'very bitter' about the break with WFTU and that the Soviet

⁶⁶⁴ 'Rapport för partibyråernes möte i Köpenhamn den 27-28.10.1951.' ABA 500, 514, 11. A Finnish colleague at a conference noted, when I had presented this material, that passing this kind of information to other countries was rather outrageous.

⁶⁶⁵ Carlsson to Aspling, Leskinen & Lie, 10 November 1951, Aspling to Carlsson, 17 November 1951. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 06 1951

⁶⁶⁶ Résumé + Danish and Finnish report for SAMAK, 3-4 November 1951. ABA 500, 326, 2

delegation had left the SAK congress that summer, without saying goodbye. They had since invited a delegation to come visit, which could be interpreted as an effort to bring back SAK to WFTU. Even with the recent victory, Sumu stated that communism was still a big problem, taking up much time and work.⁶⁶⁷

The tendency at SAMAK was – still – that the Finns put the most energy into the communist issue – understandably, as they were the ones with the biggest problems. As we have just seen, it was not a case of the other Nordic countries no longer caring about communism. However, communism was not a big political or labour problem anymore.

And then there was, of course, the confidentiality issue. SAMAK had become a large forum, and was not suitable for covert exchanges, which was highlighted at the meeting to come.

For the 22-23 March 1952 SAMAK meeting in Helsinki, the only report containing information about domestic communism was the Finnish. It stated that the power division was stuck, with no signs of communists or social democrats assuming power in unions they did not already dominate. Social democratic members of communist-dominated unions had been known to leave these, and thus be without representation. Communists were continuing the line of 'unity from below' (as in Sweden) – the so-called 'people's front tactic', trying to lure social democrats into cooperation.⁶⁶⁸

This tactic was a cause for concern. At the request of the Finns, the meeting had an item on the agenda called 'The social democrats and the new communist tactics'. The speaker, Ola Wikström, SAK international secretary, summed up communist activities since the 1930's and stated that the WFTU was now solely an organ for Cominform policy. He called for a common plan of action and suggested the topic be discussed at the next SAMAK meeting. Puskala pointed out that such joint action should not only include exchange of information, but also agreement on what methods to use against communism. Carlsson gave an overview of the Danish situation and seconded the suggestion of a more effective cooperation. This is where the Swedes protested: Aspling stated that it was necessary to separate political activity from the work carried out by the security services, and that the latter had no place in the Swedish party. He furthermore stated that he thought the question would be best treated at a 'special party secretary meeting'. Swedish PM Erlander stated that due to the latest spy cases and the government's social policy, communists were expected to disappear altogether from the political scene after the next election. In Sweden, he said, communism was no longer a

⁶⁶⁷ Résumés of labour conference 9 November 1951. AAB 1579, Dd, L0128, ABA 1500, 1069, 0001

⁶⁶⁸ Finnish report for SAMAK, March 1952. ABA 500, 327, 1

political problem. Leskinen concluded the discussion by stating that a special party secretary meeting would deal with the matter in detail.⁶⁶⁹

We know that these meetings were already taking place, as did both Puskala and Carlsson – Wikström might not have known. Perhaps they wanted the cooperation to be institutionalised within SAMAK, or perhaps they thought that it was not efficient enough, and wanted a wider base for it. Perhaps both.

The exchange was rather curious: at least some of the Finnish representatives wanted the issue of domestic communism and how to fight it to be discussed within SAMAK. On the other hand, the Swedes in particular were quite anxious to remove the discussion from this forum. It is evident that Aspling and Erlander did not wish to elaborate on these sides of party activities in SAMAK. Aspling's words on the need for separating intelligence and political work is in some contrast to party activities within Sweden and his participation in the secretary meetings, where such a separation did not take place – quite the contrary. It seems that Aspling wanted to separate, if not always party from intelligence work, then at least overt action from covert. The latter could not be an open subject in the proceedings of SAMAK, a well-known institution with participation of a wide range of party and LO officials (at least 30 people participated in this 1952 meeting). While Bergh and Eriksen write that the Swedes were less pre-occupied with communism, one can certainly conclude that they were pre-occupied enough to have the party machinery fight it tooth and nail, and participate in a covert cooperation against them with the other Nordic countries.⁶⁷⁰ Thus, Erlander's statement that communism was not a problem in Sweden can also be interpreted as a wish to keep the issue out of the open. If this interpretation is correct, it correlates very well with his 1950 viewpoint that one should not 'babble openly' about such matters (see page 64).

At any rate, the Finns seem to have understood the hint: their report for the next SAMAK meeting, 29-30 November 1952 is conspicuously free of anything that has to do with communism, even if the problems in Finland persisted. An item called 'The problem Finland and the Socialist International' by Leskinen had been withdrawn from the agenda. Ironically, the Swedish report dealt with the issue at this occasion. It admitted that communist decline in the election had not been as big as expected – they got 4,4% of the votes (as opposed to 4.8% at the previous election). The Danish report shortly mentioned a communist propaganda campaign on foreign- and defence policy.⁶⁷¹

⁶⁶⁹ Résumé of SAMAK meeting, March 1952. ABA 500, 327, 1. See also Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 456, Petersen and Schmidt 2001

⁶⁷⁰ Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 456

⁶⁷¹ 'Problemet Finland og den socialistiske internationale.' Résumé from SAMAK, 29-30 November 1952. ABA 500, 327, Den nordiske samarbejdskomité. Møde i Helsingfors nov. Protokol. Compare to

For the SAMAK meeting on 8-9 November 1953, The Finnish report contained information about official communist policy, revealing that their strength had not diminished. However, they had become less popular among their constituency after – apparently on orders from ‘outside’ – having cooperated with Kekkonen.⁶⁷²

An Icelandic representative, SDP vice chairman Benedikt Gröndal, was also present. He reported on the turbulent times in the Icelandic party, the strike movement and the peculiarities of Icelandic politics, including the difficulties of having a labour movement in which communists had 40% support.

Other than that, communism was not an issue, except internationally where ICFTU had made a fund to help victims of the 17 June events in East Germany. Hedtoft thought that moral support for the East Germans was good, but that economic support was unwise, as the party could quickly come under attack. Haakon Lie thought it was a little late for economic support.⁶⁷³ The labour conference, however, discussed donations and decided that the LO’s would help. Denmark donated 10.000 DKK, Norway 10.000 NOK and Sweden 20.000 SEK.⁶⁷⁴

At December 1954’s SAMAK meeting, communism was only discussed in relation to troubles in Iceland and shortly mentioned in the Swedish report about national elections.⁶⁷⁵ Communism slowly but surely faded from the SAMAK agenda, spurred by the Finnish suggestion, which somehow seems to have demonstrated the inappropriateness of discussing it so openly. As we shall see, the absence of communism from the SAMAK agenda in these years was not due to a lack of interest from the actors.

FINNISH REPORTING

Though silenced in SAMAK, the Finns were still generous with information. All Scandinavian labour archives contain numerous reports and information about their struggle with communism. Some of them we can say for sure were presented at party secretary

early outline of agenda: ABA 500, 327, Korrespondance, dagsorden, deltagerliste. Reports for SAMAK meeting, 29-30 November 1952. ABA 500, 327, Den nordisk samarbejdskomité. Møde i Helsingfors nov. 1952. Rapport. Discrepancy in voting numbers for 1952: The Swedish report states 4,4 while the statistical bureau states 4,3. See table 3.1

⁶⁷² Report for SAMAK, 8-9 November 1953. ABA 500, 328, 1

⁶⁷³ Report for SAMAK and résumé from meeting, 8-9 November 1953. ABA 500, 328, 1

⁶⁷⁴ Résumé of labour conference, 10 November 1953. ARBARK 2964, F25A 05, Nordiska samarbetskommittén...

⁶⁷⁵ Résumé from SAMAK and Swedish report, 4-5 December 1954. ABA 500, 328, 4

meetings, others have been sent in between, and still some we do not know the context of – but they deserve to be mentioned.

Much Finnish material on communism can be found in the Swedish party archive, such as a list from 1952 with names on border control guards and passport controllers in 'VALPO II', and the start date of their employment. VALPO was the name of the communist-dominated security police in 1945-48. The people on the list all have started the listed employment after 1948 – they might have been former officers in VALPO who were now in other positions, but it is difficult (at least to this author) to figure out the exact meaning.⁶⁷⁶ However, it does show that someone was in possession of names and details on current or former border guards, and that they were somehow thought to be relevant for the Swedish party.⁶⁷⁷ It is not unthinkable that the list has been handed to the Swedes in connection with the Finnish suggestion of a closer Nordic cooperation on border issues and their statement that the borders were under control (see page 162).

The Swedish and Finnish parties had a special bond and as we have seen, information to the Finns often went through a 'secure route' through Sweden. Väinö Leskinen also reported to Aspling about his trips to the Soviet Union.⁶⁷⁸ However, the Swedes were not the only ones benefitting from Finnish information. Whether through a secure route or not, in late 1952, Puskala sent information to Lie on the communist information secretary for the Finnish transport workers' union, and his Scandinavian as well as Cominform connections. Several Finnish communists were mentioned by name.⁶⁷⁹

Among other reports to be found in the Swedish archives (some of also in Norway and Denmark), it is worth noticing the following:

One is presumably from the late 1940's and presents a history of communist underground activities. The source was a communist who had come to struggle with his conscience. He described routes used by Finns going to the Soviet Union to receive education for underground activities since 1946. There were four different routes in use in 'his' area. Other sources told of similar methods along the border. The discoveries was kept secret, but the report stated that 'when we have documented enough certain cases [we will], in due time,

⁶⁷⁶ 'Förteckning över vissa befattningshavare hos Valpo II. vilka ställts på indragningsstat.' ARBARK 1889, F15D, 06 1950-55, 1951-55 Kommunister (med finske kommunister). The key word is 'Indragningsstat.' which translate to 'withdrawal/withdrawn stationing'.

⁶⁷⁷ 'Someone' could obviously be the Finnish party, but it must be noted that also the Swedish security police kept records of named VALPO officers. Helkama-Rågård 2005, pp. 128-129

⁶⁷⁸ Leskinen to Aspling, 21 August 1954. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 09 1954.

⁶⁷⁹ Letter from Puskala, 17 December 1952. AAB 2483, Da, L0001, Partisaker, Saksmappe NKP

publicly expose this traffic.' According to the report there were several communists employed among the border guards (perhaps it is connected to the list of guards mentioned above). Allegedly, the communists had had plans (which were not carried out) to break into a police weapons depot. According to the report, several such plans existed, and there was also an extensive interest in army depots.⁶⁸⁰

A stack of reports from around 1953-1954 gives detailed information about communist propaganda, tactics, schooling and (attempts at) subversive activities. One of them stated that The Finnish-Soviet Friendship Organisation (of which we remember that Kekkonen was chairman) had a central role in communist propaganda and the author had it from 'reliable sources' that they had applied the state council for a part of the earnings from trade between Finland and the Eastern Bloc. Besides regular party schooling, the Sirola institute also educated insurance and trade agents who could work in cover firms such as Seximo.

Another report refers to a meeting between the 'peace promoters' that had elected a Central Committee consisting of several public figures (named) and even a social democrat (also named). The new peace organisation had been started after orders from the Cominform, but it was meant to have a non-political facade. Other attempts at cooperation with social democrats (ordered by FKP's Central Committee) had been fruitless.

Soviet interest for Baltic refugees in Finland and their attempt to propagate among them was also considered fruitless. According to a 'reliable expert statement', the Soviets feared that Finland would get on the Western side in a third world war, and hence they wanted contact to Baltic-speaking people in Finland.

One report is on the Porkkala military base (at this time occupied by the Soviets). According to what the author(s) had 'learned', troops in Porkkala had not increased – however, truck traffic had, and was now quite extensive. Harbour installations were unfinished and the landing strip was ready for smaller machines. The report stated that Porkkala had, in later years, been used to educate Finnish communists for espionage, radio espionage and sabotage. Recently it had been decided that Russians should be able to travel freely through Finland on their way to Porkkala and this, the report stated, was the cause of much annoyance. Trucks could carry extra persons, because they could not be searched. This way, the Soviets could smuggle agents and espionage material, such as radio transmitters into Finland, or Finns about to receive espionage education in Porkkala. Finnish authorities now detained a radio spy who

⁶⁸⁰ Kommunisternas underjordiska verksamhet.' ARBARK 1889, F15D, 06 1950-55, 1952-55
Kommunister (med finske kommunister)

had done all this, and he claimed to have promised to work for the Soviet Union when he was a prisoner of war during World War II.⁶⁸¹

Most noteworthy is the information about military and espionage issues, but also the passing on of names, which has traditionally been a sensitive issue and latent source of conflict in Norden.

SPECIAL MEETINGS CONTINUED, II

There were no party secretary meetings in 1952. One was planned for 9-10 May, but last minute, the Swedish hosts postponed it. They had intended to give information on 'certain current issues', but when the time came, the situation was too unclear for that.⁶⁸² The current issue was probably the Enbom spy case: a 30-year old communist, Fritjof Engbom had been arrested in February on counts of espionage for the Soviet Union. He received a lifetime prison sentence in the summer of 1952.

Also the previous Swedish spy case, the arrest of Ernst Hilding Andersson in September 1951, attracted the interest of the other Nordic parties. Arne Pettersson promised to send Urban Hansen a report on the case.⁶⁸³

In August 1952, Haakon Lie wrote Aspling to enquire about the Enbom case, and Aspling suggested a meeting after the upcoming Swedish election (to take place 21 September 1952). However, as autumn approached, Aspling was going on a tour of America (which Lie helped plan), and thus suggested the meeting be further postponed until early 1953. In the meantime there was talk that representatives from Iceland should participate.⁶⁸⁴

The postponed meeting was held at Bommersvik, Stockholm 1-2 March 1953. The participants were Sven Aspling, Arne Pettersson, Rolf Gerhardsen, Haakon Lie, Väinö Leskinen and Veikko Puskala (no Icelanders). Oluf Carlsson and Urban Hansen were unable to attend

⁶⁸¹ 'Kommunisternas underjordiska verksamhet.', Den kommunistiska fredsörelsens nuvarande skede i Finland och de nya propagandatemata', 'Uppgifter om FKP:s verksamhetslinje.', 'Militära propagandapåståenden', ARBARK 1889, F15D, 06 1950-55, 1952-55 Kommunisterna (med finska kommunister)

⁶⁸² Correspondence Aspling/Carlsson/Lie/Leskinen, March-May 1952. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 07 1952

⁶⁸³ Pettersson to Hansen, 17 November 1951. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 06 1951. Cronqvist, Marie. "Fula fisken och stenansiktet: Spiontypologi och kallakrigsberättelse i 1950-talets folkhemsgemenskap." In *Hotad idyll: berättelser om svenskt folkhem och kallt krig*, edited by Kim Salomon, Lisbeth Larsson, and Håkan Arvidsson, 57-80. Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2004.

⁶⁸⁴ Correspondence Lie/Aspling, August 1952 and October 1952. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 07 1952

due to election campaigning. But Urban Hansen sent Aspling a copy of the election material, and later also a special publication on events in East Germany in June 1953.⁶⁸⁵

However, it wasn't all election for the Danes – just a week ahead of the meeting, Oluf Carlsson sent Lie a letter warning about a Danish 'fanatical' communist who had been raising trouble at Danish workplaces. He had worked in Sweden and was now working in Oslo. He had been in Denmark for Christmas, presenting a girlfriend who was allegedly the daughter of a Norwegian general.⁶⁸⁶

The Swedish report from the meeting is the only one that has been located in the archives. It confirmed that communists proceeded with the 'unity' tactics: they had left aggressive agitation and were instead driving a line of cooperation bordering on self-elimination. This was especially the case in the winter 1953 union elections. There had even been reports on communists not having their own candidate, but supporting a social democrat instead. In the elections, very little had been heard of them. The Swedish report stated that with their new line of cooperation, the communist tactics had undergone a total change.

The union elections had resulted in a continuation of the communist decline – social democrats had even won power among the mining workers' union in Kiruna, which the communists had dominated in 36 years. The communist press had been reorganised, but the percentage of communist publications in the overall media picture was only 1.7%.

It had been expected that the Enbom case would completely eradicate the SKP, but this had not been the case, according to the Swedish report, because they had successfully hidden their real involvement. (It was common for communist agents and spies not to be a member of the CP, as this would attract the interest of secret services. The Norwegian spy Asbjørn Sunde was not a NKP member, but had contacts to the party.)

Peace work was also going badly; organisations and unions that had earlier supported communist peace efforts were now keeping their distance, and the number of intellectuals supporting communist peace work was also declining. The nation-wide youth league no longer existed – there had been some attempts at starting a 'non-political' youth movement affiliated with the WFDY, but this had also failed.⁶⁸⁷

The Swedish report supports Erlander's statement at the November 1952 SAMAK meeting that communism was no longer a political problem (however; as the Enbom case illustrates, it

⁶⁸⁵ Correspondance, January-February 1953. Urban Hansen to Aspling 4 May and 16 September 1953. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 08 1953

⁶⁸⁶ Carlsson to Lie, 20 February 1953. ABA 500, 801, 1, 6

⁶⁸⁷ Swedish report for secretary meeting 1-2 March 1953. ARBARK 1889, F15D, 06 1950-55, 1953 Kommunisterna

was a security problem). It actually also supports Aspling's statement of separating party work from the intelligence services: it bears no sign of information from intelligence services – it focuses on areas of the communist activities which social democrats knew of *vis-a-vis* the daily struggle.

SKP's decline continued. Just a few months after the Bommersvik conference, Sven Aspling wrote Haakon Lie. He sent his thanks for a series of paper clippings and informed that at the recent communist congress there had been a split, leading to one of the leading members leaving the party. Aspling hoped to be able to talk personally to Lie about the events.⁶⁸⁸

Though seemingly not reliant on intelligence sources, the Swedish SDP seems to have had an insider or a contact able to obtain information from within SKP as well. In the Danish archive there is a summary of a case running from 1951 to 1954, which involved the exclusion of a member of the communist plumber's club, and a forgery of a résumé of a meeting between the club and the local communist branch leadership. The case looks like an internal investigation of events in SKP. It was obtained by Swedish SDP and passed on to Oluf Carlsson.⁶⁸⁹

As for a party secretary conference in the autumn of 1953, the picture is unclear. Arne Pettersson went to Copenhagen in October 1953, where he met Urban Hansen. It is likely that they discussed communism, but it does not seem to have a secretary meeting.⁶⁹⁰

At Bommersvik, the Danes had not been present, and perhaps that gave the Swedes, Norwegians and Finns an occasion to speak more in detail about a common problem of theirs: the Northern Cap. We have already heard about the problems facing the Swedes in Norrbotten and the Norwegians in Finnmark. For the Finns it was no different: communism was especially strong in the northern regions of the country.

Some cooperation on the problems in the Northern Cap areas had already been underway. A Norwegian delegation went to Kiruna in Sweden in August 1952, for a conference (short, but valuable). Ragnar Lassinantti had been a *primus motor* in arranging it.⁶⁹¹ Lassinantti was a former police officer in Luleå, later to become *Landshövding* (leader of the district) of Norrbotten. At this point, he was chairman of the SDP district in Norrbotten and member of the party leadership. He was one of the main communist-fighters in Norrbotten.

⁶⁸⁸ Aspling to Lie, 30 April 1953. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 08 1953

⁶⁸⁹ ABA 500, 515, 5

⁶⁹⁰ Pettersson to Hansen, 24 September 1953. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 08 1953

In November 1952, a Finnish delegation went to the Swedish northern areas, led by Arne Pettersson.⁶⁹² The Norwegian SDP already held courses in their northern districts with a strong anti-communist content.⁶⁹³

It seems hardly coincidental, that now, after the party secretary meeting without the Danes, the Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish SDP's planned a conference in Norbotten on 8-9 December 1953, with local leaders and participants from the Northern Cap area – plus Arne Pettersson and Haakon Lie. Lie announced that he would bring Minister of Fisheries Peder Holt, a former local politician from Finnmark and 'our best expert when it comes to problems in North Norway.' Lie asked that Holt's participation be held strictly confidential and not leaked to the press.⁶⁹⁴ While a social democrat would have been perfectly fine going to a local conference as a party member, his participation was sensitive because he was also a member of the government.

And the conference was sensitive, from the looks of it. In the end, it was moved to Bommersvik, Stockholm, as it was feared that a conference in Norbotten would cause too much attention.⁶⁹⁵ But the content stayed the same. Afterwards, Lie sent information on the conference to an editor in Narvik, Nilsen, and requested that he participate in a 'cooperation committee'. Nilsen wrote back that he was glad something was happening in the area, as he had often discussed such a contact forum with his Norwegian and Swedish friends. He also confirmed participation in an upcoming conference in Kiruna in January. Ragnar Lassinantti was also a part of these plans.⁶⁹⁶

This was probably the beginning of the so-called Northern Cap cooperation between Finland, Norway and Sweden, which was aimed at fighting communists and continued into the 1970's.⁶⁹⁷ A special contact committee was formed in Luleå, with Ragnar Lassinantti as the chairman and Paul Björk as secretary. Editor Nilsen from Narvik was one of the Norwegian representatives.⁶⁹⁸

More research is needed on the Northern Cap cooperation.

⁶⁹¹ Correspondence, 21 and 22 August 1952. AAB 1001, Da, L0059, Sverige

⁶⁹² Aspling to Leskinen, 4 November 1952. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 07 1952

⁶⁹³ Bergh and Eriksen 1997, pp. 454-455.

⁶⁹⁴ Pettersson to Lie and Leskinen, 30 October 1953. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 08 1953. Lie to Pettersson, 31 October 1953. AAB 2483, Dc, L0003, Sverige (2)

⁶⁹⁵ Pettersson to Lie and Leskinen 26 November 1953. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 08 1953

⁶⁹⁶ Correspondence, Nilsen/Lie, December 1953. AAB 2483, Dc, L0003, Sverige (2)

⁶⁹⁷ Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 455 + 1998, p. 517

⁶⁹⁸ Bergh and Eriksen 1997, pp. 455-456

AT ITS HEIGHT: DOMBÅS 1954

The first 1954 meeting in what Haakon Lie now referred to as 'our Nordic cooperation committee', took place 19-21 March. The agenda, as proposed by Lie was: 1) Reports, 2) The latest events in Norway (presumably the Asbjørn Sunde spy case), 3) Cooperation in the Northern Cap, 4) The possibility of a similar cooperation in Southern Scandinavia, starting with special conferences for different/difficult industries such as shipyard workers, the merchant fleet, iron- and metalworkers, chemical industry and building industry. Lie also proposed participation of Otto Larsen, the author of *Jeg var sovjet spion (I was a Soviet spy)*, later published in English under the title *Nightmare of the innocents*. He had spent 8 years in the Soviet Union, or, as Lie sarcastically wrote, 'paradise'.

The Norwegian participants would go already on 14 March, to work on their report and ski. Lie encouraged his Nordic colleagues to enjoy the possibility for winter sports as well. It wasn't just the skiing, which made the setting more congenial at this meeting: several of the participants brought their wives.⁶⁹⁹

Participants were Oluf Carlsson and Frank Christiansen (Urban Hansen's protégé, Denmark), Stefan Thomas (West Germany), Sven Aspling, Arne Pettersson and Sven Andersson (Sweden – Andersson was former party secretary and now Minister of Communication, later to become Defence and Foreign Minister). Finally, there would be two representatives from Finland not yet found at the time of planning – Leskinen was unable to make it. Haakon Lie and Rolf Gerhardsen came from Norway. Furthermore, there were two unnamed 'Norwegian participants' that only participated 20 and 21 March.⁷⁰⁰ Haakon Lie has later told historians Trond Bergh and Knut Einar Eriksen that Asbjørn Bryhn, chief of the security police and Johan B. Holte from (and later to become General Director of) the large industry Norwegian Hydro were present at the meeting. Thus, they account for the two unnamed gentlemen on the list.⁷⁰¹ Also present was Per Dragland, economic journalist at *Arbeiderbladet*, and Haakon Lie's son-in-law. He has stated that he was not there to participate in the conference but as a part of the social theme of the secretaries bringing their families.⁷⁰²

⁶⁹⁹ Correspondance, February-March 1954. AAB 2483, Da, L0001, Dombås-kursen 1954. Lie has written 'Special course' in his calendar. Haakon Lie, calendar for 1954. AAB 2483, Df, L0003, Almanakker, 1951, 1954-59. On Otto Larsen, see also Lie 1975, p. 28.

⁷⁰⁰ Reservations, 8 March 1954. AAB 2483, Da, L0001, Dombås-kursen 1954, Carlsson to Eiler Jensen, 27 April 1954. ABA 500, 801, 1, 7

⁷⁰¹ Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 482

⁷⁰² Lahlum 2009, pp. 357-358, 725, note 292. When they dated, Rolf Gerhardsen enquired young Dragland about the connection to which Dragland allegedly answered: 'Yes, can you believe that such a bulldozer could create such a lovely thing?'

In the Danish archives, there is a stack of reports from the meeting, but once again, the Danish contribution is not included.

As usual, the participants gave an overview of the situation in their country, which will be summarised thematically.

Communist organisation and tactics

NKP had recovered from its crisis and was now a 'well-oiled machine', strongest in Oslo and the North. It only had 7.500 members (as opposed to 40-45.000 during the war), 30% of which were women. Communist meetings were generally poorly attended, but this did not seem to affect the spirit of existing members.

The SKP also had very limited power: of 9.400 Swedish unions, only 124 were communist-controlled. Of these, just three had over a thousand members.

In Finland, while more powerful, communists did not have leadership in any of the major SAK federations.

The Norwegian description of the CP is revealing. A 'well-oiled machine', however small, was able to do much damage. Another thing that worried the Norwegians was that in spite of decline at the last elections, communists had gained strength in the areas where they were already strong. It was often one very good and energetic person who was able to get results. The railroad shop in Drammen was 'strongly infected' and they had relatively many supporters among forest workers.

A Gallup study showed that Norwegians was not as firmly rooted in their voting behaviour as had been assumed. Apparently communist voters were the most doubtful, which was considered interesting information. It opened up possibilities for propagating among a group that had been considered hopeless.⁷⁰³

Common to Finland, Sweden and Norway was, as always, the problems in the northern regions. In Norrbotten (Sweden), the communists were on the offensive, but this had not hindered the social democrats in assuming power in one of the largest unions there. The communists had accepted this, and moved their people to other places, continuing the trend of focusing their work where they were already strong.

In North Finland, in the latest elections, communists had increased their vote by 2.000, the social democrats by only 1.000. It was hard to do anything about it, as one more seat in

⁷⁰³ 'Nogle indtryk fra konferencen i Dombås, 19.-21. marts 1954'. ABA 500, 328, 2

parliament from the North would take an extra 7.000 votes and that was considered impossible. Thus, the social democrats concentrated on holding their ground, rather than pushing forward. However, they were not idle. They planned a district meeting to coordinate a drive in the northern areas, including a tour of MP's in the district. Two men were working on it.⁷⁰⁴

The Norwegians also had a plan for countering communism in the plants. They wanted to gather 20 men from the workplaces with most communist difficulties and have some meetings. After that, the plan was to form a 'mentor scheme' where an MP was assigned one workplace to follow and to whom union representatives from the workplace could turn in case of problems.⁷⁰⁵ Whether or not this tactic was followed through is not possible to say, but it shows that the SDP's were always on the lookout for new methods to battle their enemy. By involving MP's the work gained an air of political legitimacy. Also in Denmark, it was very popular to have MP's talk at agitation meetings arranged by the AIC.

Propaganda themes

In all of the countries there had been a rise in communist drives towards the youth. 'Tendencies of infiltration' was observed among students in Norway, Sweden and Finland. Students in Norway were 'easy prey' as they were often opposed to Norwegian foreign policy. However, the effort seemed fruitless. There had been plans of a youth festival in Oslo (18.000 NOK was left from a Bukarest festival and they had been donated for the purpose). However, all non-communist youth organisations had declined participation, so the future of the festival was uncertain. In Sweden, the communist youth movement has more or less died out, and communist youth activities were being channelled into 'the Democratic Youth League' (presumably WFDY). There was no renewal and they lacked people for schooling.

A communist agitation tactic that was seen in all three countries was a tendency to focus on the individual, instead of doing mass propaganda. At the Akers mechanical shops in Norway, communists welcomed new employees from out of town, helped them and socialised with them in their free time. This gave good results. Also in Sweden, political agitation was pushed to the background and instead the communists worked on people individually. They worked in smaller groups, had private get-togethers and avoided confrontation. This caused some problems for the social democrats. These efforts was directed 'from the top', according to

⁷⁰⁴ 'Finland.' ABA 522, 16, SUKP's 20. kongres ...

⁷⁰⁵ 'Norge'. ABA 522, 16, SUKP's 20. kongres ...

the Finnish representative. He stated that an instruction had gone out to FKP members telling them to invite people to meetings in private homes and try to influence them through conversation. With the tactics being the same in all three countries, it seems fair to assume that it had gone out from the Cominform.

The communist also had a new and improved unity line in the workplaces. Instead of promoting unity from below, the communists now showed will to cooperate and reconcile. In Finland, while they had formerly only spoken to 'the masses', they were now prepared to negotiate with social democratic leaders (with few exceptions. Leskinen was one of them). Also in Sweden, the level of aggression was low, exemplified by communists only having one 1 May-demonstration in Stockholm. They no longer fought the unions' collective membership of SDP – there had even been an instance of communists suggesting that a union join the social democratic party. It stems well with the conciliatory line of the Soviet Union after Stalin's death in 1953.

Both Sweden and Finland had also seen a rise in delegations to the Soviet Union. Whereas the Swedes did not specify what kind, in Finland, it was delegations for culture and friendship, whereas workers' delegations had decreased. The Finnish-Soviet friendship organisation arranged a good deal of travels to the Soviet Union through VOKS (Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries) and delegations were kept busy with a full program. The Swedes had also noted an all-round Soviet propaganda offensive, including a rise in radio broadcasts and sports activities.

The new friendly line had not yet reached Norway, and it was not entirely popular among Swedish communists either: it caused disagreements within their ranks, but there were no signs of an actual split. Many shop stewards had a weakened incentive to fight the party leadership openly and actively: they were on a salary and becoming older.⁷⁰⁶

It is worth noticing that in some instances, like this, tactics were dependent on the individual country. In neutral Finland and Sweden, the communists pursued a friendlier line than in NATO countries Norway and Denmark.

In Norway, communists had earlier been keen on discussing the Soviet Union, ideology and doctrine, but this was no longer the case – they preferred to discuss current events – a continuation of the trend identified at the last secretary meeting, where it had been noted that communists preferred to focus on domestic issues, and less on the Soviet Union. Their 'great leader' was still also their sore spot.

⁷⁰⁶ 'Nogle indtryk fra konferencen i Dombås, 19.-21. marts 1954. ABA 500, 328, 2 + 'Sverige' and 'Finland.' ABA 522, 16, SUKP's 20. kongres ...

As far as peace work and work through front organisations went, there was a little difference between the countries. In Norway, front organisations such as peace organisations, WIDF and WFDY, were hardly even front organisations: 'the only thing not communist about them is the names. In many instances they don't even have a non-political front figure.' In Sweden, however, many cultural personalities supported the peace movement, which made it hard for social democrats to oppose it.⁷⁰⁷ It was not possible to find out how many signatures had been collected in the latest peace appeal.

Communists had also tried to place a man (not communist but 'naive') in the Norwegian social democratic opposition circle around the publication 'Orientering'. Since the social democratic leadership knew about it, one must assume that it had been unsuccessful.

One problem in Norway was that the communists were not without their sources either. Often, they had access to social democratic publications before the social democratic contact people got to read them themselves. This was obviously a big handicap in discussions at the workplace.

Finances

Communist finances were running low in both Sweden and Finland. In Finland, a number of Russian-owned businesses were being dissolved due to deficits. They were sold to private buyers, sometimes at half the original price.

In Sweden there had been cutbacks in the communist apparatus, but some discrepancies remained: in Gothenburg the communists had 5 full-time employees in the party office, whereas the social democrats had just one. A defected communist had revealed that fundraising results were forgeries; with communists signing up for large amounts they never paid.⁷⁰⁸

In Norway, the communists had two publishing firms, Ny Dag, with five employees and no means to pay them and Falken, which published 'costly', books in limited quantities. A recent fundraising had given 300.000 NOK. The amount was thought to be correct, but a great deal of the donors was thought to be covers for 'money, which has come from elsewhere'.

The question was, as usual: 'where does the money come from?' The SDP's was never in doubt about the answer.

⁷⁰⁷ 'Sverige.' ABA 522, 16, SUKP's 20. kongres ...

⁷⁰⁸ 'Nogle indtryk fra konferencen i Dombås, 19.-21. marts 1954'. ABA 500, 328, 2 + 'Sverige.' ABA 522, 16, SUKP's 20. kongres ...

Finland

The Swedish and Norwegian reports did not contain information that couldn't have been gathered by the party itself. While we could characterise the information and its gathering as intelligence, it seems to have been done by the party only.

As for the Norwegians, they did not need state intelligence information in their report this time; they had brought state intelligence (in the shape of Asbjørn Bryhn) with them.⁷⁰⁹ As for the Swedes, they might have actually followed the line they laid down in SAMAK in 1952 of not mixing party business with that of the intelligence services. While we know they still did so in Sweden, they may have chosen to keep it out of the Nordic forum, even when the setting was confidential.

The Finns on the other hand, continued sharing everything they had (it might not have been everything – but it was far more than any of the others), and this meeting was no exception. Following is the sections of the Finnish report that is concerned with military and security questions.

The common border with the Soviet Union was, as always, a concern. The Finns told that there had been more Russian attempts to contact Finns along the border than usual. One approach was asking for literature to keep up language skills. Some Finns had received money to give information to Russians.

A number of small-scale criminals had crossed the border into the Soviet Union and been sent back. Upon their return it had not been possible to speak to them. 'Someone' would try, but did not expect anything big to come out of it. If they had learned anything of value, they would not have been sent back.

A Soviet plane had done an emergency landing on Finnish soil. The Soviets sent guarding staff and trucks to the site, dismantled the plane and drove it back across the border, much to the dissatisfaction of the Finns who had wanted to examine the plane. PM Kekkonen had not intervened and some saw the incident as an example of the conservative government's bowing and scraping to the Soviet Union. A reason could be that Finland did a lot of trade with the Soviet Union and didn't want these relations to sour.

The Soviet Union being an important trade partner, in turn, caused fears among some that Finland would come to depend on Russia economically. In a worst-case scenario, this would give Russia the power to create a critical situation in which communists could take over.

⁷⁰⁹ Bergh and Eriksen 1997, P. 482. Bryhn's participation is also discussed in Lahlum 2009, pp. 296-297

As for domestic communist operations, the social democrats had learned of an alarming situation: 80% of caretakers in Helsinki's public institution buildings were communists. Thus, they had keys to all offices in these buildings and the caretaker was often the only person present in the building from Saturday afternoon to Monday morning. In one instance, a caretaker had been caught in the act, searching through documents and drawers.

Another way for the communists to gain information was running photo companies. They sent photographers to private homes of officers where they would take pictures, also when the officers were home. The purpose was to find out whom they were socialising with. A few such cases were to appear in court shortly.

In a recent spy case, 8 persons had been sentenced from 8 months to ten years.⁷¹⁰

A Norwegian guest

As mentioned, the Norwegians had decided to bring state intelligence to this meeting, instead of just referring to it. In the résumé Asbjørn Bryhn is referred to as a 'Norwegian guest.'

Also he spoke of border areas. There had been examples of Russians crossing the border and starting conversations with the Finnish population about normal, harmless topics with the purpose of, gradually, getting them to talk about military and political issues. It is curious that Bryhn speaks of the Finnish population. Either he refers to Finnish speaking citizens in the Russian-Norwegian border area, or he speaks about Finland, which is not entirely impossible either. (Norwegian security was informed about the Finnish-Russian border from the intelligence operations they ran through Finland.⁷¹¹) If the subjects were willing to talk, they received money for their information. One man had gone to the police and told of this practice, including that he himself had received money. He was now willing to pass on information to the police. In the end the police broke off contact with the man, as he was deemed unreliable. He was now believed to be an informant for the military intelligence service. Note, that this is the same information as given by the Finnish participant. Either Bryhn was speaking about Finland, or the Soviets had the same tactics in both countries' border areas, which is fully possible.

A Soviet soldier had entered Norway fully armed. He had surrendered his weapons to the police and declared that he wanted to defect. After controlling him, the police found him dependable. For some time he had collected information about Russian agents in Finnmark

⁷¹⁰ 'Nogle indtryk fra konferencen i Dombås, 19.-21. marts 1954. ABA 500, 328, 2, 'Finland.' ABA 522, 16, SUKP's 20. kongres ...

⁷¹¹ Ex. Riste and Moland 1997, p. 99

and delivered names, addresses and cover names on 40 Norwegians and 30 Finns and the topics they had given information on. When confronted, a lot of them had been surprised and revealed a lot more than what the police had learned from the defector.⁷¹²

Bryhn then gave an overview of the Asbjørn Sunde spy case, Sunde's activities during the war and how he had been discovered.⁷¹³ The surveillance 'apparatus' had concentrated on former volunteers in the Spanish civil war and resistance fighters who might be involved in 'a certain form of work' (Sunde had been a part of the Wollweber resistance organisation). By watching this group of people, some were sorted out, leaving a few who were followed closely. Sunde had been found to act 'strange' and soon, surveillance was concentrated on him, leading to the uncovering of the case. The strange behaviour included skipping work and going places by complicated routes (tram, car, tram again, car again, and so on). 'For a long time, it was impossible to follow his whereabouts.' A policeman tracked him to a place where he was picked up by a car, and after the policeman had spent the day in a ditch waiting for the car to return, it was identified as belonging to the Russian legation. Sunde, not an NKP member, was also found to have connections to communists in 'strategically important posts' that were not party members either. His contacts included a policeman who tipped him off about police license plates, and a lieutenant in the army. He also got documents from a cleaning lady in the Home Guard. He had contacts to 'a large number of people' who gave him information.⁷¹⁴ At the core of the case was 'important defence information' and it was thought that Sunde could receive 15-20 years in prison (in the end, he received an eight year sentence). Apparently, Sunde's employees had been afraid to talk to 'the apparatus' for fear of Sunde. It had been explained to them that Sunde faced 15-20 years and that they thus didn't need to fear him as much. Sunde's activities were now thought to be 'collapsing'.

The Danish résumé states:

⁷¹² 'Norge. Marts 1954' ABA 522, 16, SUKP's 20. kongres ... The defector might have been KGB officer Grigorij Pavlov who turned himself in to Norwegian police on 19 August 1953. Isungset and Jentoft 1995, p. 75

⁷¹³ 'Nogle indtryk fra konferencen i Dombås, 19.-21. marts 1954. ABA 500, 328, 2. 'Norge. Marts 1954' ABA 522, 16, SUKP's 20. kongres ..., One of the résumés talks of 'Arne Sunde', but this must have been a mixup by the Danish. Arne Sunde did, as Asbjørn Sunde, participate in resistance work during the war, but this – apart from the last name – is where the similarities stop. Arne Sunde was Norwegian ambassador to the UN in 1949-52 and chaired NATO's financial control commission in 1953-58.

⁷¹⁴ 'Nogle indtryk fra konferencen i Dombås, 19.-21. marts 1954. ABA 500, 328, 2. 'Norge. Marts 1954.' ABA 522, 16, SUKP's 20. kongres ... This is largely in accordance with what Borgersrud tells of the case based on intelligence documents. However, Borgersrud seems to be of the opinion that Sunde was innocent. Borgersrud 2001, latter half of the book.

One got the impression from this account, that covert work of this type probably also exists in other places, and likewise, one was given a vivid impression of a thorough and very persistent job from the apparatus in question [presumably POT].⁷¹⁵

Moreover, Bryhn gave an overview of the Norwegian security police, which at the moment employed 174 men but where to increase to 200 (250 if counting office clerks). Security police was chosen from '100% reliable and idealistic' people, of which many had done resistance work during the war. They would not only receive training in intelligence and police work, but also education in social and political issues and an extensive course on the history of Norwegian and international communism (Haakon Lie's specialty) and they would read numerous books on the subject.⁷¹⁶ We remember that Lie's books were being used in educating secret service officers (see page 70)

Bryhn also gave information about other countries' security services. Danish résumé:

It was the impression of the concerned guest that the corresponding apparatus in this country [Denmark] is working well, but is too weak, which should be obvious from the fact that there is only 30 people available in all of the country as opposed to 100 people in Oslo alone and probably also 100 people in Stockholm. There is talk that activity of this sort [?] perhaps should be moved to Copenhagen, because the risk here is smaller.⁷¹⁷

Thus, from Bryhn, the participants did not only gain insight into current cases, but also the methods and training of the security police, and perhaps even their cooperation/talks with other Scandinavian services.⁷¹⁸

From the face of it, Bryhn's participation at this meeting can seem chocking. In some ways it was, being an open-and-shot (and almost too illustrious) case of the private-state network in operation. But looking at it from another angle, it is not all that extraordinary. The party ran the state, party and state intelligence was already cooperating, especially in Norway,

⁷¹⁵ 'Man fik af denne fremstilling et stærkt indtryk af, at et underjordisk arbejde af denne karakter formentlig findes også andre steder, ligesom man fik en levende belysning af et minutiøst og meget udholdende arbejde fra det pågældende apparats side.' 'Nogle indtryk fra konferencen i Dombås, 19-.21. marts 1954. ABA 500, 328, 2

⁷¹⁶ 'Norge. Marts 1954.' ABA 522, 16, SUKP's 20. kongres ...

⁷¹⁷ Det var vedkommende gæsts indtryk, at det tilsvarende apparat her i landet arbejder godt, men er for svagt, hvilket skulle fremgå af, at der kun er 30 mand til rådighed i hele landet imod snart 100 mand alene i Oslo, og vistnok også 100 mand i Stockholm. Der er tale om, at virksomhed af denne art måske flyttes til København, fordi risikoen her er mindre.' 'Nogle indtryk fra konferencen i Dombås, 19-.21. marts 1954'. ABA 500, 328, 2

⁷¹⁸ 'Nogle indtryk fra konferencen i Dombås, 19-.21. marts 1954. ABA 500, 328, 2

and much of the information presented by Bryhn was not so different from what was otherwise exchanged at these meetings. What is perhaps most intriguing, is the willingness of the party secretaries to let someone who was not an active partisan into their circle, and Bryhn's willingness to participate. But both parties obviously trusted each other: the common ideological foundation and a common threat perception that eased that trust and trusted members of the network (Lie and Gerhardsen) already knew Bryhn and did the bridging.

More curious is the presence of a representative from the Norwegian business elite, Johan B. Holte of Norsk Hydro, as employers was traditionally the opponents of the labour movement – even if labour relations was mostly peaceful in Scandinavia and employers were partners in the overall economic planning. But this is the effect of securitisation: it can make strange bed partners. Securing vital industries was a part of securing the country, and sabotage and espionage was a very real (and not entirely groundless) fear. In this venture, labour movement and business worked together. The de-radicalisation of their relation thus not only affected labour relations but also security, and even made for an informal cooperation based on the common threat perception. The social democrats were responsible for the state, and being that the state and party was hard to separate, so became the relation to a traditional partner, not of party but of state: business. We saw this already in the case of the plant defences, and it was not solely a Norwegian enterprise. It was done in Sweden and Denmark with the personnel control. In Denmark there was even a case where the social democratic prime minister turning to AIC and the employers association to end a strike at the large shipyard B&W. According to a former secretary of AIC, they were, traditionally no fans of the employers. But when security was at risk one had to do what needed to be done.⁷¹⁹

'A man from the south'

We do not know, what Holte's contribution to the meeting was (although a qualified guess would be industry security). The same goes for Sven Andersson. But there was yet another guest who hadn't participated before, although one of his countrymen had: Stefan Thomas of the West German SPD.

Thomas gave an overview of the development in Germany (especially the Eastern zone) since World War II, including the communist tactics and takeover, the Soviet wish for a strong East Germany as a power base in Europe, and an analysis of the events leading up to 17 June,

⁷¹⁹ Björnsson 2012, p. 71

1953. It was said that the authorities had trouble recovering from the strikes, but Thomas was not optimistic on behalf of the East German people.

He gave an overview of Ostbüro and its activities. The purpose of Ostbüro was 1) organise contacts with the former SPD in East Germany, 2) propaganda against communism, 3) collecting information from East Germany and 4) counter-espionage. Ostbüro had helped many refugees from East Germany and used them as sources of information. It had also had help from a group of Russian refugees who helped spread Russian leaflets in the East German zone.

However, the bulk of Ostbüro work in East Germany was built around the former SPD. They were not able to use the old well-known union representatives, but had had to find lesser-known agents. Their contacts also included officials, 'technical intelligence', employees at universities and the police. These groups were said to be the best information sources. While political issues were the main interest of the Ostbüro, they also received information on military, air bases, industries, etc. Ostbüro had offices in Bonn and Hannover, three offices in Berlin and at a number of border posts. They had 47 employees and 'several hundred agents' in the East zone. They had two illegal groups working in East Germany and sent out a number of illegal magazines. One of them, a youth magazine, was disguised as a communist publication. Another was directed at the unions. 'Der Socialdemokrat', the official publication of the illegal SPD, came out two times a month. Other means of propaganda included leaflets spread by balloons at big events in East Germany. The West German Meteorological Institute had been helpful in figuring out where the balloons would be at given times.

Thomas said Ostbüro was giving the Eastern communists trouble, pressing them into the defensive, and that it had won sympathy from large sections of the population. Stasi (headed by Wollweber as a 'red Gestapo chief') called Ostbüro murderers and saboteurs, but Thomas underlined that Ostbüro never had done and never would do sabotage. Two million people had crossed from the Eastern to the Western zone, but Ostbüro encouraged people to stay, carry on and keep fighting. It was thought that an election in East Germany would only give 10% of the votes to communists.⁷²⁰

Among the archive material from this meeting is a diagram showing 'The communist organisation- and agent net in the Federal Republic'. It shows a view of East German cover organisations and persons working in West Germany. The diagram is connected to a

⁷²⁰ 'Nogle indtryk fra konferencen i Dombås, 19.-21. marts 1954. ABA 500, 328, 2. Tyskland.' ABA 522, 16, SUKP's 20. kongres ...

corresponding list, giving details of people and organisations.⁷²¹ Thus, the West Germans gave detailed information on the illegal work of their own party in the Eastern zone, as well as (supposed) East German agents in West Germany.

This information benefitted the Nordic countries, giving them opportunities to check visitors or arrangements in the Nordic countries made by any of the cover persons or organisations on the list. Moreover, insight in East German condition made for excellent propaganda opportunities.

The conference ended by discussing, and agreeing on, a common Nordic course for workers in selected industries, first and foremost shipyards. The course would be held in Gothenburg in autumn, and it was hoped that the relevant union federations would pay. It was Arne Pettersson's initiative.

Exchange of people in the Northern Cap area was also discussed, and later, followed up. Haakon Lie met with Ragnar Lassinantti and Paul Björk on 1 November.⁷²²

Afterwards, Aspling praised the stay in the Norwegian mountains, which he claimed would be remembered for a long time and Arne Pettersson had only one complaint: the trip had been too short. Oluf Carlsson called the stay 'both eventful and trying which does both nature and the conference credit.'⁷²³ The skiing part had been great fun, with Aspling taking a dive to due his one ski breaking and Carlsson impressing the others with his skills. Aspling also wrote Leskinen about the meeting: 'We missed you much during some really pleasant days up in the Norwegian mountains. (...) However, your replacements [Veikko Puskala and A.M. Myllymäki] were fine boys and I had a feeling that they, as the rest of us, were comfortable.'⁷²⁴ Aspling thought the stay in the Norwegian mountains should be made into a yearly tradition. For him and Rolf Gerhardsen, it became one.

Obviously, the bonds between the secretaries at this point were more than just professional.⁷²⁵

⁷²¹ 'Das kommunistische Organisations- und Agentennetz in der Bundesrepublik' + numbered list. ABA 522, 48, 1957. Kommunister

⁷²² 'Nogle indtryk fra konferencen i Dombås, 19.-21. marts 1954. ABA 500, 328, 2, Marts 1954'. ABA 522, 16, SUKP's 20. kongres ... Arne Pettersson to Helge Hult and Ragnar Lassinantti, 13 April 1954. ARBARK 1889, E6, 01 1954-62, 1954-56 Arne Pettersson

⁷²³ Aspling to Lie, 27 March 1954. AAB 2483, Da, L0001, Dombås-kursen 1954, Pettersson to Lie, 12 May 1954. ARBARK 1889, E6, 01 1954-62, 1954-56 Arne Pettersson. Carlsson to Aspling and Lie, 23 March 1954. AAB 1001, Da, L0078, Danmark

⁷²⁴ 'Vi saknade Dig mycket under några verkligt härliga dagar uppe i den norske fjällvärlden (...) Emellertid är Dina ställföreträdare fina pojkar, och jag hade känslan av, att de liksom vi trivdes.' Majander 2009, p. 144

⁷²⁵ Post-conference correspondence, March 1954, ARBARK 1889, E2B, 09 1954

EDUCATION

Education and studies of each other's practices were common. At the organisation for social democratic clubs' meeting in March 1951, a Norwegian secretary was present to talk about 'weeding out communists in the Norwegian labour movement'.⁷²⁶ In 1953 Norwegian SDP labour secretary Olav Nordskog was invited on, and accepted, a trip to Sweden, to look at the organisation of contacts in the workplaces and the unions.⁷²⁷ In Norrbotten, there were plans for a course for union representatives in January 1954. The Swedish party hosted it, while the Norwegian party paid for its own attendees.⁷²⁸

Besides, there was, as always, an exchange of participants and speakers on courses for shop stewards and union representatives on broader organisational issues (which would usually also include discussions on communism).⁷²⁹

Gothenburg 1954

When agreeing, in March 1954 in Dombås, to arrange a course for shipyard workers, the secretaries had talked about funding. The Norwegians had suggested that the labour movement pay for the course. Oluf Carlsson now wrote to Danish LO leader Eiler Jensen in confidentiality to inform him about the plans. Nordskog wrote MP and secretary of the Norwegian Iron and Metal Workers Union, Josef Larsson, asking him if they would be interested in financing part of the course. Nordskog made it clear that the course was mainly to discuss communism and Larsson was asked to participate on the day when Swedish LO leader Arne Geijer would talk about problems in the shipyards industry. Larsson was positive. But in spite of their participation the LO's didn't finance the venture. In the end financing worked out so that the involved SDP's each paid an equal amount.⁷³⁰

⁷²⁶ Résumé of meeting in the organisation for union clubs, 5 March 1951. ABA 1077, Protokoll I

⁷²⁷ Correspondence Nordskog/Petterson, November 1953. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 08 1953

⁷²⁸ Correspondance, October-November 1953. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 08 1953. Price list, 16 January 1954. ARBARK F15D, 08 1952-54, Kommunisterna (Fackligt – Norden)

⁷²⁹ Correspondence Carlsson/Petterson and Aspling/Lie, spring/summer 1954. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 09 1954

⁷³⁰ Carlsson to Eiler Jensen, 27 April 1954. ABA 500, 801, 1, 7. Correspondence Nordskog-Larsson, August-September, November 1954. AAB 1001, Eo, L0012, Kurs i Göteborg, 14-20 nov. 1954. Carlsson to Urban Hansen, 2 November 1954. ABA 500, 328, 2

The course was held at Hindås near Gothenbourg 14-20 November 1954. 15 people participated from each country, 9 of the Danes from traditional communist stronghold, B&W. Frank Christiansen, Arne Pettersson and Olav Nordskog led the course. Speakers included Haakon Lie, Urban Hansen, Sven Aspling, Oluf Carlsson, Arne Geijer, Ivar Nørgaard (secretary in the Danish labour movements' business council, later to become Danish minister of Economy), Josef Larsson and Erlander's secretary (future PM) Olof Palme. Ahead of the course, Nordskog sent the participants some reading material and suggested they read a communist article on unity in the labour movement.⁷³¹

Arne Pettersson held the opening speech on Monday. Haakon Lie then spoke on international communism, starting from 1917 and giving an overview of the different periods and tactics, dividing the post-war years into three epochs: the great alliance 1941-47, the great offensive 1947-52 and peaceful co-existence 1952-.

In his talk, Haakon Lie gave an unusually thorough and comprehensible description of communism and the speech was the foundation of many discussions and conversations during the course.⁷³²

Later that day, Haakon Lie, Arne Pettersson and Frank Christiansen spoke about communism in each their country. Lie spoke of areas of communist influence, election results, member figures and cover organisations. Pettersson spoke of communist influence in the labour movement, Soviet propaganda, cover organisations, work with intellectuals, election results and members. Frank Christiansen spoke of communist campaigns (peace, taxes, trade with the Soviet Union, NATO, West German re-armament, etc.), illegal strikes and communist tactics, work with intellectuals (in which they had some success), communist gains in the labour movement and the necessity of activating the social democratic clubs. He also spoke of delegations, communist activities among young people and newly hired, cover organisations and election results. The speeches were generally along the lines of those given at the party

⁷³¹ List of participants. ABA 522, AIC. (...) Materiale fra det nordiske skibsværftsarbejderkursus i dagene den 14.-20. november 1954. List of participants, correspondance and notes. AAB 1001, Eo, L0012, Kurs i Göteborg, 14.-20 nov. 1954 Carlsson to Lie, 8 February 1954. AAB 2483, Da, L0001, Saksmappe NKP. See also 'Arbejderbevægelsens Informations-Centrals Virksomhed i 1954.' ABA 522, 41, AIC's protokol. Referater fra bestyrelsesmøder. 24. jan. 1955 – 04. marts.

⁷³² 'Haakon Lie gav i sit foredrag en ualmindelig grundig og letfattelig beskrivelse af kommunismen, og foredraget dannede grundlag for mange diskussioner og samtaler på kurset.' 'Kursus for nordiske værftsarbejdere på Hindås Idrætsgård ved Göteborg 14.-20. november 1954.' ABA 522, AIC. (...) Materiale fra det nordiske skibsværftsarbejderkursus i dagene den 14.-20. november 1954. The outline for the speech can also be found in ARBARK 1889, F15D, 06 1950-55, 1952-55 Kommunist (med finske kommunister)

secretary meeting: a general overview of communist influence and current trends, but more focused on unions.

During the discussions many examples of communist tactics came up. It was underlined that when employers were negative towards unions and social welfare, it often gave the communists more support among the workers. Everyone agreed that it was important to activate people directly in the workplaces; to put their mark on the daily discussions and make sure that the right people were elected as union representatives. Many participants wished for more publications and prints on current issues. It was also necessary to make those running for posts in the unions popular and find suitable replacement early on, if a representative left his post. All in all, discussions revolved around the daily problems and hands-on issues with communists. It was also briefly mentioned that there should be some propaganda work against the right wing.

Tuesday it was time for representatives from Oslo, Gothenburg and Copenhagen to talk about the fraction work in the large shipyards. All three gave an overview of the work since the 1930's and the organisation of the fractions and underlined the importance of having a good contact net from top to bottom in order to always be able to reach everyone quickly with information. The Norwegian representative also spoke of the necessity of having special groups that could step up in a crisis (perhaps the plant defence or similar groups).

Later Tuesday Aspling spoke of the district elections in Sweden. SDP had had a good result in Northern Sweden, due to the increased activity up there. In advance of discussion meetings, talking points and arguments were sent to the party's contacts and social democrats had the upper hand at these meetings.

Wednesday started with talks on Nordic economic cooperation, followed by a day trip to Gothenburg.

Thursday was devoted to group work and in the evening the participants saw slides about 17 June in Berlin and a Swedish election film.⁷³³

Friday, Arne Geijer talked about special problems in the shipyard industry and the groups presented their work. Questions for group work had been divided into five areas; fractions, tactics, agitation, communist organisation and communist tactics, each area containing a number of questions on both communist and social democratic efforts.⁷³⁴ Group 1 answered questions on social democratic fractions and tactics, group 2 answered the questions on agitation, and group 3 concentrated on the questions about communism.

⁷³³ 'Kursus for nordiske værftsarbejdere på Hindås Idrætsgård ved Göteborg 14.-20. november 1954.' ABA 522, AIC. (...) Materiale fra det nordiske skibsværftsarbejderkursus i dagene den 14.-20. november 1954

On the question of organisation, group 1 answered that a centre along the lines of the Danish AIC was also desirable in the other countries, to act as the link between shop floors and leadership. Before a general meeting in a union, the clubs should meet and agree on a common course. Specific tactics for meetings and general assemblies should be planned from case to case, depending on communist tactics and arguments. 'Common members' of the SDP should participate in debates, although it should not look as planned as it actually was. The 'best' of the common members should be the ones debating and they should prepare themselves in advance of meetings. Before a general meeting the social democratic club should look over the agenda and distribute the tasks for each member. At the assembly, seating arrangement was important, as was proper applause for social democratic speakers. Members of the union should be prepared for the assemblies both in regard to candidates and speakers. It was necessary to always appear united, in spite of possible differences within own ranks. Club members' loyalty should be secured by recommendations or signing a declaration of loyalty.

The group found it important to have an experienced social democratic contact for young people, but everyone in general should look after the young people and arrange get-togethers, film showings, etc. The group had also discussed how best to counter communist tactics. It was agreed to be on guard even if communists tried to be friendly and promote unity, and that relaxation of social democratic efforts would lead to the communists performing a coup in the union at any given moment. No posts should be given up because they were thought to be unimportant. It was also agreed to counter communist campaigns on current political issues. Communist suggestions of statements and resolutions should be altered so that they could not use it in their propaganda. Any communist resolution should be followed up with information about the number of members in the organisation that had agreed on it, and number of votes by which it was passed. It was also necessary to have a good and swift apparatus to counter communist 'smear campaigns' against social democratic union representatives.⁷³⁵

The second group answered questions on agitation work, including recruitment. The party's shop stewards should be liked and respected by their colleagues and be the natural 'rallying point' in the workplace. If this was the case, half the recruitment work was done already. Everyone was a candidate for recruitment, but efforts should mainly be concentrated on young people. As for propaganda material, short and concise texts were preferable.

⁷³⁴ Questions for group work. AAB 1001, Eo, L0012, Kurs i Gøteborg, 14-20 nov. 1954

⁷³⁵ Answers from Group 1. AAB 1001, Eo, L0012, Kurs i Gøteborg, 14-20 nov. 1954. See also diagram for seating arrangements in Schmidt 2009a, p. 33

Partisans should, in workplaces with communist problems prepare questions and issues expected to come up at union meetings. In the case of public political meetings, the Danish experience was that communists had them. Swedes had had success with meetings of a more enjoyable kind, with entertainment such as films, music, etc. They were said to be a good starting point for further contacts. Another good idea was family meetings with the purpose of creating understanding of the political work of (usually) the husband. Such arrangements were also thought to be good for further contacts, especially among youngsters.

The group discussed what arguments worked best for the communists. They were mainly successful in discussions on ideas (not because communists were ideologically superior, but because they frequently used big words which they didn't understand themselves), and use of solidarity within the labour movement by which they could arrange strikes. They had some leeway in economic questions (salaries and prices), peace, the arms race and (in Norway and Denmark) and the question of German rearmament. They also had some success in their cover organisations and when propagating for the Soviet Union and the Eastern 'peoples democracies'. As for counterarguments against the communists, the group agreed on pointing out that they were dependent on, and controlled by, Moscow, explaining the differences between democracy and dictatorship, compare (and contrast) the living standards in Scandinavia to those in the Eastern bloc and point out Scandinavians' possibilities to travel to foreign countries (as opposed to those in the Eastern bloc). In case of communist talk of unity one should point out their earlier behaviour, contrast the free labour movement of Scandinavia to that in the Eastern bloc, point out earlier 'sins' of the Soviet Union (such as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, annexing smaller countries and the general development in these countries), Soviet armament, the ways in which Russian farms were collectivised, and not least, espionage activities and the latest spy cases.⁷³⁶

It is interesting to note that almost all counterarguments against the communists had to do with the international situation and the East bloc. The Cold War and Soviet international (and domestic) behaviour provided the social democrats with some good arguments against their archenemies.

Group 3 answered questions about communist tactics specifically, even though both Group 1 and 2 had also addressed the question. The group gave an overview of the communist organisation and meeting structure, with both public and covert activities. In general it was noted, that the communists in Denmark and Norway tended to be secretive in their organisation work. In all three countries, communists were quick to pick up on moods and

⁷³⁶ Answers from Group 2. AAB 1001, Eo, L0012, Kurs i Gøteborg, 14-20 nov. 1954

trends among the workers and react to these. Workplace representatives formally led communist fractions, but really it was the Central Committee who staked out the terms, most evident in Sweden and Norway. Tactics for union elections varied a little according to the circumstances in each country.

As for the finances of the communists, it was mainly agreed that their good position after the war had receded and DKP, NKP and SKP struggled with bad economy. It was thought that they received money from Cominform mainly to do propaganda. Besides member fees, communists regularly had fundraisers for their press, elections and in the workplaces. They had a party press and in Sweden even a film central. Even if not able to prove it, the group found it very likely that money for these activities also came from 'the outside'.

Communist schooling and courses were often very theoretical. They targeted young people and new employees in order to win their friendship and later influence them politically. However, this strategy was less successful than earlier and the communist youth organisations had been declining all over Scandinavia. Sometimes good communist agitators were encouraged by the party to seek employment at specific workplaces. In Denmark the situation had been stable for a while, while communists in Norway and Sweden tended to be more secretive in their workplace activities (that contradicts the above statement that Danish and Norwegian communists was more secretive in their organisation work).

Communist tactic, as had been agreed on a congress in Stockholm in 1953, was to seek cooperation and understanding with social democrats, then to capture the apparatus of the shop stewards. This was dictated from the Central Committees, but had not been realised with success, perhaps because not all followed this strategy. As it was fairly new, there seemed to be a transition period, with variations in each country, in Sweden even leading to an exclusion of a leading communist, causing problems and even inactivity among workers. However, the group thought that the first troubles were over, and communists would follow the 'unity line' more regularly in the future. Blurring the borders between communists and social democrats could cause big problems. Therefore, social democrats had to point out the differences, which they had done relatively successfully. The new tactics from the communists had not been able to diminish political discussions in the workplace. In salary negotiations, communists still tried to nullify existing agreements and demand 'unrealistic' salaries. They were not very active in other local workplace organisations but the group pointed out that it would be relatively easy for communists to infiltrate these.⁷³⁷

⁷³⁷ Answers from Group 3. AAB 1001, Eo, L0012, Kurs i Göteborg, 14-20 nov. 1954

Sunday morning, the participants evaluated the course. Everyone agreed that the result should be increased activity in the workplaces and that fraction work should be more systematic so as to gain power in all the places where communists now had influence.⁷³⁸ The résumés of the three groups' answers were exchanged as a starting point for further work and discussions. It was hoped that the course would benefit the party work in the involved workplaces.⁷³⁹

Frank Christiansen sent a résumé to Eiler Jensen, including résumés of the group work. He thought the participants had had good use of the course and hoped that it would inspire increased activity in the future. He expected to be able to see results in the time ahead.⁷⁴⁰

Shortly thereafter, Nordskog, Lie, Pettersson and Ragnar Lassinantti planned a 'continuation': this time for ironworkers in the Northern Cap. It took place in summer 1955. On the agenda was communism in Norway and Sweden (Nordskog and Lassinantti), international communism (Lie) and how to speak and debate (Pettersson). Also here, a lot of time was put aside to do group work.⁷⁴¹

Courses in the Northern Cap area had 'the same purpose' as the common inter-Scandinavian courses. Courses for specific branches of workers and Swedish-Norwegian gatherings along the border became a permanent feature.⁷⁴²

Oslo 1955

One year after the Gothenburg course, another one for all three countries was done – this time for building workers. It took place 23-29 October 1955 at the LO-school in Sørmarka near Oslo. Once again the plan was for 15 people from each country to participate. The parties seem to have shared the expenses.⁷⁴³ In the end, only two Danes participated, though AIC

⁷³⁸ 'Kursus for nordiske værftsarbejdere på Hindås Idrætsgård ved Göteborg 14.-20. november 1954.' ABA 522, AIC. (...) Materiale fra det nordiske skibsværftsarbejderkursus i dagene den 14.-20. november 1954

⁷³⁹ Correspondence, December 1954. AAB 1001, Eo, L0012, Kurs i Gøteborg, 14-20 nov. 1954

⁷⁴⁰ Christiansen to Eiler Jensen, 10 December 1954. ABA 522, AIC. (...) Materiale fra det nordiske skibsværftsarbejderkursus i dagene den 14.-20. november 1954

⁷⁴¹ Letter to Arne Petterson, 29 November 1954. AAB 1001, Da, L087, Sverige. Correspondance, February-June 1955. ARBARK 1889, E6, 01 1954-62, 1954-56 Arne Pettersson. Program for course 12-18 June 1955, ARBARK 1889, F15D, 08 1952-58, 1954-55 Kommunisterna (Fackligt - Norden)

⁷⁴² Letter to Arne Pettersson, 22 February 1955. AAB 1001, Da, L0107, Sverige. Nordskog to Rolf Ankervik, 29 July 1955. AAB 1001, Da, L0092, Danmark

⁷⁴³ Correspondence about course, July 1955. AAB 1001, Da, L0092, Danmark. See also letters from Nordskog to organisers and speakers, July and September 1955. AAB 1001, Da, L0107, Sverige. Nordskog to Aspling, 29 July 1955. ARBARK 1889, E6, 01 1954-62, 1954-56 Arne Pettersson

were listed as one of the organisers. In the yearly report for AIC it says that a club representative for building workers and one for painters had participated in a Nordic meeting in Oslo. The aim was to discuss 'conditions and problems' in the trade.⁷⁴⁴

The first item on the agenda was communism: Arne Pettersson, an unknown Erik Jeppesen and Olav Nordskog gave overviews of communism in Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Haakon Lie then (once again) spoke on international communism. Other topics were Nordic economic cooperation, salaries prices and living standards, productivity problems, political work in the unions and current union problems. The course also contained a field trip and a farewell party. More detailed summaries have unfortunately not been found. As in Hindås the year before, the participants were divided into three groups, which were to discuss different questions. Answers have been preserved and were as follows:

Group 1 answered questions about tactics and union work. They spoke in favour of forming party groups in the workplaces (which were to be larger than the very closed fraction-like clubs). Members of the groups should agitate for the party, remain in contact with it and make decisions on tactics and candidates for union posts. The groups should prepare partisans for the annual general union assembly. The agenda and the position on different issues should be discussed in advance and tasks distributed. Agreements on who to nominate should also be made in advance. It was important to make sure that only one social democratic candidate was nominated. Participants should also be assigned speaking tasks and 'Nothing should be left to chance.' Printed material should be handed out, letters written to partisans and possible sympathisers. Individual face-to-face agitation was valued highly. At the meetings, partisans should be spread out in all of the room to dominate it and it should be prepared in advance who would make what points in the discussions. Lastly, everyone should remain at the meeting until the election was over, to not give the communists the advantage of dragging out time and winning because people were tired. The group thought the party should contribute to special campaigns including those before union elections. All forms of cooperation attempts from the communists should be rejected. The party should also remain attentive to having the right people lead union activities. Young people should be contacted through help and confidentiality in the hope of later activation. Furthermore it was suggested that a 'special propaganda central' be formed by the party and LO to provide printed material and act as a contact organ between leadership and workplace. This is a pretty good description of AIC, and it must be assumed that also this year, the Norwegian and Swedish participants wished for an organisation like it.

⁷⁴⁴ 'Arbejderbevægelsens Informations-Centrals Virksomhed i 1955' 16 January 1956. ABA 522, 41, AIC's protokol. Referater fra bestyrelsesmøder. 24. jan. 1955 – 04. marts 1957

Group 2 answered questions about agitation and information in the workplaces. First of all they thought that there were not enough union/party representatives in the workplaces. A way of recruiting party representatives was distributing different small tasks to different people and then let them know that their work was very valuable. It was only through active partisans that the party would have the best propaganda and the best conditions for labour/political influence. Youth courses and sporting events could be a way.

Written material for distribution was appreciated, but sometimes it was in too small quantities. The content of printed material should be adjusted to fit the current situation and not least the situation in the specific region and/or workplace. The group listed the following communist propaganda themes to be the hardest to counter: defence spending, increasing prices, unity in the labour movement, and current issues where the communists would argue that political colours were secondary. The best social democratic arguments were often about results reached by party and labour movement. The group also discussed how to get a wider distribution of the party press, but had no specific ideas. In the end, they agreed that it was a 'women's issue' as the wife at home decided what paper should be read in the house.

Group 3 discussed communist organisation and how to counter it. Communists were organised with contact people in the workplace, regular meetings and printed propaganda material. Important decisions were directed from 'above'. Political study groups met in private homes, and the intellectual level of studies was very high. Everyone wondered how communists could be so active with so little money – it was thought that they had financial support from the 'outside'. A lot of the propaganda was driven through front- or cover organisations and especially young people were targeted.

The unity line (directed from Moscow) had caused different situations; in Norway it was only promoted in places where NKP was weak, whereas nothing was changed in places where it was strong. In Sweden the party leadership pushed it through all over. In many places the communists had not accepted it and many were still agitating fiercely against social democrats. At regular union meetings however, communist leaders had more control over their members. The new communist tactic were said to have dampened social democratic activities – a point in which the Danish participants disagreed, as the communists shift of tactics underlined their instability and their attempts at splitting workers. Even though the language had changed and become less harsh, the content had not. Still, some causes such as peace campaigns and appeals had made people unknowingly side with communists on these issues.

The course was viewed as valuable and inspiring for the participants to go into the labour-political work with more energy than before. The résumé and groups' answers were

sent to the participants with a note to treat it carefully and not have it fall into the wrong hands.⁷⁴⁵

These courses were a direct result of the party secretary meetings, and one of their practical outcomes. The Scandinavian setting revealed that problems were alike in all three countries. The courses were dealt with the situation in the main battleground: the workplaces. But, like the party secretary meetings, it was also a forum in which to exchange experience and information and discuss the communist tactics. A thing one notices when reading the group's suggestions on dealing with the communists is, what we already know, that many communist tactics was mirrored by the social democrats: communists targeted young people – the SDP had to target young people, etc. Copying communist methods was no cause for scruples; it was an admitted necessity.

Many of the group answers were also repetitions of what the social democrats was already (supposed to be) doing. They were not that different from the guidelines set out by SDP leadership and almost reads like a handbook on how to carry out the old war cry: Educate! Agitate! Organise!

The courses also underline an important attitude in the social democratic movement: never cooperate with communists and never relax the effort. To give the communist an inch could be the road to them taking over a union. No compromises were allowed.

The 1954 and 1955 courses seem to have been one (or two) of a kind, planned by the party secretary meetings and devoted solely to the battle against communism. However, it does not mean that they were the only courses dealing with communism. The already mentioned courses in the Northern Cap had the exact same purpose, but without Danish representation.

As mentioned in the beginning of this section other common union courses, for which the Nordic SDP's also exchanged speakers and participants, were not as communist-specific but would treat communism as a natural part of political questions in the unions and have communism as an item on a wider agenda.⁷⁴⁶ At a Danish labour course for shop stewards in August-September 1952, to which two Norwegian and two Swedish participants had been invited, one item on the agenda was a presentation followed by group work on 'The

⁷⁴⁵ Report from course at Sørmarka, 23-29 October 1955. AAB 1001, Da, L0092, Danmark. Also to be found in ARBARK SE 1889, F15D, 08 1952-58, 1954-55 Kommunisterne (Fackligt - Norden) including list of participants. Covering letter from Olav Nordskog, 18 November 1955. The course is also mentioned in Bergh & Eriksen, p. 455

⁷⁴⁶ Correspondance Carlsson/Pettersson/Sigvald Hellberg/Per Møller Pedersen, March-April 1955. ABA 500, 826 1. See also letters from Olav Nordskog, 8 June 1955. AAB 1001, Da L0107, Sverige

communist infiltration and its prevention', led by Urban Hansen. Leskinen was also present and gave a speech about Finnish problems.⁷⁴⁷

At the Bommersvik party secretary conference in March 1953 it was agreed that a Norwegian observer should go to a Swedish course in the summer of 1953.⁷⁴⁸ It was probably a labour-political course held by the Swedish party at Bommersvik 21-28 June, from which a Norwegian participant sent a report to Haakon Lie. The course dealt with different questions concerning politics, organisation and propaganda. Arne Pettersson made a speech about communism, and in groups, the participants discussed questions such as: Why do people become communists? What are the intentions of the CP? Are the communists independent? Is the new communist tactic successful? How to counter a communist peace offensive? How should propaganda against communism be orchestrated? Pettersson also made a speech under the title 'Is the union enough?', after which the participants were asked to discuss whether or not a union could be politically neutral in relation to the right wing and the communists, whether or not cooperation was an advantage and under what conditions.⁷⁴⁹

At the Swedish annual labour-political summer course in Bommersvik 1956 it was clearly stated in the invitation that participants from areas and workplaces with communist problems was preferred as the course would be focusing on communist-infiltrated workplaces. In March 1958 Rolf Gerhardsen spoke at a course in Sweden and participated at a conference for shop stewards.⁷⁵⁰

Hence, the education work was forthcoming, and included communism regularly. We must remember that courses and exchanges happened at many levels within party, LO and the unions and federation. A complete overview of (anti-communist) course activity has thus not been possible to make. These were the courses that were planned centrally and were a direct result of the party secretaries gathering regularly.

If the courses at Gothenburg and Hindås were followed up, we do not know. Discussions of them and their possible results in the workplaces have not been found in the archives.

⁷⁴⁷ Correspondence on course, May-August 1952 and course programme, 31 August-6 September 1952. AAB 1001, Da, L0053, Danmark. Letter to Swedish party, 5 May 1952. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 07 1952

⁷⁴⁸ Pettersson to Lie, 24 March 1953. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 08 1953

⁷⁴⁹ Report and course material from course at Bommersvik, 21-28 June, 24 July 1953. AAB 2483, Dc, L0003, Sverige (2)

⁷⁵⁰ Nordskog to Norsk Kjemisk Industriarbeiderforbund, 24 May 1956. AAB 1001, Da, L0123, Sverige. Course material, November 1957. ABA 500, 825, 9. Invitation from Arne Pettersson to party districts, 25 April 1956. ARBARK 1889, F15D, 08 1952-56, 1955-56 Kommunisterna (Fackligt). Aspling to Gerhardsen, 28 February 1958. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 11 1956-58

Books

As we know, all Scandinavian SDP's possessed publishing houses, and hence means and opportunity to produce a wide range of propaganda material. They had regular journals, newsletters and pamphlets. There were, in the start- to mid-1950'es still an active exchange of propaganda material and literature. Publications on local problems were exchanged in order to keep workers informed of what was going on in the neighbouring countries, as was the case with a Norwegian publication on problematic unions and workplaces, which was thought to be of use to people in the Danish clubs.⁷⁵¹ Anti-communist material from all Scandinavian countries can be found in archives in Norway, Sweden and Denmark.

The publishing houses also gave access to publishing books on relevant topics, including translated versions of international anti-communist books such as the ICFTU-produced 'Stalin's slave camps'. We have also seen that SDP publishing houses produced books by former Soviet prisoners, and hence were able to reach a much wider audience than those already reading the dailies and journals. These books were, obviously also exchanged.

We remember that at the March 1950 party secretary meeting, the Swedish representatives told of a forthcoming book on Soviet work camps. When it was published, Aspling sent copies to Lie, Carlsson and Leskinen.⁷⁵²

Haakon Lie was a productive author on communism and has written many books on the subject. His neighbouring partisans appreciated them all. Especially popular was his 1954 *De Kommunistiske Dekk-organisasjonene (The Communist Cover Organisations)* and his 1953-54 *Søkelys på Sovjet (Searchlight on the Soviet Union)*. According to Lie, the advantage of the latter as opposed to other books on the Soviet Union, was that it was especially useful for shop stewards and union representatives. Aspling asked for, and got, 200 copies. Leskinen ordered 150 copies. Lars M. Olsen, leader of the Danish social democratic publishing house 'Fremad' was even interested in publishing a Danish version.⁷⁵³

In 1954, the Danish branch of CCF, Selskabet for Frihed og Kultur (The Society for Freedom and Culture) became interested in publishing *Kaderpartiet (The Cadre Party)* by Haakon Lie. Jens Buhl who was active in the Society for Freedom and Culture wrote Haakon Lie who, besides being the writer of the book, was leader of Norwegian CCF. Buhl was himself a social democrat and the son of Vilhelm Buhl, who was PM in the liberation government in

⁷⁵¹ Carlsson to Rolf Gerhardsen, 2 February 1953 and note to Urban Hansen. ABA 500, 801, 1, 6

⁷⁵² Aspling to Carlsson, Leskinen and Lie, 6 April 1951. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 06 1951

⁷⁵³ Correspondence, Lie/Aspling, September 1953. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 08 1953. Correspondance, October 1953. AAB 1001, Da, L0064, Finnland. Correspondance Olsen/Lie, May 1954, AAB 2483, Dd, L0005, Diverse korrespondance 1950-59. ABA 500, 801, 1, 7.

1945 and co-founder of AIC. Jens Buhl was in contact with Urban Hansen and AIC about the publication. Urban Hansen/AIC ended up buying 100 copies of the book.⁷⁵⁴

Inspiration for the books also came from the other Nordic countries: when Lie was in California writing about Norwegian communism with Walter Galenson, he wrote Aspling asking for information on the Wollweber organisation. Wollweber had once had his headquarters in Oslo but was little known in Norway, and Lie wanted to shed some light on the subject. Aspling had Ragnar Lassinantti send Lie some material as he was 'without a doubt' the one who was most familiar with the subject. In the end, Aspling sent a copy of a large article on the Wollweber affair, published in the daily Aftenposten. Lassinantti thought the article to be serious and well founded.⁷⁵⁵

Earlier that year, the Norwegians had published a book containing résumés from meetings in the communist cell at a large industrial plant. Lie sent a copy to Leskinen, Aspling and Carlsson, and informed that more anti-communist publications were on their way. The Danish party obtained one of these (unfortunately we don't know which one) in 10.000 copies.⁷⁵⁶

Lie also sent a novel to Väinö Leskinen about communists in the Northern areas bordering the Soviet Union – Lie and Rolf Gerhardsen both thought that the book should be published in Finnish.⁷⁵⁷

Different anti-communist propaganda material regularly found its way between the Nordic countries throughout the 1950s.⁷⁵⁸

One's own propaganda, by the way, was not the only propaganda being exchanged: in January 1954, Pettersson sent a copy of propaganda material used by Swedish communists to Urban Hansen, to use as he wished.⁷⁵⁹ Communist propaganda in itself could serve as social democratic ditto, when presented in the right way.

⁷⁵⁴ Correspondence Buhl/Lie, October 1954. AAB 1001, Da, L0078, Danmark. *The Cadre Party* was the source of quite some fuss in Norway. Lahlum 2009, pp. 336-339. Correspondance Nordskog/Urban Hansen, January 1955. AAB 1001, Da, L0092, Danmark

⁷⁵⁵ Correspondence Lie/Aspling, November 1951. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 06 1951. Aspling to Lie, 22 January 1952. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 07 1952. Ernst Wollweber was a Soviet-supported resistance fighter with a large Scandinavian network during WWII and continued to haunt anti-Communists in Germany and Norden after the war. Borgersrud 2001.

⁷⁵⁶ Lie to Aspling, Carlsson and Leskinen, 23 January 1953. ABA 500, 801, 1, 7. Carlsson to the Norwegian SDP, 23 April 1953. AAB 1001, Da, L0064, Danmark

⁷⁵⁷ Lie to Leskinen, 20 November 1954. AAB 1001, L0078, Finland

⁷⁵⁸ See for example publications from Denmark in ARBARK 1889, F15D, 08 1952-58, 1955-56 *Kommunisterna* (Fackligt - Danmark)

⁷⁵⁹ Pettersson to Urban Hansen, 14 January 1954. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 09 1954

TRAVELLING

Travelling to Eastern countries was a question frequently discussed within SDP circles, especially as delegations between East and West became more frequent after Stalin's death. Invitations were often extended to labour delegations.

The May 1954 SAMAK labour conference discussed the issue. The Finns had accepted an invitation from the Soviet TUC, whereas Denmark and Norway had rejective attitudes. The Swedes had also received invitations, but would not go if it were against the recommendations of ICFTU. Eiler Jensen thought that it would be.⁷⁶⁰ He promised the others a copy of a Danish LO circular letter, supported by the party, recommending members not to travel eastwards. It was entitled 'Travels to dictatorships' and stated that while everyone was free to go anywhere as a tourist, delegations could only be recommended to go under certain conditions. These were that an official invitation should be extended through the right channels (the relevant federation), that participants be chosen by officials in the Danish labour movement, that delegations could bring their own interpreter and be allowed to go any place they wanted to. Moreover the delegation should be free to comment on any résumé made by the hosting country. Private invitations should not be accepted.⁷⁶¹ These conditions were, considering the nature of the Soviet Union, pretty unrealistic (probably on purpose).

The question came up again at the January 1955 conference, as the Swedish LO had received an invitation for a study delegation. While the Danish and Norwegian LO advised against it in their own countries, no one minded if the Swedes went. Weighing towards this was, that it was a study delegation and not a delegation to participate in a congress. Participation in such could be seen as a blueprint for the organisation holding the congress.

In May 1955 the Norwegian LO told its Scandinavian partners that it had accepted an invitation from the Soviet Union, on the condition that they themselves would decide who should go and bring their own interpreter. They had seemingly adapted the guidelines from the Danish circular letter. A Swedish labour delegation had gone at this point, and LO leader Axel Strand informed that later in the year a delegation of MP's (including himself) would go. Afterwards, the Swedish delegation made a detailed report about the visit, which was sent to the Norwegians.⁷⁶²

⁷⁶⁰ Résumé from labour conference, 8 May 1954. AAB 1579, Dd, L0205, Nordisk samarbeidskomité

⁷⁶¹ Circular letter 5 April 1954, sent to Norway 13 May 1954. AAB 1579, Dd, L0205, Skandinaviske forbindelser, Danmark. Circular letter, 27 April 1954. AAB 1001, L0078, Danmark. Carlsson to Aspling 27 November 1954. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 09 1954

⁷⁶² Résumé of labour conference, 30 January 1955 and 14 May 1955. AAB 1579, Dd, L0205, Nordisk fagl. samarbeid. Letter & report, 12 November 1955. Résumé of nordic labour conference 14 May 1955. AAB 1579, Dd, L0230, Sverige

Travelling to the East Bloc was thus not entirely ruled out after Stalin's death. However, the Scandinavian LO's made sure to have delegations under strict control, and frequently exchanged opinions and experiences on the matter.

When a Soviet fisheries delegation visited Norway in early 1956, two Soviet journalists brought Haakon Lie an invitation to go to the Soviet Union. Lie wrote Sven Aspling and Oluf Carlsson to warn them that they might be in for an invitation of the same sort: '

It was simple to tell them why a secretary in the Norwegian Labour Party did not wish to accept such an invitation. If the communists wanted cooperation with social democrats, they could start by releasing our party friends in Eastern Europe from the prisons.

Carlsson passed the warning on to HC Hansen who was both Prime and Foreign Minister.⁷⁶³ HC Hansen was, himself, on the way to the Soviet Union.

Swedish international secretary Kaj Björk wrote to Carlsson in mid-1956 for a résumé of the visit, as Tage Erlander was next in line to go. Carlsson passed on some of Hansen's general observations and wrote that the Soviets had suggested connections or cooperation between the Danish SDP and the CPSU. HC Hansen had brushed it aside with a remark that he was there as a Prime Minister, not leader of his party.⁷⁶⁴ This was a repetition of Einar Gerhardsen's answer to the same question during his 1955 visit (he was the first of the Scandinavian PM's to go). The answer from Erlander ended up being the same. In 1956, the Norwegian party issued a statement saying that Russian visitors to the SDP were welcome under the same circumstances as everyone else: visits to the party could be paid in opening hours, between 9 and 16 at the party office.⁷⁶⁵

Eiler Jensen, Arne Geijer and organisational secretary Poul Engstad discussed union delegations to East Bloc countries on a 1958 trip to Norrbotten. They agreed on a standard answer to invitations: as members of ICFTU, they could only do exchanges with other member countries. However, everyone was free to go as tourists, and they did, the LO's were willing to be at their disposal with information and advice.⁷⁶⁶ This standpoint was repeated at a labour

⁷⁶³ Lie to Aspling and Carlsson 3 April 1956 and Carlsson to HC Hansen, 5 April 1956. ABA 500, 801, 1, 7

⁷⁶⁴ Correspondence Kaj Björk/Carlsson, June 1956. ABA 500, 826, 1

⁷⁶⁵ Gerhardsen did bring an invitation home for the party to consider - which was flatly turned down. He wouldn't have minded himself. Lie 1975, pp. 113-116. Gerharden 1972, pp. 69ff.

⁷⁶⁶ Eiler Jensen to Swedish LO, 27 June 1958 and circular letter from Norwegian LO, 30 June 1958. AAB 1579, Dd, L0315, Nordisk fagl. samarbeid

conference in September 1960 – however, it was at the same time acknowledged that not all organisations were adhering to these guidelines.⁷⁶⁷

The issue of traveling continued to worry the LO leaders, as was the case at a 1959 conference where they discussed youth delegations and exchanges. The East European countries had attractive festivals, which could lure some of the easily influenced youth. Such travels were tempting in a time when only the most privileged went abroad, and it was a continuing source of concern that invitations flowed in from the east. The LO leaders discussed arranging travels to democratic countries for the Nordic youth as an alternative and agreed on taking it up with the parties.⁷⁶⁸ At least in Denmark, this idea was later followed up with the NATO travels, where delegations went to West European countries to be educated about the Cold War.⁷⁶⁹

In 1960, the Danish LO repeated its 1954 guidelines advising against travels, unless an official invitation was received and the delegates were appointed by the official labour system. The same series of demands, such as own interpreter and freedom of movement during the trip should be fulfilled.⁷⁷⁰

As for delegations to Yugoslavia, in 1955 Denmark sought advice and experience from Norway.⁷⁷¹ The Norwegian party were the ones with the primary contacts to the Yugoslavian CP (which they had had since Tito's break with Stalin in 1948, see page 147). The downsides were obvious; Yugoslavia was not a democracy, which created some limits to conversation and a risk of weakening the fight against dictatorship and the internal Yugoslav opposition. And obviously there was the risk of giving the party a bad name by cooperating with communists. However, at least to the Norwegians, the upsides outweighed the downsides: some Yugoslavs were possible to talk to, and wanted to learn. Furthermore, they had extensive knowledge about the Soviet Union, its leaders and the communist world. Also, Scandinavia was a good example of democratic socialism and there had been examples of Yugoslavs promoting Scandinavia to Soviet leaders. Haakon Lie thought they could have a positive

⁷⁶⁷ Resumé of labour conference, 12-13 September 1960 by Alfred Skar. AAB 1579, Dd, L0372, Nordisk fagl. samarbeid

⁷⁶⁸ Resumé of labour conference, 21-22 March 1959. AAB 1579, Dd, L0343, Nordisk fagl. samarbeid

⁷⁶⁹ Bjørnsson 2012, pp. 222ff.

⁷⁷⁰ Circular letter 24/1960, 25 May 1960. AAB 1579, Dd, L0372, Danmark

⁷⁷¹ Carlsson to Lie and Kaj Björk, 9 May 1955. ABA 500, 825, 7, Lie to Carlsson, 10 August 1955. AAB 1001, Da, L0092, Danmark

influence on developments in the Soviet Union. The purpose of the interaction was to get the Yugoslavian labour movement to join the Western side.⁷⁷²

It was not uncommon for the Norwegians to share information about their contacts with the Yugoslavs (on the condition that it wasn't published).⁷⁷³

The correspondence of the secretaries was also of benefit to the PM's when going on state visits. This was the case when Einar Gerhardsen went to visit Tito in late 1958. Lie wrote Carlsson to ask what HC Hansen had talked to Tito about on his recent visit, especially in regards to human rights. Hence, Gerhardsen could come more prepared.⁷⁷⁴

The traveling issue was a delicate balancing act for the Nordic countries. Promoting dialogue and international cooperation, state leaders and political delegations could hardly shut off interaction. But at the same time, those state leaders belonged to movements, which were staunchly anti-communist, and this attitude took the front when it came to the labour movement and union delegations. The worst thing that could happen was that some union representative came home all excited about the Soviet Union.

The Scandinavian leaders expressed it well, in their answer to the CPSU: state visits was one thing, party/union visits another. It is a neat illustration of the balance between international and domestic security politics.

1950-54: IN CONCLUSION

This period represents the heyday of Nordic anti-communism and anti-communist cooperation. The CP's were on the decline, but still considered a threat, both in the labour movement and to national security.

It is a period in which effects of securitisation were manifest: we see a steep rise in intelligence-related information being exchanged at the party secretary meetings, culminating with the very presence of an intelligence officer. We see SDP representatives sharing information that can only be described as military secrets and we see government representatives and ministers involved in covert party affairs.

⁷⁷² 'Utviklingen etter 20. Kongress i Russlands Kommunistiske Parti'. ABA 500, 329, 2. Résumé from labour meeting, 30 January 1955. AAB 1579, Dd, L0205, Nordisk fagl. Samarbeid. For Lie's reasoning and his experience with Yugoslavia, see Lie 1975, pp. 121ff. See also Gerhardsen 1972, pp. 320-324, Lahlum 2009, pp 330-332.

⁷⁷³ Lie to Carlsson, 26 November 1957. AAB 1001, Da, L0130, Danmark

⁷⁷⁴ Correspondance, Lie/Carlsson, September 1958. ABA 500, 801, 1, 7

But we also see differences in the countries. While the Norwegians and Finns seemingly had no limit for what they brought to the table, the Swedes, especially after having discussed it at SAMAK seemed to stick to party information. Denmark lay somewhere in the middle: while sharing information, which in the eyes of this author has to have been obtained from security services, there were seemingly no actual military secrets. That we know of; an unfortunate side effect of the résumés being written by Danes is that the Danish reports are seldom referenced in full. In some instances, like the Danish November 1950 report, or the presence of Asbjørn Bryhn, we can establish a connection to the security police. At other times we have to judge ourselves, whether or not the information is likely to have been collected by the party network or some other apparatus. At any rate, it is safe to say that all the countries' representatives did, from time to time, present information that had a character of being from a state security agency (although not the Swedes after 1952). However, nobody topped the Finns in this category (except, perhaps, the occasional German). Their information was by far the most sensitive and secretive. The Finnish information would be of interest, not just to the other Nordic SDP's but also to the secret services. Finland was (with good reason) feared to be a stepping-stone for Soviet intelligence and in worst case, military operations, in Norden. There was already cooperation between the Finnish and Scandinavian security services, but the social democratic cooperation seems to have functioned as an additional channel of information.⁷⁷⁵ Whether or not the party secretaries shared the Finnish information with their own national security services, we don't know.

The differences might have been due to the culture in each country, or they might have been due to the nature of contacts and sources for each party. Perhaps the Danes or Swedes did not have the same kind of access to military information as the Finns or Norwegians. We know that both Danes and Swedes had intelligence contacts; but the extent and nature of them might have been different.

Another reason for the difference could be simple geography; neither Danes nor Swedes shared a land border with the Soviet Union, and the intelligence from both Norway and Finland often concerned the border areas.

However, Norway and Finland lay on each side of the spectrum when it came to mixing state intelligence and party business. While the Norwegians were perhaps most integrated at this point, bringing ministers and intelligence officials to party secretary gatherings and having Lie and Gerhardsen (none of them officially involved in government) involved in major

⁷⁷⁵ Schmidt, Regin, and Nicoline Nyholm Miller. *PET's virkemidler. Internationalt samarbejde, kildeføring, aflytning, mv. PET-kommissionens beretning, bind 4*. København: Justitsministeriet, 2009, p. 31

decisions and development on intelligence, what about Finland then? Not being in government in a social democratic state didn't seem to affect them too badly, when it came to collecting information about the communists. We need to remember that social democrats still participated in government coalitions from time to time, but perhaps more importantly, that they had established the new security service in 1948. Though not dominating government throughout the Cold War, they were there long enough to leave their mark on one of the most important aspects of national security – and from the looks of it, they might have made sure to install some friends in the security police they build. And as mentioned before – it only takes one connection to establish a channel of information. But the Finnish had problems from not being dominating; mainly that they were not able to act the way they would have wanted to. Time and again, we see them complain about decisions involving communists and the Soviet Union. They were well informed – but not able to use this information, or their contacts in the same way as the Norwegians.

The theory of Hedin, that times of uncertainty causes the network to tighten and demands ideological conformity applies in full to this period. The social democratic oligarchy demanded strict discipline and the time was not to question the guidelines or even need for combatting communism. Among the unions and clubs, we see a rigid focus on tactics, planning and most of all control; control over who were elected (and even suggested) as shop stewards; control over the course of a meeting or assembly down to the very last detail; control over who did what and when. The Gothenburg and Hindås courses illustrate this very clearly. The participants (whom one must assume was chosen from loyal partisans) were not the ones to question it; instead they were deeply involved with it and expected and willing to enforce it. They shared their leaders' worldview and did their bit not only to control and discipline communism but also to an equal degree to control and discipline their own ranks.

Among the effects of securitisation was also mobilisation: the engagement of party and seemingly private groups in waging the Cold War. Mobilisation – or *total Cold War* meant that national security was not a concern for diplomacy, military and security services alone – take the unloading of NATO material in Danish and Norwegian harbours as an example: it was basically a military/state issue, but in order to secure the unloading, one needed trustworthy labourers. Technically, it might have been solved by presence of police and specially hired people, but then there was the possibility of angering one's own unions by hiring non-organised labour. Involving the labour movement was by far the easiest and most obvious option.

The labour movement had been incorporated as a responsible part of society; they secured salary negotiations, and stable production. By the mechanisms of corporatism they had become part of the elite, far from a protest movement. It seems only natural that they would be trusted with the task of securing the shipments of NATO material or guarding important industrial sites in a crisis. In the self-image of the social democratic LO's, they were as much a part of building society as was the political establishment – and this image, was supported by their 'siamese twins' – who happened to be governing parties as well. Even when they were not (Denmark had a liberal-conservative government in 1950-1953), centre/right wing governments knew that the labour movement was too large and too important to ignore. Party, movement and state in Scandinavia acted within one network.

Cooperation between Nordic SDP's extended far beyond party secretary gatherings. Friendships were formed and the network utilised. Whenever someone needed information, or wanted to inform someone in their brother parties, they were only a letter away. The common problems secured good use of common experiences, propaganda material, and even schooling. Educating, agitating and organising was not just done domestically – this, as well as security, transcended borders.

17. 1955-59: CHANGES

1955: BUSINESS AS USUAL

The first party secretary conference of 1955 took place 23–24 March in Saltsjöbaden, Stockholm. The Swedes originally wanted to repeat the skiing success, but for practical reasons they stayed in the Stockholm area.

As usual, Oluf Carlsson, Sven Aspling, Veiko Puskala and Haakon Lie were the main organisers. The other participants were Frank Christiansen, Rolf Gerhardsen and Arne Pettersson. Urban Hansen was planned to participate, but it is not clear whether he did. Once again, Stefan Thomas came from Germany (Aspling's initiative) and Jon Sigurdsson, former leader of Althydusamband from Iceland (Haakon Lie and Rolf Gerhardsen's initiative – remember that Rolf Gerhardsen had been in Iceland and participated in the SDP congress in September 1954).⁷⁷⁶ It was the first time an Icelandic representative participated.

While extended with representatives from both Germany and Iceland, it does seem that this time, there were no representatives from outside the party circle. No government representatives, employers or leaders of intelligence bureaus.

Frank Christiansen has written the résumé, which, once again, gives us only Oluf Carlsson's fragmented notes as a source for the Danish contribution. We also have Finnish written reports for the meeting.

Afterwards Oluf Carlsson showed the résumé to a small circle of Danish MP's who was or had been involved in AIC. He referred to the meeting as a 'confidential conference'.⁷⁷⁷

The Danish contribution at this meeting might not have been overwhelming at any rate. It seems that the participants had taken a logical step: as communist problems were declining in Scandinavia, focus lay on the 'troublesome' countries: Germany, Finland and Iceland.

Communist organisation and tactics

The Finnish CP had recently (2-5 October 1954) had their X (10th) Congress, and the Finnish SDP had compiled a report summarising it, including a list of names of the FKP central committee after the congress, substitutes, members of the control committee and the cadre

⁷⁷⁶ Correspondence ahead of conference, January-February 1955. ABA 500, 825, 7 and February-March AAB 1001, Da, L0107, Sverige and ARBARK 1889, E2B, 10 1955

⁷⁷⁷ Note by Oluf Carlsson, 5 April 1955. ABA 500, 515, 5

section. The list also gives details on birth dates, jobs, education (including schooling in the Soviet Union) and posts within front- or other organisations.⁷⁷⁸ At this point, Väinö Leskinen was Minister of the Interior, which gave him access to whatever the security police might have found out; however, we need to remember that the Finnish SDP had also been capable of obtaining such information before he got the post (which he held from May 1954 to September 1955).

The Finnish communists were represented in parliament by the SKDL whose youth organisation was the democratic Youth League of Finland (SDNL, a member of the WFDY). Finnish communists were active in SDNL, and the Finns gave an overview of the organisation and people in it, including their relation to the FKP. It was written by '... a person who has been a member all the way and continues to hold a very prominent position in the league's activities'.⁷⁷⁹ The communists were aware of leakages. According to the SDP, they gave only limited written instructions for partisans and were now mostly given face-to-face in Helsinki or by courier.⁷⁸⁰

Iceland was in a sorry state, according to Sigurdsson: there had not been any real social democratic agitation or information work within the labour movement, but they wanted to start it up. He summarised the Icelandic troubles, which was if anything, a horrific example of how bad things could get in the absence of a well-functioning SDP organisation. The CP paper had twice the circulation of the social democratic (7.000 to 3-4.000).

In Norway, communist political strength was down to 7-8.000 party members, 3.000 youth league members and 3 MP's. Pettersson stated that in Sweden, communism was only a problem in larger cities and the youth league was practically non-existent. However, the Swedes also gave an example that supported the belief that inactivity was dangerous. The SDP's, as we know, thought that relaxing the battle, even for a moment, would lead to renewed communist takeovers. And now it had: the general number of voters in union elections had gone down, leading to one less social democratic controlled union. Troubles were biggest among metal workers where the social democrats had even lost the collective membership of some union branches. Even if one did not seem to have major communist problems, one needed to be on ones toes! Pettersson gave the name of an officially non-communist person to watch out for; he was involved with Marxist circles.

⁷⁷⁸ 'Medlemssammansättningen i Kommunistiska Partiets Contralkomit  sedan den X partikongressen 1954.' ABA 500, 515, 5

⁷⁷⁹ 'En person som hela tiden varit medlem och som forts ttningsvis innehar en mycket framst ende position inom f rbundets verksamhet.' 'Utvecklingen inom ungdomsf rbundet (SDNL).' ABA 500, 515, 5, also ARBARK 1889, F15D, 08 1952-58, 1954-56 Kommunisterna (Finland)

⁷⁸⁰ 'FKP:s X kongress och dess betydelse'. ABA 500, 515, 5

Propaganda themes

The communist 'charm offensive' continued, and had spread to all of Norden, even Norway (where, however, it had not been a success). In Sweden, the communists had, once again only had their own 1 May-demonstrations in Stockholm. But in no place was the campaign as strong as in Finland. It wasn't just in the workplaces but also at political level. Local communist efforts were backed by an increased interest from the Soviet Union to improve the relations to the social democrats. The Soviet Union had started a regular friendship offensive, especially directed at the Finnish SDP (we remember from the PM's visits that the Soviet Union also courted Scandinavian SDP's, see page 201). It had intensified after Leskinen had visited the Soviet Union in 1954 as leader of a sports delegation. According to Puskala, Leskinen's statements on the trip had been distorted in an overly friendly direction, leading to a Soviet diplomat in Helsinki suggesting even closer cooperation and statements of support by the social democrats towards the Soviet Union. More social democrats had been encouraged to visit the Soviet Union, but without much luck: party leader Skog had declined. However, many Finns, also social democrats had taken up the offer of friendship. According to Puskala, many feared the consequences of doing otherwise.

The Finns had gotten their hands on a résumé of a meeting in the FKP executive district secretary committee that laid out the unity tactics. Social democratic leaders should be met with a flexible attitude, in spite of political disagreements. Areas of possible cooperation should be sought. Social democratic workers should not be encouraged to leave the party, rather they should be encouraged to join in the common battle and mistrust the old 'junta'. If a social democrat in a key position had been convinced to cooperate, communists were to lay low to not alert the social democratic 'rightist leadership' who would surely put a stop to the cooperation. Members should encourage partisans to support social democrats working for the unity line. The FKP thought that many social democrats, especially young people, secretly wanted to cooperate.⁷⁸¹ Such direct insight into communist planning gave the social democrats a head start – and confirmed their suspicions about the communist charm offensive.

In Germany, the friendliness had taken form of a 'letter campaign' towards social democrats, to widen contacts. This had now resulted in criticism of the SDP from the right wing. A communist publication stated that Ulbricht had met with 160 social democrats, something, which Thomas considered to be a lie. The worst part of the friendly tone from the communists was that the SDP had trouble convincing their members not to cooperate with

⁷⁸¹ 'P.M. Om verksamheten i massorganisationerna och på arbetsplatserne'. ABA 500, 515, 5

them. As much as 60% of attendees at a communist course, had been non-communists. Thomas stated that all communist activity in West Germany was directed from East Germany.

The communists also still followed familiar propaganda themes. In Norway, they campaigned against German re-armament and price increases, which were 'safe' areas where they didn't have to discuss Soviet policy. Cover organisations had been relatively quiet, but two persons prepared and agitated for an upcoming festival. In Denmark, they campaigned against nuclear war.⁷⁸² In Finland and Sweden, peace campaigning was pushed a little harder; in both countries, communists were gathering signatures and advertising an upcoming peace conference in Helsinki. In Finland, campaigning against German rearmament was especially harsh, and underlined the increased threat against Finland by way of its pact with the Soviet Union. According to the Finnish SDP the communists had strengthened their grip on the front- and cover organisations, including the SKDL, where they had placed leaders educated at the Sirola institute. West Germany also had a number of 'cultural' groups, which were believed to be communists but acted neutral.

Common conclusions were that the communists seemed to have stabilised their position and that their work was primarily focused on the workplaces.⁷⁸³

We still see a relatively consistent line of communist propaganda all over Norden, with an eye for local differences. This surely confirmed that communist policy was directed from the Cominform/Soviet Union.

SDP propaganda

According to the Norwegian representatives, Lie's book 'The Cadre Party' had had a big effect in Norway. This time they brought a number of their 'Argument collections' with them.⁷⁸⁴ They were short reports on different questions regarding the Soviet Union and world politics, designed to counter communist statements. The Norwegians had an extensive collection of arguments in all kinds of different areas, which they frequently circulated among their Nordic colleagues. Topics could include military issues (who started the arms race, communist plans for the national defence, the military power of the communist states, nuclear energy, arms control) unequal economic growth in Soviet society (national resources, heavy

⁷⁸² Carlsson's notes, 23-24 March 1955. ABA 500, 514, 11

⁷⁸³ 'Stockholm 23. og 24. marts 1955.' ABA 500, 515, 5

⁷⁸⁴ Lie to Aspling, 4 March 1955. AAB 1001, Da, L0107, Sverige. Carlssons notes, 23-24 March 1955. ABA 500, 514, 11

industry, farming) living standards in the Soviet Union (housing, food, clothing, prices, taxes) labour unions in the communist countries, 'the fake democracy', 'the politics of broken promises', and the inconsequent communist policy in Norway.⁷⁸⁵ Separate reports include topics as 'World revolution or co-existence', the Soviet use of veto's in UN and West German rearmament.⁷⁸⁶ With these collections, social democrats were equipped for almost any discussion with the communists. While the Nordic partisans could not always use argument collections on Norwegian issues, they benefitted from the wide range of knowledge on international and Soviet issues.

Eastern connections & finances

The Soviet charm offensive was not only visible through a hitherto unseen will to cooperate with social democrats, but also in a rise in delegations to and from all Nordic countries. 11 Norwegian delegations had been in the Soviet Union in the last six months of 1954. Also in Sweden and Iceland, delegations were on the rise and they were mostly among artists. In Finland the number of delegations to the Soviet Union in 1954 had been larger than the whole period 1945-53, and the first tourists since the war had visited Leningrad. Moreover, every Finnish social democrat applying for a visa had been granted one. The Scandinavian PM's visits were part of this trend, even if they rejected SDP-CPSU cooperation.

Stefan Thomas gave an overview of different types of East-West German exchange. There were regular delegations exchanges, courses and holiday invitations to children. When going on trips in the East, West Germans were treated like royalty to give them a good impression. According to Thomas, the communists had spent 46 million marks on delegation travels in 1954. The SDP were now preparing a massive information campaign to encourage partisans not to participate in or receive delegations. Also Denmark wanted countermoves to the delegation wave, but what they had in mind is not clear.

Communist finances weren't a big issue at this meeting, with the exception of Iceland: Jon Sigurdsson stated that the communists had a lot of money at their disposal and guessed that much of it came from the Soviet Union, but was covered by fundraisers. The communists

⁷⁸⁵ Argumentsamling mot kommunistene. ABA 500, 515, 5. Also in ARBARK 1889 F15D, 06 1950-55, 1951-55 Kommunister (med finske kommunister)

⁷⁸⁶ 'Verdensrevolution eller co-eksistens', 'Sovjetunionens anvendelse af vetoretten', 'Vesttysklands genbevæbning'. ABA 500, 515, 5

owned several estates and made money by wholesale trade and trade with the Eastern countries.

Infiltration and espionage

Norway, Sweden and Finland had all had spy cases in the last year, but none of them had really affected the communists. The Sunde case in Norway had only been a minor defeat for the communists. A Swedish spy case had not had any direct connections to SKP and had, according to the SDP been blown out of proportions in the press. Finland had had a couple of spy cases in the border areas. But even here, it was not too serious, and seemed to have been the result of individuals acting on their own initiative.⁷⁸⁷ We know that people who spied for the Soviet Union, even if communist, were seldom party members or publicly outspoken on their political views. This might be a reason that the spy cases were not really connected to communism in the public and thus didn't hit the parties that hard.

Puskala told of a Finn who had lived as both a prisoner and a free man in the Soviet Union. He had written a lengthy report on conditions in Soviet prisons and slave camps, partly based on his own experiences, partly on interviews. Three copies of the report existed, and the security police had confiscated them all. Some criticised the man for fear that it would damage the relationship to the Soviet Union. Others worked to have the report released, alternatively printed in 200 copies 'for internal use', as it contained much new information. At the moment the case was being looked over by the Chancellor of Justice.

Stefan Thomas told of a communist infiltration plot, with the goal of exposing social democrats in East Germany. Since the SDP was banned there, East German social democrats turned to West German partisans. Now communist agents presented themselves as West German social democrats, luring 'democratically minded' East German workers to confide in them. This, obviously, could have 'unpleasant consequences'. The West Germans had therefore warned East German workers through radio and leaflets to not approach West Germans posing as social democrats: they could turn out to be communist agents.

Communists had also tried infiltrating the SDP in West Germany, but without luck.⁷⁸⁸

⁷⁸⁷ 'Stockholm 23. og 24. marts 1955.' ABA 500, 515, 5. Carlssons notes, 23-24 March 1955. ABA 500, 514, 11. 'Kommunisternas verksamhet under perioden maj 1954 - februari 1955. ABA 500, 515, 5. The reports can also be found in the Swedish archives.

⁷⁸⁸ 'Stockholm 23. og 24. marts 1955.' ABA 500, 515, 5. Carlsson's notes, 23-24 March 1955. ABA 500, 514, 11

Trends and other issues

This meeting was a little more 'low key' than some of the previous. There were, as mentioned above, no government officials, no state intelligence representatives and no employers, only party officials. In a sense, focus was directed 'back to the roots' of the social democrat struggle, namely communist activities in workplaces and civil organisations. Even the Finns did not bring as extraordinary information as they had done previously. That did not mean, however that they didn't had access to inside sources – but this time, the sources told of communist tactics, not military issues.

It could be due to a wish to return to the 'original' communist fighting and focus on the places in which the social democrats had the most routine. It could also be due to the secret services now being 'up and running' in all the Nordic countries so that social democratic involvement was no longer deemed as necessary. The spy cases showed that the security services were doing their job. Or it could be that the communists were not viewed as that big of a threat anymore (which would also be related to the security services being up and running). Finally, it could be due to the Icelandic presence: never mind intelligence, the Icelandic SDP had huge problems just holding their ground in the labour movement, and needed the information and experience of the others in this particular field.

At any rate, it seems that the overall sense of urgency created by securitisation in the late 1940s and early 1950s had relaxed a bit.

Even if we lack details of the Danish contribution, we have contemporary reports from the Danish SDP to their Nordic colleagues that, whether presented on a meeting or sent in between, give us an idea of the kind of information the Danish party brought to the table. The Danes generously shared the AIC statistics of the strength division in the unions in Copenhagen and Denmark's next largest city, Aarhus. The sharing of these statistics and other AIC reports were routine. In 1956, Urban Hansen sent the 1955 AIC report to Aspling including the statistics on division of power in the Copenhagen unions. Hansen asked for similar material for Sweden if such was available. The statistics, which AIC shared with their Nordic partisans were the ones with the full names of communists and non-partisans.⁷⁸⁹

⁷⁸⁹ 'Statistisk for Århus. Partistillingen i fællesorganisationen pr. 30/12-54, AIC-statistics, June 1955. ARBARK 1889, F15D, 08 1952-58, 1955-56 Kommunistera (Fackligt - Danmark). Statistics for Copenhagen, ultimo 1954. ARBARK 1889, F15D, 06 1950-55, 1951-55 Kommunister (med finske kommunister). Letter and report from Urban Hansen to Aspling, 20 February 1956. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 11 1956-58

There doesn't seem to have been a second conference in 1955. This might be the reason that Väinö Leskinen expressed the wish to have a private gathering with the other party secretaries at the end of the year, when they were all in Stockholm for the November SAMAK meeting.⁷⁹⁰ The lack of a second conference might also be an expression of communism being less of a problem in Scandinavia. In that case, it seems only logical that a Finn was the one to express the wish for one.

1955 was, however, the year in which it was once again discussed to have a 'secretary meeting' in a broader European context. On 29 January, Hans Hedtoft died, and at his funeral, German partisan and organisation secretary, Max Kukil discussed with Oluf Carlsson the possibility of having conferences on organisation in the big cities (which would almost certainly have to do with communism, as these were the problem of the big cities). He imagined conferences with the Scandilux-countries, as well as an expert conference in connection with ICFTU meetings. In Scandinavia, the inclination was to think that there was no need for both a regional and expert conference.⁷⁹¹ They might have been satisfied with what they already had.

The Scandinavians did, however, lend a helping hand internationally, with their skills in countering communism; a 1955 anti-communist ICFTU seminar in France was led by Norwegian John Sanness and had a very strong Scandinavian presence, with Scandinavian speakers on economic conditions in the Soviet Union, and counterpropaganda.⁷⁹²

In the absence of another party secretary meeting, some issues were discussed via mail: in 1955, the communists started a new campaign, the 'Vienna appeal' (against preparation for nuclear war). The Swedish SDP discussed whether, and to what extent, the campaign should be countered. International secretary Kaj Björk wrote Oluf Carlsson and Haakon Lie asking whether the Danish and Norwegian parties had made resolutions on the nuclear question. After consulting Frank Christiansen, Carlsson answered that the Vienna appeal hadn't really been promoted in Denmark. Thus, the Danish party had made no resolution to counter it. The Norwegian party however, had made a statement about 'Nuclear power for peace', which

⁷⁹⁰ Leskinen to Aspling, 28 October 1955. ARBARK 1213, A1, 8, Nordiska Samarbétsskommittén 1954-56. Aspling to Carlsson and Lie, 7 November 1955. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 10 1955

⁷⁹¹ Carlsson to Aspling and Lie, 17 February 1955. AAB 2483, Dc, L0008, 1955. Lie to Fritz Heine, 25 April 1955. AAB 2483, Dc, L0008, 1955

⁷⁹² Correspondence on course, January 1955. AAB 1001, Da, L0107, Sverige and ARBARK 1889, E2B, 10 1955

Haakon Lie thought was far more than just a counter to the Vienna-campaign, as it also contained positive elements about democracy and higher living standards. The Norwegian party wanted to push the statement in the workplaces as a countermove to the Vienna appeal. Lie obviously shared its content with his Scandinavian colleagues.⁷⁹³

Exchange of named persons was still in place in the mid-1950'es. In January 1955, Haakon Lie was in touch with Aspling and Carlsson about several named persons.⁷⁹⁴

Iceland revisited

The Icelandic presence at the party secretary meeting was followed up: in November 1955, Lie wrote Carlsson and Aspling about a course in 'practical party work' for Icelanders. Aspling was doubtful, as communists might use it to give social democrats a bad name – it might even be misunderstood by social democrats. He preferred for someone to go to Iceland and get an overview of what was happening. Carlsson informed Lie that there did already exist Danish LO plans of having two Icelanders come to Denmark for schooling.⁷⁹⁵ Meanwhile, Lie and Gerhardsen were busy making plans, resulting in a compromise between theirs and Aspling's views: the Nordic party secretaries should go to Iceland and train partisans there. The idea had been presented to the relevant quarters in Iceland, who gladly accepted. Oluf Carlsson, Rolf Gerhardsen and Lie would be going (Aspling declined as the Swedish party faced a congress and an election). The plan was for 30-40 Icelanders to participate.⁷⁹⁶

The British Oslo embassy (who was encouraging contacts between the Icelandic social democratic labour movement and their Scandinavian partisans) was kept updated and reported in late February 1956 that Lie ('the actively anti-communist Secretary of the Labour party') and Rolf Gerhardsen would go to Iceland in April. Among other things, they would select two Icelanders to attend a trade union course in Norway in September. Preferably they would stay

⁷⁹³ Correspondence, Björk/Carlsson, May 1955. ABA 500, 825, 7. Lie to Aspling and Carlsson, 14 May 1955. AAB 1001, Da, L0092, Danmark, correspondence Lie/Kaj Björk, 5 and 12 May 1955. AAB 1001, Da, L0107, Sverige

⁷⁹⁴ Lie to Aspling and Carlsson 15 Januar 1955. AAB 1001, Da, L002, Danmark

⁷⁹⁵ Correspondence Lie/Aspling/Carlsson, November-December 1955 Lie to Carlsson and Aspling, 28 November 1955. ABA 500, 856, 3. See also correspondance, November-December 1955. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 10 1955.

⁷⁹⁶ Correspondance, Carlsson/Aspling, April 1956. ABA 500, 826, 1. Gudmundsson and Gisslasson, 4 January 1956. Lie to Carlsson, 18 January 1956. ABA 500, 856, 3. Rolf Gerhardsen to Aspling 8 March 1956. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 11 1956-58

in Norway for two months before the course so they could learn 'the background and the language'.⁷⁹⁷

The plans of a Nordic party secretary trip fell through at the last moment. Rolf Gerhardsen learned that Norway had become unpopular, since news of the visit had been leaked to a British newspaper that had called Lie to enquire about the purpose of it. The Swedish and Icelandic communist press raged against it: in Iceland it stated that Norway was responsible for the 'occupation' of Iceland (the Keflavik base) as they were the ones who had dragged Iceland into NATO. This was made worse by a rumour that the US considered asking Norway to intervene on the issue of the Keflavik air base. Rolf Gerhardsen and Haakon Lie thought that under these circumstances, the visit would attract too much attention and agreed to postpone it. Haraldur Gudmundsson agreed. He was afraid that a visit by Danish and Norwegian secretaries could potentially hurt the Icelandic SDP. Lie still thought the other Scandinavian countries should pursue 'educating' Icelandic labour and wanted Carlsson to go alone to 'gather information' for the Swedish and Norwegian parties. However, Carlsson thought that even if information was always desired, the original purpose of the trip – an organisation course – had ceased, and he cancelled his trip as well.⁷⁹⁸

1956: UPHEAVAL

1956 was an eventful year for the communists and the social democrats that followed them closely. In February, the CPSU had its XX (20th) congress, where Khrushchev made his famous 'secret speech' denouncing Stalin policies and Stalinist cult. In November, the Soviet Union moved in to crush the reform movement in Hungary, at the same time crushing any positive attitudes towards the Soviet Union.

In 1956, the party secretaries met in June in Helsinki. Participants were Frank Christiansen (Denmark) Haakon Lie and Rolf Gerhardsen (Norway) Arne Pettersson, and possibly Sven Aspling (Sweden). The Finns enquired about German and Icelandic guests but at

⁷⁹⁷ Oslo to Given, Northern, 27 February 1956. PRO, FO 371/122540: Gives further information about Norwegian interest in Iceland

⁷⁹⁸ Letter from Rolf Gerhardsen to Carlsson, 17 April 1956. ABA 500, 856, 3. Cullis to Rennie, IRD, 23 May 1956. PRO, FO 371/122071: Reports on discussions with the Norwegians about the troubled situation in Iceland

least Haakon Lie did not consider this necessary.⁷⁹⁹ Unfortunately no résumé has been found, but from the planning and prepared reports we get an idea of the agenda. Besides the usual topics, the XX congress was a major point of interest.

The XX CPSU congress

In advance of the meeting, a text by Haakon Lie was sent out: an 87-page analysis of the CPSU XX congress, its political consequences and Soviet ideology. Headlines were: collective leadership and foreign policy, the new theses (including quite a lot on peaceful co-existence and new forms of transitioning to communism), the signal for a new offensive, contesting Stalin and Stalinism and transition to the enlightened dictatorship.⁸⁰⁰ One must assume that his lengthy analysis served as a starting point for further discussion of the congress' influence on Soviet and international communism.

Lie's knowledge of international communism and the situation after the XX congress made him a sought-after man. He was engaged to make a speech about it at a Socialist International conference in Zürich in the spring of 1956. Having been absent, Puskala was very grateful to receive a copy of the speech.⁸⁰¹ Besides his 87-page text and a shorter one for SAMAK, Haakon Lie also produced a brochure on the events. Alsing Andersen thought it could be used in Denmark and Lie also thought it to be useful in Finland – if necessary it could be sent out without the name of the author.⁸⁰²

Strikes

Other events marked the first half of 1956: large strikes in Denmark and Finland, in which the communists assumed a central role. The Danes and Finns were asked to give an overview of the spring 1956 strikes at the party secretary conference.⁸⁰³ In Denmark, the communists had tried to make as much of the strikes as they possibly could, including forming a 'General Staff of the Situation' to direct the strikes. The strikes had been legal, but the SDP

⁷⁹⁹ Planning of party secretary meeting, spring 1956, AAB 1001, Da, L0112, Danmark and L0113, Finland, same, May-June 1956. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 11 1956-58

⁸⁰⁰ 'Den 20. kongress i Russlands Kommunistiske Parti' by Haakon Lie, 1956. ABA 522, 16, AIC. SUKP's 20. kongres ...

⁸⁰¹ Correspondence Lie/Puskala, April 1956. AAB 1001, Da, L0113, Finland

⁸⁰² Correspondence, Alsing Andersen/Lie, 24-25 April 1956. AAB 1001, Da, L0112, Danmark. Lie to Puskala, 25 April 1956. AAB 1001, Da, L0113, Finland

⁸⁰³ Lie to Leskinen, 24 May, 1956. AAB 1001, Da, L0113, Finland

and LO had been suspicious of every communist move, and the Danish report states that they were busy using the strikes to do their usual splitting work. The strikes ended by government and parliament elevating the draft settlement to law, thus avoiding a union vote. The communists had obviously supported a 'no' vote.⁸⁰⁴

As for the Finnish strikes, a report about them stated that they had been a success for SAK in taking a stand against the right wing/centre government. However, it had also been a success for the communists 'united front' tactics. But the author chose to look at the bright side, stressing that the communists had been forced to acknowledge SAK tactics and consequently there had been some division within communist ranks.⁸⁰⁵ From these reports, we can assume that the strikes were also discussed at the meeting, presumably with a weight on communist behaviour.

Finnish reporting

Ahead of the meeting, Leskinen announced that the Finns would be contributing with 'some special information'.⁸⁰⁶ This came in the form of a report titled 'Soviet-Russian spy organisations, their subordinate centrals abroad and the Soviet-Russian spy activity in Finland'.

The report started with the history of Soviet espionage. It went on to treat the means and goals for foreign espionage (information on foreign policy, political and economic developments, keeping in contact with agents and increasing the agent net), and how spies worked from embassies and legations: they sent ciphered texts back to Moscow, often without the other staff or the ambassador knowing their real job. Furthermore, they built organisations for intelligence and illegal activities during wartime. The report went on to describe how and where agents were recruited and how KGB and GRU worked.

A section on Soviet operations in Finland, was partly extracted from what was published in newspapers and partly what had been 'obtained in various ways'. It told of Soviet communication with agents and recruitment along the Finnish border. A spy case was described in some detail including the recruitment and education of a Finnish spy, and the following operations. Many spies were recruited from border regions and prisoners in the Soviet Union. Stationed officers becoming friendly with the local population often did recruitment in the border areas. The object was then invited across the border for drinking and food.

⁸⁰⁴ ARBARK 1889, F15D, 08 1952-58, 1955-56 Kommunisterna (Fackligt - Danmark)

⁸⁰⁵ 'Storstrejken', ABA 500, 807, 2

⁸⁰⁶ Correspondance on meeting, May-June 1956. ABA 500, 807, 2

The purpose of espionage in the border areas was to find out about how much Finnish border personnel was stationed there, what their ranks and political views were, how often they patrolled, how they were armed, and how the situation was as to military sites and fortifications. Besides this, information on civilian issues was collected, such as the political and economic situation among the local population, the whereabouts and importance of large public buildings, infrastructure and information about police authorities, etc.

The report also described spies coming to Finland from the Soviet Union. There were three types: First, Finnish-speaking Soviet citizens who were sent across the border to mingle and observe. Second, people disguised as political refugees, defectors or escapees from work camps, who settled in the community. Third, those who spoke Scandinavian and used Finland (and a fake Finnish identity) as a transit on the way to another Nordic country. There existed education centres in Karelia for all three types. Another form of espionage cover was a company with a neutral exterior.

The report finished by stating that it may seem exaggerated, but warned that in the case of war, a well-established net of operators would be in place in Finland. Much of the information was alike to that which the Finns had brought to the party secretary meetings over the past six years. Whether they were repetitions or new information that confirmed the older, we don't know.

The Finns also brought a report on communist propaganda. The main theme was cooperation with social democrats. In keeping with the new line, cooperation was no longer 'from below', but also with labour leaders in accordance with CPSU attempts to make contact with SDP's in other countries. Another was the old familiar peace theme, also following Soviet initiatives. A third theme was internal Finnish politics and current affairs. The report had two enclosures illustrating communist tactics: one is a résumé of a 2 June 1956 meeting in the FKP Central Committee, another one is a résumé of an internal speech by communist Veikko Hauhia on 3 June 1956. Both are about creating a 'people's front' based on the peace movements.⁸⁰⁷

We must assume that each country gave their usual reports, but apart from this, the meeting seemed to have mainly focused on the XX congress, the strikes in Denmark and Finland, and special Finnish issues. Thus, the themes were roughly the same as they had been

⁸⁰⁷ 'De sovjetryska spionageorganisationerna, deras underlydande centraler i utlandet och den sovjetryska spionageverksamheten i Finland'. 'Kommunisternas propagandatemata' + enclosure 1 and 2. ABA 500, 807, 2. Also in Swedish archive.

all along: communism and how to fight it. And it looks as though the Finns were still in the lead in contributing with sensitive information.

Besides participating in the meeting, Frank Christiansen used his summer vacation in 1956 to travel to Stockholm, Gothenburg and Oslo to study AIC-related problems – that is to say communism.⁸⁰⁸

SAMAK: A SHORT REVIVAL

There were no more party secretary meetings in 1956. Events throughout the year sent communism right back on the SAMAK agenda, which probably rendered another party secretary meeting unnecessary.

The Finns hosted the SAMAK meeting on 4-5 November 1956, and they suggested in that the CPSU XX congress be the main item on the agenda.⁸⁰⁹ So it was. Haakon Lie gave a speech summing up events and consequences.

But Hungary also forced itself onto the agenda. The meeting was held on 4-5 November, that is, in the midst of the chaos (Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest early in the morning on 4 November). Lie stressed that things there were unfolding so fast that one's prepared words were at the risk of being outdated already the next day. He noted the deep crisis and open confusion within the CP's outside of the Soviet Union – a confusion that, obviously, could be used to one's own advantage:

Not at any time have we had a better chance to do a drive against the communist parties – never have we had better opportunities to peel off groups of doubters and sympathisers.

How to proceed was another matter. According to Lie, hammering away at the communists at this point wouldn't do much good, but strengthen their resolve. Pushing too hard and aggressively could result in isolation. Rather, it was about nurturing the doubts and inner skirmishes, and use the communists' insecurity and vulnerability. Events were moving fast and one should strike while the iron was hot. Lie nurtured no hope that the East bloc was about to fade away or that it would stop trying to keep communism alive in the Western countries – the battle was not over, but conditions were good for getting (even more) ahead.⁸¹⁰

⁸⁰⁸ Annual AIC report 1956, 2 Februar 1957. ABA 522, 41, AIC's protokoll. Referater fra bestyrelsesmøder 24. jan 1955 – 04. marts 1957

⁸⁰⁹ Leskinen to SAMAK-members, 9 October 1956. AAB 1001, Da, L0113, Finland

⁸¹⁰ 'Utviklingen etter 20. Kongress i Russlands Kommunistiske Parti' enclosure to SAMAK résumé. ABA 500, 329, 2

After Lie's speech, there was a discussion. The party leadership in Norway and Sweden had already adopted resolutions on Hungary and one was under review in Finland. In Denmark, 30.000 people had demonstrated against the Soviet intervention.

In Denmark, communists had gained some momentum in the spring strikes, but this had all been wiped away by Hungary and DKP was now destabilised – which, according to Danish delegate Alsing Andersen should be used to social democratic advantage. He pointed out that although Khrushchev had directed some criticism at Stalin's regime it wasn't sufficient. Khrushchev had touched only lightly upon the purges of the 1930s and failed to vindicate the victims. Andersen thought it would be a good point to make in propagating against the communists, especially to drive a wedge between the 'old' Stalinists, who had claimed that the Soviet Union was democratic in the 1930s, and the younger members.

Leskinen agreed that using Hungary to agitate against communism should be done without hammering away at the communists – rather, it was about appealing to those with a conscience.⁸¹¹

Another thing, which was discussed, was how to react to Soviet attempts at charming Western social democrats. Swedish party leadership had decided to decline cooperation at party level between SDP and CPSU. As we already know, all three Scandinavian PM's had done so, when visiting the Soviet Union. Leskinen said that the Finnish social democrats had told the Soviets that there would be no direct connections between their parties. He thought there was too much cooperation between the countries already. We remember what the Norwegian party had to say about the matter (see page 201)!

Still, Lie, of all people, was open to connections to the Soviet Union and satellite states – not by party cooperation but by delegation exchanges.⁸¹² He thought it a way to cause division in the East Bloc – by bringing impulses from the West (an early example of the thinking that would become normal during *detente*). Delegations from both Norway and Sweden had been to the Soviet Union in the course of 1955 (and written lengthy reports about it, which they shared with one another).⁸¹³ Eiler Jensen wasn't too keen on it. When Danish LO had been invited to send a delegation they had come up with their long list of demands. When all of these had been met, they had used Hungary as an excuse not to go. From the Swedish side, there wasn't an official stand on delegations, however, Aspling did not believe in vetos.

⁸¹¹ Resumé of SAMAK meeting, 4-5 November 1956. ABA 500, 329, 2

⁸¹² Resumé of meeting in the party committee, 22 March 1956. ARBARK 1889, A2A, 017 1956-59. Resumé from SAMAK, 4-5 November 1956. ABA 500, 329, 2 See also Carlsson to Aspling and Lie, 20 January 1956. AAB 1001, Da, L0112, Danmark

⁸¹³ Letter and report from Swedish to Norwegian LO, 12 November 1955. AAB 1579, Dd, L0230, Sverige

Järvinen from Finland thought it was a question of picking the right people for such trips: some one who could 'keep their eyes open' and be critical.⁸¹⁴ If this was the case, much valuable information could be obtained. For instance, when Swedish Esse Beckius (a trusted SDP partisan) visited Poland in 1957, Haakon Lie was eager to read a (confidential) résumé of the trip.⁸¹⁵

On the same note, Haakon Lie once again encouraged the other Nordic countries to take up connections with Yugoslavia. This, however, was not something that the Danish party wished to get involved with. Alsing Andersen stated that intimate connections with the Yugoslavs would create confusion among the Danish workers, and that the party had agreed with LO to lay low. Eiler Jensen agreed and added that the LO wished for the toppling of Tito – they had no wish for a repetition of an earlier visit to Yugoslavia. Sweden had not taken an official stand on the matter, but evaluated the situation from case to case.

With this meeting, communism had once again become the headline at SAMAK. The events of 1956 made it hard bot to talk about it. It was mainly dealt with as a result of international events; it was not, as the party secretary meetings, a strategy meeting for combatting domestic communism (except for the discussion about the opportunity to cause splits, which is not elaborated in the résumé). Neither did it have any sort of intelligence related content.

The meeting produced a resolution condemning both events in Hungary and the resort to violence to solve the Suez crisis, and wishing for solutions in the UN. Mentioning the Middle East along with Hungary had been thought necessary by several participants in order to keep some sort of balance and not subject SAMAK to accusations of taking sides.⁸¹⁶ However, it was clear what side SAMAK was on. It is a prime example of the social democratic schism between their anti-communism and a wish for pragmatic detente-oriented foreign policy.

– On a side note: the 'not hammering away' seems to have been forgotten fairly quickly. At least the Norwegian and Danish SDP's did not fail to squeeze every drop of propaganda value from the Hungary events – and that included hammering away at the inhumane and violent nature of the Soviet Union and the position of domestic communists as grovelling henchmen.⁸¹⁷

⁸¹⁴ Résumé from SAMAK, 4-5 November 1956. ABA 500, 329, 2

⁸¹⁵ Correspondence, Lie/Aspling, February 1957. ARBARK E2B, 11 1956-58

⁸¹⁶ Résumé of SAMAK meeting, 4-5 November 1956. ABA 500, 329, 2. 'Utviklingen etter 20. Kongress i Russlands Kommunistiske Parti' enclosure to SAMAK résumé. ABA 500, 329, 2.

⁸¹⁷ Lahlum 2009, p. 256, Bjørnsson 2012, pp. 65-66

Communism resurfacing in SAMAK did not introduce a new trend; that it was a one-off event, is clear from the next meeting in November 1957. The Finns was marked by the turmoil in the labour movement. Other than that, communism went back to being a non-issue, apart from a line in the Norwegian report that communists had lost 30.000 votes in the national elections and went from 5,1% in 1953 to 3,4. The effects of Hungary on the popularity of the NKP were obvious and measurable.⁸¹⁸ The Swedish report for the September 1958 SAMAK meeting in Copenhagen, stated that the communists, in connection with their new unity tactics had abstained from having candidates in any districts in the election.⁸¹⁹

In all the Scandinavian countries, the CP's lost supporters, and for many, Hungary was the turning point: by supporting the Soviet invasion, Communists committed political suicide.

In 1958, the aftermath of the Hungarian uprising led to severe punishments of the reformers. After a SAMAK labour conference in September 1958, the LO's of Denmark, Norway and Sweden issued a protest statement, which they sent to the Soviet TUC as a reaction to reports on 'executions, secret processes and deportations' against former Hungarian labour officials. The Finnish SAK supported the statement internally but did not consider themselves able to sign it openly.⁸²⁰

And thus it was with SAMAK from then on: if security issues or communism was mentioned it was because of events in international politics – with the apparent exception of Finland.

FIZZLING OUT – OR A LACK OF SOURCES?

It is hard writing about party secretary meetings in the latter half of the 1950s; there were some, and it would have been interesting to learn more about them. However, they became more irregular and have left next to no sources in the archives. They are mentioned in correspondence, but we do not have details of their content.

Day-to-day cooperation and correspondence continued, as did visits to each other's meetings, conferences and courses. And, as friendships evolved, private visits. Rolf

⁸¹⁸ Report on developments in Finland, presented in SAMAK, 29-30 November 1957. ABA 500, 807, Finland. Résumé from SAMAK 29-30 November 1957, Norwegian report. ABA 500, 330, 1

⁸¹⁹ Report for SAMAK meeting, 28-29 September 1958. ABA 500, 330, 2

⁸²⁰ Resumé of meeting, correspondence and resolution, September-October 1958. AAB 1579, Dd, L0315, Nordisk fagl. Samarbeid. Note, 23 September 1958. ARBARK 2964, F25B 02, Nordiska fackliga konferenser 1957

Gerhardsen's frequent skiing trips to the Dovrefjell hotel in the Norwegian mountains in Dombås were often guested by his Nordic party friends – including later Swedish PM, Olof Palme.⁸²¹ On Easter 1958, Sven Aspling was visiting. While there, they received news of the 'Easter rebellion' in the Norwegian party. According to his son, Rolf Gerhardsen said to Aspling: 'Now you'll see Haakon speed it up!'⁸²²

Sven Aspling also kept in contact with Urban Hansen who had become Mayor of Social Affairs in Copenhagen in 1956 – Hansen still took an active interest in the communist issue. In June 1958 they met with Arne Pettersson. Considering this constellation, it is likely that the topic was communism, but we don't know for sure.⁸²³

It is hard to say whether or not a secretary meeting took place in 1957. In Haakon Lie's personal calendar, a 'secretary course' is booked for 1-3 April.⁸²⁴ It might have been a party secretary meeting or a meeting in the Northern Cap committee.

Ahead of the SAMAK meeting in the fall of 1957 Lie wanted a personal meeting with Aspling and Carlsson to prepare thoroughly. He wanted to discuss the European common market, Germany and Khrushchev's assumption of full power in the Soviet Union.⁸²⁵ It was a confidential talk, but it was no party secretary meeting as we know it.

In 1958, Lie and Aspling planned a secretary conference at Dombås in March. However, Lie thought that a change of subject was due. To Aspling, he wrote: 'This time, I think that we should let our friends, the communists, disappear from the agenda and instead concentrate on other political and electoral problems.' Lie, of all people, writing that is a testament to the decreased significance of communism as a major issue. Other issues had become more important, and there was no rush: the conference was postponed indefinitely, as the Swedes were busy.⁸²⁶

The postponed conference was held at the Hotel Beaulieu outside of Copenhagen on 6-7 December 1958.⁸²⁷ From Denmark Ejgill Jørgensen (AIC accountant and party treasurer), Niels

⁸²¹ Gerhardsen 2009, pp. 87, 159, 253. In February 1955 Aspling planned a skiing trip for his family with Rolf Gerhardsen. Correspondence, February and April 1955. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 10 1955

⁸²² 'Ja nå skal du se Haakon har fått opp farta!' Gerhardsen 2009, p. 176

⁸²³ Aspling to Urban Hansen, 10 June 1958. ARBARK 1889, E6, 01 1954-62, 1954-57 Stig Lundgren

⁸²⁴ Haakon Lies calendar, 1957. AAB 2483, Df, L0003, Almanakker 1951, 1954-59

⁸²⁵ Lie to Carlsson, 16 August 1957. AAB 1001, Da, L0130, Danmark. Correspondence Aspling/Carlsson/Lie, August-September 1957. ARBARK 1889, F15D, 07 1952-53, 1952 Kommunistiska partier (Internationella enheten)

⁸²⁶ 'Denne gangen synes jeg at vi skulle la våre venner kommunistene falle ut av dagsordenen, og at vi i stedet skulle konsentrere oss om andre politiske og om valgtekniske problemer.' Lie to Aspling, 15 February 1958. AAB 1001, Da, L0176, Sverige. Aspling to Lie, 28 February 1958. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 11 1956-58

⁸²⁷ Oluf Carlsson to Emil Jonsson, 11 December 1958. ABA 500, 856, 4

Matthiassen (who had become party secretary in 1957) and Oluf Carlsson participated. From Sweden came Sven Aspling, party treasurer Ernst Nilsson and organisational secretary and secretary in the personnel control unit Stig Lundgren. Haakon Lie, Rolf Gerhardsen and treasurer Arvid Dyrendahl came from Norway, and from Finland Kaarlo Pitsinki and party treasurer Aarne Paananen. In short: the usual secretary gathering, including party treasurers. The reason for bringing in the treasurers was their valuable contribution to Nordic cooperation:

They have succeeded in, on a more regular basis, keeping in contact through the years, and their discussions not only include economic issues. Naturally activities in general are also discussed.⁸²⁸

Unfortunately, this is all we know about the meeting. It would have been interesting to see if communism was discussed, after Haakon Lie's suggestion earlier that year.

The reason that the party secretary meetings seem to have fizzled out at this point is obviously that the communists were becoming less interesting. Politically, they were all but wiped out. As for security they seem to have been safely contained at this point. Wild rumours of sabotage and espionage had calmed down.

Other business

Party secretaries and leadership were not the only ones who held inter-Nordic meetings. As we see, the party accountants did, and in the 1950s and at least the early 1960s (perhaps longer) the education leagues did as well.⁸²⁹ At such a conference in 1957, the agenda was: experiences from the Swedish elections by a Swedish speaker, communist activity by a Norwegian, Finnish issues and lastly organisation/organisation work by a Danish speaker.⁸³⁰ No résumé of the meeting survived, only the Finnish report. It was written by Pitsinki and started with the efforts to keep communists out of Government since 1948 before moving on to the turmoil in the late 1950s. Enclosed were statements by SDP leader Fagerholm and the party leadership stressing party discipline. The report did not lash out against communists or contain

⁸²⁸ 'De har ju lyckats att på et mera regelbundet sätt upprätthålla kontakterna under årens lopp, och i deras diskussioner inngår ju inte bara de ekonomiska tingen utan helt naturligt måste verksamheten i stort också bli diskuterad.' Aspling to Carlsson, 20 October 1958. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 11 1956-58

⁸²⁹ AOF meeting, 4 March 1957. AAB 1579, Dd, L0278, Arbeidernes Opplysningsforbund, resumé from AOF-conference 14-15 November 1961. AAB 1001, Da, L0256

⁸³⁰ Correspondence about meeting, October-November 1958. ABA 500, 330, 4

confidential information.⁸³¹ Still, Lie wrote Pitsinki a few days after the conference to tell him that it had made a deep impression. *Arbeiderbladet* would send 'one of their best employees' John Sanness to Helsinki to investigate further, and Lie asked Pitsinki to give him 'all possible help' during the stay.⁸³²

Such investigative tours also continued: in 1957, a Norwegian AOF secretary, Ivar Viken, received a grant to study problems in the 'fringe areas': he would look at districts in Northern Norway, and compare them to Finland.⁸³³ To the fringe areas the Norwegian party also sent Osvald Harjo, a former Finnmark communist who had survived the Soviet slave camps, had been released after Norwegian pressure in 1955, and now toured with his story. Harjo went on a tour of Northern Sweden in early 1957, where he would also meet with a former co-inmate. He wrote the book *Moskva kjenner ingen tårer* (*Moscow knows no tears*) published by the SDP publishing house Tiden.⁸³⁴

Even though concerns about communism was on the wane, we do see instances of the battle 'flaming up' – as in 1959 where Haakon Lie orchestrated a general call to up the ante in the organisations, as communists were attacking collective union membership of LO.⁸³⁵ For that end, the Norwegians enquired their Scandinavian colleagues for inspiration, in the shape of information about Danish and Swedish organisation, meetings and information work.⁸³⁶ Also the Danish party obtained inspiration from Norway and Sweden, when putting together a manual in organisation work.⁸³⁷

- The back of his personal 1959 calendar, by the way, demonstrates that Haakon Lie had not left the issue completely: he kept an overview of NKP member figures since 1945.⁸³⁸

In May 1959 there was 'a get-together' in Malmö, with at least Aspling and Lie present, but it is not clear what the content was.⁸³⁹ It might have been to prepare for the large Nordic labour conference in Malmö in September with around 50 delegates from Finland, 100 from

⁸³¹ Finnish report and enclosures for conference, 6-7 December 1958. ABA 500, 330, 4 and ARBARK 1889, E2B, 11 1956-58

⁸³² Lie to Pitsinki, 8 December 1958. AAB 1001, Da, L0159, *Arbeiderbladet*

⁸³³ Lie to Helene Halava, 8 February 1957. AAB 1001, Da, L0131, Finland

⁸³⁴ Nordskog to Ragnar Lassinantti and Ingvar Paues, 8 and 25 February 1957. AAB 1001, Da, L0155, Sverige. Lahlum 2009, pp. 354-355 Lie 1975, p. 28, Gerhardsen 1972, p. 72, Bergh and Eriksen 1997, p. 451

⁸³⁵ Speech by Haakon Lie, 19 February 1959. AAB 1001, Da, L0198, Partikontoret

⁸³⁶ Nordskog to Carlsson, 27 June 1958. AAB 1001, Da L0616, Danmark. Nordskog to Aspling, 19 June 1958. AAB 1001, Da, L0176, Sverige

⁸³⁷ Børge Jensen to Swedish party, 5 November 1958. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 11 1956-58

⁸³⁸ Lie's calendar for 1959. AAB 2483, Df, L0003, Almanakker 1951, 1954-59

⁸³⁹ Lie to Aspling, 26 May 1959. AAB 1001, Da, L0198, Partikontoret

Denmark and Norway each, and 100-150 from Sweden.⁸⁴⁰ Mostly, the labour conference was a show of Nordic solidarity and opinions more than a meeting that produced political results. Afterwards the proceedings were published. Especially Leskinen was eager to get the conference together, as the Finns, as he stated at the March 1959 SAMAK meeting, were in dire need of moving closer to the other Nordic countries.⁸⁴¹ Unlike the last conference (in 1947), this one openly distanced itself from communism with the words:

We turn against communism with its contempt for the freedom of the individual human being. We turn against everyone who try to put down peoples' striving for freedom and independence.⁸⁴²

In connection with the conference, there was also a party secretary meeting with the presence of LO chairmen in September 1959. Lie thought it best to not include Arne Pettersson – 'he has enough to battle with as it is.'⁸⁴³ We don't know what these problems were – they might have been personal. We don't know what the meeting was about either; it could be solely about the conference, or it could have been used as an opportunity for the secretaries and LO leaders to catch up on organisational issues. Or both.

1955-59: IN CONCLUSION

This was the period in which the party secretary gatherings on communism started winding down. Lie's 1958 wish to concentrate on something other than communism is crucial, and even though we lack the sources to say specifically what went on at the last couple of secretary gatherings, it seems safe to assume that communism simply had become less of a concern.

Hungary, obviously, was a major turning point that rendered the communists more toothless than ever before. It wasn't just that they became extremely unpopular in the wider public by supporting the bloody invasion. It was also a starting point for inner skirmishes and confusion, which made them weaker. This was most evident in Denmark, where Hungary set in motion a chain of events culminating in the exclusion of DKP leader Aksel Larsen two years later. Contributing to the inner confusion in the CP's was surely also Khrushchev's dismissal of the former hero Stalin.

⁸⁴⁰ Letter from Lie 10, July 1959. AAB 1001, Da, L0184, Danmark

⁸⁴¹ Resumé of SAMAK meeting in Stockholm 23 March 1959. ABA 500, 331, 2

⁸⁴² Svensson 1986, p. 89

⁸⁴³ 'Han har nok å stri med som han har.' Lie to Aspling, 28 August 1959. AAB 1001, Da, L0201, Sverige. Correspondence about meeting, August 1959. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 12 1959-60

But things were happening in the SDP's as well, especially in Norway. Haakon Lie who had been a driving force in the battle against communism seemingly started to lose interest. Significant was probably also the split in the Norwegian party. Haakon Lie and Rolf Gerhardsen had been an unusually dynamic anti-communist duo, which was now slowly but surely splitting up as relations between Lie and Rolf's brother, PM Einar Gerhardsen soured. The driving force of the Norwegians thus became less forceful. During this period we also see a markedly diminishing Norwegian contribution of intelligence-related information. In 1954 they were taking intelligence involvement to the extreme, by having Bryhn present at a secretary meeting. But as the 1950s proceeded, the Finns seem to have been the only ones still bringing this sort of business to the table. At this point, people in the Norwegian SDP was actively bugging communist meetings, AIC had access to confidential information about the unrest in DKP, and people in the Swedish SDP were moving closer to Birger Elmer, but apparently neither felt the need to share the outcomes of this with their Nordic colleagues.

However, as we lack the full knowledge of many of the meetings in the latter half of the 1950s, this is not a conclusion that we can be absolutely sure of. But the lack of sources might hint that party secretary meeting wasn't such a big 'thing' anymore, as opposed to earlier when detailed agendas were planned and reports sent out.

Outside forces had set events in motion, too. The 'small detente' after Stalin's death (usually thought to have lasted from 1953 to 1956) led to Scandinavian PM's visiting the Soviet Union, and some Scandinavian labour movements even opening up for delegation exchanges under certain circumstances. Incidentally, the end of the small detente also marked the beginning of serious decline in Western communism.

The SDP's still battled communism whenever it popped up. But the threat assessment had gone down, rendering extraordinary measures less necessary. The SDP's still didn't trust their communist counterparts – but with the exception of Finland, talks of sabotage, illegal arms and the likes were not as high on the agenda anymore. The post-war rumours of illegal groups, still holding on to weapons had died down, and the communists themselves didn't show the same initiative in this area as earlier. The sense of urgency, which had made the Nordic secretary network so tight and alert, was not there anymore. One might say, that communism, as an inter-Nordic problem, was de-securitized. The network did not fall apart – but it became more relaxed as sailings became smoother.

18. 1960- : THE END

By the turn of the decade, communism had become less of a pre-occupation (some might say obsession) for the Nordic SDP's. Domestic communism was on the wane, the Cold War was a settled bipolar system, and other issues, such as decolonisation, came onto the agenda. Lie became increasingly interested in the third world and the newly independent countries and he was a pioneer in starting aid to those areas. By 1960, he seemed more interested in schooling Nordic shop stewards for work in developing countries than fraction work against communism. He also wanted to engage his secretary colleagues in this and suggested it as the central item for the spring meeting in SAMAK in 1961.⁸⁴⁴ It did not mean that Lie was going soft on communists – he would still hit the roof when faced with communists. It just didn't happen so often.⁸⁴⁵

Europe, EEC and EFTA became topics more frequently discussed between the Nordic SDP's. The Nordic community was clearly expanding into Europe. Nordic integration, at least in the labour movement was considered successful, and eyes now turned outwards. This was underlined by a decision in 1960, to end a long-time tradition: the exchange of speakers for 1 May celebrations. There was an overall agreement on this decision.⁸⁴⁶ While the post-war years had been marked by a wish to break isolation and create common ground across borders, this was now effortless: 'We now meet so often at conferences and meetings, – and tens of thousands of Danes, Swedes and Norwegians are crossing the borders every year'.⁸⁴⁷

In August 1961, Aspling wrote Lie that those organisations designed to split and divide (meaning communist) 'no longer has a market in our countries.'⁸⁴⁸ At times it even seemed that the absence of drama could be a little boring – as Rolf Gerhardsen wrote Aspling in 1960: 'Everything is so damn peaceful, so god damn peaceful.'⁸⁴⁹ Their bond lasted and Cold

⁸⁴⁴ Lie to Aspling, 10 September 1960. AAB 1001, Da, L0218, Partikontorets personale. Lie to Carlsson, 10 September 1960. AAB 1001, Da, L0208, Danmark. Lie to Pitsinki and Carlsson, 20 March 1961. ABA 500, 331, 2. Lie to Aspling, 9 Januar 1961. AAB 1001, Da, L0245, Nordisk samarbeidskomité. Björk 1990, p. 51, Lahlum 2009, pp. 323-326.

⁸⁴⁵ Lahlum 2009, pp. 402-403

⁸⁴⁶ Letters from Aspling 25 and 29 March 1960. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 12 1959-60. See also correspondence Lie/Aspling February-March 1962. AAB 1001 Da, L0277, Sverige and ARBARK 1889, E2B, 13 1961-62

⁸⁴⁷ Letter from Arvid Dyrendahl, 17 March 1960. AAB Da, L0208, Danmark

⁸⁴⁸ Aspling to Lie, 25 August 1961. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 13 1961-62

⁸⁴⁹ 'Alt er så forbannet fredelig, så inn ihelvete fredelig.' Rolf Gerhardsen to Sven Aspling, 8 April 1960. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 12 1959-60

Warriors had become good friends: in 1961, Rolf Gerhardsen, Sven Aspling and their families once again went skiing in Norway during Easter. To Aspling, it was important to keep the friendship alive.⁸⁵⁰

But while friendship bonds lasted, professional bonds were breaking up, as the pre- and post-war generation of party secretaries and communist-fighters left their posts one by one. Lie wrote Carlsson in 1962: 'It's getting harder and harder to detach myself from this desk'. Lie was indeed the one who held on the longest.⁸⁵¹ Carlsson left his desk in 1961 and Aspling followed suit in 1962. Thereby two of the four 'great ones', as Haakon Lie called the circle of party secretaries – himself, Aspling, Carlsson and Pitsinki – had left the arena.⁸⁵² Pitsinki left the job in 1966 (at a point where even Leskinen was conciliatory towards the Soviet Union) and Lie in 1969. It was not only two of the four great ones that had left – it was also two of the three stable pillars in the party secretary cooperation (the Finns sent several different people over the years, but the Scandinavian party secretaries had almost always been in place).

As the cooperation was based on a social network that became a close-knit circle, obviously a change in people led to a change in the work.

The enemy also changed: in 1959 excluded DKP leader Aksel Larsen formed the Socialist Peoples' Party (SPP), a party which would still be based on Marxism but be independent of Moscow. A Norwegian SPP was formed in April 1961 after inspiration from the Danish. The SDP's (and security services) viewed these new parties with suspicion, convinced that they were just communists with a nicer surface.⁸⁵³ Nordahl gave the new party the following characteristic: '(...) nothing but a new communist party, which in many ways are trying to outdo the communist party.'⁸⁵⁴ At one point, Haakon Lie even considered working with former NKP-leader Furubotn in order to discredit leading figures in SPP.⁸⁵⁵

In spite of their suspicions, the SDP's underrated the SPP's: in 1960, the Danish SPP won 11 seats in parliament. In 1961, the Norwegian won two.⁸⁵⁶ The new socialist parties were a reason for concern in Sweden where the SDP feared a similar development, and the Swedes

⁸⁵⁰ Planning correspondence, January-March 1961. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 13 1961-62. Aspling to Rolf Gerhardsen, 6 October 1962. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 13 1961-62

⁸⁵¹ 'Jeg har vanskeligere og vanskeligere for å rive meg løs fra denne pulten.' Lie to Aspling, 5 September 1962. AAB 1001, Da, L0277, Sverige

⁸⁵² 'Vi 4 (Store)...' Lie to Pitsinki and Carlsson, 20 March 1961. ABA 500, 331, 2

⁸⁵³ Bergh & Eriksen, vol. 2, pp. 124ff., Schmidt, Regin. *PET's overvågning af politiske partier 1945-1989. PET, Folketingets partier og østlig efterretningsaktivitet. PET-kommissionens beretning, bind 7.* København: Justitsministeriet, 2009 (2009c), pp. 146ff. Bjørnsson 2012, pp. 68, 121-123

⁸⁵⁴ "(...) ikke noe annet enn et nykommunistisk parti som på en del punkter forsøker å overgå Det kommunistiske parti." Nordahl 1992, p. 246

⁸⁵⁵ Bergh and Eriksen 1998, pp. 416ff.

⁸⁵⁶ Nordahl 1992, pp. 235, 238

kept themselves up to date about the issue.⁸⁵⁷ The SPP's were a nuisance, but not a security risk. They did not take orders from Moscow and they did not preach revolution.

In December 1961, there was a secretary conference with the presence of party treasurers to talk about organisation work. Niels Matthiasen, who had replaced Oluf Carlsson, suggested they discuss the SPP's.⁸⁵⁸ According to Aspling, the conference was 'short and a little rhapsodic' (which is, alas, all that we know about it), but he expressed the wish to meet to Matthiasen again. He thought it 'valuable that we meet from time to time to exchange thoughts about problems and tasks that we share'.⁸⁵⁹

But as Aspling left the job the following year, the 'old' party secretary group was amputated for good, and it seems that the new party secretaries group did not carry on the anti-communist torch (which, at any rate, had not shone too brightly the last couple of years). A party secretary meeting in May 1962 was primarily concerned with planning the following SAMAK meeting and discusses future guidelines for SAMAK.⁸⁶⁰

Communism was not totally sent off the Nordic agenda. It popped up now and then, but was no longer the object of a systematic cooperation. At the labour conference in connection with the August 1961 SAMAK meeting in Sweden, the representatives discussed countermeasures to the Soviet youth festivals. There was support for a Danish proposal to have a youth festival in Denmark in 1962, which the Scandinavian LO's would support both financially and by taking up the matter with their youth organisations.⁸⁶¹

The Nordic parties also continued to exchange speakers at courses on political organisation and labour issues – if those included communism, communism would be on the agenda. In Denmark such courses were, in 1962, led by Frank Christiansen, and still included guests from the other Scandinavian countries. But also here, the topic became more rare.⁸⁶²

⁸⁵⁷ Texts on Socialists People's Parties, 1962. ARBARK 1889, F15D, 07 1952-63, 1952 Kommunistiska partier (Internationella enheten)

⁸⁵⁸ Lie to Aspling, 15. November 1961. AAB 1001, Da, L0246, Partikontorets personale. Aspling to Lie, Niels Matthiasen and Pitsinki, 10 November 1961. AAB 1001, Da, L0256, Sverige. Correspondence about conference, November 1961. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 13 1961-62

⁸⁵⁹ 'Värdefullt att vi iblandt får tillfälle träffas och utbyta tankar om problem och uppgifter som är gemensamma för oss.' Aspling to Matthiasen, 15 December 1961 and 18 September 1962. ARBARK 1889, E2B, 13 1961-62

⁸⁶⁰ Agenda for party secretary meeting in Copenhagen, 4 May 1962. ABA 500, 331, Partisekretærmøde på soc.dem.forbund...

⁸⁶¹ Resumé of labour conference, 2 August 1961. AAB 1579, Dd, L0409, Nordisk fagl. samarbeid

⁸⁶² Correspondence about summer course, July-August 1962. AAB 1001, Da, L0260, D-Diverse Danmark. E.g. Nordskog to Gösta Damberg, 21 Juni 1961. AAB 1001, Da, L0256, Sverige

To a greater extent, eyes turned outwards. If communism was an issue, it was first and foremost in connection with foreign policy. Thus, at a labour-political course at Bommersvik in early 1963, John Sannes, director of the Norwegian Foreign Policy Institute, former employee at *Arbeiderbladet* and 'the prime Soviet expert' in Norway would speak about communism after Stalin.⁸⁶³ Foreign policy was debated both in SAMAK and in confidentiality between the party secretaries and Nordic SDP's would also exchange information and publications on international communism.⁸⁶⁴

However, the weight was on foreign policy now. Domestic communism was dealt with sporadically and less systematically. And the cases were markedly fewer. The broad, frequent and systematic anti-communist cooperation of the Nordic SDP's was over at this point.

One exception was the Northern Cap, where domestic communism was still a part of the daily political issues. When Olav Nordskog invited Gösta Damberg to speak at a labour-political course for rail workers in Mo i Rana in early 1962, he stated this as an incentive and attraction about the course: 'here you will be at the core of the work with the Socialist People's Party and the Communist Party in Norway.'⁸⁶⁵ As mentioned earlier, more research is needed about the Northern Cap cooperation, but it seems to have continued into the 1970s.

Another exception was Finland and Iceland. The state of their labour movements once again left them as the odd ones out – for a Nordic conference for LO officials in 1962 no representatives from these two countries were invited because of their 'special conditions.'⁸⁶⁶ It seems that once the Scandinavians had put their own houses of labour in order, they were not as eager to involve themselves in the others'. The years of Finland and Iceland never getting better, might have tired them and caused a somewhat indifferent attitude. The world was fixed in the two-bloc system and it seemed that no matter what the efforts in Finland and Iceland had been over the years, they ran their own weird course – and it was no longer deemed a threat to world – or Nordic – stability.

⁸⁶³ Correspondence, Paul Engstad/Sven Erik 'Esse' Beckius, December 1962. AAB 1001, Da, L0277, Sverige

⁸⁶⁴ E.g. plans for a committee to study and support Soviet jews. Lie to Matthiassen, 8 January 1962. AAB 1001, Da, L0260, D-Diverse, Danmark. Nordskog to Gösta Damberg, 9 August 1962. AAB 1001, Da, L0277, Sverige

⁸⁶⁵ 'her kommer du mitt opp i kjernen i arbeidet med Sosialistisk Folkeparti og Kommunistpartiet i Norge. Nordskog to Damberg, 28 January 1962. AAB 1001, Da, L0277, Sverige

⁸⁶⁶ Report on conference 11-12 May 1962. AAB 1579, Dd, L0440, Nordisk fagl. samarbeid

1960- : IN CONCLUSION

This is the period in which the cooperation that is the central topic of this thesis died out. The cause was obviously that the cause for it – communism – had become less of a problem, and other things now pre-occupied the secretaries. In this connection, one must not underestimate Haakon Lie's wish for the cooperation to take another direction. He was, in many ways *the* Nordic anti-communist, and without his energy and resolve, things might have looked different.

Another important factor is the generation change of these years. The new generation of social democrats were simply not that pre-occupied with communism. While the new party secretaries in Denmark and Sweden, Niels Matthiassen and Sten Andersson, were no strangers to anti-communist work, the whole party organisation was changing its focus away from communism as the main organisational problem and enemy number one. The new generations of social democrats, shop stewards and organisers did not have the same stake in the battle. They had not been there during the hard fights of the 1920s and 1930s or experienced the sense of betrayal and they had not been active when rumours of armed communists and sabotage were all over the workplaces. They might have been aware of communism as a security risk in the post-war years, but this risk was now gone, and they simply did not feel the intense hatred of earlier generations. What they saw was a crippled communist movement that no one took seriously. De-securitisation was complete and at least the Scandinavian SDP's (who had been at the core of the Nordic cooperation) had won the battle for the workplaces. Hence the extraordinary measures, the tight discipline and the need for ideological conformity were no longer as pressing.

Moreover, new anti-authoritarian winds were blowing, and the new generations were repelled by the harsh demagogic tone of the 'old' communist-fighters.⁸⁶⁷ They didn't see the purpose of it, and didn't understand why one should blindly obey the movement and the party. With that, organisation, education and agitation were about to change drastically, as was the faces of the SDP's; but that is another story.

⁸⁶⁷ Lahlum 2009, p. 475, Bjørnsson 2012, pp. 79-80

19. CONCLUSION

THE STATE PARTY

In the 1920s and 1930s, the SDP's of Scandinavia underwent a transformation from class to peoples' parties, by incorporating the working class and expanding its participation, in society.⁸⁶⁸ Capitalism should not be torn down before building socialism; socialism should be built on, and integrated into, the capitalist society by reforms. As this development moved along parallel lines in Scandinavia, the understanding of the phenomenon became not only national but also Nordic – and a regional identity was built.⁸⁶⁹ This, in time became identified as 'the third way' or the 'middle way' between totalitarian communism and raw capitalism. This middle way, or the Scandinavian model, became defining for Scandinavian values and self-image during the Cold War.

In Scandinavia, this strategy was successful to the point where the social democratic parties became the single largest parties in each country. But they didn't get there by being unruly and revolutionary. They adapted to parliament politics and they incorporated nationalist and Nordic ideals to broaden their electoral base. The pendulum swung from a narrative of international class-based action, to one of national progress and prosperity.

In their own narrative, of which they successfully convinced large parts of the population, the SDP's became bearers and developers of both national and Nordic identity and core values: pragmatism, welfare, social peace, mediation and reform over conflict. Having incorporated themselves into the national narrative and identity, they also felt a sense of self-entitlement as bearers and developers of state, and obvious and natural governors of Scandinavian society. Through their prism, party and state had the same objectives and values, and a natural cohesion.

When communism emerged strengthened after WWII, it wasn't just an old enemy rearing its head. It was a threat to the socialdemocratic vision and the state they wanted to build. The social democratic project needed the support, and hence the domination, of the labour

⁸⁶⁸ Christiansen, Niels Finn. "Socialdemokratiets fællesskabstænkning i 1930erne." In *Folk og fællesskab*, edited by Cecilie Felicia Stockholm Banke, 84-89. København: Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier (DIIS), 2001, pp. 84-85

⁸⁶⁹ Christiansen 2001, p. 89

movement. Having the LO's as their siamese twins was paramount – without it they would be just another political party.

In Scandinavia, the SDP's had it, but resented more than anything those who were now trying to undermine it. The SDP's were cementing a near-hegemonic power position in society and it rested on the solid base of, and coupling with, the labour movement. If communists assumed domination over the labour movement, what would become of social democracy and the social democratic state vision?

THE STRUGGLE

The line between international fear and national power struggle is not easily drawn (...) ⁸⁷⁰

The rift between communists and social democrats is older than the Cold War. One cannot understand their rivalry unless one understands the beginning of the battle, its ideological, and practical implications. They started out fighting for the right interpretation of the socialist vision and the right to represent the worker.

Discussions about revolutions versus reform flared up, as the international labour movement became permanently split. The split was a threat to the very basis of the labour movement: unity. Hence, the fractions that broke off from the old socialist parties to adhere to Moscow's theses were deemed as traitors and opponents by those working within existing parliamentary systems.

Coming into the post-war era, the social democrats faced communism on two fronts. First, increased communist popularity threatened the social democratic hegemony the labour movement. Second, as the Cold War evolved, the Soviet Union became not only the cradle of revolutionary communism, but also an international security risk.

In Norden the threat felt very present; small countries in East and Central Europe 'fell' to the Soviet Union one by one, with the help of the CPSU's proselyte parties. This did not happen across big oceans, but in neighbouring countries – and almost in Norden. While not turning Finland into a satellite state, the limitations imposed of her set a very direct and threatening example.

The rift between the WWII victors created division through Europe, and the border went straight through Norden. Politically and ideologically however, the Nordic countries all leaned westwards – also Finland, who preserved a Western-style society and democracy. All the Nordic countries feared the same threat: the Soviet Union.

Still, the conciliatory facade was upheld; not just by 'neutral' Sweden and Finland, but also by NATO countries Denmark and Norway who, as opposed to the fifth Nordic country, Iceland (tucked away in the Western hemisphere), was in the firing line of a new world war and painfully aware of it. They pleaded international solutions in UN and sought bridge-building between East and West. While anti-communist, they were also pragmatic; they couldn't afford another war and were terrified to, with an expression of those days, 'wake the sleeping bear'.

Along with the narrative of freedom versus dictatorship, the 'old' social democratic narrative also continued to exist: it told of a vision for a just and equal society; a welfare state, a *people's home*, which communism threatened on two fronts: from outside *and* inside.

The two fronts melted together; the CP's could not be analysed apart from their ideological leader, the Cominform/Soviet Union, and hence they were looked upon, not just as domestic opposition, but a fifth column. While the Eastern neighbour should be approached with caution, its proselytes were to be destroyed almost by all means necessary. And those were mainly in the category of negative anti-communism. True, social democrats believed that the welfare state was a good way to undermine communism, but it was not the main purpose of it.

As the two fronts were hard to separate, so became the means. Knowing the communists in the workplaces for reasons of agitation became useful in screening for employment at sensitive industries. Collecting active communists' names in order to know in which unions to set in, became useful to the security police for other reasons. Collecting the information twice would simply have been a waste of time: the interests and threat assessments of the labour movement and the state had become identical and the Scandinavian (and probably Finnish) social democratic party apparatuses started cooperating with the security services of the state.

A question in later debates has been whether or not the benefits were mutual. As we have seen, information was not a one-way channel in any of the three Scandinavian countries: there are plenty of examples showing that party members gained insight into information from

⁸⁷⁰ 'Igjen er likevel grensen mellom internasjonal frykt og nasjonal maktkamp vanskelig å trekke (...)' Lahlum 2009, p. 304

the state services, perhaps most evident in Norway. Information flow from services to party might not have been as massive in Denmark and Sweden, but it was there nonetheless.⁸⁷¹ In the words of a former IB office clerk 'it worked as networks usually do – there was giving and taking.'⁸⁷²

The character of such cooperation can be very hard to uncover. It consisted of informal networks and one contact was all it took for a connection to be established and information to flow.

The code of "need to know" was in effect: Almost no one knew everything. Only a few knew something. The majority never suspected – and those who suspected didn't ask. This was true for leaders as well as further down the hierarchy.⁸⁷³

An environment in which cooperation thrived and was deemed natural and necessary tied the network together. The social democrats re-entered their hegemonic positions of the 1930s and created the social democratic state. They not only built a system of welfare; they also built the security services. They installed old friends in sensitive positions and sanctioned, if only by looking the other way, the cooperation. Also in this area they felt self-entitlement – being the state-bearers, it was only natural for them to take part in the state's struggle against the enemy – an enemy which they knew better than anyone else.

This is not to say that SDP's and state security services were tangled up to the point where no one can tell the difference; it is to say, however, that lines became blurred.

It is tempting to point out that the social democrats used un-democratic methods and hence, if one wants to, condemn it. To do so is not the point here. What is more interesting is the threat perception, which, in the eyes of the actors made these measures acceptable. And one must not doubt that the SDP's (and almost everyone else) *did* view communism as a threat, in more than one sense; they were a threat, not only to national security in the traditional sense, but also to the SDP vision of society – and to the SDP's, the latter was just as bad.

⁸⁷¹ Lampers 2002, pp. 307-309

⁸⁷² Lampers 2002, p. 315. Notice the similarity to Kokk 2001, p. 119

⁸⁷³ 'Her gjaldt princippet "need to know": Nesten ingen visste alt. Ganske få visste noe. De fleste ante ikke – og noen som ante spurte ikke. Det gjaldt både ledere i fremste rekke og nedover i rekkene.' Lund 1996, p. 1027

Obviously, the CP's received orders and finances from a country, whose society was radically different than the Nordic and democratically unacceptable. Moreover, they spoke of this country as an ideal, and revolution as a means of getting there. And obviously such a party – and especially its eastern relations – created fear and uneasiness and was the subject of scrutiny. What is more interesting is whose job it is to keep an eye on them. Strictly speaking, it is a job for the state, not the party – but it is precisely the lack of those lines being drawn, which is interesting – to a large extent because said party already identified so much with the state. Moreover, the special historic relationship between communists and social democrats gave the latter a sense of prerogative in fighting the former.

As Lie's biographer points out, Lie (and, one might add, the other secretaries with him) found communists to be a direct threat to the nation as a democracy and independent state. This was not used as some far-fetched rationalisation but perceived as something that made most means necessary and even natural. Hence securitisation was not done just for the sake of it: it was a consequence of real fear. But while the fear was real, there is no doubt that the social democrats were also quick to take advantage of the situation. As they always were, whenever a chance to demonise the communists presented itself.⁸⁷⁴

At the same time, Lie later in life stated that the fight against the communists had primarily been a fight for power and control in the labour movement.⁸⁷⁵ Whether or not the battle was mostly about security or labour movement domination is hard to say, especially in those years where it was mixed up. And that might be exactly the point: the battle for labour hegemony and state security was as mixed up as party and state interests.

One thing is true: the battle for the labour movement had gone on, and went on both before and after securitisation came and went. But another thing is also true: the 'securitised years' are those in which the battle was fiercest.

Bergh and Eriksen concludes that the activities in Norway (which was largely the same as in Denmark and Sweden) were not a special social democratic feature, as using the security services to battle communists was also seen in countries with conservative or right wing governments. It is true that right wing governments also viewed CP's as a security threat; and obviously a state, no matter what the leadership, uses its security service to check such threats.

However, I still beg to differ: the party-political battle against communism was a special social democratic feature. However anti-communist, no conservative or right wing-party in

⁸⁷⁴ Point also made by Lahlum 2009, p. 274

⁸⁷⁵ Lahlum 2009, pp. 292, 363

Scandinavia, or Europe, had a special conflict with communism going back to the 1920's, and none of them used nearly the amounts of work or finances that went into it. Right wing parties were not tangled up in a battle to represent the labourer – and right wing parties did not have vast organisational apparatuses designed, in part, to combat communism or a labour movement as their siamese twin. Right wing parties hadn't hands-on experience with communists, and hence, an extensive knowledge about them to pass on to the security services.

The SDP's had a stake in the battle that right wing parties didn't: they bore the brunt of the fight against communism and had done so since before the war. It is not likely that any right wing party to the same extent would have adapted security service information into their party-political work, simply because this work did not involve a fight for the hegemony in the labour movement. This is probably also, as mentioned earlier, why the social democrats felt a special prerogative, another self-entitlement, in this battle.

Being 'the state party' didn't just mean connections to security services; it also meant connections within ministries and officials, which were as much a force and an advantage in keeping informed. Reports on communist problems in other countries were available to the party secretaries and they had the ear of the countries' leaders. When social democratic PM's went to the Soviet Union and stated that they were there only on behalf of the state, not the party, it was not entirely true: because the party secretaries also received an exchanged the information from these trips. The secretaries could partake in the benefits of the party as well as the state apparatus.

Finland and Iceland stood out. It is noteworthy that the countries with the most communist problems were also the countries that were not social democratic states. But as far as causality goes, we do not know which situation affected the other.

A question related to the Finnish and Icelandic situations is; was it the work of the SDP's that killed communism or would it have died on it's own? Obviously, the actors like to think the first. Lie's biographer concludes that communism would have died anyway.⁸⁷⁶ This author is inclined to agree, although it might have taken longer without the social democrats. It is curious that as the Cold War dragged on, the overall security situation of Finland and Iceland didn't change markedly – the Scandinavians even lost a bit of interest in trying to intervene. It looks as if they lost the conviction that hell would break loose if the communists were not contained – as time passed and hell didn't break loose. Communism didn't die there (in the early Cold War anyway) – but it didn't bring about a *coup d'état* either.

THE PARTY SECRETARY MEETINGS

No, it is not easy being a party secretary, Oluf. We have to keep the organisations alive and make sure that the members feel that they are fighting for something. But at the same time, we have to keep ourselves nicely in line.⁸⁷⁷

Haakon Lie to Oluf Carlsson, 1956

Party secretary meetings were a logical consequence of the tradition of the Nordic labour movements to discuss common problems. And communism was a common problem.

Communism was traditionally an organisational problem, and since the party secretaries were responsible for organisational matters, it was only natural that communism fell under their area of expertise. In the long run, and after securitisation set in, it proved to be an advantage that party secretaries dealt with communism: they were not bound by governmental responsibility. They could tend to their business without being held responsible by parliament.⁸⁷⁸ This had the further advantage that those running the government didn't need to know all that was going on.

The network was always there – it was bound together by ideological conformity and the common cause. But when times got uncertain, it tightened. It was with securitisation that the party secretaries started meeting regularly. And security issues set part of the agenda. All the regular participants were part of a movement that had contacts to state security circles, and in the first couple of years, this was an integral part of the cooperation. Furthermore, three of the regular participants were also governing parties, which sometimes showed in the sense that they discussed not only the problems of the movement, but of the state as well.

SAMAK quickly became an unfitting forum in which to discuss communism; and hence the party secretary meetings became the core of anti-communist cooperation in the labour movement.

⁸⁷⁶ Lahlum 2009, p. 363-364.

⁸⁷⁷ 'Nei, det er ikke alltid så lett a være partisekretær, Oluf. Vi skal holde liv i organisasjonene og sørge for at medlemmene har følelsen av at de kjemper for noe. Men samtidig skal vi holde oss pent på matta.' Lie to Carlsson, 15 February 1956. AAB 1001, Da, L0112, Danmark

⁸⁷⁸ Lahlum 2009, p. 23

Also in this venture, the Scandinavian countries were the core of the cooperation. The Finns were represented all the way through, but by different people (though always trusted people), and their problems surpassed those of the others. The information they brought with them went far beyond party strategy and one can only assume that their information was extremely valuable for those neighbours who feared the state of events in Finland, and the effect it could have on themselves.

In this cooperation, Finland, though not a core country, was certainly no odd one out, either. While its problems differed from those of the Scandinavians, they held on to this cooperation as one of many ways to stay integrated in Norden, and in a wider sense, the West. Debating security issues under the cover of 'organisational matters' must have been a welcome forum in which they could freely share their worries and suspicions.

The true 'odd one out' in the party secretary cooperation was the Icelanders. Once again, geography and finances kept them from closer integration, but there was something else: although we do not know for sure, it does not seem that party and state intelligence cooperated – something which the Finns managed, even though not being in government. In Iceland, problems were of a whole different kind; Americans were the intruders, and communists gained popularity by incorporating a narrative of national independence. Something they could do to a larger extent than the other Nordic CP's, since they were not members of the Cominform. It seems that Icelandic social democrats never really succeeded in explaining, even to their own members, why communism should be fought tooth and nail.

This, too, became increasingly hard for the Scandinavians. While the network and the party organisation had been at its strongest in the heyday of threat, it began to fall apart when the threat started to dissolve. Both in terms of security and organisation, the communists became increasingly toothless, culminating in the massive unpopularity they called upon themselves by supporting the Soviet invasion of Hungary.

As the threat (perception) dissolved, so did the efforts. New problems appeared, and a new generation of social democrats began questioning the blind discipline demanded by the 'old' guard'. Ideological conformity within the corporation was no longer a question of the movements' (or even the state's) survival. The social democratic vision – the welfare state – was well on its way to being fully realised, and no small group of communists was likely to stand in the way. The party secretaries began taking more interest in other political questions and the close-knit group they had formed also disintegrated. The Nordic secretary network was, to a large extent actor-driven. Obviously, the actors acted the way they did because of the

circumstances they were embedded in; but personalities such as Haakon Lie, Urban Hansen, Väinö Leskinen and Paul Björk made the cooperation come alive: they were the driving force behind domestic communist-fighting and its coordination with the *brethren people*.

I started off by quoting Hedin for stating that the primary function of the network is exchange of resources and information (see page 29). As we have seen, nothing could be truer for the party secretaries.

We know that state-party cooperation against communism continued in each of the Scandinavian countries for some time, but seemingly it became more specialised, and indeed in the case of Sweden and Norway, more illegal. Perhaps there was a limit even to what one could share with one's Norse brothers. Or perhaps the problems were now so localised that a cooperation across the borders was no longer needed – except in the Northern Cap.

NORSE BROTHERS *AND* BROTHERS IN ARMS?

Just good friends. This is not only the name of a 1980s pop song, but a common characteristic of the Nordic countries' security relation. New research is questioning this old wisdom, as we learn more and more about secret (especially Scandinavian) defence and intelligence links during the Cold War. Already here, it might be more fitting, if we extend the description to include the lines that come before: 'If they ask you, just *tell them* that we're just good friends.' (My italics)

The puzzle of the Nordic countries' security orientation during the Cold War is being re-arranged in these days. New research keeps adding pieces to a picture, which is changing before our eyes. This investigation is an attempt to add such a piece. We have learned of military and intelligence cooperation between primarily the Scandinavian countries. We now know (!) also of cooperation between key figures of the governing parties, against an enemy to both themselves and the state that they governed. SDP's were tangled up in national security to a wider extent than that of an 'ordinary' governing party. The lines between state and party not only blurred nationally, but transnationally, as the Nordic SDP's took their state-private networks and applied them in a new setting: the Nordic.

In the introduction, I stated with Buzan et.al. that the security sectors applied in this thesis were the political and societal. These, as any security, are about preserving and

promoting core values, which in the political and societal sectors were not only a pragmatic and law-regulated democracy, but also the welfare state and its promises of equality, individual rights and prosperity. These core values; and hence political and societal notions of security were shared by all of the Nordic countries' labour movements (and hence, in Scandinavia, the countries), and were obvious areas for cooperation. This cooperation took place not only in building up society, but also in fighting the internal threats. The Nordic countries also shared threat perception: communism was viewed as a threat to every core value the social democrats held, and hence also political and societal security. It is only natural that they would cooperate in fighting it as well. The fight for hegemony in the labour movement was *also* a struggle to define the core values and structure of society. In that sense, the battle for the labour movement was also, in the last instance, a battle for political and societal security.

The party secretary gatherings were not solely strategy meetings in order to coordinate the battle in the unions – they were also coordination and exchange of national security issues, made possible by the SDP's unique position as the 'parties of the state'.

The Nordic *brethren people* were not only brothers; they were *also* brothers in arms.

Literature

- Adler, Emanuel, and M. Barnett. "Taking Identity and Our Critics Seriously." *Cooperation and Conflict* 35, no. 3 (2000): 321-329.
- Adler, Emanuel, and Michael Barnett, eds. *Security communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Agrell, Wilhelm. *Den stora lögnen: ett säkerhetspolitiskt dubbelspel i alltför många akter*. Ordfronts förlag, 1991.
- Agrell, Wilhelm. *Fred och fruktan : Sveriges säkerhetspolitiska historia 1918-2000*. Lund: Historiska media, 2000.
- Andersen, Mads Lykke, Jonathan Reinhardt, Charlotte Rosen, and Peer Henrik Hansen. "AIC, efterretningstjenesteren og begyndelsen af den kolde krig." *Arbejderhistorie*, no. 2 (2009): 18-34.
- Andren, Nils. "Sweden's security policy." In *Five roads to Nordic security*, edited by Johan Jørgen Holst, 127-153. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973.
- Andresen, Frederik Anton. "Norden sett i sovjetisk synsvinkel." *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 2-3 (1964): 208-232.
- Andrén, Nils. "Changing Strategic Perspectives in Northern Europe." In *Foreign policies of Northern Europe*, edited by Bengt Sundelius, 73-106. Westview Press, 1982.
- Andrén, Nils. *Den Nordiska balansens framtid*. Stockholm: Centralförbundet Folk och Försvar, 1976.
- Andrén, Nils. "Nordic Integration." *Cooperation and Conflict* 2, no. 1 (1967): 1 -25.
- Andrén, Nils. "Nordic Integration and Cooperation — Illusion and Reality." *Cooperation and Conflict* 19, no. 4 (1984): 251 -262.
- Appelius, Stefan. *Heine: die SPD und der lange Weg zur Macht*. Essen: Klartext, 1999.
- Archer, Clive. "The Nordic Area as a 'Zone of Peace'." *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 4 (1996): 451 -467.
- Aronsson, Peter. "Local Politics - The Invisible Political Culture." In *The Cultural Construction of Norden*, edited by Bo Stråth and Øystein Sørensen, 172-205. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997.
- Arter, David. *Scandinavian politics today*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999.
- Arter, David. "Social Democracy in a West European Outpost: The Case of the Finnish SDP." *Polity* 12, no. 3 (1980): 363-387.
- Aspling, Sven. *Med Erlander och Palme: Sven Aspling berättar för Arvid Lagercrantz*. 1. uppl. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg, 1999.
- Aspling, Sven. "Sverige under 100 år. Vägen till folkhemmet." In *De nordiska arbetarekongresserna under 100 år: arbetarrörelsens framväxt och utveckling i de nordiska länderna*, 233-377. Stockholm: SAMAK, 1986.
- Aunesluoma, Juhana. *From war to cold war : Anglo-Finnish relations in the 20th century*. Helsinki: SKS Finnish Literature Society, 2006.

- Aunesluoma, Juhana, Magnus Petersson, and Charles Silva. "Deterrence or Reassurance? Nordic Responses to the First Détente, 1953-1956." *Scandinavian Journal of History* 32, no. 2 (2007): 183-208.
- Berdal, Mats R. *The United States, Norway and the Cold War, 1954-60*. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997.
- Berger, Stefan. "'Organising Talent and Disciplined Steadiness': The German SDP as a Model for the British Labour Party in the 1920s?" *Contemporary European History* 5, no. 2 (1996): 171-190.
- Bergh, Trond, and Knut Einar Eriksen. *Den hemmelige krigen: overvåking i Norge 1914-1997. Bd 1, Overvåkningssystemet bygges opp 1914-1955*. Oslo: Cappelen, 1997.
- Bergh, Trond, and Knut Einar Eriksen. *Den hemmelige krigen: overvåking i Norge 1914-1997. Bd 2, Storhetstid og stormkast 1955-1997*. Oslo: Cappelen, 1998.
- Berlin, John Daniel. "Andreas Andersen: outsider i maktens høyborg. En utenrikspolitisk biografi". Universitetet i Oslo, 2007.
- Bernstein, Eduard. *Sosialismens forutsetninger*. Oslo: Pax Forlag A/S, 1973.
- Beukel, Erik. "Hvad er sikkerhedspolitik." *Politica* 14, no. 3 (1982): 6-28.
- Beyer-Thoma, Hermann. *Kommunisten und Sozialdemokraten in Finnland 1944-1948*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harassowitz, 1990.
- Bjereld, Ulf, and Ann-Marie Ekengren. "Cold War Historiography in Sweden." In *The cold war - and the Nordic countries: historiography at a crossroads*, edited by Thorsten Borring Olesen, 143-175. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004.
- Björk, Kaj. *Kallt krig. Människor och idéer*. Stockholm: Tidens Förlag, 1990.
- Björk, Paul. *Remote control: Swedish socialdemocracy looks at communism*. Stockholm: The ECA Special Mission to Sweden, 1950.
- Bjørlo, Stein. "Et bål av vilje. Haakon Lie - et portrett." In *Arbeiderhistorie. Årbok for Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek*. Oslo: ARBARK, 2005.
- Bjørnsson, Iben. *Arbejderbevægelsens Informations-Central. Socialdemokratiets kamp mod kommunismen 1944-1973*. København: SFAH, 2012.
- Bjørnsson, Iben. "The Information Research Department – i grænselandet mellem information og efterretning under den kolde krig." *Arbejderhistorie*, no. 2 (2008): 33-50.
- Blidberg, Kersti. "Ideologi och pragmatism – samarbetet inom nordisk socialdemokratisk arbetarrörelse 1930-1955." *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 69-70 (1994): 132-150.
- Blidberg, Kersti. *Just good friends: Nordic social democracy and security policy 1945-50*. Forsvarshistorisk forskningscenter, 1987.
- Blidberg, Kersti. "Socialdemokratin och Norden – synpunkter ur ett nordiskt samarbetsperspektiv." In *Socialdemokratin och svensk utrikespolitik : från Branting till Palme*, edited by Bo Huldt and Klaus Misgeld, 184-194. Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska institutet, 1990.
- Blidberg, Kersti. *Splittrad gemenskap : kontakter och samarbete inom nordisk socialdemokratisk arbetarrörelse 1931-1945*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell international, 1984.
- Boel, Bent. *The European Productivity Agency and Transatlantic Relations 1953-1961*. Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2003.
- Borgersrud, Lars. *Fiendebilde Wollweber: svart propaganda i kald krig*. Oslo: Oktober, 2001.

- Brands, H. W. "The Idea of the National Interest." *Diplomatic History* 23, no. 2 (1999): 239-261.
- Brandt, Willy. *Erindringer*. København: Munksgaard, 1990.
- Brandt, Willy. *Min vej til Berlin*. København: Schønberg, 1970.
- Brandt, Willy. *Norden i Nürnberg*. Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska institutet, 1946.
- Brandt, Willy. *Norge ockuperat och fritt*. Stockholm: Kooperativa förbundet, 1943.
- Brandt, Willy. *Norwegens Friheitskampf 1940-1945*. Hamburg: Verlagsanstalt Auerdruck, 1948.
- Brandt, Willy. *Nürnberg - Norge - Dommen*. Oslo, 1946.
- Brandt, Willy, and Sven Åhman. *Att ta parti för friheten : min väg 1930-1950*. Stockholm: Norstedt, 1983.
- Bratt, Peter, and Jan Guillou. "Hur IB kom till." *FiB/Kulturfront* 2, no. 9 (1973).
- Bratt, Peter, and Jan Guillou. "SAP och spionaget." *FiB/Kulturfront* 2, no. 17 (1973).
- Bruhn Henriksen, Christian. "HIPA - propaganda- eller efterretningsorganisation?" *Arbejderhistorie*, no. 1 (2007): 1-19.
- Brundtland, Arne Olav. "Hvorfor ikke skandinavisk forsvarsforbund?" *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 2-3 (1964): 179-198.
- Brundtland, Arne Olav. "Nordisk balanse på nytt." *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 3 (1976): 599-639.
- Brundtland, Arne Olav. "The Nordic Balance." *Cooperation and Conflict* 30-63, no. 2 (1966).
- Buschfort, Wolfgang. *Das Ostbüro der SPD : von der Gründung bis zur Berlin-Krise*. München: Oldenbourg, 1991.
- Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.
- Bye, Ronald. *Sersjanten: makt og miljø på Youngstorget*. Oslo: Gyldendal, 1987.
- Bye, Ronald, Finn Sjøe, and Alf R. Jacobsen. *De visste alt: en dokumentasjon om niende etasje*. Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1993.
- Carew, Anthony. *Labour under the Marshall Plan: the politics of productivity and the marketing of management science*. Wayne State University Press, 1987.
- Carew, Anthony. "The politics of productivity and the politics of anti-communism: American and European labour in the Cold War." *Intelligence and National Security* 18, no. 2 (2003): 73-91.
- Carlton, Frank T. "Labor Policies for the Struggle with Soviet Communism." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 18, no. 3 (1959): 277-284. [.dk/stable/3484757](https://doi.org/10.2307/3484757).
- Christiansen, Niels Finn. "Socialdemokratiets fællesskabstænkning i 1930erne." In *Folk og fællesskab*, edited by Cecilie Felicia Stockholm Banke, 84-89. København: DIIS, 2001.
- Christiansen, Peter Munk. "Leif Lewin, Samhället och de organiserade intressena, Stockholm: Norstedts, 1992, 135 s.; Bö Rothstein, Den korporativa staten., Stockholm: Nordstedts, 1992, 374 s." *Politica* 23, no. 4 (1992): 439-441.
- Christmas-Møller, Wilhelm. *Obersten og kommandøren: efterretningstjeneste, sikkerhedspolitik og socialdemokrati 1945-1955*. København: Gyldendal, 1995.

- Christophersen, Jens A. "Norden i den europeiske maktbalanse." *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 2–3 (1964): 138-178.
- Cox, Robert W. "Labor and Transnational Relations." *International Organization* 25, no. 3 (1971): 554-584.
- Cronqvist, Marie. "Fula fisken och stenansiktet: Spiontypologi och kallakrigsberättelse i 1950-talets folkhemsgemenskap." In *Hotad idyll: berättelser om svenskt folkhem och kallt krig*, edited by Kim Salomon, Lisbeth Larsson, and Håkan Arvidsson, 57-80. Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2004.
- Cummings, Bruce. "'Revising Postrevisionism,' or, The Poverty of Theory in Diplomatic History." *Diplomatic History* 17, no. 4 (1993): 539-570.
- Dahl, Ann-Sofie. *US policy in the Nordic-Baltic region : during the cold war and after*. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press, 2008.
- Dalsjö, Robert. *Life-Line Lost: The Rise and Fall of "Neutral" Sweden's Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the West*. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press Sweden, 2006.
- Dalsjö, Robert. "Tung vägande kritik? En granskning av kritik mot teorin om nordisk balans." *Militärhistorisk Tidsskrift* 9 (1987): 131-185.
- Danielsen, Tore M. "The Security Choices of the Scandinavian Countries 1948-1948." In *Hett och kallt - Tre studier i svensk säkerhetspolitik och strategi gentemot västmakterna i början av det kalla kriget*, edited by Kent Zetterberg, 13-72. Stockholm: Forsvarshögskolan, 1999.
- Danmark under den kolde krig: den sikkerhetspolitiske situation 1945 - 1991*. København: DUPI, 2005
- Dansk Og Europæisk Sikkerhed*. København: DUPI/SNU, 1995.
- De nordiska arbetarekongresserna under 100 år : arbetarrörelsens framväxt och utveckling i de nordiska länderna*. Stockholm: SAMAK, 1986.
- "De nordiske fællesskaber: myte og realitet i det nordiske samarbejde." *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 69–70 (1994).
- Deutsch, Karl. "Security Communities." In *International politics and foreign policy : a reader in research and theory.*, edited by James Rosenau, 98-105. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961.
- Deutsch et.al., Karl. *Political community and the North Atlantic area: international organization in light of historical experience*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957.
- Durkheim, Émile. *The division of labor in society*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1933.
- Ekberg, Gunnar. *De ska ju ändå dö: tio år i svensk underrättelsetjänst*. Stockholm: Fischer & Co,
- Ekeland, Arne. "Finlands sikkerhetspolitikk og den nordiske balanse." *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 2–3 (1964): 315-333.
- Eliasson, Ulf. *Politisk övervakning och personalkontroll 1945-1969 : säkerhetspolisens medverkan i den politiska personalkontrollen : forskarrapport till Säkerhetstjänstkommissionen*. Stockholm: Fritzes offentliga publikationer, 2002.
- Engelbrekt, Kjell. "The Social Construction of Swedish Neutrality: Challenges to Swedish Identity and Sovereignty/Life-Line Lost: the Rise and Fall of 'Neutral' Sweden's Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help From the West." *Journal of Cold War History* 11, no. 1 (2009): 154-157.
- Enggaard, Knud. *50 år Nordisk Råd 1952-2002: til nordisk nytte?* Nordisk Råd, 2002.

- Engh, Sunniva, and Helge Pharo. "Nordic cooperation in providing development aid." In *Regional Cooperation and International Organizations. The Nordic model in transnational alignment*, edited by Norbert Götz and Heidi Haggrén, 112-130. London: Routledge, 2009.
- Engmand, Max. "Är Finland ett nordiskt land?" *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 69–70 (1994): 62-78.
- Eriksen, Knut Einar, and Helge Øystein Pharo. *Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie. Bd 5, Kald krig og internasjonalisering : 1949-1965*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997.
- Erlander, Tage, and Sven Erlander. *Dagböcker. 1945-1949*. Hedemora: Gidlund, 2001 (2001a).
- Erlander, Tage, and Sven Erlander. *Dagböcker. 1950-1951*. Hedemora: Gidlund, 2001 (2001b).
- Erlander, Tage, and Sven Erlander. *Dagböcker. 1952*. Hedemora: Gidlund, 2002.
- Erlander, Tage, and Sven Erlander. *Dagböcker. 1953*. Hedemora: Gidlund, 2003.
- Erlander, Tage, and Sven Erlander. *Dagböcker. 1954*. Hedemora: Gidlund, 2004.
- Erlander, Tage, and Sven Erlander. *Dagböcker. 1955*. Hedemora: Gidlund, 2005.
- Erlander, Tage, and Sven Erlander. *Dagböcker. 1957*. Hedemora: Gidlund, 2007.
- Erlander, Tage, and Sven Erlander. *Dagböcker. 1958*. Hedemora: Gidlund, 2008.
- Erlander, Tage, and Sven Erlander. *Dagböcker. 1959*. Hedemora: Gidlund, 2009.
- Esping-Andersen, Gosta, and Kees van Kersbergen. "Contemporary research on Social Democracy." *Annual Review of Sociology* 18 (1992): 187-208.
- Von Essen, Sarah. "NATO sikrer freden. Atlantsammenslutningen oprettelse og tidlige virke." *Arbejderhistorie*, no. 1 (2001): 38-54.
- Evans, Graham, and Jeffrey Newnham. *The Penguin dictionary of international relations*. London: Penguin Books, 1998.
- Flådestrategier og nordisk sikkerhedspolitik*. København: SNU, 1986.
- Fowkes, Ben. *The rise and fall of communism in Eastern Europe*. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995.
- Friðriksson, Thorleifur. *Den gyldne flue: De skandinaviske socialdemokratiers relationer til den islandske arbejderbevægelse 1916-56 : internationalisme eller indblanding?* København: SFAH, 1990.
- Frisch, Hartvig. *Pest over Europa. Bolschevisme - Fascisme - Nazisme*. København: Henrik Koppels Forlag, 1933.
- Friðriksson, Thorleifur. "Economic assistance from the Nordic social democratic parties to Icelandic social democracy, 1918–1939: Internationalism or manipulation?" *Scandinavian Journal of History* 13, no. 2 (1988): 141.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War." *International Security* 17, no. 3 (1992-1993): 5-58
- Gaddis, John Lewis. "The Corporatist Synthesis: A Skeptical View." *Diplomatic History* 10, no. 4 (1986): 357-362.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War." *Diplomatic History* 7, no. 3 (1983): 171-190.
- Gardner, Lloyd C. "Responses to John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War'." *Diplomatic History* 7, no. 3 (1983): 191-204.

- Gerhardsen, Einar. *I medgang og motgang: Erindringer 1955-65*. Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forl., 1972.
- Gerhardsen, Einar. *Samarbeid og strid: Erindringer 1945-55*. Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forl., 1971.
- Gerhardsen, Tron. *Einar og Haakon, Rolf og jeg: fra Arbeiderpartiets indre liv*. Oslo: Aschehoug, 2009.
- Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Bjørn Møller, Håkan Wiberg, and Ole Wæver. *Svaner på vildveje?: Nordens sikkerhed mellem supermagtsflåder og europæisk ...* Vindrose, 1990.
- Gottlieb, Henning, Bertel Heurlin, and Jørgen Teglers. *Fred og konflikt*. København: SNU, 1991.
- Grelle, Henning. "AIC – propaganda- eller efterretningsorganisation?" In *Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv. Årsskrift 1998*, 30-37. Copenhagen: ABA, 1999.
- Gustafsson, Harald. *Nordens historia : en europeisk region under 1200 år*. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2007.
- Hanhimäki, Jussi M. *Scandinavia and the United States: an insecure friendship*. New York, N.Y.: Twayne, 1997.
- Hansen, Hans. *Kommunisterne splitter: Et Opgør med de kommunistiske Splittelsesmænd paa Grundlag af officielle Aktstykker*. København: Fremad, 1933.
- Hansen, Svein Olav. "Foreningene Norden 1919-94 – ambisjoner og virkelighet." *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 69–70 (1994): 114-131.
- Hansson, Per Albin. *Demokrati: tal och uppsatser*. Stockholm: Tiden, 1935.
- Hansteen, Wilhelm. "Hvilken rolle spiller de nordiske land, samlet og enkeltvis, for vestmaktene og hvilken interesse har disse av å holde dem utenfor en øst-vest konflikt?" *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 2–3 (1964): 199-207.
- Haskel, Barbara G. *The Scandinavian option : opportunities and opportunity costs in postwar Scandinavian foreign policies*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1976.
- Hedin, Astrid. *The politics of social networks : interpersonal trust and institutional change in post-communist East Germany*. Lund: University, Dept. of Political Science [Statsvetenskapliga institutionen], 2001.
- Heiberg, Morten. *Stay-behind og Firmaet. Efterretningsvæsen og private antikommunistiske organisationer i Danmark 1945-1989. Pet-kommissionens beretning, bind 5*. København: Justitsministeriet, 2009.
- Helenius, Henrik. "Socialdemokratin i Finland – klasskamp och Consensus." In *De nordiska arbetarekongresserna under 100 år: arbetarrörelsens framväxt och utveckling i de nordiska länderna*, 151-175. Stockholm: SAMAK, 1986.
- Helkama-Rågård, Anna Katarina. "Det röda hotet från Finland. De finska kommunisterna som ett svenskt säkerhetsproblem 1944-1975". Helsinki University, 2005.
- Hemstad, Ruth. *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter. Skandinavisk samarbeid, skandinavisme og unionsoppløsningen*. Oslo: Akademisk Publiserings, 2008.
- Hemstad, Ruth. "Scandinavianism, Nordic Co-operation and 'Nordic Democracy'." In *Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy*, edited by Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang, 179-193. Helsinki: Studia Fennica Historia, 2010.
- Heurlin, Bertel. *Global, regional and national security*. København: DIIS, 2001.
- Heurlin, Bertel, and Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut. *Danish security policy over the last 50 years: long-term essential security priorities*. København: DUPI, 2001.

- Hilson, Mary. *The Nordic model : Scandinavia since 1945*. London: Reaktion, 2008.
- Hjartarson, Stefán F. *Kampen om fackföreningsrörelsen : ideologi och politisk aktivitet på Island 1920-1938*. Uppsala: University, 1989.
- Hjort, Magnus. "*Nationens livsfråga*" : *propaganda och upplysning i försvarets tjänst 1944-1963*. Stockholm: Santérus, 2004.
- Hogan, Michael J. *America in the world : the historiography of American foreign relations since 1941*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Hogan, Michael J. "Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal." *Diplomatic History* 10, no. 4 (1986): 363-372.
- Hogan, Michael J., and Thomas G. Paterson. *Explaining the history of American foreign relations*. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Hogan, Michael J. *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*. Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Holmström, Mikael. *Den dolda alliancen. Sveriges hemliga NATO-förbindelser*. Stockholm: Atlantis, 2011.
- Holst, Johan Jørgen. *Five roads to Nordic security*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1973.
- Holst, Johan Jørgen. "Noen tanker om norsk sikkerhetspolitikk." *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 2-3 (1964): 351-368.
- Holst, Johan Jørgen. *Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk i strategisk perspektiv, bind I*. Oslo: NUPI, 1967.
- Holst, Johan Jørgen. "The Pattern of Nordic Security." *Daedalus* 113, no. 2 (1984): 195-225.
- Holtmark, Sven G. "Udenlandsk finansiering af de nordiske kommunistpartier, 1917-1990." In *Guldet fra Moskva. Finansieringen af de nordiske kommunistpartier 1917-1990*, edited by Morten Thing, 9-41. København: Forum, 2001.
- Hovbakke Sørensen, Lars. *Nordenforestillinger i dansk politik 1945-1968*. Århus: Historia, 2005.
- Hovbakke Sørensen, Lars. *Slagsbrødre eller broderfolk : Nordens historie gennem 1300 år*. København: Aschehoug, 2004.
- Hur enigheten torpederades: enhetsförhandlingarna mellan socialdemokrater och kommunister i Norge och Danmark*. Stockholm: Tiden, 1945.
- Hägglund, Gustav. "Strategisk utveckling i Norden." In *Flådestrategier og nordisk sikkerhedspolitik*, 2, 41-54. København: SNU, 1986.
- Ingebritsen, Christine. "Norm Entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's Role in World Politics." *Cooperation and Conflict* 37, no. 1 (2002): 11-23.
- Ingebritsen, Christine. *Scandinavia in world politics*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006.
- Ingimundarsson, Valur. "Post-Cold War Historiography in Iceland." In *The cold war - and the Nordic countries: historiography at a crossroads*, edited by Thorsten Borring Olesen, 83-96. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004.
- Insall, Tony. *Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an Anglo-Norwegian Special Relationship 1945-1951*. Oslo Academic Press, 2010.
- Isungset, Odd and Morten Jentoft. *Verkebyllen : om menneskeskjebner og agenter i kald krig*. Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forl., 1995.

- Jansen, Trine S. "Komintern og dannelsen av de skandinaviske kommunistpartier." *Arbejderhistorie*, no. 3 (2003): 20-44.
- Jenssen, Lars Christian, and Olav Riste. *Intelligence in the Cold War: organisation: role: international cooperation*. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2001.
- Jervis, Robert. "Security regimes." *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (1982): 357-378.
- Johannesson, Kurt. "Agitatoren som hot och ideal." In *Agitatorerna*, edited by Kurt Johannesson, 10-49. Stockholm: Carlssons, 1996.
- Johannesson, Kurt, ed. *Agitatorerne. Arbetarrörelsen och språket, 1*. Stockholm: Carlssons, 1996.
- Johansen, Viggo, Pål T. Jørgensen, and Finn Sjøe. *Vi som styrer Norge: Arbeiderpartiet og de hemmelige tjenestene*. Oslo: Aventura, 1992.
- Jul Nielsen, Niels. *Mellem storpolitik og værkstedsgulv*. København: Museum Tusulanum, 2004.
- Jungar, Sune, and Bent Jensen. *Sovjetunionen och Norden : konflikt, kontakt, influenser*. Helsingfors: FHS, 1997.
- Kanger, Thomas, and Jonas Gummesson. *Kommunistjägarna : socialdemokraternas politiska spioneri mot svenska folket*. Stockholm: Ordfront, 1990.
- Kihlberg, Leif. *Den ryska agenturen i Sverige*. Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & Söners Förlag, 1950.
- Kirby, D. G. *Finland in the twentieth century*. London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1979.
- Kirby, David. "The Finnish Social Democratic Party and the Bolsheviks." *Journal of Contemporary History* 11, no. 2/3 (1976): 99-113.
- Kjartansson, Helgi Skúli. "Íslands arbeiderbevegelse og sosialdemokraterne." In *De nordiska arbetarekongresserna under 100 år: arbetarrörelsens framväxt och utveckling i de nordiska länderna*, 195-212. Stockholm: SAMAK, 1986.
- Kjeldstadli, Knut. *DNA - fra folkebevegelse til statsstøtte*. Oslo: Pax, 1973.
- Knudsen, Dino. *Amerikaniseringen af den danske fagbevægelse: Marshallhjælp, kold krig og transatlantiske forbindelser, 1945-56*. København: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2012.
- Koikkalainen, Petri. "From Agrarian Republicanism to the Politics of Neutrality." In *Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy*, edited by Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang, 238-261. Helsinki: Studia Fennica Historia, 2010.
- Kokk, Enn. *Vitbok: militärens hemliga nätverk i arbetarrörelsen*. Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg, 2001.
- Kosningaskýrslur. Fyrsta bindi 1874-1946 + Annad bindi 1949-1987*. Reykjavík: Hagstofa Íslands 1988
- Krabbendam, Hans, and Giles Scott-Smith. "Introduction: boundaries to freedom." *Intelligence and National Security* 18, no. 2 (2003): 1.
- Kronvall, Olof. *Den bräckliga barriären: Finland i svensk säkerhetspolitik 1948-1962*. Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan, 2003.
- Kurunmäki, Jussi. "'Nordic Democracy' in 1935. On the Finnish and Swedish Rhetoric of Democracy." In *Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy*, edited by Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang, 37-82. Helsinki: Studia Fennica Historia, 2010.
- Kurunmäki, Jussi, and Johan Strang, eds. *Rhetorics of Nordic democracy*. Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2010.

- Kuusisto, Allan A. "The Paasikivi Line in Finland's Foreign Policy." *The Western Political Quarterly* 12, no. 1 (1959): 37-49.
- Kvam Jr., Ragnar. *DNA mot splittelse. Dan venstrefløyen ble ekskludert og SF stiftet*. Oslo: Cappelen, 1973.
- LaFeber, Walter. "The Tension between Democracy and Capitalism during the American Century." *Diplomatic History* 23, no. 2 (1999): 263-284.
- Lahlum, Hans Olav. *Haakon Lie: historien, mytene og menesket*. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2009.
- Lahtinen, Esa. "Finnish Participation in Co-operation within the Nordic Labour Movement, 1880-1918." *Scandinavian Journal of History* 13, no. 1 (1988): 23-28.
- Lampers, Lars Olof. *Det grå brödrskapet : en berättelse om IB : forskarrapport till Säkerhetstjänstkommissionen (SOU 2002:92)*. Stockholm: Fritzes Offentliga Publikationer, 2002.
- Larsen-Bjerre, Hans. "Socialdemokratiet i Danmark støt på Nordisk kurs." In *De nordiska arbetarekongresserna under 100 år : arbetarrörelsens framväxt och utveckling i de nordiska länderna*, 117-150. Stockholm: SAMAK, 1986.
- Lauridsen, John T., Rasmus Mariager, Thorsten Borring Olesen, and Poul Villaume, eds. *Den kolde krig og Danmark*. København: Gads Forlag, 2011.
- Laursen, Johnny. *Politiets efterretningstjeneste 1945-1968. PET's grundlæggelse og registreringer på det politiske område 1945-1968. PET-kommisjonenens beretning, bind 2*. København: Justitsministeriet, 2009.
- Laville, Helen, and Hugh Wilford. *The US government, citizen groups and the Cold War: the state-private network*. Routledge, 2006.
- Leffler, Melvyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Stanford University Press, 1993.
- Leffler, Melvyn P. "Cold War and Global Hegemony, 1945-1991." *OAH Magazine of History* 19, no. 2 (March 2005): 65-72.
- Leffler, Melvyn P. "National Security." *The Journal of American History* 77, no. 1 (June 1990): 143-152.
- Leffler, Melvyn P. "New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconfigurations." *Diplomatic History* 19, no. 2 (1995): 173-196.
- Lewin, Leif. *Samhället och de organiserade intressena*. Stockholm: Norstedts/CE Fritzes, 1992.
- Lewin, Leif. "The rise and decline of corporatism: The case of Sweden." *European Journal of Political Research* 26, no. 1 (July 1994): 59-79.
- Lidegaard, Bo. *Jens Otto Krag: 1914 - 1961*. København: Gyldendal, 2003.
- Lie, Haakon. ... *slik jeg ser det*. Oslo: Tiden, 1975.
- Lie, Haakon, Hilde Harbo, and Hans Olav Lahlum. *Slik jeg ser det nå*. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2008.
- Lie, Haakon. *Skjebneår 1945-50*. Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1985.
- Lindberg, Steve. "The Illusory Nordic Balance: Threat Scenarios in Nordic Security Planning." *Cooperation and Conflict* XVI (1981): 57-70.
- Lindbäck-Larsen, Odd. "Konkluderende bemerkninger." *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 2-3 (1964): 343-350. (1964a)

- Lindbäck-Larsen, Odd. "Sverige i den nordiske balanse." *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 2–3 (1964): 307-314. (1964b)
- Lorentz, Einhart. "Komintern." *Leksikon for det 21. århundrede*, 2003. www.leksikon.org – 31 July 2012
- Lucas, Scott. "Beyond freedom, beyond control, beyond the Cold War: approaches to American culture and the state-private network." *Intelligence and National Security* 18, no. 2 (2003): 53-72.
- Lucas, Scott. *Freedom's war: the US crusade against the Soviet Union, 1945-56*. Manchester University Press ND, 1999.
- Lund, Ketil. *Rapport til Stortinget fra kommisjonen som ble nedsatt av Stortinget for å granske påstander om ulovlig overvåking av norske borgere (Lund-rapporten)*. Oslo: Stortinget, 1996.
- Lundestad, Geir. *America, Scandinavia, and the cold war 1945-1949*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1980.
- Lundestad, Geir. "Introduction." In *The cold war - and the Nordic Countries. Historiography at a Crossroads*, edited by Thorsten Borring Olesen, 7-15. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004.
- Löfgren, Ingemar. *Den socialdemokratiska partistyrelsens informationsavdelning under 1930-talet*. Stockholms universitet. Historiska institutionen, 1975.
- Majander, Mikko. "Kommunistisk frontorganisation eller värnare av det västerländska samhällssystemet? Den finska fackföreningsrörelsen i det kalla kriget 1947-51." *Arbetshistoria* 60, no. 4 (1991): 27-31.
- Majander, Mikko. "Med apelsiner mot kommunismen." In *Arbeiderhistorie. Årbok for Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek*, 123-151. Oslo: Arbeiderbevegelsens arkiv og bibliotek, 2009.
- Majander, Mikko. "Post-Cold War Historiography in Finland." In *The cold war - and the Nordic countries: historiography at a crossroads*, edited by Thorsten Borring Olesen, 43-81. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004.
- Majander, Mikko. "The Limits of Sovereignty - Finland and the Question of the Marshall Plan in 1947." *Scandinavian Journal of History* 19, no. 4 (1994): 309-326.
- Majander, Mikko. "Tillbaka till den nordiska gemenskapen. De finska socialdemokraterne och Norden 1944-1948." *Historisk Tidsskrift för Finland* 82, no. 1 (1997): 45-76.
- Mariager, Rasmus. "Den kolde krig i international og dansk historieforskning." In *Den kolde krig og Danmark. Gads Leksikon*, edited by John T. Lauridsen, Rasmus Mariager, Torsten Borring Olesen, and Poul Villaume, 720-746. København: Gads Forlag, 2011.
- Marks, Harry J. "Reformism in the Social Democratic Party of Germany, 1890-1914." *The Journal of Modern History* 11, no. 3 (1939): 334-356.
- McCormick, Thomas J. *America's half-century: United States foreign policy in the Cold War and after*. JHU Press, 1995.
- McCormick, Thomas J. "Drift or Mastery? A Corporatist Synthesis for American Diplomatic History." *Reviews in American History* 10, no. 4 (December 1982): 318-330. ht
- Michels, Robert. *Political parties: a sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1999.
- Midtgaard, Kristine. "Nordic cooperation in the United Nations during the First Cold War. Between internationalism and realpolitik." In *Regional Cooperation and International Organizations. The*

- Nordic model in transnational alignment.*, edited by Norbert Götz and Heidi Haggren, 47-64. London: Routledge, 2009.
- Mills, C. Wright, and Helen Schneider. *The new men of power: America's labor leaders*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1948.
- Mills, C. Wright. *The power elite*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.
- Misgeld, Klaus. "As the Iron Curtain Descended: the Co-ordinating Committee of the Nordic Labour Movement and the Socialist International between Potsdam and Geneva (1945-55)." *Scandinavian Journal of History* 13, no. 1 (1988): 49-63.
- Misgeld, Klaus. "Trade Union Neutrality? The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) and the Trade Union International at the Beginning of the Cold War". Amsterdam: International Institute of Social History, 1998.
- Moberg, Erik. "The 'Nordic Balance' Concept. A Critical Commentary." *Cooperation and Conflict*, no. 3 (1968): 210-213.
- Molin, Karl. *Övervakningen av "SKP-komplexet" : forskarrapport till Säkerhetstjänstkommissionen*. Stockholm: Fritzes offentliga publikationer, 2002.
- Mouritzen, Hans, and Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Institut. *Sikkerhedsfællesskaberne i Norden og EU*. DUPI, 2001.
- Mouritzen, Hans. "The Nordic Model as a Foreign Policy Instrument: Its Rise and Fall." *Journal of Peace Research* 32, no. 1 (February 1995): 9 -21.
- Nevakivi, Jukka. "Finland and the cold war." *Scandinavian Journal of History* 10, no. 3 (1985): 211.
- Nevers, Jeppe. "Reformism and 'Nordic Democracy'. A Journey in Danish Political Thought." In *Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy*, edited by Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang, 165-178. Helsinki: Studia Fennica Historia, 2010.
- Nilsson, Mikael. "Amber Nine: NATO's Secret Use of a Flight Path over Sweden and the Incorporation of Sweden in NATO's Infrastructure." *Journal of Contemporary History* 44, no. 2 (2009): 287 -307.
- Nilsson, Torbjörn. "Scandinavian Liberalism - Prophets instead of Profits." In *The Cultural Construction of Norden*, edited by Bo Stråth and Øystein Sørensen, 206-230. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997.
- Njølstad, Olav. *Jens Chr. Hauge: fullt og helt*. Oslo: Aschehoug, 2008.
- Nordahl, Konrad, and Ketil A. Nordahl. *Dagbøker. Bd 1, 1950-1955*. Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1991.
- Nordahl, Konrad, and Ketil A. Nordahl. *Dagbøker. Bd 2, 1956-1975*. Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 1992.
- Nordby, Trond. *Korporatisme på norsk: 1920-1990*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1994.
- Noreen, Erik. "The Nordic Balance: A Security Policy Concept in Theory and Practice." *Cooperation and Conflict* 18, no. 1 (March 1983): 43 -56.
- Nye, Joseph S. *Soft power: the means to success in world politics*. Public Affairs, 2004.
- Olesen, Thorsten Barring. "Under the national paradigm: Cold War studies and Cold War politics in post-Cold War Norden." *Cold War History* 8, no. 2 (2008): 189-211.
- Olesen, Thorsten Barring. "Brødrefolk men ikke våbenbrødre – diskussionerne om et skandinavisk forsvarsforbund 1948-49." *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 69-70 (1994): 151-178.

- Olesen, Thorsten Barring. *The cold war - and the Nordic countries: historiography at a crossroads*. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004.
- Olesen, Thorsten Barring, and Poul Villaume. *I blokopdelings tegn: 1945-1972*. København: Gyldendal, 2005.
- Olmsted, Mary S. "Communism in Iceland." *Foreign Affairs* 36, no. 2 (January 1958): 340-347.
- Olofsson, Gunnar. *Mellan klass och stat: om arbetarrörelse, reformism och socialdemokrati*. Lund: Arkiv för studier i arbetarrörelsens historia, 1979.
- Olsson, Tom, and Jens Christensen. *Nordisk arbejderbevægelse i mellemkrigstiden : stat, parti og fagbevægelse : rapport fra nordisk konference i arbejderbevægelsens historie på Roskilde Højskole 19-21. april 1979*. København: SFAH, 1980.
- Om kriget kommit... Förberedelser för mottagandet av militärt bistånd 1949-1969: betänkande av Neutralitetspolitikkommisionen. SOU 1994:11*. Stockholm: Fritze, 1994.
- Osgood, Kenneth A. "Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 2 (2002): 85-107.
- Osgood, Kenneth. *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*. University Press of Kansas, 2008.
- Ouchi, William. "Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (March 1980): 129-132.
- Pedersen, Thomas. "Sikkerhedsbegrebet." In *Fred og konflikt*, edited by Henning Gottlieb, Bertel Heurlin, and Jørgen Teglers, 43-54. København: Det Sikkerheds- og nedrustningspolitiske udvalg, 1991.
- Petersen, Klaus, and Rasmus Mariager. "Socialdemokratiet og forholdet til DKP under den første kolde krig." *Arbejderhistorie* 2004, no. 4: 55-76.
- Petersen, Klaus, and Regin Schmidt. "Gemensam nordisk front." *Arbetarhistoria*, no. 4 (2001): 42-46.
- Petersen, Nikolaj. "'We Now Know'. The Nordic Countries and the Cold War: An Assessment." In *The cold war - and the Nordic countries: historiography at a crossroads*, edited by Thorsten Barring Olesen, 177-191. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004.
- Petersson, Magnus. *Brödrafolkens väl: svensk-norska säkerhetsrelationer 1949-69*. Stockholm: Santérus, 2003. (2003a)
- Petersson, Magnus. "Man lär sig ... 'vem man kan hålla i hand när leken blir allvar': Svensk militär underrättelsestjänst och Norge under första delen av de kalla kriget." In *Motströms. Olav Riste og norsk internasjonal historieskrivning*, edited by Sven G. Holtmark, Helge Ø. Pharo, and Rolf Tamnes, 257-294. Oslo: Cappelen, 2003. (2003b)
- Petersson, Magnus. "The Scandinavian Triangle: Danish-Norwegian-Swedish military intelligence cooperation and Swedish security policy during the first part of the Cold War." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29, no. 4 (2006): 607-632.
- Petersson, Magnus. "The theory and practice of the 'Nordic balance' during the 1950s and 60s, with special emphasis on Swedish-Norwegian relations", n.d.
<http://www.lufftarmuseum.no/Engelsk/Research/foredrag/peterson.htm>.
- Pharo, Helge. "Post-Cold War Historiography." In *The cold war - and the Nordic countries: historiography at a crossroads*, edited by Thorsten Barring Olesen, 97-142. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004.

- Pharo, Helge. "The cold war in Norwegian and international historical research." *Scandinavian Journal of History* 10, no. 3 (1985): 163.
- Philipsen, Ingeborg. "The congress for cultural freedom in Denmark." *Intelligence and National Security* 18, no. 2 (2003): 237-253.
- Productivity centers around the world*. Washington, D. C., 1975.
- Redovisning av vissa uppgifter om den militära underrättelse- och säkerhetstjänsten*. Stockholm: Försvarets underrättelsenämnd, 1998.
- Redvaldsen, David. "Haakon Lie, Denis Healey and the Making of an Anglo-Norwegian Special Relationship 1945–1951." *Scandinavian Journal of History* 36, no. 1 (2011): 114.
- Rentola, Kimmo. "From Half-Adversary to Half-Ally: Finland in Soviet Policy, 1953-58." *Cold War History* 1, no. 1 (August 2000): 75-102.
- Richter, Patrik. "Sveriges baspolitik 1951-1953." *Historie*, no. 2 (2005): 310-344.
- Rikets säkerhet och den personliga integriteten : de svenska säkerhetstjänsternas författningsskyddande verksamhet sedan år 1945 : betänkande*. Stockholm: Fritzes offentliga publikationer, 2002.
- Rintala, Marvin. "Vaino Tanner in Finnish Politics." *American Slavic and East European Review* 20, no. 1 (February 1961): 84-98.
- Riste, Olav, and Arnfinn Moland. "*Strengt hemmelig*" : norsk etterretningsteneste 1945-1970. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997.
- Riste, Olav. *The Norwegian intelligence service 1945-1970*. London: Frank Cass, 1999.
- Riste, Olav. "With an eye to history: The origins and development of 'Stay-Behind' in Norway." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30, no. 6 (2007): 997.
- Rohde, Peter P. "The Communist Party of Denmark." In *The Communist Parties of Scandinavia and Finland*, edited by A. F. Upton, 3-33. London: Routledge, 1973.
- Rohde, Peter P. "The Communist Party of Norway." In *The Communist Parties of Scandinavia and Finland*, edited by A. F. Upton, 35-59. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973.
- Rothstein, Bo. "Corporatism and Reformism: The Social Democratic Institutionalization of Class Conflict." *Acta Sociologica* 30, no. 3/4 (1987): 295-311.
- Rothstein, Bo. *Den socialdemokratiska staten : reformer och förvaltning inom svensk arbetsmarknads- och skolpolitik*. Lund: Arkiv, 1986.
- Rudfalk, Ragnar. *Jag jobbade i Sovjet*. Stockholm: Tiden, 1951
- Schmidt, Regin. *PET's overvågning af arbejdsmarkedet 1945-1989. Fra samarbejde til overvågning. AIC, fagbevægelsen og faglige konflikter under den kolde krig. (PET-kommissionens beretning, bind 8)*. København: Justitsministeriet, 2009. (2009a)
- Schmidt, Regin. *PET's overvågning af Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti 1945-1989. PET-kommissionens beretning, bind 6*. København: Justitsministeriet, 2009. (2009b)
- Schmidt, Regin. *PET's overvågning af politiske partier 1945-1989. PET, Folketingets partier og østlig efterretningsaktivitet. PET-kommissionens beretning, bind 7*. København: Justitsministeriet, 2009. (2009c)
- Schmidt, Regin, and Nicoline Nyholm Miller. *PET's virkemidler. Internationalt samarbejde, kildeføring, aflytning, mv. PET-kommissionens beretning, bind 4*. København: Justitsministeriet, 2009.

- Schmitter, Philippe C. "Still the Century of Corporatism?" *The Review of Politics* 36, no. 1 (1974): 85-131.
- Schouenborg, Laust. "The Scandinavian International Society: From Norden to the Northern Dimension?" London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010.
- Schrecker, Ellen. *Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism*. New York: New Press, 2006.
- Schäferhoff, Marco, Sabine Campe, and Christopher Kaan. "Transnational Public-Private Partnerships in International Relations: Making Sense of Concepts, Research Frameworks, and Results." *International Studies Review* 11, no. 3 (2009): 451-474.
- Shaw, Tony. "The Politics of Cold War Culture." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3, no. 3 (2001): 59-76.
- Skogrand, Ketil, and Rolf Tamnes. *Fryktens likevekt. Atombomben, Norge og verden 1945-70*. Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag, 2001.
- Smith, Tony. *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Solheim, Bruce Olav. *The Nordic Nexus: a lesson in peaceful security*. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 1994.
- Stadius, Peter. "Visiting Nordic Modernity around 1900." In *Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy*, edited by Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang, 194-207. Helsinki: Studia Fennica Historia, 2010.
- Steen, Reulf. "Den norske revolusjonen." In *De nordiska arbetarekongresserna under 100 år: arbetarrörelsens framväxt och utveckling i de nordiska länderna*, 213-232. Stockholm: SAMAK, 1986.
- Steger, Manfred B. *The Quest for Evolutionary Socialism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Stenius, Henrik. "The Good Life is a Life of Conformity: The Impact of the Lutheran Tradition on Nordic Political Culture." In *The Cultural Construction of Norden*, edited by Bo Stråth and Øystein Sørensen, 161-171. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997.
- Stråth, Bo, and Øystein Sørensen, eds. *The Cultural Construction of Norden*. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997.
- Sturmthal, Adolf. "The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions." *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 3, no. 3 (1950): 375-382.
- Sundelius, Bengt. *Foreign policies of Northern Europe*. Westview Press, 1982.
- Sundelius, Bengt. "The Nordic Model of Neighbourly Cooperation." In *Foreign policies of Northern Europe*, edited by Bengt Sundelius, 177-196. Westview Press, 1982.
- Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1935*. Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1935.
- Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1937*. Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1937.
- Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1939*. Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1939.
- Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1950*. Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1951.
- Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1952*. Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1953.
- Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1955*. Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1955.

- Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1959*. Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1959.
- Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1963*. Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1963.
- Suomen virallinen tilasto – Finlands officiella statistik: *XXIX Vaalilasto. 10 Eduskuntavaalit vuonna 1922*. Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston Kirjapaino 1923.
- Suomen virallinen tilasto – Finlands officiella statistik: *XXIX Vaalilasto. 11 Eduskuntavaalit vuonna 1924*. Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston Kirjapaino 1925.
- Suomen virallinen tilasto – Finlands officiella statistik: *XXIX Vaalilasto. 13 Eduskuntavaalit vuonna 1927*. Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston Kirjapaino 1928.
- Suomen virallinen tilasto – Finlands officiella statistik: *XXIX Vaalilasto. 14 Eduskuntavaalit vuonna 1929*. Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston Kirjapaino 1930.
- Suomen virallinen tilasto – Finlands officiella statistik: *XXIX Vaalilasto a eduskuntavaalit 15 vuonna 1930*. Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston Kirjapaino 1931.
- Suomen virallinen tilasto – Finlands officiella statistik: *XXIX Vaalilasto a eduskuntavaalit 17 vuonna 1933*. Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston Kirjapaino 1934.
- Suomen virallinen tilasto – Finlands officiella statistik: *Kansanedustajain vaalit 1966*. Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1966.
- Suri, Jeremi. "Conflict and Co-operation in the Cold War: New Directions in Contemporary Historical Research." *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 1 (2011): 5–9.
- Svensson, Lennart. "Arbetarekongresserna i Norden under 100 år." In *De nordiska arbetarekongresserna under 100 år : arbetarrörelsens framväxt och utveckling i de nordiska länderna*, 17-116. Stockholm: SAMAK, 1986.
- Svensson, Torsten. *Socialdemokratins dominans : en studie av den svenska socialdemokratins partistrategi*. Uppsala: Statsvetenskapliga föreningen i Uppsala, 1994.
- Tamnes, Rolf. "Brødre folk – allierte i krig?" *Historisk Tidsskrift (Sweden)* 125, no. 2 (2005): 344-350.
- Tamnes, Rolf. *Integration and screening : the two faces of Norwegian Alliance policy, 1945-1986*. Oslo Norway: National Defence College Norway Research Centre for Defense History, 1986.
- Tamnes, Rolf. *Oljealder: 1965-1995. Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, bd 6*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997.
- Tamnes, Rolf. *The United States and the Cold War in the High North*. Dartmouth, 1991.
- Therborn, Göran, and Gunnar Sandin. *Vad gör den härskande klassen när den härskar? : statsapparater och statsmakt under feodalism, kapitalism och socialism*. Stockholm :: Zenit ;, 1980.
- Thing, Morten, ed. *Guldet fra Moskva : finansieringen af de nordiske kommunistpartier 1917-1990*. København: Forum, 2001.
- Tony Shaw. "The Politics of Cold War Culture." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 3, no. 3 (2001): 59-76.
- Treverton, Gregory. *National intelligence systems: current research and future prospects*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009..
- Trägårdh, Lars. "Statist Individualism: On the Culturality of the Nordic Welfare State." In *The Cultural Construction of Norden*, edited by Bo Stråth and Øystein Sørensen, 253-285. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997.
- Upton, A. F. *The Communist Parties of Scandinavia and Finland*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973.

- Villaume, Poul. *Allieret med forbehold: Danmark, NATO og den kolde krig : en studie i dansk sikkerhedspolitik 1949-1961*. Eirene, 1995.
- Villaume, Poul. "Post-Cold War Historiography in Denmark." In *The cold war - and the Nordic countries: historiography at a crossroads*, edited by Thorsten Borring Olesen, 17-41. Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004.
- Vinge, Per Gunnar. *Säpochef 1962-70*. Wahlström & Widstrand, 1988.
- Wahlbäck, Krister. "The Nordic Region in Twentieth-Century European Politics." In *Foreign policies of Northern Europe*, edited by Bengt Sundelius, 9-32. Westview Press, 1982.
- Walker, III, William O. "Melvyn P. Leffler, Ideology, and American Foreign Policy." *Diplomatic History* 20, no. 4 (1996): 663-674.
- Wasserman, Stanley, and Joseph Galaskiewicz. *Advances in social network analysis: research in the social and behavioral sciences*. SAGE, 1994.
- Weber, Max. *Ekonomi och samhälle. Förståendesociologiens grunder, 1*. Lund: Argos, 1983.
- Weber, Max. *Makt og byråkrati*. Oslo: Gyldendal, 1971.
- Weber, Max. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*. London: William Hodge & Co. Ltd., 1947.
- Weber, Max. *Udvalgte tekster, bind 2*. Edited by Heine Andersen, Lars Henrik Bruun, and Lars Bo Kaspersen. København: Hans Reitzels Forlag, 2003.
- Wendt, Frantz. *Cooperation in the Nordic Countries*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International for The Nordic Council, 1981.
- Wendt, Frantz. *Nordisk råd 1952-1978. Struktur - arbejde - resultater*. Stockholm: Nordiska Rådet, 1979.
- Whitehead, Thor. *The ally who came in from the cold: a survey of Icelandic foreign policy 1946-1956*. Reykjavik: Centre for international studies, University of Iceland Press, 1998.
- Wiberg, Håkan, and Øberg Jan. *Concepts of security and their implications, Håkan Wiberg, Jan Øberg*. Lund: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Lund University, 1977.
- Wiberg, Håkan. "Scandinavia." In *Encyclopedia of arms control and disarmament, Vol. I*, edited by Richard Dean Burns, 209-229. New York: Scribner's, 1993.
- Wiberg, Håkan. "The Nordic Security Community: Past, Present, Future." In *Danish foreign policy yearbook. 2000*, edited by Bertel Heurlin and Hans Mouritzen, 121-137. København: DIIS, 2000. (2000b)
- Wiberg, Håkan. "Security Communities: Emmanuel Adler, Michael Barnett and Anomalous Northerners." *Cooperation and Conflict* 35, no. 3 (September 1, 2000): 289-298. (2000a)
- Wiederholm, Tomas. *Att bemöta kommunismen : antikommunism inom SAP 1947-1960 : politik och retorik*. Stockholm: University, historiska institutionen, 1997.
- Windmuller, John P. "Labor: A Partner in American Foreign Policy?" *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 350 (1963): 104-114.
- Witoszek, Nina. "Fugitives from Utopia: The Scandinavian Enlightenment Reconsidered." In *The Cultural Construction of Norden*, edited by Bo Stråth and Øystein Sørensen, 72-90. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997.

- Wåhlin, Vagn. "Island, Færøerne, Grønland og det nordiske." *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 69–70 (1994): 38-61.
- Wæver, Ole. "Insecurity, security, and asecurity in the West European non-war community." In *Security communities*, edited by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 69-118. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Wæver, Ole. "Nordic nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War." *International Affairs*, no. 1 (1992): 77-102.
- Zetterberg, Kent, and Per Iko, eds. *Kvalificerat hemlig. Fyra studier om svensk underrättelsestjänst i Sverige*. Stockholm: Forsvarshögskolan, 2002.
- Ólafsson, Jón. "Decomposing capitalism: socialists in power, Iceland 1956-1958." *Bifröst Journal of Social Science*, no. 1 (2007): 18-30.
- Ólafsson, Jón. "The Nature of Friendship. Icelandic Socialists and Their Special Relations with the Communist International and CPSU According to Soviet Sources." In *Sovjetunionen och Norden: Konflikt, kontakt, influenser*, edited by Bent Jensen and Sune Jungar, 243-264. Helsingfors: FHS, 1997.
- Øberg, Jan. *Myter om vor sikkerhed, en kritik af dansk forsvarspolitik i et udviklingsperspektiv*. Kbh., 1981.
- Ørvik, Nils. "Nasjonal sikkerhet og nordisk balanse." *Internasjonal Politikk*, no. 2–3 (1964): 233-274.
- Østergaard, Uffe. "Norden – europæisk eller nordisk." *Den jyske Historiker*, no. 69–70 (1994): 7-37.
- Østergaard, Uffe. "The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity." In *The Cultural Construction of Norden*, edited by Bo Stråth and Øystein Sørensen, 25-71. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997.

Archives

Arbeiderbevegelsens Arkiv og Bibliotek (The Labour Movements' Archive and Library, Norway): AAB

1001: Det Norske Arbeiderparti

1579: LO

2483: Haakon Lie

Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv och Bibliotek, (The Labour Movements' Archive and Library, Sweden): ARBARK

37: Sven Aspling

693: Sven Andersson

1213: SAMAK

1889: SAP

2964: LO

Arbejderbevægelsens Bibliotek og Arkiv, (The Labour Movements' Archive and Library, Denmark): ABA

39: Hans Hedtoft

500: Socialdemokratiet

522: AIC

1500: LO

UK National Archives: PRO

Lab Series 13

FO Series 371

FO Series 1110

US National Archives: NARA

Record Group 59

Record Group 84

Electronic resources

Danish PET-commission publications available in full text:

<http://www.petkommissionen.dk/>

Norwegian 'Lund-report' available in full text: <http://www.stortinget.no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Publikasjoner/Dokumentserien/1995-1996/Dok15-199596/>

Swedish security service commission publications available in full text:

<http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/108>

National statistical bureaus – election data:

Denmark – <http://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/Publikationer/VisPub.aspx?cid=16252>

Norway – <http://www.ssb.no/histstat/publikasjoner/>

Sweden – http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart____32065.aspx

24 August 2012

Abbreviations

AIC – Arbejderbevægelsens Informations-Central/*The Labour Movement's Information Centre (Denmark)*

ASI - Alþýðusamband Íslands/*Icelandic TUC*

CCF – Congress for Cultural Freedom

CFF (Sweden) – Centralförbundet Folk och Forsvar (Civil Defence Organisation)

Cominform – Communist Information Bureau

Comintern – Communist International

DKP – Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti/*Danish Communist Party*

DKU – Danmarks Kommunistiske Ungdom/*DKP's youth league*

CP – Communist Party

CPSU - Communist Party of the Soviet Union

FCO – Fackliga centralorganisationen/*Central Labour Organisation. (Sweden)*

FFC - Finlands Fackliga Centralförbund/*Finnish TUC – Swedish name*

FST II (Norway) - Military intelligence service

IB (Sverige) – Informasjonsbyrå/*Information Bureau or Indhæmtning Birger/Intelligence Birger*

ICFTU – International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

IRD – Information Research Department (UK)

LO – Landsorganisationen/*TUC in Denmark, Sweden or Norway.*

LSI – Labour and Socialist International

NKP – Norges Kommunistiske Parti/*Norwegian Communist Party*

NKU – Norges Kommunistiske Ungdom/*NKP's youth league*

POT (Norway) – Politiets overvåkningstjeneste/*Police Surveillance Service*

SAK – Suomen Ammattiliittojen Keskusjärjestö/*Finnish TUC – Finnish name*

SDP – Social Democratic Party

SI – Socialist International

SKDL – Finnish People's democratic League

SKP – Sveriges Kommunistiske Parti/*Swedish Communist Party*

SP – Socialist Party (Iceland)

SPP – Socialist Peoples' Party (Denmark and Norway)

STAPO - Swedish Security Police 1948-

SÄPO – Säkerhetspolisen/*Swedish Security Police*

Trade Union Federation: A body representing the different unions within a given trade, e.g. all the woodworkers unions in one country. Federations can also be trans-national, e.g. Scandinavian woodworkers.

TUC: Trade Union Congress. Central body representing all federations.

VALPO – Finnish security police -1948

VOKS – Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (Soviet Union)

WFDY: World Federation of Democratic Youth

WFTU: World Federation of Trade Unions

WIDF: Women's International Democratic Federation

Appendix I – Tables

Table 1 – Creation of SDP's/TUC's

<i>Country</i>	<i>Creation of SDP</i>	<i>Creation of TUC</i>
Denmark	1871	1898
Norway	1887	1899
Sweden	1889	1898
Finland	1899	1907
Iceland	1916	1916

Table 2 – Scandinavian labour conferences

<i>Location</i>	<i>Date</i>
Gothenburg	27-29 August 1886
Copenhagen	27-29 August 1888
Kristiania (Oslo)	14-17 August 1890
Malmö	18-20 August 1892
Stockholm	19-21 August 1897
Copenhagen	22-24 August 1901
Kristiania (Oslo)	6-8 September 1907
Stockholm	2-5 September 1912
Copenhagen	21-23 January 1920
Oslo	29-30 August 1947
Malmö	5-6 September 1959

Table 3 – Social democratic-led* governments in the 20th century

<i>Country</i>	<i>Period</i>
Sweden	1920, 1921-1923, 1924-1926, 1932-1936, 1936-1976, 1982-1991, 1994-2006
Norway	1928, 1935-1940, 1945-1963, 1963-1965, 1971-1972, 1973-1981, 1986-1989, 1990-1997
Denmark	1924-1926, 1929-1940, 1945, 1947-1950, 1953-1968, 1971-73, 1975-1981, 1993-2001
Finland ⁸⁷⁹	1948-1950, 1956-1957, 1958-1959, 1966-1970, 1972-1975, 1977-1987, 1995-2003 Minor partner in government coalition: 1926-1927, 1945-48, 1951-1953, 1954-1956, 1970-1971, 1975, 1987-1991
Iceland ⁸⁸⁰	1947-1949, 1958-1959, 1979-1980 Minor partner in government coalition: 1944-1947 1947-1950, 1956-1958, 1959-1970, 1978-79, 1987-91

* PM is a social democrat

⁸⁷⁹ Arter 1999, p. 236

⁸⁸⁰ Arter 1999, p. 228

Table 4.1-4.5 – Social democratic and communist elections results, by percentage, from creation of communist party until the mid-1960s

4.1 – Sweden^{881*}

<i>Year</i>	<i>SDP</i>	<i>SKP</i>
1921 G	39,4	4,6
1922 P	34,7	4,5
1924 G	41,1	5,1
1926 P	39,0	4,1
1928 G	37,0	6,4
1930 P	41,4	4,9
1932 G	41,7	8,3
1934 P	42,1	6,8
1936 G	45,9	7,7
1938 P	50,4	5,7
1940 G	53,8	4,2
1942 P	50,3	5,9
1944 G	46,7	10,3
1946 P	44,4	11,2
1948 G	46,1	6,3
1950 P	48,6	4,9
1952 G	46,1	4,3
1954 P	47,4	4,8
1956 G	44,6	5,0
1958 G	46,2	3,4
1958 P	46,8	4,0

⁸⁸¹ http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart____32065.aspx – 23 August 2012

1960 G	47,8	4,5
1962 P	50,5	3,8
1964 G	47,3	5,2

* P = Parliament, G = Government

4.2 – Norway⁸⁸²

<i>Year</i>	<i>SDP</i>	<i>NKP</i>	<i>Social democrats*</i>
1924	18,4	6,1	8,8
1927	36,8	4,0	
1930	31,4	1,7	
1933	40,1	1,8	
1936	42,5	0,3	
1945	41,0	11,9	
1949	45,7	5,8	
1953	46,7	5,1	
1957	48,3	3,4	<i>SPP</i>
1961	46,8	2,9	2,4
1965	43,1	1,4	6,0

* Re-united with SDP (DNA) in 1927

⁸⁸² <http://www.ssb.no/histstat/publikasjoner/>

4.3 – Denmark⁸⁸³

<i>Year</i>	<i>SDP</i>	<i>DKP</i>	
1920	32,2	0,4	
1924	36,6	0,5	
1926	37,2	0,4	
1929	41,8	0,3	
1932	42,7	1,1	
1935	46,1	1,6	
1939	42,9	2,4	
1943	44,5	– *	
1945	32,8	12,5	
1947	40,0	6,8	
1950	39,6	4,6	
1953	40,4	4,8	
1953**	41,3	4,3	
1957	39,4	3,1	<i>SPP</i>
1960	42,1	1,1	6,1
1964	41,9	1,2	5,8

* Communist party banned by occupying Germany

** Two elections in 1953 due to constitution change

⁸⁸³ <http://www.dst.dk/da/Statistik/Publikationer/VisPub.aspx?cid=16252>

4.4 – Finland⁸⁸⁴

Year	SDP	SKDL*
1919	38,0	-
1922	25,1	14,8
1924	29,0	10,4
1927	28,3	12,1
1929	27,4	13,5
1930	34,2	1,0
1933	37,3	-
1936	38,6	-
1939	39,8	-
1945	25,1	23,5
1948	26,3	20,0
1951	26,5	21,6
1954	26,2	21,6
1958	23,2	23,2
1962	19,5	22,0
1966	27,2	21,2

* From 1944. CP banned until 1944. 1922-1930: Communist coalitions which became banned.

⁸⁸⁴ Suomen virallinen tilasto – Finlands officiella statistik: *XXIX Vaalitulasto. 10 Eduskuntavaalit vuonna 1922.* Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston Kirjapaino 1923; *XXIX Vaalitulasto. 11 Eduskuntavaalit vuonna 1924.* Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston Kirjapaino 1925; *XXIX Vaalitulasto. 13 Eduskuntavaalit vuonna 1927.* Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston Kirjapaino 1928; *XXIX Vaalitulasto. 14 Eduskuntavaalit vuonna 1929.* Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston Kirjapaino 1930; *XXIX Vaalitulasto a eduskuntavaalit 15 vuonna 1930.* Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston Kirjapaino 1931; *XXIX Vaalitulasto a eduskuntavaalit 17 vuonna 1933.* Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston Kirjapaino 1934; *Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1935.* Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1935; *Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1937.* Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1937; *Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1939.* Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1939; *Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1950.* Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1951; *Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1952.* Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1953; *Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1955.* Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1955; *Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1959.* Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1959; *Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1963.* Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1963; Suomen virallinen tilasto – Finlands officiella statistik: *Kansanedustajain vaalit 1966.* Helsinki: Tilastollisen päätoimiston julkaisema 1966

4.5 – Iceland⁸⁸⁵

<i>Iceland</i>	<i>SDP</i>	<i>SP*</i>
1927	19,1	-
1931	16,1	3,0
1934	21,7	6,0
1937	19,0	8,5
1942	15,4	16,2
1946	17,8	19,5
1949	16,5	19,5
1953	15,6	16,1
1956	18,3	19,2
1959	12,5	15,3
1959**	15,2	16,0
1963	14,2	16,0
1967	15,7	17,6

* CP before 1938 – People’s Alliance from 1956

** Two elections in 1959 due to change in electoral system

⁸⁸⁵ *Kosningaskýrslur. Fyrsta bindi 1874-1946 + Annad bindi 1949-1987.* Reykjavik: Hagstofa Íslands 1988

English summary

This thesis investigates the anti-communist cooperation between the social democratic parties of Norden in the early Cold War (1945-62).

The animosity between social democrats and communists dates back to the 1920s but received new actuality with the relative rise in communist popularity after WWII. As the Cold War froze over, the social democratic party secretaries started meeting once or twice a year to exchange information about communism and plan how to counter it. The party secretary meetings went on for a decade and died out in the late 1950s/early 1960s as communism ceased to be a threat and the Cold War settled.

The party secretary meetings were marked the the *securitisation* of the communist problem, which caused social democratic parties, mainly in Scandinavia, to cooperate with state security services on containing and fighting communism. The meetings were marked by this cooperation as they not only discussed communism in the labour movement but also in terms of national security.

The Nordic labour movements have cooperated since their establishment in the late 1800s and early 1900s; hence it was only natural that they cooperated on this common problem as well.

During the early Cold War the social democratic parties of Scandinavia were politically dominant. They built welfare states which they identified themselves with to such an extent that separating party and state became increasingly difficult. They were *social democratic states*. This identification was a contributing part in the social democratic view of national security as a party problem.

Since the end of the Cold War, new research have increasingly shown the Scandinavian countries to have cooperated militarily and in intelligence. Hence, the failure to establish a Scandinavian defence union in 1949 did not mean a division of Scandinavia, to the extent that traditional research has looked at it. A new picture of Nordic security is emerging, to which this thesis is a contribution: the picture of a region that was bound together not only by culture, values and language, but also by security issues. The governing parties were a part of this cooperation as well, as I show. They were, in all practicality, brothers in arms.

Hence, I propose that research in Nordic security re-evaluates the picture of a divided Norden.

Danish summary/Dansk résumé

Denne afhandling undersøger de nordiske socialdemokratiske partiers antikommunistiske samarbejde under den tidlige kolde krig (1945-62)

Fjendskabet mellem socialdemokrater og kommunister går tilbage til 1920'erne og 1930'erne, men blev aktualiseret med kommunisternes relativt stigende popularitet efter Anden Verdenskrig. Samtidig med at den kolde krig nåede under frysepunktet, begyndte partisekretærene for de nordiske socialdemokratier at mødes en eller to gange om året for at udveksle information omkring kommunisterne og diskutere hvordan man bedst imødegik dem. Partisekretærmøderne fandt sted i et årti, men døde ud i slutningen af 1950'erne/starten af 1960'erne, da kommunismen forsvandt som en trussel og den kolde krig blev hverdag.

Partisekretærmøderne var markeret af den stigende *sikkerhedsliggørelse* af kommunistproblemet, som forårsagede at socialdemokrater, primært i Skandinavien, begyndte at samarbejde med de nationale sikkerhedstjenester om at inddæmme og bekæmpe kommunismen. Møderne bar præg af dette samarbejde, idet de ikke blot diskuterede kommunisme i fagbevægelsen men som del af et nationalt sikkerhedsproblem.

De nordiske fagbevægelser har samarbejdet siden de blev etableret i slutningen af 1800-tallet og starten af 1900-tallet; derfor var det naturligt at de også samarbejdede om dette problem.

Under den tidlige kolde krig var de Skandinaviske socialdemokrater politisk dominerende. De opbyggede velfærdsstater som de identificerede sig med i en sådan grad at det kunne være svært at adskille parti og stat. De blev *socialdemokratiske stater*. Denne identifikation var en bidragende faktor til synet på national sikkerhed som et partiproblem.

Siden slutningen af den kolde krig, har ny forskning i stigende grad vist at de skandinaviske lande samarbejdede om militære og efterretningsmæssige forhold. Således betød det mislykkede forsøg på at etablere en skandinavisk forsvarsunion i 1949 ikke en sikkerhedsmæssig splittelse af Skandinavien, som forskningen traditionelt har hævdet. Et nyt billede af nordisk sikkerhed er ved at tegne sig, til hvilket denne afhandling er et bidrag: billedet af en region der var bundet sammen, ikke bare af kultur, værdier og sprog, men også af sikkerhedsmæssige forhold. Jeg viser, at de regerende partier var en del af dette samarbejde. De var, i praktikken, våbenbrødre.

Således lægger jeg op til nordisk sikkerhedspolitisk forskning reevaluerer billedet af et splittet Norden.